§ EARL CAWDORrose to call attention to the statement of the First Lord of the Admiralty explanatory of the Navy Estimates, 1907–1908, and to ask—
1. For information as to the present constitution of the Home Fleet, with special reference to the manning and efficiency of the squadrons at the Nore;
2. Whether a statement can be made comparing the state of repairs of the ships of the Fleet in January, 1905 and 1907, similar to that which has been given for 1904 and 1907;
3. Whether the arrangements and staff at the various dockyards are at present sufficient for the efficient repair and maintenance of the Fleets;
4. What is the exact position as to dockyard accommodation for ships of the "Dreadnought" and "Invincible" Class at home and abroad, and what steps are being taken at Rosyth or elsewhere for further provision of such accommodation.
The noble Earl said: My Lords, in bringing before your Lordships' notice the Questions which stand in my name on the Paper I trust the House and the noble Lord opposite will believe that I do so in no contentious spirit and with no view of fault finding, but with the 823 object simply and solely of affording the First Lord an opportunity of giving some information on the matters to which these Questions refer, on which I think it would be very desirable if your Lordships and the public had some further information.
In the first instance, I wish to draw attention to the Home Fleet. The noble Lord, in his Memorandum to which I have called attention, told us in February last that the Home Fleet would be constituted by April of this year. By constituted I do not mean to pin the noble Lord to having the Home Fleet in an absolutely perfect condition. I think we have understood from him, and it has been stated in another place, that the Home Fleet would take some considerable time to consolidate, and therefore I do not expect to be told that that fleet is at present in a perfect condition. But I do ask that we may be told what the exact position is at the present time. With a view of strengthing the Home Fleet, with a view, I think, almost of creating the Nore part of the Home Fleet, your Lordships will remember that six battleships and six first-class cruisers were withdrawn from the Mediterranean, the Atlantic, and the Channel Fleets; and we were told a short time ago that six battleships, six first-class cruisers, a certain number of small cruisers, and forty-eight destroyers were to be concentrated at the Nore with full crews and ready for any emergency at a moment's notice. I would venture to ask the noble Lord what is the exact condition, not alone of the Home Fleet as a whole, but especially with respect to the Fleet at the Nore? I should like to ask whether these six battleships and six first-class cruisers, the forty-eight destroyers, and the second-class cruisers are at the present time fully manned with their proper crews, or whether to any extent they are manned by men who are still undergoing their training.
We are told that in time of war the Home Fleet is to be under the orders of the Commander-in-Chief of the Channel Fleet. I should like to know whether, that being so, the Commander-in-Chief of the Channel Fleet is to have any control and, if so, what control, over the Home Fleet in time of peace, because it occurs to 824 me there may be some difficulties in the Commander-in-Chief taking up the command of a Fleet and not being very well acquainted with the officers commanding the ships or with the ships themselves, and I should like to know whether the Home Fleet is to be an independent command or a command subordinate to the Commander-in-Chief of the Channel Fleet.
There is one other Question I should like to ask under this head arising out of an Answer given a few days ago in another place. The Secretary to the Admiralty was questioned with respect to gun practice and also with respect to the amount of ammunition to be issued to the Home Fleet. He was asked whether the amount of ammunition issued to the Home Fleet would be the same as that issued to the other Fleets in active service, and his reply was, "No." I hope we may tempt the noble Lord to give us a little more detailed information. I should like to know, not alone whether the amount of ammunition issued to the Home Fleet is to be less than that issued to the other Fleets in commission, but more especially on what footing the Fleet at the Nore, which we are told is to be our foremost fighting Fleet, is to be dealt with in reference to the important item of ammunition.
I come next to a statement made by the noble Lord in his Memorandum on the Navy Estimates with respect to vessels unavailable owing to the need for repairs in the years 1904 and 1907. The noble Lord pointed out the greater efficiency that had taken place in respect to repairs and the general condition of the Fleet since the introduction of the nucleus crew system. The nucleus crew system, so far as I am aware, came into active operation in the early part of 1905. During the year 1904, as far as my information goes, there was a very considerable outlay in repairs, in some cases clearly for the purpose of bringing up the vessels that were then in reserve so that they should be fit to be taken charge of by the nucleus crews and worked under the nucleus crew system. Therefore I suggest to the noble Lord that a comparison should be given to your Lordships as between the year 1905, when the nucleus crew 825 system was started, and the year at which we have at present arrived. That would give us a fairer Estimate than the estimate between 1904 and 1907. I do not know what the reason was for selecting the year 1904.
§ * THE FIRST LORD OF THE ADMIRALTY (Lord TWEEDMOUTH)It was selected because it was just before the new plan of nucleus crews came out.
EARL CAWDOJRAt all events, we should like to know the comparison between the years I have named. There is one other point with respect to this statement—it is that the numbers of the ships compared in each class are not the same in the two years. For instance, the battleships in 1904 were sixty in number; in 1907 they were fifty-one. Armoured cruisers were twenty-four in number in 1904; they were twenty-eight in 1907. Unarmoured cruisers were eighty-four in number in 1904; they were seventy-six in 1907. The number of destroyers in 1904 was 110 and in 1907, 148.
§ * LORD TWEEDMOUTHOne hundred and forty-three.
§ EARL CAWDORI beg the noble Lord's pardon—143. Therefore, there was a substantial increase in armoured vessels and destroyers, and a substantial I decrease in battleships and unarmoured cruisers in 1907, as compared with the figures given for 1904. It occurs tome that that may to some extent diminish the value of the statement made, and that it would be better if we had a like number of vessels compared in the two years taken for the purpose of comparison. That affects merely the repairs of vessels in order to make them available; but, with respect to repairs generally, we understand that there have been considerable reductions in the staffs at the various dockyards, and I ask the noble Lord if he can tell us whether, looking to these reductions, the Board of Admiralty are now quite satisfied that the staff and the arrangements at all the dockyards, both at home and abroad, are sufficient and efficient for keeping the vessels of the Fleets in a proper and satisfactory state of repair. I ask this question 826 because it is impossible not to know that there are murmurs in some quarters, and statements have been made, that these vessels are not in repair. I have no knowledge on the point myself, but the statements have been made so often and so repeatedly by those who ought to know that I hope the noble Lord will be able to give us a definite statement with regard to that matter.
Then I come to the question of the nucleus crew system, and I do not for a moment wish to put that system on the noble Lord's shoulders more than he has put it upon his own shoulders by adopting it. We are anxious to know how the system is progressing. I should like to know whether the experience of the Admiralty in the last two years has led them to believe that under that system vessels are being properly manned, and are able properly to maintain their speed. I should like to know whether any reports have been received on that subject bearing especially on the nucleus crew system, and, if so, how far they have been satisfactory in their statements in that respect.
I now come to the last Question I have on the Paper, with respect to dockyard accommodation, both at home and abroad, for vessels of the "Dreadnought" and "Invincible" classes. Your Lordships will be well aware that the increased size of these vessels makes the ordinary docks in many instances useless for the purpose of their repair. We have had also put before us very clearly that this Fleet at the Nore is to be in the front rank of our fighting Fleets for the defence of our shores. We are told that its manԓuvring and practising ground is to be the North Sea. I should like to know what accommodation there is, not only at home and abroad for all the Fleets so far as vessels of these two classes are concerned, but more especially how it is proposed to deal with these vessels when they are concentrated at the Nore. The question is one of vital importance. We have been told by the noble Lord himself, and the statement has been made in another place, that in a very few years, I think by1909, we shall have a good many of these vessels in commission; and that, assuming that many of them may be concentrated at the Nore, it is absolutely 827 essential that there should be proper docking accommodation for those vessels within reasonable reach. It does not very much matter how many docks there are, but the important point is whether those docks are, and to what extent they are, really available, and conveniently available, for the various branches of the Fleet, not alone in time of peace, but more important still for those vessels in time of war. I should like to know whether there is any satisfactory accommodation for those vessels in the United Kingdom at the present time, apart from Portsmouth and Devon-port. I have been told that the accommodation at Portsmouth was not found to be as satisfactory as had been expected. I do not know how far the noble Lord will be able to contradict that, or to give us any definite details in regard to it. There is satisfactory accommodation to a certain extent for the vessels at Keyham, and, I believe, at Devonport. But, my Lords, imagine the position of a Fleet made up of "Dreadnought" battleships and of the "Invincible" class of first-class cruisers in the North Sea in time of war with no satisfactory base for repairs nearer than Devonport. That is a most serious question, and one which I am sure must have pressed itself very much on my noble friend; and I am perfectly certain that he and the Board of Admiralty, over whom he so ably presides, must have it very strongly in their minds. I would ask the noble Lord, if he could, to tell us what is being done in order to supply that accommodation.
There is, of course, Rosyth. I believe it was stated in another place that Rosyth had had a very chequered career; it has been under consideration for a considerable time. It was first seriously considered in 1900, and I believe the estimated cost of supplying what was thought necessary was then £10,000,000. In August, 1905, an Estimate was prepared showing an outlay of £2,300,000 for Rosyth, but I find that in the Estimates for this year the only Vote taken is a sum of £10,000. Now you cannot build dry docks for "Invincibles" or vessels of the "Dreadnought" type for £10,000. I would press this matter strongly on the noble Lord. It is one of 828 vital importance. It is absolutely important that you should select the proper base, and, having selected it, it is equally important that no time should be lost. Assuming that Rosyth or some other place on that coast is selected, how many years would it take to provide the necessary accommodation? I am told that it would take from eight to nine years, and in three years or two years we may have six or eight of these vessels, many of them quartered in the North Sea, and no place available in time of war for docking or repairing them, unless they pass through the Channel—a dangerous course to take, I imagine, in time of war—in order to get to Portsmouth, and possibly to Devonport. I hope the noble Lord will be able to give us satisfactory information on this point, and as to the provision to be made for the two classes of vessels to which I have referred, so that the country may feel assured that proper I steps are being taken to supply the accommodation as quickly as may be. I beg to ask the Questions standing in my name.
§ LORD BRASSEYMy Lords, Lord Cawdor's observations in reference to repairs affords an opportunity for calling attention to the Returns of casualties to ships, annually presented to Parliament. Commencing with the year 1901, and dealing only with battleships and crusiers, casualties were very few. In 1905 the increase was serious. In all cases blame was attributable. The Return for 1906 has not yet been presented. We have lost a battleship. It is a matter of common knowledge that serious casualties have occurred, especially among battleships. As might have been expected, casualties have always been numerous in the torpedo flotilla. In many cases blame was attributable. The ships of the British Navy are, as a rule, navigated and handled with consummate skill. The recent manœuvres off Lagos Bay, under the direction of Sir Arthur Wilson, were carried out by all concerned in a manner which redounds to the credit of the British Navy. Casualties, however, have, of late, been numerous. They call for a remedy. I venture to submit that the course of instruction for junior officers in pilotage and navigation should be 829 extended, and that more small vessels should be attached to the school for practical exercises, under the direction of experienced officers.
§ * LORD TWEEDMOUTHMy Lords, perhaps it will be convenient if, before dealing with the Questions asked by Lord Cawdor, I say a word or two upon Lord Brassey's remarks. In the first place, I think the noble Lord a little exaggerated the average groundings which have taken place. It is quite true that 1905 was a very bad year; there were forty-one cases of grounding; but last year there were only twenty-eight groundings. From the year 1887 there has been a gradual decrease in the number of groundings on the whole. They were as high as 47 in 1887, but in no year since, except the one year, have they reached forty. They fell last year to twenty-eight. It is impossible to escape an occasional grounding.
So far as the practice of destroyers is concerned, I think the men in them would not receive a really good training unless they worked in the dark at night, and these conditions of going at high speed on dark nights must necessarily sometimes lead to regrettable incidents. That was very well illustrated the other day in the accident that occurred to the "Ariel" at Malta. There is no doubt whatever that the commander of that boat suffered because he was blinded by the electric searchlight from the harbour. It is only due to the commander of that boat to express great admiration for the way he saved his crew after the accident occurred.
Lord Brassey next found fault with the amount of attention that is paid to navigation instruction. It is true that up to 1903 the instruction in navigation was extremely casual. The young man who went in for navigation was allowed to become a navigator without thorough instruction. Volunteers were taken, and their instruction was most desultory. They were accepted as volunteers without having more training than they could get as midshipmen or at the Naval College at Greenwich on their examination for lieutenancies, and after three years they were allowed to act as navigating officers of small ships and then allowed to qualify as navigating officers of big ships. But that was all changed in 1903. A navigation school was then established on board 830 the "Mercury," under Captain Oliver, and a tribute is due to the work which Captain Oliver has done. Very good instruction is now given to young men who come out as navigating officers. The "Dryad" is now the vessel, with two tenders attached, the "Harrier" and the "Plucky." My noble friend has suggested that the number of these small vessels should be increased. I would like to point out to the noble Lord that the destroyer flotilla is more or less at the disposal of the captain of the "Dryad," and that he does use some of the destroyers for the purpose of instructing officers under his charge.
A great deal more attention is now paid to teaching navigation. Navigating lieutenants and torpedo and gunnery lieutenants are treated in very much the same way; the Admiralty take navigating officers from men who volunteer for that particular work, and a preference is given to those young men who, as sub-lieutenants, qualify for pilotage certificates. Then the selected candidates are sent to the navigation school at Portsmouth—the "Dryad" now—and there they have to go through a course of ninety days. They then act as assistants to navigating officers in large ships, and they must obtain a certificate from the navigating officer of a large ship before they themselves can undertake any such responsibility as the navigating of ships They have this further obligation imposed upon them, that they have to pass the examination for first-class ships after three years service as navigating lieutenants before they can be appointed to navigate big ships.
In making a comparison of the number of groundings and accidents year by year the difference in the vessels now and in past years must be considered. The immense increase in the size, the increased complexity of machinery, and the much higher speeds, all make the risks greater. I think the result is to show that the navigation of our ships is better than it was twenty or twenty-five years ago. The effect of the navigation school at Portsmouth will be more apparent when the men who attend it become navigators in the service. Of course the senior officers in the service never had the training in navigation which modern officers are able to obtain, and, therefore, 831 except by experience, they are not as qualified as I hope the officers of the future will be. I now come to the Questions on the Paper, and I hope I shall be able to give adequate Answers. It must be remembered that the Home Fleet is still in a state of development. We do not pretend that it is complete or that it will remain as it is now constituted. The Admiralty retain their complete freedom to modify the constitution of this Fleet and particularly the Nore Division; the intention being to maintain this particular part of the Fleet: at a strength consistent with the strategical needs of the moment.
The present constitution of the Home Fleet is as follows: There is a division of six battleships—the "Dreadnought," the "Bulwark," the "London," the "Magnificent," the "Majestic," and the "Victorious." The noble Earl said there were several greater ships either launched and now finished, or laid down. Those ships will no doubt take the place of other ships which now are in the Home Fleet. The Cruiser Squadron consists of six first-class armoured cruisers. One of these, the "Warrior," will join the Fleet during the present month. These are all stationed at the Nore. All these twelve ships have full complements. Then we have four flotillas of destroyers of twelve boats each in full commission. They are based at the Nore and Dover or Portland with the necessary parent ships, scouts, and so forth. Further than that, we have at each of the home ports twenty-five destroyers in commission, each of which has four-fifths of its full crew; and they, too, have their proper provision of parent ships and scouts. All the remaining efficient modern battleships and cruisers are in the other two home ports. Portsmouth has four battleships and twelve cruisers. Devonport has three battleships and ten cruisers. They are in commission and they all have, as nucleus crews, three-fifths of their full I complement on board.
Then there are a certain number of older vessels which are not so fully manned. They are seven "Royal Sovereigns," two "Niles," two "Centurions," one "Renown," six "Edgars," and five "Latonas." They are not fully 832 manned, but they are maintained in an efficient condition for special service. There is a special crew of about seventy men in each of these ships. I believe that in a certain number of them, which are termed leading ships, the crew either is now or will be kept at 100. These ships have sufficient crews to keep their machinery in thorough order. In this category of ships there are also one battleship and three cruisers which are employed as tenders to the gunnery and torpedo schools. These four ships have a very considerable complement. The men on board are thoroughly efficient in torpedo and gunnery work, because they have to carry out the instruction of both officers and men.
Some exception has been taken to the proportion of younger untrained men on board the ships at the Nore. Your Lordships need have no apprehension that these ships are not sufficiently and well manned. It is true that about one-seventh of the crews are young men who are now going through their training, but there is a full complement of the higher and skilled ratings on board these ships, and the number is quite sufficient to do the daily work. I would remind the House that these ships at the Nore are in a far better condition with regard to manning than the old Channel Fleet, which was the great striking force of the Navy in those days, used to be. The former practice was to change one-fourth of the crews of the Channel Fleet every six months, and therefore the whole of the crews were completely changed every two years. That practice has been stopped, and all the higher ratings, the more important men, are kept permanently on board these ships.
I will give your Lordships an interesting comparison. I have recently received a report relating to the condition of the eight principal German battleships, which are kept in the fullest state of preparation. I am informed that one-third of the crews of these first-class battleships are recruits, one-third are two years service men, and one-third are long service men. I am also told that these German ships go to sea on the average eight-days a month, or twenty-five days in the quarter. In the quarter ended 833 31st March this year, they had 31½sea days, and on many occasions that they were at sea they passed the night in port. Therefore, I think the ships at the Nore compare favourably with these eight German battleships both in regard to their crews and their sea time.
With regard to the second Question, I can assure the noble Earl that there was no sort of arrière pensée in taking the dates 1904 and 1907. I was abroad at the time I was preparing that Statement, and I took] 904 simply because it was the date just before the nucleus crew system was introduced. The percentages the noble Earl asks for are as follows:—Of fifty-eight battleships at the end of January, 1905, nineteen were unavailable owing to need for repairs, or 33 per cent.; and of fifty-one battleships at the end of January, 1907, eight were so unavailable, or 16 per cent. Of twenty-four armoured cruisers at the end of January, 1905, six were unavailable, or 25 per cent.; and of twenty-eight vessels at the end of January, 1907, seven were unavailable, or 25 per cent. Of eighty-four unarmoured vessels at the end of January, 1905, twenty-four were unavailable, or 28½ per cent.; and of seventy-six unarmoured vessels at the end of January, 1907, seventeen were unavailable, or 22½ per cent. Of 128 destroyers at the end of January, 1905, thirty-six wore unavailable, or 28 per cent.; and of 143 destroyers at the end of January, 1907, twenty-nine were unavailable, or 19 per cent. The year 1905 is better than the year 1904, but still the year 1907 is considerably better than the year 1905. I now pass to the next Question.
§ EARL CAWDORBefore the noble Lord passes away from the Home Fleet there are two other Questions I put to him—one with regard to the Commander-in-Chief of the Channel Fleet, and the other as to the ammunition supplied to the Fleet at the Nore.
§ * LORD TWEEDMOUTHAs to the Commander-in-Chief in time of war, it is perfectly true that the Commander-in-Chief of the Channel Fleet, as senior officer, will take command of the whole Fleet. The arrangement that has been made with regard to destroyers and cruisers is that when the Commander-in- 834 Chief wishes to have them for the purposes of drill or anything of that sort he has to apply to the Admiralty for them, and the destroyers are put at his disposal. The same thing applies to the cruiser squadron at the Nore, which is put at the disposal of the Commander-in-Chief, at the discretion of the Admiralty, (when he asks for it, so that he will have considerable opportunities of carrying on manœ with the assistance of those additions to the Fleet. With regard to the amount of ammunition issued to the Home Fleet, it is the same as that issued to fleets abroad; the amount of ammunition allowed per annum for exercise to the Home Fleet is thirteen-sixteenths of that allowed to other Fleets, and is composed three-fourths of practice ammunition and the rest of live shell.
§ EARL CAWDORDoes that apply to the Fleet at the Nore?
§ * LORD TWEEDMOUTHYes. Coming to the question of the dockyards, as a matter of fact in the whole of the dockyards we employ at this moment, I think, 100 more men than when I took office. We have altogether 27,878 men, and, so far as I am able to judge, that number is sufficient to keep up the repairs, which are being efficiently attended to. I think I may fairly say that the staff in the dockyards is on the whole sufficient and efficient for the work they have to do, both in construction and in repairs. Of course we have from time to time to make special arrangements. For instance we have had two ships in hand lately which required to be quickly dealt with—the "Commonwealth" and the "Dominion"—and we have added a certain number of men to their staff to deal with those ships quickly and satisfactorily.
With regard to the docks available for big ships, I think on the whole we may say that we are in a pretty satisfactory condition, and certainly we are far ahead of the other nations of the world with regard to dock accommodation. At this moment we have thirteen Government dockyards in this country and abroad that will take "Dreadnoughts"—at Portsmouth, one dock; 835 at Devonport, four; at Gibraltar, two; at Malta, three; at Bermuda, one; at Hong-kong, one; and at Simon's Bay, one. The dock at Halifax would also take a "Dreadnought," but that dock is now out of the Admiralty's hands, the Canadian Government having taken it over. We shall have very shortly a dock that will take a "Dreadnought" and an "Invincible" at Haulbowline. We are lengthening the dock there now. For the "Invincible" class we have more docks—at Chatham, one; at Portsmouth, three; at Devon-port, three; at Gibraltar, one; at Malta, two; at Bermuda, one; at Hong-kong, one; at Simon's Bay, one; the docks at Halifax, Colombo, and Sydney will also take "Invincibles," though, of course, none of these three docks are under Admiralty control.
Coming to the question of Rosyth, I believe it is absolutely necessary to have on the East Coast a dock which will take our big ships. I am not prepared to say off-hand what is the best place for it, but we must have one. The present plan which is being considered for Rosyth is a dock and a basin. I think myself that everything points towards Rosyth being the place chosen, but I will not say so for certain. We have, however, already spent a good, deal of money on Rosyth, both on experimental works and on the water supply from the local authority. The! Board, both under myself and under my predecessors, have made very careful inquiries about Rosyth, and what has now been decided is to draw up complete plans for a dock and a basin, which will in due course be submitted. All these water constructions, however, are exceedingly speculative, and my experience on the Harbour Accommodation Committee whilst I was a Member of the House of Commons has taught me that frequently the money is literally thrown into the sea. So I think we are bound to consider this matter very thoroughly, and to be very certain indeed before we embark upon it that this is the best place from every point of view—from the strategical point of view and from the point of view of convenience for the works.
836 As to private yards, I only make out that there are five possible docks in private yards which would take a "Dreadnought," and four of these are on the west coast, one at Birkenhead, one at Liverpool, and two at Southampton. As to the other, at Hebburn on the Tyne, I believe it might be possible to squeeze a "Dreadnought" into that, but it is extremely doubtful, and I am inclined to say that if the "Dreadnought" were a crippled ship it would be almost impossible for her to get into that dock at all. So I think I may fairly say that we have not got a dock on the east coast at all which would take a "Dreadnought." We must, therefore, give our best consideration to the particular place for a new dock, and I hope that before next year's Estimates are brought forward, a decision will be arrived at, and that we shall be able to make some more definite announcement.
§ LORD JOICEYI should like to ask whether that is the dock which has recently been finished.
§ * LORD TWEEDMOUTHIt is. I think it has got 26½ feet on the sills, and it is a very nice thing to get the "Dreadnought" into that. I think I have answered the Questions that the noble Earl has addressed to me. I have endeavoured to speak perfectly frankly, and I have not tried to hide anything from the House. I can only say I hope that the policy we have adopted is one which will be for the benefit of the Navy and of the country.
§ EARL CAWDORI should like to thank the noble Lord for his full and courteous answer, but there are two or three points I did not quite understand. I gathered that out of the forty-eight destroyers which we had understood were to be concentrated at the Nore with the rest of the Fleet, twelve are based on Portland. Surely they can hardly be considered part of the Nore Fleet if they are based on Portland?
§ * LORD TWEEDMOUTHThe twelve I ships I spoke of are the Nore Division of the Home Fleet. The destroyers arc all in the Home Fleet.
§ EARL CAWDORIn his Memorandum, the noble Lord stated that—
These twelve ships, together with forty-eight destroyers with full crews, some small cruisers, and the requisite auxiliaries will be concentrated at the Nore.It is not said that these forty-eight destroyers are scattered throughout the Home Fleet, but that they are to be concentrated with full crews at the Nore. How is it, then, that twelve are to be based on Portland? The noble Lord has given us a comparison between the number of partially-trained men in the Nore Fleet and that in the Channel Fleet of past years; but what I should like to have known was, not how it compared with the Channel Fleet of years ago, but how it compared with the Channel Fleet of to-day, and with the Mediterranean and Atlantic Fleets, because we are told that the Nore Fleet is to be constantly ready for any emergency. There is another point. The noble Lord did not tell us whether the Admiralty were satisfied that the system of nucleus crews had resulted favourably as regards the repairs to the vessels which are maintained by nucleus crews and not in repairing dockyards.
§ * LORD TWEEDMOUTHThe whole of the forty-eight destroyers are to be based on the Nore; those at present at Portland are available for training with Lord Charles Boresford's Fleet. What we believe is that the repairs are very well kept up in the nucleus crew ships, and that those repairs have been greatly helped by the engine-room artificers on board the ships, the number of whom has been increased.
* LORD ELLENBOROUGHMy Lords, I was very glad to learn from the noble Lord the First Lord of the Admiralty that he requires no arguments to convince him of the necessity of a repairing dock on the east coast; but I am sorry to find that he does not attempt to follow that up by asking in another place for a large Vote of money. He merely asks for £10,000 to ascertain the geology of the neighbourhood of Rosyth, which might easily have been done before. The noble Lord cannot act upon that report 838 unless he gets a Vote passed in another place in time, and therefore any attempt at actual work at Rosyth is put off until April of next year. It takes a great many years to build docks; it is a pity, therefore, to lose time. Portsmouth represents the work of centuries, and yet we have only one dock there big enough to take a "Dreadnought." We have gone rather far in scooping out Portsmouth; we have scooped out so much mud that we have increased the strength of the tide, and these immense vessels are rendered unhandy in consequence. I would suggest that the next time the opinion of experts is taken on dock accommodation at Portsmouth, it should be considered whether the widening of the mouth of the harbour, so as to lessen the currents and tides, should not be undertaken. I note with satisfaction that the Government is going to build another dock at Haulbowline, for by so doing it is greatly strengthening the arguments against any approach to Home Rule. I should, however, have been still more pleased if a dock had been commenced on the East Coast. I was glad to hear that the six battleships, six cruisers, and forty-eight destroyers are in a better state than I thought, but I hope that the proportion of one-seventh of partially trained men in their crews will be eliminated or further reduced in vessels which are put in the front rank. It is rather a small Fleet for the work it will have to undertake, and there is a risk that if one or two of the ships are out of repair, the Fleet may be overpowered before other vessels could come to its assistance. I know the value of giving our Admirals large fleets to manœuvre, but it may be paid for too dearly if the North Sea and the Channel are stripped of vessels for the purpose of manœ at a distance from our shores. I therefore suggest the strengthening of the Home Fleet. I had intended saying more in this discussion, but as I find that the First Lord is converted to the necessity of a dock on the east coast I shall not trouble the House further.
§ * THE EARL OF HARDWICKEI should like to ask whether the nucleus crews merely look after the engines and other machinery on board ship, or 839 whether they are regularly trained like other crews?
§ * LORD TWEEDMOUTHAll the nucleus crews in the ships which go to sea are trained. Only the Reserve ships have the smaller nucleus crews, and they remain in harbour, and only their machinery and so forth is kept ready and cleaned.
§ LORD LEITH OF FYVIEMy Lords, the reductions that have been made in the dockyards since 1904 must have materially diminished the ability to carry out repairs. The reductions for the period 1904–7 represent 22 per cent. of the actual employés in the dockyards, and, in considering this question, it would be very useful to know whether those reductions were in the dockyards used for construction or in the dockyards that were to be generally used for repairs in time of war. The dockyards as they are at present are not ready even for our Fleets when they come home from manœuvres. You hear from captains and officers that ships are laid up and repairs are not taken in hand because they cannot be. The policy of nucleus ships and nucleus crews is undoubtedly an admirable one if carried out as it was theoretically intended to be, namely, that you should have in the nucleus crew a large proportion of capable, well-trained men both as gunners and in the engineroom. But, unfortunately, the evidence of the ships as they go to sea is that they are not perfectly ready for war, that they are not ready to run full speed at once. Our ships are repaired to a point at which it is well understood they are not ready forwar. With the best intentions on the part of the First Lord, I feel that we do not get the information which would enable us to judge whether the Navy is being kept up to date or not. We can only get it from our admirals when they test the Fleets fully upto war manœuvres; but, unfortunately, our admirals must obey orders and are not there to criticise. What we require to have is a system which will give us comparative details as to whether our Navy is being kept up to date, and whether 840 the wonderful new developments o machines are properly taken care of With regard to strategy, we are now told for the first time that the Lords of the Admiralty are not rigidly bound to the size of the Home Fleet as it was originally outlined, and that they keep themselves free to increase or decrease it as they please. That, undoubtedly, must be the case. I do not see how the Lords of the Admiralty could do otherwise when they have no docking arrangements to fall back upon in the North Sea. The Fleet must pursue the old fighting policy of Nelson of attacking the enemy in their own ports, and cannot act as a Fleet of defence. That may be a reason for the uncertainty and inconsistency in regard to expenditure on docks on the east coast. But if the Government propose to have a dock on the east coast at all, surely £10,000, which they have put on the Estimate, is quite inadequate for the purpose. It shows that no practical sense is being applied to the matter.