TERRITORIAL AND RESERVE FORCES BILL.

HL Deb 26 June 1907 vol 176 cc1260-356

[SECOND HEADING.]

Order of the Day, for resuming the adjourned debate on the Motion for the Second Reading, read.

*THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE COLONIES (The Earl of ELGIN)

My Lords, I think it was generally accepted in the debate yesterday that my noble friend behind me had, in a fair and temperate and lucid manner, set before your Lordships the substance of the Bill; but in the course of the discussion which ensued various questions were asked to which noble Lords desired to have answers. I think it is a somewhat inconvenient practice to ask many questions across the Table during the progress of a Second Reading debate, but, of course, His Majesty's Government have no other wish than that the House should be put in possession of any information which they can provide. Therefore I have possessed myself of certain information bearing on some of the questions which were then put, which I shall be ready to submit to your Lordships. Some of them were dealt with in the very able maiden speech which was delivered by my noble friend on the second bench behind me last evening, but as the House had then considerably thinned I daresay your Lordships will not mind if I repeat some of the information which he then gave.

The noble Viscount Lord Midleton raised a question about the reductions which had been made in the Army, and stated that those reductions had wiped out the increases which had been made during the years from 1895 to 1898, during which I think the noble Marquess opposite was in charge of the War Office. I believe that putting it in one way, that is not an unfair statement; but I am informed that there is another way of putting it, and that the fact is that we are still 27,000 men in excess of the numbers of 1895. The noble Viscount also dealt with the question of the establishment of the home battalions, and he said that the home battalion establishment had been reduced from 750 To 720 men. But that is not a reduction in actual numbers. Owing to the effect of the system of three years enlistment, which is still making itself felt, the strength is very much below the establishment, and the reduction is not really a reduction in men, because the men are not there. The object of the reduction is to make the establishment and the strength coincide; and I am informed that there is every intention, when the men are forthcoming, to make the establishment revert to the former figure. It is also worth mentioning that the twenty-five battalions on Colonial stations have had their strength increased by seventy-four.

Then the noble Viscount questioned us about the Artillery. He was very anxious to know whether there had been, or was to be, any reduction in the Artillery. No, my Lords, there has been no reduction in the Artillery establishment. There has been a reduction of two depots at home, but that has been more than compensated by the increase in the Indian establishment. It is not proposed in any way to weaken the strength of the Artillery, which at the present moment is altogether inadequate to the needs of the Expeditionary Force. On the contrary, it is the intention to increase the strength. With the present establishment it is only possible to mobilise forty-two batteries, whereas sixty-six are required for the Expeditionary Force. This is owing to the great number of men required for the largely increased ammunition columns. The Secretary of State for War has several times explained his intention of providing ammunition columns from the special contingent in order to be able to mobilise the necessary number of batteries, and this proposal has the full assent of his council. There are also proposals under consideration for increasing the Reserves of Regular artillerymen.

Then a question was asked with regard to the field artillery of the Territorial Army. That artillery is to be armed with the field gun which was in use by the Regulars before the recent rearmament, and that gun is to be improved by being mounted on a quick-firing carriage. Then, outside the divisional organisation of the Territorial Army, there will be raised a number of strictly local corps for coast defence, consisting chiefly of garrison artillery; and it is hoped to raise these corps in the immediate neighbourhood of the defences which they will have to man, so that they may always train and become familiar with the guns which they will have to use.

The noble Viscount also called attention to the composition of battalions. He said that in the Expeditionary Force the proportion would be 380 and 620 instead of 500 to 500, as at the time of the war; but in this comparison he did not use the same sets of figures. The noble Viscount gave the numbers of infantry in the future war establishment at 28,847 serving soldiers and 48,900 in the Reserve, and he compared them with the figures at the time of the war, which were, he said, 57,000 with the colours and 43,000 from the Reserve. In the first case the noble Viscount did use the infantry figures, but in the second he used those for all ranks. The actual numbers from all ranks embarked to South Africa were 56,553 with the colours and 42,957 from the Reserve. In the future war establishment there will be, it is calculated, 75,558 men with the colours and 85,023 with the Reserve. But it has also to be observed that at the time of the war the battalions did not go out at what we should consider full strength. The Reserve was unusually low at that particular moment, owing to the men who had rejoined the colours under the Army Order of 1898. The effect was to show more men with the colours than would otherwise have been the case.

The noble Viscount asked a question as to military opinion with regard to the value of the special contingent, and I am informed that in the opinion of the military advisers of the Secretary of State the Special Contingent will be perfectly efficient to use as drafts. They consider that these men will, on the whole, be more efficient than the men of the Militia Reserve who reinforced the Regular battalions in South Africa, for they will have had a longer average service than those men. In the Natal Army, after the relief of Ladysmith, it was the opinion of all the. officers who had to do with these men that they did their full work at once and in a short time were not distinguishable from the older soldiers.

A question was raised as to the average age of the Militia. I think the noble Viscount said that the fighting age of the Militia was between twenty and thirty-five, and that it would be found that the Militia would not present a good appearance if that age was prescribed. The figures do not bear out that contention. I find that of the Militia under twenty and over thirty-five there are 31,000, while the number between those ages is 52,800. The noble Earl Lord Donoughmore asked a question with regard to the amalgamation of regiments, and whether extra legislation would be necessary for that purpose. I understand that it is believed that this will be covered by the Bill; but that, of course, is a question which would naturally come up in Committee. The Duke of Bedford referred to the Norfolk Commission and stated, as I understood him, that if the proposals of that Commission were accepted he would be prepared to find recruits both for the Militia and for the Army. That, however, depends on the argument that there are two classes of men who will enlist for the Militia—one going on to the Army and one remaining in the Militia itself. But I understand that view is not accepted universally, and in those circumstances it would, of course, be necessary to make further investigation before one could go on with that proposal. But, anyhow the offer of the noble Duke would involve, I imagine, the adoption of the Norfolk Commission's proposals altogether, and this would mean compulsion and a very large expense. We cannot be expected to accept that proposition.

Then questions were asked, and were very largely answered by the noble Lord behind me, as to officers in the Militia, and especially as to their succession to the command. Perhaps I had better repeat the answer. It is that junior officers up to the age of thirty-four who are of the rank of captain or under are to be invited to go into the Reserve of officers under the terms of Sir Edward Ward's Committee. They will receive a retaining fee of £20 a year, and will rise automatically to the rank of captain and pass into the Reserve of officers, who do not get a retaining fee, with the rank of honorary major at the age of thirty-five. Then with regard to officers above thirty-five, they are to be invited to go into the Reserve of officers and join for duty with the battalions of the Special Contingent, but they will not receive the £20 payment. The Army Council fully recognise that the command of a Special Contingent battalion should be within the reach of this class of officer, provided that they are competent in other respects. This applies to both the third and fourth battalions. As vacancies occur in the third battalions the establishment of Regular officers will gradually be decreased until they number about nine or ten. This is rendered necessary by the amount of training and instruction which the third battalion will have to do. The officering of the fourth battalion is at present under consideration, but the tendency will probably be not to give them so large an establishment as the officers of the third battalion It has been asked by one noble Lord whether those officers who are below the age of thirty-five at the date of transfer would become eligible for succession to the command. It is intended that they should not become eligible.

Several points were raised by Lord Scarbrough with regard to the Yeomanry and by Lord Fortescue with regard to the County Associations, most of which will naturally be better dealt with in Committee. But I may say, with regard to the County Associations, that it is intended to start these Associations as soon as possible, and, as far as possible, simultaneously. Everything is ready to make a start as soon as the Bill is passed. It is intended that the Lord-Lieutenant should be the president of the Association in every case, except when there is any reason why he would desire not to hold that position; and it is hoped that the president of the Association will be its constitutional head, and he should not be excluded from the chair if that is a position for which he is suited and which he desires to hold. At any rate, he would take a leading part in the work of the Association.

A question was asked with regard to the officers of the Territorial Army who would be put upon the County Association. I am informed that it is intended in most cases that they should be senior officers, but it was thought better not absolutely to tie our hands, in case other officers should appear to be qualified for that post. As to the allotment of troops in grouped regimental districts, the General Staff has been at work upon the allotment for some months, and it is intended shortly to refer the results of their work to a larger Committee. Wherever possible they have worked on the force that already exists, and it has been found, on the whole, that the General Staff requirements fit them very well. I hope that the information I have given may be of use to the House, and it is in that belief that I have troubled your Lord ships with it.

In dealing with, this Bill I am unavoidably compelled to say that I find that my connection with the Commission which sat with regard to the war in South Africa has been so much mentioned in the debates here and in another place that I am bound to refer to it. It is a point which, has not been raised by me. Since the Report was issued I have never said a word about it in any public manner. I have felt that the position of a Commission of that character is one which ought to compel silence upon the members of the Commission. A Royal Commission is appointed for a specific purpose; its members meet for that purpose and perform that purpose; but when that purpose is finished they separate, and there is no possibility of their assembling together again to give any deliberate conclusion. In those circumstances it has always appeared to me that for a single member of a Commission to take upon himself in any way authoritatively to declare the meaning or intention of a Report is beside the mark. It has been, of course, very gratifying to me that not only was the Report of the Commission a unanimous one, which is one of the matters to which I shall always look back with the greatest satisfaction, but it has not been on the whole seriously challenged; and that, considering how full of controversial matter our investigation was, is a position which I should not wish to disturb.

But, my Lords, there have been in discussions preceding the introduction of this Bill and also in these debates references to our Report, and particularly to one passage. I think the noble Earl on the cross benches (Lord Roberts) was the first to draw attention to this passage, and the other day a right hon. Gentleman in another place, speaking from the Front Opposition Bench, paid us the compliment of describing it as a classic passage. That right hon. Gentleman criticised the use of it by my right hon. friend the Secretary of State, and he went on to say that my right hon. friend knew quite well that the Commissioners did not mean what he meant when they wrote those words. He said— They contemplated too definite matters. They laid down that there must be an oversea obligation lying upon the second line, and that, in the second place, there must be compulsory training in time of peace in order that men should be fit to discharge their duties in time of war. He added— Both of these recommendations are ignored in the Bill. I have searched my memory and I have searched the pages of the Report, but I cannot find any reference to either of the qualifications mentioned. It is a gratification, of course, to be quoted as an authority, provided always that there is sufficient of one's opinion quoted to bring out its true meaning and that nothing is read in which the writer did not intend to include.

I am afraid I have, I will not say an accusation, but an objection to take in the case of the noble and gallant Earl on the cross benches. The noble and gallant Earl used this passage in the first place, I think, in connection with a public letter which he addressed to authorities throughout the Kingdom, and I can only say that I think in that case also he was inclined to use it in a meaning more favourable to his proposals than the words bear out. Again he made a reference to it in July last, and he said then that the shortcomings of the Auxiliary Forces were proved by the evidence in our Report. My Lords, many shortcomings were proved by the evidence in our Report, but this quotation which has been so frequently used is in reality only three lines out of a paragraph which contains forty-five, and the heading of that paragraph is "General Observations on the Imperial Forces." It was the general system with which we were dealing in that paragraph, expansion outside the limits of the Regular Forces; and though, of course, alterations in the organisation of the Regular Forces might affect our position, the actual expansion of the Regular Forces themselves had nothing to do with the matter.

In the earlier part of the paragraph we dealt with the limit which existed at the time with which we were dealing. As noble Lords know, the limit in 1899 was that laid down by Mr. Stanhope's Resolution of two army corps and one at home. It was the expansion beyond that that we had in view. I do not wish to go into details with regard to those particular matters, because I have no wish whatever to be supposed to be entering or making any attack upon the Administration of noble Lords opposite; but I want to enforce my position that it was the military system and nothing else with which we were dealing. The Commission drew attention in this part of their Report to defects in the military system. They found that the expansion which they thought necessary was difficult in 1899. That difficulty had not been removed when their Report was written, and therefore references were necessary to it in their Report. I go further: no advance had been made even last year. I make that assertion not on my own authority, but on that of the noble and gallant Earl on the cross benches. The noble and gallant Earl, speaking on 10th July last year, said — My remark about the Regular Forces was misconstrued. I never said a word against the Regular Forces. I said that the armed forces of the Crown, taken as a body, were not more fit for war now than in 1899. I was talking about the recommendation made by the Commission presided over by the noble Earl the Secretary of State for the Colonies, that outside the Regular Army there should be a power of expansion. Nothing has been done to bring that about. That was what I was alluding to last year, and what I allude to now. Therefore, my Lords, I think I may say that we are now for the first time discussing a method for bringing about the expansion to which we referred. I should like to read a few lines which follow those generally quoted, in order to show the defects to which we pointed. The words which are generally used are— The true lesson of the war. in our opinion, is that no military system will be satisfactory which does not contain a power of expansion outside the limits of the Regular Forces of the Crown, whatever that limit may be. But we went on to say— If the war teaches anything it is this, that throughout the Empire, in the United Kingdom, its Colonies, and dependencies, there is a reserve of military strength which for many reasons we cannot and do not wish to convert into a vast standing army, but which we may be glad to turn to account in our hour of need, as we did in 1899. In that year there was no preparation whatever for utilising these great resources. Nothing had been thought out either as to pay or organisation, as to conditions of service, or even as to arms. Even here in England it was to be an experiment. We mentioned further on the case of handbooks, and I desire to press that because it does not seem a very large thing to undertake. We had evidence from two officers who raised corps— Colonel Thornycroft and General Baden-Powell—of the use which had been made by them of handbooks, and we also had before us Sir William Nicholson, who was then Director of Military Intelligence, and, on being pressed on this point, he expressed his agreement as to the value of these handbooks. He even said that he had himself brought under consideration the necessity of inquiring into the organisation and equipment of Colonial forces, but that had been refused on the ground of expense, although, as a matter of fact, only a single officer for six months would have been necessary to carry out that operation. I do not wish to weary the House, but I do desire to make it quite clear that this passage from our Report which has received so much currency does not mean at all any adherence to compulsory service or any change of that description. As I have shown, we declared distinctly against a vast standing army. But, at the same time, we turned to the reserve of military strength found in the United Kingdom and its Colonies and dependencies. The noble and gallant Earl on the cross benches could not find last year that anything had been done in that direction, and therefore I contend that this Bill is the first effort really to grapple with the difficulty.

The title of this Bill is the Territorial and Reserve Forces Bill. Therefore it deals with those forces, but, in the course of the discussion, both here and in another place, the rules of order have not been sufficient to prevent a pretty large divergence into the other parts of the military system. For my part, however, I do not intend on this occasion to say anything at length with regard to the Regular Forces. It is one of those alterations in organisation which affect expansiveness that the Expeditionary Force, which, under Mr. Stanhope's Memorandum, was 80,000 men, is now to be 160,000. Having said that, I do not intend to go further.

I do not think that we ought to forget the lessons of 1899. But we must also remember the circumstances. And if we keep in remembrance the circumstances of that time I cannot see how anybody can argue that a call, tremendous and unprecedented such as the one that came at that time, could come without any warning. There were warnings enough in 1899 if they had been taken account of. I do not wish to raise any controversial argument, but the sudden emergency argument is sometimes put very extravagantly. What is the assumption? The assumption seems to be that the country will be found in the guardianship of the troops who have just assembled for the first time for six months training, and that they will be pounced upon by the best soldiers of the best European Army. I cannot, I am afraid, imagine a raid out of the blue. I do not see how it is to happen. I cannot imagine how all the Government agents and all the newspaper reporters of all the world are to fall asleep. But, even if that were the case, ex hypothesi the whole Expeditionary Force will be at home, and the Fleet cannot possibly have been blown out of the seas. There would have been a sufficient warning certainly if either of the other alternatives had taken place.

Then there was a suggestion made in this House a few weeks ago, that the assemblage of the Fleet at Lagos might have afforded an opportunity for a raid of this description; but I rather think my noble friend the First Lord of the Admiralty would have regarded that as an opportunity of catching the raiders like rats in a trap. Those who put forward the raid argument cannot have it both ways. Either the Fleet must be beaten, and then the Expeditionary Force would be at home, there being no one to convoy them across the seas: or the Fleet would convoy the force across the seas, in which case it would be in command of the seas and well able to make short work of the raiders. There might be a third supposition, that both the Fleet and the force had left our shores, and that while the Expeditionary Force was absent the Fleet had met with disaster. What, however, was the history of 1899? The orders to mobilise were given on 9th October, and the first field force, which consisted of 41,000 men, had all sailed by 17th November. Others followed in separate divisions, but it was not until the middle of March that 75,000 men had landed in South Africa. Therefore it took five months to complete what was an extremely successful mobilisation, on which I have always felt inclined to congratulate the noble Marquess who was Secretary of State for War at the time.

Is the future to beat that record? If it does not, how long will it take an Expeditionary Force of 160,000 men to leave our shores? Certainly they cannot all leave on the same day, or during the same week or the same month. Their departure must be gradual, and during the process the scheme of the Bill now before your Lordships would come into operation, and the second line of troops would take their place, occupy the barracks, and undergo training; and therefore before the last troopship could have sailed the battalions thus trained would be on guard to undertake the most sacred duty that can befall any men— the protection of their homes. This Bill, therefore, will for the first time seriously attempt to provide the framework on which the organisation the Commission desired will be built.

A good deal of criticism has been directed against the clauses relating to the County Associations. I am quite prepared to admit that there may be many blanks in those clauses. On the other hand, I am not sure that it is not more prudent to put matters tentatively. I believe that no mistake would be worse than to send down a scheme of a cast-iron description for the adoption of local bodies. If the scheme is flexible there. will be room for adaptation to local feeling and local prejudices, perhaps even sufficient to deal with the cases of the two Irish regiments which the noble Earl mentioned yesterday afternoon. We must remember, too, that in this case the County Associations will be helped by the sympathetic guidance of the military authorities. I think this will: also tend to the desired end, which is to have a force efficient for the protection of our shores against a foreign foe.

I should like to be allowed to refer, though it is outside the limits.of this Bill, to another chapter in this eventful history. This Bill, of course, is for the United Kingdom, but the Commission, in the passage in their Report which I have quoted, referred also to the reserve military strength in our Colonies and dependencies. The proceedings of the Colonial Conference are now in your Lordships' hands, and I venture to think you will find the discussion on military defence not the least interesting in that volume. The Secretary of State's statement was received with acclamation. What was the principle underlying that statement? It was, as in this Bill, local autonomy — local autonomy under the guidance of a general staff recruited from the forces of the Empire as a whole. The discussion at the Conference ma de it perfectly clear that each Colony desired to manage its own local affairs. That was the view of Canada, of Australia, of New Zealand, and of South Africa, but all welcomed the idea and promise of trained advisers. The noble and gallant Earl on the cross benches said last night that the Secretary of State had not faced the elementary facts, and he went on to say that we had shut our eyes to such things as the Canadian frontier, and that our silence might be misinterpreted. A perusal of the proceedings of the Conference will show that that is not so. We did hear the views of Canada and the other Colonies. They are confident in their own resources, but entirely sympathetic to the defence of the Empire.

This Bill is for the establishment of a Territorial Army for home defence. We can all remember the patriotic feeling in the dark days of 1899. Though the danger which threatened us was far distant and the difficulties of enlistment and service were not few, still that patriotic feeling manifested itself distinctly. Surely we are not wrong in saying that we may rely confidently in time of trouble on a similar manifestation under the scheme prepared by the Government. A man joins the Territorial Army knowing the call awaiting him, and that that call is that he should promptly take service on the occasion of an emergency to supplement the military training he has already had. Knowing, too, that he will take a share in no ill-directed effort but in a scheme which is suggested and approved by the combination of local knowledge and scientific attainments, which is best calculated to win his confidence and enthusiasm.

THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY

My Lords, we have listened to a very interesting speech from the noble Earl the Secretary of State for the Colonies, though, as he himself admitted, he sometimes wandered very far from the provisions of the Bill. Yet I am quite sure your Lordships were very glad to hear all he had to say upon the wide questions of Empire with which he dealt. The noble Earl made a complaint, at the beginning of his speech, that the speakers on behalf of the Government during last evening were interrupted by a series of questions put to them to elucidate the provisions of the Bill. I do not see what use a Second Reading discussion is unless it elucidates the principles and details of a Bill, and there never was a Bill the principles and details of which required more elucidation. It was discussed at certain length in another place, but, though several speeches were heard from the Government Bench, a considerable mistiness remained over the whole subject, and Members of the House of Commons were very little wiser after those speeches than they were before.

And, my Lords, if there was required any other justification for the attitude and conduct of speakers on this side of the House, last night I think it would be found in the result, because the questions we put have led to answers being given in the very interesting speech of the noble Lord who spoke to us for the first time last night (Lord Lucas) and in the speech of the noble Earl who has just sat down, which have thrown considerable light on the matters under discussion. The noble Earl went on to discuss the question of compulsory service, and I was very glad to hear him say once more, on his own behalf and on behalf of His Majesty's Government, that they were not in favour of compulsory service. There is no one in this House who does not profoundly respect the opinions of the noble and gallant Earl on the cross benches (Lord Roberts), but when he presses upon us the advantages of compulsory service we always feel that we are faced with this dilemma, that a large conscript Army is not required for home defence and cannot be used for foreign service. There is no country in the world which has used its conscript troops for service abroad unless they volunteered, and therefore the principle of compulsion maybe said not to be required for home service and to be of no use for foreign service.

The advocates of this system feel that dilemma, and the noble Viscount, Lord Milner, speaking last night, tried to get out of the difficulty by contending that these compulsory troops were required for home service; that is to say, that the raids which we have to fear may be so powerful that we may require this enormous conscript Army in order to protect us. I am not one of those who belong to the extreme blue-water school, but I must say I think it is an exaggeration—I think it is a gross exaggeration—to say that we require the enormous force which would be raised by a conscript Army in order to be prepared, I will not say for any probable, but for any possible invasion of these shores. I do not believe that, under these circumstances, the people of this country will ever consent to undertake the burden on their time and on their purse which compulsory service would involve. They pay already for their Fleet. They stint nothing for their Fleet. I am quite certain that I am speaking what everybody knows when I say that in the opinion of this country there is no money that is required for the Fleet which ought not to be spent. Having arrived at that conclusion, I think the country would resist the extra burden which would be thrown upon them by a conscript Army.

That brings me to the practical consideration of this Bill. We have to deal with a limited amount of money. Whatever money is required for the Fleet will be found, but, in the case of the Army, we have to deal with a limited amount, and we have to keep expenditure on that Service within the four corners of that sum. The first question which occurs to anyone approaching the discussion of a new Army system is: Is the money which Parliament is to be asked to provide going to be economically spent? That was the burden of the greater part of the speech of my noble friend Lord Midleton last night. He contended that under the military policy of the Government there would be a reduction of efficiency and practically no saving of money. To that we want a very definite answer. Is it or is it not the fact that under the policy of His Majesty's Government the Regular Forces of the Crown will be diminished by something over 20,000 men? If that be true, then at any rate we should expect to find a very considerable saving of money.

The second question is: Is there to be a saving of money? My noble friend put the question to the Government. He asked whether the Government had made an accurate estimate of what their policy is likely to cost. The noble Earl the Secretary of State for the Colonies, although he dealt most fully with some of the questions which, my noble friend put, carefully abstained from dealing with that particular question. He said nothing about money. The noble Earl dealt with the Artillery, and told us in very definite language that there was to be no reduction in the Artillery— no reduction in numbers and no reduction in efficiency. The noble Earl nods assent. Therefore we may look upon it as an absolute pledge given by His Majesty's Government to Parliament that under their policy there will be no reduction whatever either in the numbers or in the efficiency of the Artillery. If my noble friend's speech had led to nothing except that distinct pledge from the Government his efforts certainly were not thrown away. My noble friend Lord Midleton suggested that upon the figures, so far as he could calculate them, there would be at the very best a saving of about £800,000. Now, do the Government agree with those figures? That is a very simple question, and one upon which I have no doubt the War Office have arrived at a very definite conclusion.

THE EARL OF ELGIN

We received the suggestion of the £ 800,000 at eight o'clock last night, and there has scarcely been time to inquire into it.

THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY

I am inclined to think that this £ 800,000 is likely to be rather a phantom figure. Have the Government reflected on the cost which the County Associations are likely to involve?. I do not want to repeat what my noble friend said last night, but, as the Government have not answered, it is necessary to remind them of the point. My noble friend suggested to your Lordships that each of these miniature War Offices all over the country would require a staff of clerks of its own. We who live in the country are very familiar with this sort of thing. Nearly all the reforms in local government which we have witnessed in our time have led to increased expenditure. It is quite true that they very often lead to greater efficiency, and I earnestly hope that this will be the result of the proposals of the Government; but without exception such proposals have led to greater expenditure. That is the universal experience I do not care what county in England you take.

And what check is there upon the expenditure of these County Associations? Has that been thought out among the many matters which the Army Council have considered? The noble Earl who has just sat down took credit to himself and his colleagues that the clauses with regard to the County Associations were so vague. They are absolutely vague. There is no inference which Parliament can draw from the words in the clauses respecting the County Associations. I would venture to ask what is in the mind of the Government. What among all the plans and memoranda lying at the War Office at this moment is written as to the County Associations? Are they to have a lump sum, or are their bills to be presented and paid with a more or less check according as the War Office at the moment may think well? I do not say that the plan is a bad one, but I say it is a great and rather hazardous experiment.

I studied at one time of my life the question of rating reform and how far money should be paid by way of grants -in-aid by the Exchequer to the county authorities, and the one axiom which is always laid down is that where a locality has the responsibility of administering a particular service it should be a contributory party to the cost, because, if the whole of the funds are provided by the Imperial Exchequer, extravagance is almost certain to result. That is an axiom in rating reform, but your Lord ships will observe that in this instance no attention appears to have been paid to it. The money is to be raised from the taxpayers and paid over either in a lump sum, or according as it is required, to the local authority, who is to manage it apparently in its absolute discretion. I would ask the Government to tell us whether the sympathetic guidance of which the noble Earl spoke will deal with points of that kind—whether the County Associations will have an absolutely free hand, or whether the general principles on which the Government desire they should work will be indicated.

I will not dwell at any great length upon the clauses dealing with the Territorial Force. I notice that the noble Earl, in that part of his speech which had reference to the Bill, almost entirely confined himself to the Territorial Force. I will only say this upon that head, that some of the provisions which deal with the Territorial Force have been found, and are still found, by Volunteer officers, who will mainly constitute the officers of the Territorial Force, to be of too drastic a character. I may instance, for example, the famous proviso in Clause 16, which enacts that after the Reserves have all been called out the whole of the Territorial Force shall be embodied for an indefinite period. I will not labour the point. Your Lord ships are well aware how difficult it would be for all the Volunteers in the different parts of England to be mobilised for an indefinite period upon such an emergency as is described, and I think that in his later speeches in another place the Secretary of State explained that as a matter of fact that particular proviso will never be rigidly enforced, and that it will be adapted to the circumstances of each corps. But, if that be so, the proviso ought to disappear, because it has frightened, is frightening, and will continue to frighten a very large number of possible candidates for the Volunteer Force. Under the earlier words of the clause there is ample power to call out as many of the Territorial Force as may be required, and this drastic proviso is really unnecessary. Since the clause was drafted there has been a great change in the proposals of the Government which centre round the Militia. Those changes I need not say, so far as they go, I welcome very heartily. When the Bill was first introduced the Secretary of State and his advisers were wedded to a rigid interpretation of the scheme of two lines as against three lines. I think the Secretary of State was perhaps misled to some extent by the symmetry of the proposal, and he conceived that it would be a proper and a symmetrical arrangement that the land forces of Crown should be split into halves: on one side should be all the professional soldiers, and on the other side all the amateur soldiers— on one side all the soldiers who were ready to go into action and on the other side all those who were unready. That was his conception, and consequently he organised the Army in two lines. People began to see that there was a great blemish in this proposal. It was quite true that the Regular Forces of the Crown were ready, and that there was a second line which was organised to appear upon the scene of action in six months time. But there was a gap. What was there to stand behind the first line in the earlier months of the war? Were there any organised units which would be ready to take the place of the Regular Army in the garrisons at home and in the Colonies, and were there any troops sufficiently organised to take their position on the lines of communication in the earlier stages of the war?

The noble Earl who has just sat down has indicated that in his opinion all these fears of great emergency may be swept aside. He said we should always have warning. My Lords, I look upon a speech of that kind with profound dismay. I believe that the noble Earl cannot do a worse service to his country than by repeating statements of that kind. Of course, we expect and believe and hope that there will not be a war, and the chances are that there will not be a war for very many years. The chances are, no doubt, even stronger that we shall be able to meet that war properly and with sufficient readiness; but we keep up the armed Forces of the Crown as an insurance against possible danger, and the whole raison d'etre of the Volunteer Force and of the other Forces of the Crown is lest that emergency should overtake us.

The noble Earl says we should have warning, that we would know beforehand in sufficient time that there was going to be a great war and that we could then mobilise. I can assure him that the difficulties of the course he proposes are very great, and I remember circumstances connected with the South African war which justify my observation. When negotiations are very critical, when peace and war are hanging in the balance, you cannot order a general mobilisation without precipitating the very crisis you wish to avoid. The fact is that to the last moment a Government will always desire to avoid mobilisation. Therefore the noble Earl's phrase is a most unfortunate one. We must be ready, not a few months after mobilisation, but the next morning after mobilisation. If war becomes inevitable on a Tuesday we must be ready in the course of that week, if necessary, to move the whole of our Regular Force abroad, so far, of course, as our shipping would permit, and to mobilise the troops which stand immediately behind in order to support them in that great operation.

It is not sufficient to have troops like the Territorial Force, which will only be ready after six months training. We require organised Auxiliary units to support them as soon as the Regular troops themselves are ready. Therefore I welcome the rehabilitation in the scheme of the Militia. That Force affords an opportunity for obtaining these organised units. I do not care whether you say that the armed Forces of the Crown are to be organised in three lines or in two lines. It is largely a question of phrase. But behind the first line there must be a supplementary line, something which is not necessarily quite so good, but which is ready as soon as the first line to support them in the field. The Secretary of State, evidently impressed with that view, saw it was necessary to change his scheme, and the Militia reappeared. The Militia constitute the only organised units available for the purpose I have indicated. That makes a great change, and I think a good deal of the interesting speech which was delivered by Lord Lucas last night was really conceived upon the basis that the scheme had not been altered as it has been by tire rehabilitation of the Militia. He seemed to think that the important thing was to merge the greater part of the Militia absolutely in the Regular Force, and to change all their characteristics so that they should be assimilated to the Regular Army and lose as far as possible their distinctive character. I do not think that is good policy.

There are limitations upon the existing Militia which ought to be swept away, as, for example, that they can only be used, compulsorily, at any rate, for service at home. There is also the fact that the standard of efficiency of the Militia is not so high as is required for the purposes I have indicated. But if those two defects could be remedied, then beyond that the character of the force should be changed as little as possible. Now, why do I say that? I say it because you have to consider the sentiments of the men who form the Militia now and who are going to form the Militia under your new scheme. They are voluntary agents. They cannot be compelled to join your new force. You will have to ask them; you will have to go on your knees to ask them. You must consider their feelings, and it is no good attempting to ride rough shod over them. Unless the men of the Militia consent to back you up you are defeated on the very threshold of your scheme. Therefore, it is absolutely essential that you should consider, and consider carefully, the susceptibilities of Militiamen.

In order to achieve what I have already indicated as the necessities of the case you will have to make certain rather drastic changes. You will be compelled—I frankly admit it—to admit more Regular officers than you have already to assist in the training of the Militia, and you will have to insist that they shall enlist for foreign service. But the Government want to go further. They not only say the Militia must enlist for foreign service, but that they shall go on foreign service, if required, with and under perfect strangers, men with whom they have not served before. That will be a very stiff fence to jump. We on this side of the House can take no responsibility for it whatever. I do not say, speaking only for myself, that I shall oppose it; but do not let it be said afterwards that it was done by the general consent of your Lordships' House. That is not so.

So far as Militia officers are concerned they are quite willing to admit Regular officers, and they are quite willing to go on foreign service in time of emergency, but they are not willing—that is to say, they cannot advise—that they should go under strangers. I changed that phrase because, as your Lordships know, a great misunderstanding has taken place as to the attitude of Militia officers. We do not refuse anything. We are not in a position to refuse anything. We shall do, of course, as we an; told, but, if we are asked for our advice, we cannot advise that these men should be asked to serve under perfect strangers. Supposing the Government do not agree with us—and I am afraid they do not—then I would ask them in every way in their power to mitigate the severity of that change. In the first place, as your Lordships know, there are two categories of Militia battalions under the scheme. There are the battalions which are mainly to be used as units, and there are the battalions which are mainly to be used as draft-producing machines. These battalions are seventy-four in number. They are to have a large number of Regular officers assigned to them, and it was a matter of great interest to us at the beginning of this debate to know what would become of the Militia officers. A good deal of light has been thrown on that point both by Lord Lucas and by the noble Earl the Secretary of State for the Colonies, and we understand that even in those battalions the equities of the position of existing Militia officers are to be considered to some extent.

But I am not only thinking of the feeling of Militia officers. I am thinking of the efficiency of these battalions. I am not satisfied to know that after a certain number of years' service a Militia subaltern will become a captain. What I want to know is whether he will be a substantive captain, an acting captain— that is to say, whether he will have command of one of the companies into which these battalions must be divided. There should be Militia officers commanding companies, not in their own interests but in the interests of these battalions How can you do without them?

I would ask your Lordships to pay attention to this rather dry detail for a moment. What officers are going to command the battalion when it is out for its annual training? We know there are to be four regular captains at the depot training the recruits, but once a year, for a longer or a shorter period, the whole battalion is to go out for training, 500 strong. I suppose the companies will not be more than 100 strong. All the Regular captains will not be available, because, although the Militia battalion goes out for training, the Regular officers who have had charge of the recruits have also to do the work of the depot of the Line battalion, and the Line recruits will be still at the depot and will require training. Therefore, a number of these officers will have to be left behind when the Militia battalions go out for training. The four Regular captains and two subalterns and so forth will not be available. Consequently you must have some other substantive officers even in time of peace to command Militia battalions when out for training. And if the training is longer than the Government have indicated, as I earnestly hope will ultimately be the case, the necessity for these extra officers becomes all the more apparent.

I am speaking of time of peace. But take time of war. What is to be the function of these battalions in time of war? In the first place, they are to send out drafts. The drafts must go under officers, and if you send out a sufficient number of men in a draft you will require a captain to go with them, and of course it is a far better system that when you send out a draft an officer who knows the men should accompany them. So that in time of war you will require other officers besides these Regular officers, for, according to the Government's scheme, the Regular officers will be left in England to train more recruits and so supply successive drafts to the Army in the field. The Secretary of State went further. He said that occasionally these seventy-four battalions will what he calls "throw off" battalions— whole battalions to fight in the field. I have never been quite able to understand what capacity there is for throwing off battalions from 500 men if you leave anything behind. The Secretary of State thinks he can do it, but, if he does it, these battalions which are thrown off will require trained officers whom the men know and who know the men. Regular officers, as I say, will not be available, and therefore you will require Militia officers serving under Militia engagements as officers of the battalion.

The first mitigation I would suggest in the Government's scheme is that they should recognise frankly that officers of the old stamp should continue to be officers of these battalions—that is to say, that the posts for officers should not be confined to Regular officers. This leads me to suggest to the Government that as a matter of fact it is a great pity that they should resolve so firmly that these seventy-four battalions should never, or hardly ever, act as units. Why do they come to that conclusion? Why do they think that twenty-seven battalions will be sufficient for the purpose I have indicated— that of acting as units in colonial garrisons and for lines of communication? Why, my Lords, in the South African War you used sixty-eight Militia battalions for this purpose. Why should you think that in a future war you will only require twenty-seven? It is not likely that the next great war in which we shall be engaged will be of less dimensions than the South African War. I think it will be of greater dimensions; and the idea that you are likely to have sufficient troops for the line of communications with less than half the number you used in South Africa seems to me an assumption founded on no reason whatever. If that is so, then twenty-seven is not sufficient, and you will require many more battalions to act as units on the outbreak of war. Is it not far better to say so at once? Why should you depress the spirits of all these seventy-four battalions by telling them they never must act as units when you think it highly probable that they will have so to act? If it were said that the Militia must furnish drafts, that they might have to act as units, not twenty-seven battalions but all of them, that would to a large extent mitigate the natural mortification which the decision of the Government must have inflicted on the Militia.

I come to one other point, and here I hope the Government will agree, because they have already gone a long way in that direction. Lord Lucas told us last night that, although the Militia must be content to be drafted into the Line in time of war, yet it was the intention of the Government to draft them as a general rule only into their Territorial battalion; and he went even further, because he said that, with respect to existing men serving in the Militia, the Government were prepared to give an absolute promise that existing Militiamen should never be asked to form drafts except to their own Territorial battalion. That is a concession, but I would ask the Government not to make two bites at a cherry. Let them go the full length and say what they ought to say, that tinder our Territorial system the other battalions of the Territorial regiment ought only to be drafted into the first or second battalion. of their own regiment. That is a perfectly reasonable proposal, and it is the system which obtains with regard to the first and second battalions already. Why should not the third battalion be treated in a precisely similar way? That, again, would be some mitigation. There is a certain sympathetic feeling between the Militia battalion and the Line battalion of the same Territorial regiment, and the Militiaman would not think himself entirely among strangers when he was passed from one to the other.

Lastly, I suggest that with regard to disembodiment the present system which obtains in the Militia should be preferred to the system under the Reserve Forces Act, which the Government propose to substitute for it. Under the Militia Act when the period of active service comes to an end the whole unit is disembodied together, but under the Reserve Forces Act once a man has been called out for permanent service he has no claim to be dismissed to his home at all until the end of his engagement, he having once more re-entered into the active Line. Within that limit each man has to stand by himself. He is not disembodied with his friends. He is allowed to go to his home as an individual, or he is not. That, again, is a variation from the existing system in the Militia which I deplore. I think it far better that the men should understand, if they are to be subjected to this process of being sent abroad and being drafted into strange battalions, that at any rate when the war comes to an end and the Militia return they should all have a chance of going back to civil life together. The continuance of Militia officers as substantive officers, the concession that all the Militia ought to be capable of being used as units, the concession that they should only be drafted into their own Line battalions, and that they should all be disembodied together—these are concessions which I think the Government might grant.

There are one or two other points to which I should like to call the attention of His Majesty's Government. They are in the direction of improvements in the standard of efficiency of the Militia under these new circumstances. There is the question of the training, which I have already mentioned, but on which I will say one or two further words. We want to be clear about the training, and, though I listened with great care to the speech of the noble Earl the Under-Secretary for War, I am afraid I was not quite clear as to what training is proposed for the Militia under the new state of things. A few weeks ago the noble Earl told us, in great detail, what the training of the Special Contingent was to be. There was, first of all, to be a preliminary drill, which in many cases would be divided into two parts, and then there was to be an annual training which was to be fifteen days one year 'and twenty-one days the next. I want to know whether the same system is to prevail now that the Militia have taken the place of the Special Contingent. Is the six months preliminary drill to be divided into two parts, and is the annual training only to be fifteen days one year and twenty-one days the next? If that is so, I regret it. It is a great mistake to have the preliminary drill split into two parts, because the recruits will not know what to expect when they join the force, and employers will not know what they are in for if a long period of preliminary drill may be suddenly projected upon them two or three years after the men have joined. It is far better that the six months preliminary drill should be taken together.

Then I would ask for information about the annual drill. Last night the noble Earl the Under-Secretary said that there would be fifteen days annual drill and musketry as well. Does he mean that there will be fifteen days annual drill and musketry training every year—because the Secretary of State observed in another place that he could not promise that there would be training every year? It may well be that on reflection the Government have come to the conclusion that there must be training every year. If so we should like to know the facts. My uncertainty applies to annual drill as well as to preliminary training. It is much better to have a fixed period, and to have the same period every year. The idea that musketry training can be put in the background, that you can have six days of it, and have that only once in every two years, seems to me to be the most absurd proposal that could possibly be made. Musketry training is much the most important part of the training. It is not the whole training, of course, but of the two I venture to say— though perhaps I ought to speak with more diffidence in the presence of great soldiers —that the musketry training is the most important. It is of the greatest moment that there should be adequate musketry training, and that it should take place every year.

That means a local training, and I do not conceal from your Lordships that the suggestions which I have made, if they were adopted by the Government, would approximate the position of the seventy-four battalions to the position of the twenty-seven battalions. And this leads me to ask His Majesty's Government why they maintain these two categories at all. I am sure your Lord ships will allow me to say that I have not approached this Bill in a Party spirit. In the criticisms which I have made I have tried to put myself more or less in the position of the Government, and to work at their Bill from their own point of view. I ask them, in all seriousness, why they maintain these two categories. The distinction that is made is the most invidious thing in the world. How are the Government going to pick the battalions which are to go into the one category and those which are to go into the other? I do not envy them the prospect. I do not envy them the friction and the justifiable indignation which they will arise when they begin to deal with this question. What they had much better do would be to introduce a sufficient number of Regular officers into all the Militia battalions to raise them to the standard of efficiency which they require.

I am afraid I have troubled your Lordships at great length. I will only say, in conclusion, that I am grateful to the Government for having at any rate maintained the Militia in being. I earnestly hope that they will not obstinately set their face against further Amendments in the Bill when we get into Committee; and if they do make the concessions which I have ventured to suggest to them they will mitigate the not unjustifiable mortification which the Militia undoubtedly feel at the treatment to which they must perforce be subjected.

LORD NEWTON

My Lords, as I listened to the noble Earl the Secretary' of State for the Colonies I could not help feeling a certain amount of commiseration for him, inasmuch as he appeared to me to be endeavouring to discharge a difficult, if not impossible, task— namely, that of reconciling the finding of his own Commission with the Bill which has obtained his enthusiastic support. It is no use the noble Earl trying to get out of the fact that the main finding of his Commission was that what the country needs beyond anything else is the power of expansion in our military forces. I submit, in spite of all that has fallen from noble Lords on both sides of the House, that there is no expansion provided for under this Bill. You do not add an officer, you do not add a man; as a matter of fact, you no not take a single step to render the country more fit to grapple with an emergency than we were a few years ago. I believe that to be a per- fectly plain and accurate statement of the case, and I do not believe any independent military authority would contradict it.

I observe that, with the charity which always characterises Members of this House, nearly everyone who has spoken has endeavoured to find some thing favourable in the Bill. I confess, so far as I am concerned, that I should have thought that the only people who would rejoice over these proposals were the people who were contemplating making war on this country. To my mind there is only one favourable aspect with regard to it—namely, that it is absolutely bound to leave us in so deplorable a condition that we shall before long be obliged to take very radical steps in order to put ourselves. in a safe position again. Indeed, I am not at all sure whether it is worth our while to discuss the Bill at all. I believe that historians will record with astonishment that one of the principal measures of the session was a Bill the main feature of which was that preparation for war was not going to begin until war had broken out. Rather move than a year ago we were led to suppose that a new era was going to dawn on this country, that a complete transformation was going to take place, that we were going to see created "a. nation in arms.'' We were led to believe that hundreds of thousands of able-bodied men would flock voluntarily to be trained. A picture was drawn of instructors in summer cycling from one village green to another, and in winter from one school house to another in order to drill these expectant volunteers. Smart young solicitors were going to act as adjutants for several battalions at once— a sort of combination of Arcadia and Aldershot, with a dash of Lincoln's Inn thrown in. In addition there was to be beneficent landowners offering their land for nothing, sympathetic employers who were to let their men go and pay their wages at the same time, and sympathetic representatives of labour who were going to do all they could to assist this movement.

What is the result of all this torrential eloquence about "a nation in arms" and reservoirs of national spirit and all the rest of it? The result is a reduced Regular Army—a largely reduced Regular Army. That is one result. The other result is that the Militia is now liable for foreign service. The Yeomanry remain precisely where they are, the Volunteers remain precisely where they are but have a new name. Literally the only new military asset which is acquired are the County Associations—a boon which does not appear to be thoroughly appreciated in all quarters. This is the result of the torrential rhetoric, and, I suppose I ought to add, "clear thinking." The "clear thinker," the person who is responsible for all this, has the audacity to tell us that we are 50 per cent. stronger now than we were before he assumed office. Personally I am not in the least surprised, I am not even disappointed, but I take it that there must be many who are disappointed, because when rather more than a year ago I ventured to express the opinion that the present War Secretary would not be more successful than his predecessors, I was at once met with the assurance that the new Secretary for War was an entirely different man from his predecessors. My friends informed me that he was quite different from them; he had a deep insight into military matters; he was a man of inflexible determination, and had a thorough grasp of his subject; and, above all, he was going to do what none of his predecessors had ever done—give the voluntary system a fair chance.

Many people appear to have been taken in. It is remarkable to me as showing the extraordinary power which oratory and rhetoric, or, as I should prefer to call it, claptrap, still possess over many people. So far as I can see, it is perfectly easy to be a highly successful Secretary of State for a short time. As long as you continue to talk about a nation in arms, national duties, reservoirs, and all the rest of it, people are ready to applaud you to the echo. But there is no particular merit in this. It is merely a question of practice. Anybody who has had practice in public speaking can turn out these unimpeachable sentiments. In fact, you do not require a human being to do it; it can be done just as well by a gramaphone. It is only when you begin to act that you are found out.

I should like to ask sober and common-sense people why this particular Secretary of State should be expected to succeed where his predecessors were supposed to have failed. There are two explanations. One is the extremely unflattering one, which I decline to accept myself, that all his predecessors were incompetent men. The second alternative is that his predecessors never gave the voluntary system a fair chance. Well, I am aware that there is a sort of lingering superstition that there is an immense amount of untapped patriotism, so to speak, in this country. It really seems to be thought by many persons here that every able-bodied man in this country has got somewhere about him a sort of bump of patriotism which only requires to be touched in order to develope him into a red-hot patriot, and apparently the agency by which this patriotism is to be invoked is the agency of the County Associations.

As to the County Associations, I confess that I see nothing to admire in the idea. Surely national defence is the duty, not of local bodies, but of the Government, and it appears to me that this is nothing but a mean-spirited attempt on the part of the Government or the War Office to transfer their obligations to local authorities, and eventually, I suppose, to saddle on the rates to some extent the Territorial Army. How, as a matter of fact, can these Associations have any effect at all upon the spirit of volunteering? It is gratifying, more especially in view of the attacks which are now being made upon land, to observe the excessive confidence which is placed in that somewhat archaic official the Lord-Lieutenant; but, after all, what power of peaceful persuasion does a Lord-Lieutenant possess? How can he or anybody else on the proposed Associations induce an unwilling man to enter the Territorial Army? It appears to me that to these Associations will be assigned the somewhat undignified task of endeavouring to persuade a small fraction of the population to discharge what ought to be a national duty. I feel inclined to suggest, as a motto for these Associations, something of this kind: "We expect that every man in this country will find some other man or boy to do his duty for him." That is really the principle upon which they will be expected to work, and even supposing that they do get into working order it is perfectly clear that everything in the nature of uniformity will be practically impossible.

To return for a few seconds to the question of the present Secretary of State and his predecessors. On the whole, it is not fair to charge any of those gentlemen with failure. It is not my noble friend Lord Midleton who has failed; it is not Mr. Arnold-Forster who has failed; it is not even Mr. Haldane who is about to fail; what has really failed is the voluntary system. Let us be honest if we can. I, at all events, desire to be honest, and I do not impute any fault to these distinguished men. I attribute their failure solely and simply to the voluntary system. As a country we are exactly in the position of a man who has got an excellent carriage which has seen better.days while all his neighbours possess motor cars. He finds that he is unable to get as much work out of his carriage as he would like, and he sends for various experts to give him advice. One expert suggests a new wheel, another that the seating accommodation should be altered, the third proposes something else, and the fourth —and this is the most acceptable proposal of all—suggests that the whole thing should be covered with a new coat of paint. That is exactly the position we are in when we talk about military reform.

The voluntary system does not give us the number we require; it never has given us the number we require and it never will. The voluntary system clearly broke down a few years ago, and to my mind this Bill is absolute and convincing proof that the voluntary system is recognised on every side to have broken down. I can prove it in this way. Your Territorial Army is fixed at 300,000 men. Upon what do you base those figures? They are not based on your military necessities in the least, but solely on the fact that 300,000 is the largest number you can count on getting under the voluntary system. Nothing has excited greater criticism in this Bill than the proposal that the training of these troops should not begin until after war has broken out. Why is this? There is nobody here, I take it, who will assert that training after war has broken out is better than training before war has broken out. But the evident reason why the Government have been compelled to act in this way is that if you were to exact six months training from recruits before they joined the Territorial Army you would not get any men in continuous employment under conditions of that kind. As far as I am concerned, I do not believe you will even get the training after hostilities have broken out, because after what occurred in 1889 I doubt whether any Government would have the courage to call out these men. Therefore, we should be reduced to this, that when the Regular Army and the Militia had left this country we should be obliged to keep our Fleet chained round our shores in order to give the country some sense of confidence.

I do not feel that I have any particular right to speak on this question, but there is one point which I desire to touch upon before I sit down. I listened with considerable attention to the speeches from the Front Opposition Bench, and I must admit with regret that, although those speeches were no doubt admirable as regards their quality of destructive criticism, they offered no alternative at all. To use the jargon of the day, the Government Bill holds the field. The only real alternative is that proposed by the noble and gallant Field Marshal Earl Roberts and my noble friend Lord Milner. Unfortunately, those two distinguished Members of your Lordships' House apparently do not count. They represent—and I am proud to call myself one of their followers—a great and growing opinion of the country, but they evidently do not command much confidence upon either of the Front Benches. It is curious to observe the different estimates in which the opinion of the noble and gallant Field Marshal is held according as he happens to agree or disagree with the Government. When the noble and gallant Earl agrees with the Government he is triumphantly cited in favour of their plan as the greatest military authority of the age. But when he disagrees he is politely ignored by both Front Benches, just as much by the Front Bench on this side as by the Front Bench on the other, as if he were some obscure retired Militia major with a grievance, or somebody of that kind. My noble friend Lord Milner does not count either. Personally I attach a great deal more importance to the opinion of the noble and gallant Earl and of my noble friend Lord Milner than I do to that of most other people. I attach more importance to their opinion than even to that of my noble friends Lord Salisbury and Lord Donoughmore, who have spoken from the Front Opposition Bench in the course of this debate. Lord Roberts and Lord Milner have at all events the courage of their opinions. They are not afraid to say, and in my humble way I say too, that the voluntary system has broken down, that you cannot put it right until you have recourse to universal service, and that universal service must be a statutory obligation. I maintain that this is the only logical attitude. We are always being told, and more even now than at any other time, that it is the duty of every man to defend his country. If it is the duty of every man to defend his country, why in Heaven's name and in the name of commonsense is it left optional for him to do so when other things are made obligatory upon him? And if it is absolutely essential to our safety, as we have been told over and over again, that we should have a great trained reserve, why, again, do we leave it to chance and the County Associations? I have listened with the greatest pain to the deplorable utterances of my noble friends on the Front Opposition Bench with regard to this question of compulsion. It appears to me that their horror and their hatred of even the mildest form of compulsion, such as is suggested by the National Service League, is such that they are literally prepared not only to run any risks, but apparently to see the country actually conquered or annihilated rather than adopt a system of compulsion.

THE EARL. OF DONOUGHMORE

No.

LORD NEWTON

They will not have it. But it is all very well to say "No."

THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY

I beg the noble Lord's pardon; I do not know whether he thinks he is representing my views, but I said that compulsory service was not necessary I did not say I would not adopt it if it was necessary.

LORD NEWTON

I am glad to have drawn that amount of repentance from the noble Marquess, because being a young man I feel sure he will live long enough to regret having made the statement to which I alluded. But my noble friend below me (the Earl of Donoughmore) has not cleared himself. They both went out of their way to applaud the equally deplorable sentiments uttered by speakers last night. If you are going absolutely to refuse to discuss at all the question of compulsion merely because it may involve some personal inconvenience, it seems to me that the sooner we sweep away all this talk about national defence and Army reform the better, because it becomes little more than a farce.

I have only one other matter to refer to, and that is with regard to voting for this Bill. We are asked to vote for this Bill because it is the last and final chance for the voluntary system. If I really thought that was the case I would vote for it with the greatest pleasure. If anybody could assure me that that was a true statement, and that compulsion would follow if this Bill were not a success, I would gladly vote for it; but I am afraid I cannot regard the Bill as anything but an immense and solemn sham. It is a Bill which was not brought in in the least in order to meet the military requirements of the nation. It is a Bill brought in in order to redeem rash pledges made during the election and at other times in favour of economy and so forth; it is a Bill brought in for political reasons; it has been emasculated and altered also for political reasons, and that being so I personally prefer to have nothing to do with it.

LORD RAGLAN

My Lords, when we come to look at what this Bill contains we find nothing whatever except the dry bones on which the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for War proposes to hang the newest War Office scheme. There is nothing whatever that we can discover from the Bill itself, and that being so the next thing we should refer to would be the speeches of the Secretary of State himself. The right hon. Gentleman has made a great many speeches; I do not believe any man in this world holding the office he holds has ever talked so much and said so little. If by any chance he has made a speech which appeared to contain some glimmerings of a system or of a principle, he has always hastened shortly afterwards to make another speech in exactly the opposite direction. When he first came into office he made a great many speeches, and the bulk of them might have been made by the noble and gallant Earl Lord Roberts. My noble friend below me has alluded to those speeches, and, therefore, I will not detain your Lordships by further quoting from them. But of late the right hon. Gentleman— I suppose in consequence of some political pressure—has altered his position, and the last few speeches he has made might be fitly put into the mouth of that Member of another place who is the proud father of an innocent-minded boy of fourteen years of age who as yet is untainted by militarism.

Then we come to the Bill as introduced in this House and the speech of the Undersecretary of State for War, from whom we might have expected some information. But the noble Earl is like the needy knife-grinder: he had no tale to tell us at all; and it was not until we heard Lord Lucas, whose most interesting and informing speech we listened to with so much pleasure last night, that any details or any inkling of what was really behind this Bill was vouchsafed to your Lordships. I am afraid I must, with all respect, put the speech of the noble Earl the Secretary of State for the Colonies in the same category, as I did not get much information from it. That being so, let us turn from the speeches of these high officials to what they have actually done.

I will take first the question of the Regular Army. The right hon. Gentleman, the Secretary of State for War has done two things which to my knowledge have never been done by any other Secretary of State for War since such a person has existed in this country. First of all, he has reduced the Regular Army to below what it was before the late war. As a rule, after a war the Regular Army has been largely reduced, but it has always remained stronger than the establishment before the war. In this case, however, the right hon. Gentleman bas not only abolished all the additions that ware made to the Regular Army for the purposes of the war, but also additions made before the war. In the second place, the right hon. Gentleman has largely reduced the pay of the Regular Army. Never has faith been broken with men to the extent and to the amount that it has been broken with those men who entered the Army on the understanding that they were to receive service pay. From 20,000 to 30,000 men have had their pay reduced from 2d. to 8d. a day, and that loss falls with excessive force upon those branches of the service who receive corps pay—engineers, army service men, and various other tradesmen whom you wish to attract to the Army by good pay and generous treatment.

Then I should like to say a word with regard to the riding-masters. The British cavalry has had every possible fault found with it on every possible occasion, but if there is one thing upon which everybody is agreed, it is that there is no force in the world which rides anything like as well as the British cavalry. That being so, what can one put it down to except to the fact that the instruction of the riding-masters is of the very best description? These officers have been swept away and an adjutant is to take on their duties. I do not know what is the case in the Regular Army, but in my own regiment the duties of the office have about trebled within the last five years, and I do not see how much time the adjutant is going to spare from the task of grappling with the mass of correspondence for the instruction of recruits in the riding-school. It is still more remarkable when you think that this great Liberal Government, which considers itself to represent the democracy of the country, has proceeded to reduce the number of officers who are promoted from the ranks. The position of riding-master peculiarly suited men promoted from the ranks. It gave them an assured position and a respectable pension; but now the whole of the cavalry will be deprived in future of that particular form of promotion.

I now come to the Militia. I am afraid I cannot take the same rose-coloured view that is taken by my noble friend on the Front Opposition Bench. This scheme is the end and the abolition of the Militia. It is no use saying otherwise. Do not let noble Lords deceive themselves. To show that I am making no mistake I will quote a few words from the letter of the military correspondent of The Times, who appears to know considerably more about the scheme than anybody else, including the Secretary of State for War himself. The words he used on Friday, 21st June, were these— Until we know what the attitude of the Militia will be, nothing is finally settled. The Militia arc the best judges of their own interests, and they must decide for themselves what they will do. I do not think we are going to have much chance of doing that. In order to leave no opening for misconception hereafter, it is necessary to remark that whether the old Militia keeps or loses its name of Militia in the.3rd and 4th battalions it will in effect wholly' cease. Let us not, then, deceive ourselves in any way: the Militia does entirely disappear.

If I might mention a personal matter, I am chairman of the Militia Rifle Association, which is the only central body which in any way represents the Militia, and therefore I venture to address your Lordships at some length on this matter, because I represent the feeling and opinion of the force. I must go back for a few moments to matters of history, and I will take first the Crimean War. Your Lordships will remember that the Militia was embodied for a considerable period during the Crimean War and the Mutiny. After the war, for some years— certainly for a year or two— the greater part of the regiments were not trained. The Militia regiments were not kept up to strength, and no attempt was made to recruit them in any way. The first attempt made to deal with the Militia was in 1866, I think, when a Committee was appointed. General Peel was Minister for War, and the Militia Reserve was formed. The original idea of the Militia Reserve was that they should be supernumerary to the establishment of the Militia. There is one remarkable tiling about Army reform in this country, and that is, that while all the things which are detrimental to the Militia always remain, anything which is for the good of the Militia always drops out; and although the Militia Reserve remained, the question of making them supernumerary to the Militia absolutely dropped out.

Then I come to Lord Card well's scheme to which the Under-Secretary of State referred us. Lord Cardwell's scheme has given us the Regular Army which we now possess. But I think the noble Earl forgot—possibly he does not know— that the whole of Lord Cardwell's scheme was based on a largely increased Militia, dependent, in the first place, on voluntary enlistment, but to be made up by ballot if voluntary enlistment would not fill the ranks. There again the whole of Lord Cardwell's scheme went through, with the exception of the one portion which would benefit the Militia, the resuscitation of the, ballot being dropped. What happened? The Militia was brought closer to the Regular Army, with the result that the recruiting of the Militia was moved out of the hands of the Militia into the hands of the Regular Army. That meant that the recruiting of the Militia ceased to be anybody's particular business, and it became merely a side issue of recruiting for the Regular Army. The old Militia permanent adjutants, who had their disadvantages, were abolished, and adjutants were sent for short periods from the Army, and they were judged not by what they had done for the Militia regiments to which they were attached, but by the number of recruits they induced to transfer to the Regular Army. Therefore the whole result of Lord Cardwell's reform was that the Militia was very much damnified in every possible way.

Another horrible thing that happened about that time was that some abominable person invented the expression "Auxiliary Forces." I do not know who he was, but if ever there was a man who injured his country it was that person. The expression "Auxiliary Forces" was used to wrap up three absolutely distinct forces, serving under different conditions with different ideas, different feelings, and different sentiments, and nothing has done more harm to those three bodies than that enforced triangular sort of management.

I now come to the War. The Duke of Bedford some time back expounded to your Lordships at some length the very great services which the Militia rendered during the War. Those services are forgotten as though the War had never taken place. The short memory of this country is amazing. The dust and smoke of war has hardly cleared away before the fact that you employed 100,000 Militia in South Africa is forgotten as though it had never taken place. But the officers and men of the Militia remember it, many of them to their cost. Those who have had no experience cannot be aware of the immense amount of hardship which was inflicted upon both officers and men and unflinchingly borne by them by the prolonged embodiment of the War. I could give your Lordships a dozen cases where the entire livelihood of an officer was lost by his volunteering for a duty which he had not originally agreed to do.

Then came the advent of my noble friend Lord Midleton to the War Office. He was the first Secretary of State for War for a great many years who attempted to do anything whatever for the Militia. First of all, he largely increased the pay during the training. He levelled up the pay of the non-commissioned ranks to that of the corresponding ranks in the Regular Army. He largely increased the bounties and established a system of bounties during the non-training period. It has been said constantly by those who apparently are determined to depreciate the Militia that in spite of the enormous cost the Militia has gone down in numbers. There are certain reasons for that. If your Lordships will take the trouble to turn to the returns of the Militia for the years following the Crimean War, you will see that prolonged embodiment which gives to the Militia work which a great many of the men never contemplated, or at any rate looked upon as exceedingly unlikely, when they originally enlisted, always exercises and must exercise a deterrent effect upon recruiting, for a certain period. You must also remember that the increased recruiting consequent upon the war somewhat anticipated the recruiting crop of ensuing years; that is to say, a certain number of men enlisted both in the Regular Army and in the Militia who would not then have enlisted had it not been for the war. I can assure your Lordships, and I think every Militiaman in this House will agree, that if it had not been for those non-training bounties introduced by my noble friend the Militia to-day would have been in a parlous condition.

Then there is another thing that my noble friend Lord Midleton did. He took up the question of the proper training of officers. He threw open a large number of courses to officers and set aside £ 10,000 in the first year for the pay and allowance of officers while going through those courses. Another thing done while my noble friend was at the War Office was the reduction of the number of deputy-lieutenants, and the establishment of an age below which a gentleman should not be appointed to that high office. As a result of that, it is now not so easy for a young man, who should be serving his country, by the payment of a three-guinea fee to obtain a quasi-military uniform in which to go to the Levee. To that extent it must have been a benefit in turning the minds of those gentlemen who wish to have pretty clothes in the direction of officering, as they should, the Auxiliary Forces. All these things were carried through in face of the bitterest opposition from the military. A distinguished general officer said to me, "I hope you will never be too good; I shall oppose your being made good as much as possible, because if you become too good they may reduce us." I think that is a view— I; regret to think it, because it is a very short-sighted and unpatriotic: view— which has been taken by a great many Regular officers towards the Militia.

My noble friend was succeeded at the War Office by Mr. Arnold-Forster. One of the first things Mr. Arnold-Forster did was to increase the standard of height for the Militia. At one fell swoop that change removed from the Militia that very large body of young men who are in the habit of entering the force because they are a little below the standard of the Regular Army, or for the purposes of "feeding up" for the Regular Army, or to see if they like a soldier's life. At one stroke of the pen all those men were kept from the force, and the Militia is blamed for being under its establishment. I will not dwell on the Report of the Norfolk Committee, except to say that the noble and gallant Earl, Lord Roberts, in his evidence before that Committee, made one statement about the Militia which has been made the most of and supplemented and used as the text in the campaign of depreciation which has been carried on for the last year or two against the Militia.

I now come to the present Secretary of State for War. The right hon. Gentleman appointed a Committee which, were I not following the example of My noble friend the Under-Secretary of State, I should hesitate to call the "Duma," to go into the whole question of the Auxiliary Forces. It was my fate, in concert with certain other noble friends and various commanding officers, to be summoned to that "Duma," where certain questions were put to us. The first question asked was, Is the Militia prepared to accept enlistment for service abroad in case of emergency? To that we unanimously answered, It is. Then they asked, Is the Militia prepared to accept drafting by individuals to the Regular Army? We all said that it was not. A remarkably unfair use has been made of that meeting. The Secretary of State for War said that the Militia officers had refused to find drafts. The military correspondent of The Times has used practically the same expression. I quite agree with my noble friend the Duke of Bedford on this matter. I was asked for my opinion — I imagine it was considered to be of some value or it would not have been asked for— and I gave it, because I knew that if you persisted in this course you would not get the men to enlist. That is what happened, and it was then said that we were of no use and ought to be abolished. That, however, by the way. It was very remarkable that that statement should have been made by the Secretary of State for War, because he has or should have in his possession the Report sent in and signed by the members of the "Duma" at that very meeting, and no words used in that Report would even hint that the officers of the Militia had refused to do anything whatever. I ask His Majesty's Government, Will they lay on the Table of the House that Report? I do not think it can be called a confidential document. If the War Office are not prepared to do that, I call on the Secretary of State for War to withdraw the statements that he has made about the Militia colonels.

Now I come to the present proposals. First, with regard to the third battalions. These ideas have been in the air for some considerable period, and a great many Militia battalions have been training. Have any Militia battalions been asked if they will transfer to these new third battalions? If they have, what has been the result? If they have not, why have the War Office been afraid to ask them? I will ask your Lordships to dwell for a moment on the position of the Militia commanding officer of one of these battalions which is to be turned into a third battalion. First of all, it is pointed out that no Militia officer under the age of thirty-five will ever be anything except an honorary major retired into the Reserve without any retaining fee at all. A very noble position, showing the gratitude of the country for services rendered! It is quite clear that no Militia officer above the rank of captain is wanted at all in these third battalions, or will ever have the chance of seeing them. Under no possibility whatever will he go to war. I do not command a battalion of this sort, as I belong to a different arm. But supposing I did command one of these battalions, I am to be asked to go to the men and say, "I hope you will take on this gigantic increase of liability in the very manner which you dislike most, for no extra pay whatever except a £ 2 bounty, which is hedged round with all sorts of conditions; I hope you will do it, but I am not going to take it on myself." Is that a fair position in which to put any commanding officer? I do not consider that you can in decency ask any officer and gentleman to do a thing of that sort.

Then with regard to officers of the Militia. By a stroke of the pen they are to be turned into officers of the Reserve of Officers. It must be known even at the War Office that the number of officers in the Militia as now constituted is exceedingly small. Is there any proposal in this scheme that is likely to increase the number of officers prepared to devote a substantial part of the year to training themselves as soldiers? They will have no mess, because I do not believe the regiments are going to be trained as battalions. The only person who attempted to give us any information on this matter was Lord Lucas, who hummed and hated and said it was a matter for future consideration. That they will not be trained as battalions is, I think, plain. They will have no mess, no home; they will not go to war with their own units — which will not matter so much because they will never see a unit. They will have no battalion training whatever, and will enjoy none of the camaraderie of living in mess, which is the whole essence of the British Army. What is to be the reward for which you are going to get this vast influx of young so-called Reserve officers? £ 20 a year, or about 7s. a week ! For that magnificent sum of money you are going to get as officers an immense number of gentlemen who, as things are now, cannot give the time necessary to serve in the Militia. No regimental mess, no unit to belong to, liable to be sent as drafts here or there to any branch or arm of the service—I do not for a moment believe you will get one-tenth of the officers you have had.

Then as to the men, which is really the point put to us. I have had twenty years experience of the Militia, and if I do not know what the average Militiaman thinks the sooner I am kicked out with ignominy the better. I am the more entitled to say that I do know because I am one of those fortunate people— there are not many of them—who do their own recruiting and are not interfered with practically by anybody. They try to interfere with me, but I do my best to ward them off. What are you offering the men? I am not talking of the present Militia. I will not lay down any figures, but next year when we are discussing this matter I shall be very much surprised if 10 per cent. of the men now serving have transferred into this new force. Quite lately it has been the fashion— I think it is part of the campaign of calumny against the force— to say that the Militia competes and interferes with the Regular Army in that it recruits exactly the same class of men, and that if the Militia could be abolished recruiting for the Regular Army would ipso facto become magnificent. If there is anything absolutely untrue from start to finish it is that remarkable idea, which nevertheless has got into the War Office. Its falsity can be proved in this way. The War Office acknowledge that every year 12,000 men go from the Militia to the Regular Army. But there are 90,000 Militiamen. Therefore there must be something like 80,000 who do not want to go to the Regular Army.

But putting that aside, how can you induce young men to enlist in this new force? What do you offer them? You ask the recruit to go and do six months at the depot and he has to go to the depot for his annual training. If there is one thing on which all Militiamen are agreed it is that nothing has ruined recruiting for the Militia more than the fact that recruits have to be trained at the depots of the line. From the moment the recruit puts his nose inside the barrack gate, everybody from the colonel to the drummer boy is bullying him to transfer to the Regular Army. If he is a fairly strong-minded man he may get through his recruit's course without being transferred to the Regular Army. But in future this unfortunate person is not only to do his recruit's course at the depot, but he is to have this experience every year, and from the moment he enters the gate for his annual training—which will probably be coal carrying or whitewashing the barrack-room—everybody will be at him to transfer. It seems to me to be a most remarkable and extraordinary thing that people should think it possible to get a considerable force of men to enlist under these conditions. Then, my Lords, I think the six months universal recruit training will interfere very largely with the recruiting for the Regular Army, because that period may take them right through the winter. As to the fortnight's training that is perfectly ludicrous. We have Reports of an endless number of Commissions declaring that the month's training was not sufficient to make the Militia into a force able to face the picked troops of foreign nations, but here you propose to cut down that exiguous training to a fortnight. I do not think the increased recruits' training will anything like make up for the diminution of the annual training.

Then there is another point. At present there are 12,000 recruits a year who go from the Militia to the Regular Army. If the Militia disappear, then the 12,000 troops will also disappear. How is that wastage to be made good? Will it be from the new third battalion? Are they to be permitted to enlist in the Regular Army? If not, where are you going to get your 12,000 men? If they are, what happens to the Reserve which these 500 men battalions are supposed to be going to give you? With regard to the establishment of these battalions, what number of men fit for foreign service does the War Office imagine that one of these third battalions, with an establishment of 500 men, is going to produce? The bulk of these men will be boys under twenty years of age; there will be more young recruits than in the present Militia battalion of the same kind.

There is one point upon which I should like to offer the Under-Secretary of State for War my hearty and sincere sympathy. That is when he comes to decide the battalions to be reduced. I remember when there was a question of reducing a Militia battalion which had very nearly reduced itself. It had got down to three officers and 120 men, and it was considered advisable to reduce it. If we had proposed to abolish the Crown and Constitution there could hardly have been more row created; and when the Secretary of State for War and his military advisers begin to tackle this delicate question, I think they will wish they had never touched it at all.

There are three favourite fallacies which appear to be indigenous in the War Office. I had hoped that on moving into the new buildings some of the obsolete microbes might have been left behind, but I do not think they have. All these old fallacious are being trotted out again. The first is the love for changing names. We have an instance of that in this new so-called Territorial Force. The second fallacy is that it is possible to lengthen a blanket by cutting a piece off one end and sewing it on the other. That is an idea which has been prevalent at the War Office for many years, but the present régime is responsible for the first time for suggesting that you can cut off a foot from one end and by sewing six inches on the other make a longer article. The first fallacy is very innocuous, if somewhat silly; the second is so evidently wrong that sooner or later it is bound to be found out; but the third is a very serious and grave danger, namely, that it is possible under a voluntary system to dictate to men the terms on which they shall join the Auxiliary Forces. That belief dies very hard in the War Office, and is apparently very prevalent there now. No warning from those who have a right to consider themselves experts and no amount of experience appears to make any difference. One of the greatest dangers of this scheme is to my mind that it appears to consider it possible to induce men to enlist on your own terms. I do not believe that you can, and I regret to see it in the forefront of the Ministerial proposals. Schemes are all very well, but, after all, the whole thing boils down to this: will Tom Smith or Bill Jones join these particular forces? They care nothing about schemes, or Army corps, or divisions, or third battalions; what they want to know is what they are going to do, whether they will have a pleasant time, and what they are going to get. You must consult the feelings and the sentiments of the people. I will not touch upon the Yeomanry, as many of your Lordships are better acquainted with that force than I am.

With regard to the Territorial Army, as my noble friend Lord Donoughmore says, it is the Volunteers under another name, with the same organisation, the name system, the same training, the name numbers, and the same feelings. But it will be deprived of its regular adjutants, which I can hardly think is a good move. It will be instructed by those peripatetic gentlemen of whom we have heard so much, who are to go riding about the country on bicycles. I think they will have a pretty busy time, as they have to train the third battalions, the recruits in the depot, and buzz about on bicycles to train the Territorial Army. I do not think there will be much competition for posts on the staff. There is to be no increase of liability whatever on the Volunteers. All the beautiful arrangement as to enlisting, purchasing discharge, and so forth, has disappeared, and the only thing that remains is that the scheme is to cost more than the old Volunteers did.

Then I come to the County Associations. If there is a class which is anathema to His Majesty's Government it is the country gentlemen. They have been threatened by Ministers of the Crown with all sorts of dreadful fates, and now this great democratic Government comes hat in hand and says, Will you be so good as to come and help us? In old France it used to be said that the nobles fought for everybody, the priests prayed for everybody, and the people paid for everybody. In the new England the classes will fight for everybody, because all question of training the children of the masses as cadets has been dropped out of the Bill; they will pay pretty heavily for everybody in taxation, and they will pay for everybody over again in subscriptions; the masses are apparently not to be trained to fight; they are not to pay any particular taxes, and they are not to be taught to pray for their country. I do not think that that is exactly the way in which the working classes should look at a question of this sort.

Just one word with regard to the "Duma." The noble Viscount who presided over the "Duma "was also a Member of the Defence Committee. I wish it were possible for him to tell us what the "Duma" recommended with regard to the Auxiliary Forces, why it was recommended, and what the Defence Committee think of those recommendations. You take 30,000 out of your Regular Army, you abolish 90,000 Militia, you think you may possibly get 50,000 or 60,000 for the new force—which I do not believe; all the lest that we have heard is mere vague generalities; everything will have to be modified when the details are gone into. I believe the details have never been thought over; I am sure that the financial arrangements have never been considered. I think this House ought to be very careful in a matter of this sort. It ought to require a full and clear explanation of all the details and a frank exposition of the reasons for the adoption of this scheme, so that we may have a thorough understanding of it.

LORD HAVERSHAM

My Lords, I share with my noble friend Lord Elgin the desire to point out to the House some of the inconsistencies which appear in the speech of the noble Viscount who led the debate last night. The noble Viscount spoke in very laudatory tones of the large increase of our Regular Forces which took place during the administration of the noble Marquess opposite in the period 1895 to 1900. Then he said, "You have done away with all that increase; what can possibly justify that reduction?" That was all very well, but later on in his speech when referring to the financial aspects of the question he turned round altogether, and said that no one had any doubt as to the mandate which the Government had received to reduce expenditure on the Army and Navy. I do not think that anybody who recollects the events of the last general election will disagree with that statement. Every Liberal candidate declared that he would vote for a large reduction of expenditure on the Army at any rate, and when we remember that Army expenditure has increased by £9,750,000 in eight years we cannot be surprised that the country is determined upon that point. The noble Viscount also stated that he had again and again told the House of Commons that if they wanted to reduce the Army Estimates it could only be done by reducing the strength of the Army. I quite agree with him. Like the noble Viscount, I have been engaged in the duty of preparing Estimates for the House of Commons, and I am positive that you can never make any substantial diminution in the Army Estimates unless you considerably reduce the number of men. It is not only that there is a large reduction in the Vote for pay, but other Votes, such as for transport, clothing, and medical services, all depend upon the number of men. Consequently I cannot conceive how Mr. Haldane could carry out the mandate of the country and the wishes of the Liberal Party unless he took the only possible means in his power of reducing the Estimates by decreasing the number of men. Mr. Haldane took that view. He has reduced the Army Estimates by £2,000,000 and the Army itself by not 20,000 or 30,000 men, but by 14,000 men—from 204,000 to 190,000.

The only question that occurs to my mind is, that reduction being inevitable in our position, was it carried out in the most advantageous manner? The reduction affected both the Foot Guards and the Line. Up to 1896 the whole of the duty of the Foot Guards was performed adequately and satisfactorily by seven battalions. The noble Marquess opposite increased the establishment of the Guards by two battalions, and he added afterwards a third battalion by creating the Irish Guards. He did that for a particular purpose— a very laudable purpose; he intended to send them to garrison the Mediterranean, but they never went. Consequently they were entirely redundant to the establishment in London, there were no barracks for them here, and they were sent down to Aldershot, for a long period. That was most unpopular with the officers. They did not object to being there during the drill season or when they could learn the duties of their profession, but to be kept for a long time away from London seems to be very hard. There is no other country that does this. If you go to St. Petersburg, Vienna, or Berlin, you find the Guards employed about the person of the Sovereign and quartered in the capital. The Inspector-General of the Forces informed me that so short was service in the Guards and so long the time they were kept at Aldershot that many of the men never did any London duty at all. This told upon the officers, and there was no longer that number of competitors for commissions that there had been before. Various things were tried. Probationers were appointed, but the experience of the Scots Guards did not show that the experiment was very successful. The fact remained that by no manner of means could the number of commissions be filled up. The Scots Guards were never able to replace the numbers they ought to have until one battalion was reduced, and the Grenadier Guards are not full now. Only the other day at a great meeting of the old officers of the regiment Col. St. Aubyn informed us that there were absolutely not sufficient officers to go round. That being so it is perfectly clear that so far as officers are concerned no diminution, but rather an increase, of efficiency will be caused by reduction.

Then with regard to the rank and file. Here is the report about recruiting for the Foot Guards in 1896— Recruiting for the Foot Guards, while showing a decided increase over the numbers taken for the corresponding period last year, hag not been sufficient to bring the several regiments up to establishment. The report for 1907 says— Recruiting for Foot Guards shows a decrease over the numbers during the preceding year. Therefore neither in officers nor in men can you fill up these ten battalions.

I maintain therefore that for these and other reasons Mr. Haldane was fully justified in carrying out his reductions. He found that they were redundant to the home duties, and they were not to be included in the striking force. It must be remembered that the Guards at all times have a very large reserve from their short-service system from which to fill up their battalions when going on service, but they are incapable of finding drafts for the Indian battalions, and they can never be used in that way until they have longer service.

Another point was the reduction in the line. Last year in this House it was said, and not at the moment denied because the debate ended, that we were denuding Malta of troops. I wish to show how far that is from the truth. The garrison in Malta for many years had not been more than 5,300 men. At the close of the last Administration it had been brought up to 9,352. The hygienic state of the garrison was so bad from the crowded state of the barracks that I brought the question before the House of Commons, and asked Mr. Arnold-Forster what he was going to do about it. He said he could not give an affirmative answer in regard to withdrawing the troops, because the whole question of the Mediterranean garrisons was before the Cabinet. Mr. Haldane as soon as he had the power reduced this garrison, and it now stands at 7,500, which is considerably more than it was in olden times, although considerably less than during the mischievous period which caused so much loss among the troops. But at the very moment when we were withdrawing these 1,700 men from Malta, we were finding 1,700 men to increase the garrison in Egypt. So that the one balances the other, and so far from denuding the Mediterranean garrisons we are leaving those two garrisons in precisely the same position us before. With regard to South Africa, although the third and fourth battalions which were raised for the war have been withdrawn, we have replaced them with an entire regiment of cavalry and raised by seventy or eighty men every battalion in the Colonies, so that the nine battalions in South Africa together with their increase make up another battalion. Ceylon loses a wing of a regiment of about 500 men, but receives an increase of a whole native battalion of considerably greater strength. So that the reductions come to this—that one battalion only is withdrawn from Gibraltar.

With regard to this particular Bill, I think it is an honest attempt to make out of the heterogeneous forces of the Crown one homogeneous body. At present there is no connection whatever between the Militia, the Volunteers, and the Yeomanry. They are not under the same regulations, they are not paid the same rates, they are not exercised together, they are not under the same command. In future, at any rate, a great deal of this will be remedied. It must surely be a good thing that we should divide them in fourteen divisions with their own Brigadier-Generals and Brigade-Majors, going out at the same time so that they can be exercised together, and be trained to a certain extent alike. I cannot help thinking that this will be satisfactory so far as it goes. The noble Viscount the other day said that Colonel Pollock, who has had a great deal to do with drilling these new recruits, had expressed himself very unfavourably, saying he would not lead them into the field. I read what he said the other day; it may not have been the same occasion, but what he said then was this— I taught 100 men a good deal that a soldier ought to know, but it is ridiculous to believe that because 100 men or 100,000 or 1,000,000 men have learnt their work, you can call them soldiers unless in time of peace they are organised in the unit in which they will have to proceed to the front when wanted. That seems to me to be an entirely different statement. We are endeavouring to put them into units, and to give them the drill that Colonel Pollock-gives them, to place them in units, and utilise them as a Regular Army.

Just one regard with regard to the County Associations. The noble Marquess who addressed us to-day on the Militia said that he did not understand how their budget was to be framed, and he thought they would be very extravagant. If he will consult Mr. Haldane's speeches he will find that every year the County Association is to form its own financial budget. That will be gone into very carefully on the spot, and afterwards sent up to the War Office, where they will have to prove before the staff that there is no excess on any particular point. When the budget is approved the War Office will issue the money, but the whole will be carefully audited by civilians in the same way as the Local Government Board audits now.

As many other noble Lords desire to speak, what I should like to say of the County Associations had better be said on Clause 2 of the Bill. All I will do now is to touch upon one point, viz. the reserve of officers. I sincerely hope the Government will undertake to carry out the scheme of Sir Edward Ward and offer to all the public schools and universities the opportunity of sending their young men into these Auxiliary Forces. I firmly believe that this scheme is an honest attempt to make a homogeneous Army of our Auxiliary Forces. I earnestly trust that the Lord-Lieutenants the Deputy-Lieutenants and all of us who are landowners, will do all we can to assist the Government to achieve the object which is so laudably attempted in this Bill.

LORD AMPTHILL

My Lords, I do not, intend to make a speech; I have not come prepared to do so. But there are two things I must say. One is to remove a possible source of misunderstanding, and the other is to enter a protest. There is an impression abroad that something in the nature of a compromise has been arrived at in regard to the Militia. Whatever understanding there may be among other Members in this House, there are a number of us who do not admit that there has been any sort or kind of compromise. Under the Bill the Militia disappear, and that is a state of things which we cannot regard without; the gravest apprehension. What I wish to say, therefore, is that if there is any notion of a compromise, there are some of us— I speak for a good many— who cannot admit it, and we shall consider ourselves free to act accordingly when the Bill goes into Committee.

The other thing I wish to say is by way of protest. I regret that the noble Marquess against whose words I wish to protest is not here; but I should feel indeed cowardly if I did not take the first opportunity of standing up to defend the noble Earl, Lord Roberts, against the most unfair attack which the noble Marquess made upon him. The whole burden of the remarks of the noble Marquess was that Lord Roberts was an advocate of conscription, and then, having conjured up a purely imaginary picture of a vast conscript Army which he declared Lord Roberts wished to establish, he proceeded to pour ridicule upon it. Nothing could be more unfair or more inconsistent with the facts. I challenge anybody to find any word uttered by the noble and gallant Earl which will bear the interpretation that he is an advocate of conscription or; anything resembling a conscript Army. What the noble Earl is advocating — he has said it over and over again in the clearest and most unequivocal language— is universal military training. It would be just as illogical and just as absurd to say that it would be a mistake to teach every child in the country arithmetic because we do not want to have a nation of accountants, as to represent the scheme of the noble Earl as one for establishing a nation of con- script soldiers. I am proud to be a follower of the noble Earl in this matter. I am one of those who believe that we can do nothing with the voluntary system, and that we shall have sooner or later— I only hope it will come before it is too late— to resort to a system under that which is recognised and proclaimed by every statesman in the country to be a duty is enforced as a duty. If I had the time I could quote to your Lordships words on the part of the greatest statesmen of the country on both sides declaring it to be the absolute duty of every citizen to bear arms in defence of his country. A duty is necessarily that which is done under some form of compulsion, and if that is so, surely the only reasonable, consistent, and honest thing to do is to see that the duty is performed— the duty of learning to bear arms. I said I would not detain your Lordships, and I will resist the temptation to go on; but I could not allow the opportunity to pass without defending my noble and gallant friend who is absent from the misrepresentation of his remarks, which, although it was made by another noble friend of mine, I am bound to say I consider most unfair and extremely mischievous.

THE EARL OF DUNDONALD

My Lords, one can look at this Bill from two points of view, firstly as a plan by which a definite amount of money is expended to the best possible advantage; secondly as to whether the nation obtains in this plan a full and final arrangement of the military problem. Looking at the Bill from the first point of view— Is the scheme a good one; does the nation get full value for its money?— I have no hesitation in saying that in my opinion the organisation proposed to be effected by the Bill is a great improvement on that which exists at present. But I do not suppose that any Bill connected with the Army presented to your Lordships' House has ever depended so much on administration for its success or its failure as does this Bill.

With regard to the sufficiency of the Expeditionary or Striking Force proposed by the Government, it seems to me impossible to get what we may call a "sealed pattern" size of force by logic, unless we have a very large force indeed to provide against all contingencies. There are so many considerations to be thought of, the most important being the part that the Navy would take against our possible adversary. The size of the force has therefore evidently been settled on the basis of providing as large a force as the nation can afford without too much taxation.

Does the scheme before us provide the Expeditionary Force on the cheapest possible basis? I think it does. By use of Militia trained soldiers to supplement the first line when called out we get such a force as it would be impossible to get in any other way.

I will not weary your Lordships with detail, but I see no reason against supplementing the First Line artillery with ammunition columns manned by men trained on a Militia basis. I think it quite possible in certain localities and by recruiting the right type of man trained by good officers to provide men on the non-Regular basis to serve in the ammunition columns of the Expeditionary Force. I do not believe that a large number of first-rate men can be obtained in this way, but some with special aptitude, perhaps encouraged by an extra bonus for efficiency, will no doubt be forthcoming to replace casualties.

As regards Yeomanry serving as divisional cavalry in the First Line, it appears to me that if the men who enlist for first-line service in regiments of Yeomanry are only enlisted for a year, no invidious special class can be formed in a regiment; and the extra training of the men who belong to the special contingents for a year will permeate and improve the whole regiment. Some of the officers and non-commissioned officers might easily get more training over a longer period, As regards the capability of the Yeomanry to do divisional cavalry duty, I should say that their high level of intelligence, their knowledge of scouting and horse mastership will make them invaluable for the purpose.

Turning again to the scheme, will the Militia which is to back up the Army by enlisting for foreign service under new conditions of enlistment be able to do what is asked of it? It will probably get its officers if the advice of men like the Duke of Bedford is taken, and the sentiments and traditions of the force are respected; for in that case the powerful class who have always supplied officers for the Army and Navy will send their sons into it and give it their support.

The next point is, Will the force get its men? I desire, however, to raise a note of warning on this point. For many years this country has taken full advantage of the necessities, spirit of adventure, and want of business habits in making a contract of that unique and best product of these isles—the British private soldier. For a trifle— a sovereign— which he spent at once, he has agreed when in the Militia to join the Army Reserve; and at the time of the South African War many thousands of these men who agreed to take upon themselves all the risks of war for 20s. were sent out to South Africa, in many cases never to return. But, because we have got the Militia in the past so readily to take upon themselves war service in a foreign country, is it certain that we shall get men to join the Militia as reconstituted and with a liability to foreign service to the extent and at the price contemplated by this scheme? Personally I doubt it, and why do I doubt? I will tell your Lordships why. The success of our recruiting, both for the line and the Militia, has depended largely on the state of the labour market. Is the labour market, especially the unskilled labour market, going to be as favourable to recruiting in the future as it has been in the past?

Within the last few years— few months I may almost say— the vast lands of Canada are becoming known to our labouring population. The man with a stout heart and strong arms who has been our cheap fighting-man is daily, by the advance in the science of shipbuilding and transport, being brought nearer and nearer to the land where he can found a comfortable home for himself and his family. My Lords, the day of brave, cheap, willing, patient Tommy Atkins is passing, slowly, if you will, but it is passing away; while the day of the unskilled labourer with a stout heart and strong arms is coming in the great dominion of the West. Let old-age pensions be commenced by giving them as a reward to our soldiers for standing in the First Line of our defences. Let this be the first charge on the Chancellor of the Exchequer's old-age pension scheme. I strongly advise the Government to be just and generous to men who undertake liability for Reserve service, whether they join the Militia or the Army, remembering that the contract entered into is between a powerful Government and those who are not of mature years, and that this contract hampers the man in civil life.

Turning to the new Territorial Army scheme, the point that occurs to one first is, Will the men be obtained? On this point I have grave doubts. Even if the ranks are filled at first, will they continue to be filled? Will this force furnish that great reservoir of men trained to arms that the country ought to have? Even supposing the scheme gives us 300,000 men, this is not the nation in arms. This number represents only a little more than ¾ of 1 per cent. of the population of these islands, and imposes on the people, with all the forces of the Crown taken into consideration, only about one-sixth part of the military liability which the colony of Natal imposes by law on its inhabitants after they have arrived at the age of manhood.

If your Lordships do not mind listening to the experience of one who has had to do on a large scale with the very class of Army proposed to be created by this territorial scheme, I will repeat what I have already stated on several occasions, that it is not in my opinion possible to form any large unpaid citizen army without the military training of the youth of the country in cadet corps. On 10th July last year the Government appeared to be of the same opinion, for the noble Earl who represents the War Office in this House stated that— We at the War Office, although not in favour of compulsion, because we do not think it will he necessary, are in complete sympathy with any measure that would tend, not only for military, but for physical purposes, to promote the drilling of youth.? both in secondary and in elementary schools. Anyone who read this statement will naturally search in the Bill for evidence of the complete sympathy promised by the noble Earl; and will find that this complete sympathy has been shown by the insertion of a clause which provides that no school in receipt of a Government grant can be assisted by public money in the formation of cadet corps of youths under sixteen years. I shall be interested to hear what the soldiers on the Army ' Council think of this clause.

In conjunction with the provision of leaders and their efficient training which forms such an important element of this scheme, it would be possible to have a very fair Territorial Army even with the small amount of compulsory annual training of the rank and file contemplated by the Bill, provided the men were taught military formations, habits of discipline, and a knowledge of the rifle in their schoolboy days before they take up seriously the business of their lives, i.e., before the age of sixteen. Without this early training in their schoolboy days, neither sufficient men will be found to form a great reservoir of military strength for our requirements, nor will the number of days training contemplated by the Bill be sufficient for the purposes of efficiency. If more days training are exacted the men will not be forthcoming, so that, look at the matter how you will, one thing is certain, that if we are to avoid the risk of disaster on the one hand or compulsory training of the adult on the other, we must be driven to a very large training of the youth of the country before they arrive at the age when they enter upon their various civilian occupations.

If the country imagines that in passing this Bill into law, good as it is in many respects, a final settlement of the military problem has been arrived at, they will be much mistaken. This Bill will not satisfy our military requirements, for it will not give us that large number of trained men necessary for our security. Anyone who travels about the world knows that there are forces that make for peace; there are also other forces that make for war. Some of these are not ready yet. Now is the time to prepare —to make our country safe, and our Navy free to leave our shores; the time to make our great Colonial possessions certain of getting large reinforcements of trained men. This can only be done by dealing with this great question, but not in a half-hearted way that spells delay and may spell disaster.

THE MARQUESS OF BATH

My Lords, the Government have already heard from more than one Member of your Lordships' House that we do not look at this measure, at all from a Party point of view. It I rise to-night as one of those who have taken a modest part in the defensive forces of the country, and as a Member of the Yeomanry, I do so with the feeling that the case of that particular force might well be left where my noble friend Lord Scarbrough took it. But since the meeting that was held some time ago a large number of concessions have been made by the Secretary of State. Those concessions have largely met the points that we placed before him, but I would venture to urge that the concession of what has been called the period of grace should be extended to the men of the force. I cannot believe that it would make any great difference to the scheme of the right hon. Gentlemen. but it would make all the difference to the satisfactory maintenance of the force, It might lead to a certain expense, but that cannot be avoided in making great changes like this. The additional expense, however, would not be much, as the period is only three years, but it would enable us to get a large number of men who by then will prove themselves useful to the defensive forces of the country.

The difficulty of dealing with this measure is that it is entirely a skeleton measure, and that the concessions that have been made both to the Yeomanry and to the Militia are practically outside the Bill. But there is one matter to which I wish to allude from another point of view. In looking at Clause 1 of the Bill I am filled with feelings of disquietude. We have been told by the Secretary of State that it was his intention to call upon the lords-lieutenant to take an active part in the organisation of this Territorial Force, but in reading the clause which establishes the Associations there seems to be an idea of appointing other persons to the position which I certainly gathered it was intended that these gentlemen should fill. I hope it is the intention of the Government to ask those who occupy the position of lord'-lieutenant to take up this matter, and I hope when we get into Committee they will accept an Amendment making the point perfectly clear. I would further urge that when they are so appointed the position should not be a purely honorary one, but that the lord-lieutenant and president of the Association should have distinct powers. I should like to know what is the position of the chairman and vice-chairman when taken in conjunction with the presidency of the Association. You seem to have two officials each of whom is going to perform the same duties.

Speaking for myself, I am sure we shall be fully prepared as a body, whatever may be our opinions as to the probable future of this scheme, to do our best. To work the Associations we must have complete power and opportunity to do so. While, as I have said, I do not approach this measure with any Party feeling, I have a fear as to what its effect may be. You are destroying the old order of things without knowing what is to take its place or whether it will succeed, but I hope that, as has happened so often in the history of this country, that we shall muddle out of it somehow.

LORD CASTLETOWN

My Lords, I should like to say a few words in regard to this Bill, which I think will depend very largely for its success upon the manner in which it is administered. I would compliment my noble friend Lord Portsmouth upon the clear, concise, and patriotic manner in which he introduced the Bill. The scheme seems to me to be the only alternative to either compulsory training or conscription. It gives power to every young man to serve his country and do his duty by it. It gives him three alternatives. It enables a man if he chooses to go into the striking force, or he may go into what I call the relief force, or he may become a useful member of the Territorial Army. I was struck by the fact yesterday that my noble friend Lord Midleton apparently neither blessed nor condemned the Bill, and when I heard his speech I looked back to the years when the Party opposite were in power. I do not wish to introduce any Party tone into the debate which has been so thoroughly patriotic and common-sense, but if one looks back to those years and to all the schemes that were brought forward one remembers what was said by the Regulars, by the Yeomanry, and by the Militia. It was, What are they doing? — and the general reply was: ''They are messing the Army about." That is exactly what I think this scheme is not doing. There is a strong, clear, distinct striking force, there is a relief force, and there is a Territorial Army for home defence. You have in the striking force what has been an historical factor in all English history. In the history of Great Britain throughout the Army that has gone forth from this country has been a striking force. It has gone perhaps to other lands, where it has been amalgamated with or utilised by the Army of the part to which it went, and it has effected its work by being a striking force. The South African War was more or less an exception, such as I hope will never occur again. Then you have the factor that the Army Council has apparently said that this striking force is the type of force we require, and that the numbers are sufficient. We have to look to the Army Council for expert advice in this matter.

Perhaps, as the only representative in this House of the Irish Militia battalions, I may say a few words upon the Militia side of the question. I speak with a certain amount of knowledge, having served in the Regulars, in the Yeomanry, and in the Militia, and I believe I retire from the Militia this year on account of my time being up. My noble friend the Duke of Bedford, whose knowledge on this subject is so very extensive, I think dotted the is when he said that one serious point in the Bill is that it was requisite for some force or another to fill up any depletion there might be in the Regular ranks, and he asked how that was to be done. As I understand the Bill, the third and fourth battalions are to do a certain amount of this work. I would appeal to my noble friend the Under-Secretary of State to think over what I am about to say. I can endorse in many respects what Lord Raglan and the Duke of Bedford said with regard to the Militia. If the Militia are to keep on drafting men as individuals, you will find the value of the drafts deteriorating and becoming deficient. My noble friend brought forward a magnificent example of what I am afraid is not in this scheme. He quoted a few words from General Sherman on the Wisconsin Regiment, explaining how it was filled up by Wisconsin men and with Wisconsin officers, and how that regiment by the fact of being filled up with men who were locally known to those with whom they were side by side in the fighting line, governed and commanded by officers whom they knew, came by degrees to be considered as being as valuable as a brigade. That, is a most valuable example and factor of the whole question. May I put shortly before the House what happened in the South African War in exactly the opposite direction? It happened to the battalion which I have the honour to command, therefore I am speaking what I know. About 170 men were taken from that battalion and sent to South Africa—I think by mistake—without their officers and non-commissioned officers, and they were practically hurled about in different parts of South Africa among other regiments and men they knew nothing of. The result was that these men came back absolutely cowed by the life they had had to live, and it took us two or three years to get them to come back into the ranks and work with us. I think that shows the difference between working by units and working by individuals.

I have a profound belief in the great change that the Secretary of State made when he allowed the English Militia to come in on the same lines as the Irish, and I would ask him to go one step further, that he should work the Militia on the lines of the scheme as it is provided on the understanding that they shall be treated as units and not as mere individual feeders of the Regular Forces. I have had long experience and have seen what has been going on during recent years in regard to the Militia and. the Regular Forces. I make this statement with some diffidence and a certain amount of regret. Speaking as an old Regular I cannot understand why the Regular Forces will not try to work with the Militia. Why will they not work with us and for us? We are as anxious to help feed the Regular forces as they are anxious for our assistance, but they look down upon us either with suspicion or, I was going to say, contempt. I attach no blame in this matter to the Secretary of State for War, because he must get his advice from the Army Council who are experts. I attach no blame to him at all, but I do attach blame to the men who must know that the only way that you can make a real fighting force is to make these forces absolutely homogeneous— they must work together for one end, and every force, whether it be the striking force, or the Militia or the relieving force as I call it, or the Territorial Force, must be effective and work one with the other.

I believe the scheme is a very valuable one, and that if worked sympathetically and well, and with a desire to make it work—I lay stress on that—it will prove the best scheme that is possible for this country as we are circumstanced. I will not go into the question of compulsory training. The only people who could make compulsory training a necessity are the people themselves. When they ask for it, the Government will have to give it whatever the Government then may be. I do not share the distrust of my noble friend as to the County Associations taking up this question and not being able to manage it. Surely the County Associations can work up and look after the men in their own districts; you can hardly expect laymen and volunteers to be patriotic if the lords lieutenant, deputy lieutenants, and others do not take a deep interest in their work. I would like to endorse everything my noble friend Lord Raglan said on the subject of the Militia; I believe he agrees with me that the scheme is a valuable, able, clear, and distinct scheme, but I think he hopes, as I hope, that some assistance may be given to make it more workable by bringing in the Militia as the real relief force, not of the Regulars, but of the Empire.

LORD HARRIS

My Lords, notwithstanding the confidence of my noble friend opposite in this scheme, I think even those who officially have to be confident of its merits must feel from the speeches which have been made that there is a very grave element of doubt in the minds of those who are most experienced in the recruiting, in the officering, in the commanding, and in the administration of what are still the Auxiliary Forces. There is a very grave element of doubt in their minds as to whether this Bill is going to do any of them any good. I am perfectly certain of this, that if it is going to do any good to the Regular Army or to the Militia and the Volunteers, it is not going to do any good to the Yeomanry, and it is to that point that I propose to direct my remarks. First of all, I should like to say a word, as an old War Office official, on the speeches of Lord Newton, Earl Roberts, and Lord Milner. I am sorry they have left the House, as I would rather say what I have to say before them than in their absence. I do not understand what is meant by this compulsory service idea. Do they mean compulsory enlistment for serving abroad? If so, I imagine that there is no precedent for it in any military system in the world.

A NOBLE LORD

Did not Napoleon's Army go abroad occasionally '?

LORD HARRIS

I am not talking about 100 years ago; I am talking about the present day, and if the noble Lord can refer me to any case of compulsory recruiting on the Continent for foreign service, I shall be corrected.

A NOBLE LORD

The Germans crossed the Rhine in 1870.

LORD HARRIS

When they were at war. But I am speaking of recruiting for foreign service. And after all, how can that be compared with our case? Did the French compulsorily recruit for service in China?

A NOBLE LORD

Yes.

LORD HARRIS

I am told not. I believe they depended entirely upon voluntary enlistment for Chinese service.

A NOBLE LORD

I do not wish to interrupt the noble Lord, but I think he will find that the marine troops of France provide nearly all their colonial garrisons.

LORD HARRIS

Certainly, they are marines.

A NOBLE LORD

They are recruited by compulsory service.

LORD HARRIS

They are a part of the Navy, and of course they have to go abroad: they are not true land forces. How did the Germans recruit for the South West African campaign? I am told by the help of marines and volunteers. Where is there a system at work on the Continent where they recruit compulsorily for foreign service? I am doubtful whether there is one. But as far as our service is concerned, we have to find garrisons for India, and for the fortresses and coaling stations abroad, and it is no answer to suggest that the scheme now propounded—that the Militia should be recruited with an undertaking that on embodiment they will be willing to serve abroad—gets over the difficulty that confronts every Secretary of State when he, possibly absolutely new to the whole of our military system, arrives at the War Office, where he finds on the doorstep the stumbling-block that the British Army exists for the purpose of garrisoning India and the coaling stations: That is the stumbling-block which every Secretary of State finds on taking office, and which some enthusiasts and persons of great experience in military matters do not realise unless they have had the advantage of serving inside the War Office.

I sympathise entirely with my noble friend Lord Newton in this respect. The noble Lord appeals to your Lordships on the ground that he has had twenty years experience of the Militia. But I have had thirty-five years experience of the Yeomanry, and I confess it fills me with indignation when I see young gentlemen with ample time and means putting in not one solitary hour's work in the whole year for their country. I was for twenty years a troop and squadron leader, and I have metaphorically gone on my knees to these young gentlemen and implored them to come into the Yeomanry, feeling that those who were patriotic were taking far more than a double tide of duty in consequence of these young gentlemen refusing to put in the very moderate service asked for under the Auxiliary system. I am as indignant as my noble friend can be; but compulsion for home service is not going to help us out of our difficulty of finding garrisons for India and the coaling stations. I would gladly see compulsion for home service if it was only to get hold of these young gentlemen to whom I have referred. I would be only too glad to compel them to serve, and I only wish I could get some of them in my regiment; they would have a double tide of duty then.

I pass to what is really more germane to the service of the Yeomanry. I repeat that if any advantage is going to accrue from the Bill to any other branches of the Auxiliary Services, I am certain that none will accrue to the Yeomanry. In the first place we are degraded. We are at present the mounted branch of the Militia; we are under the Militia Act; we were put so by my noble friend after the war. Now we are to be removed from the branch to which we felt it an honour to be attached; we are to be taken out of the Militia and attached to the Volunteers, in whom we have the utmost confidence, but with whose service our service his never been akin. Our service has always been akin to that of the Militia, but now we are to be taken out of the Militia and we are not to be given the opportunity—of which we should have been proud— which has been given to the Militia, of attempting to recruit for foreign service in case of embodiment, notwithstanding the fact that last year we voluntarily offered to try and do so. In the second place, we are to be put under a body partly civilian, partly military, after having been for decades under the War Office. We are to be put for purposes of supply under a semi-civilian body upon which we shall be easily outvoted by the colonels of Volunteers who will be our colleagues. In the third place, our pay, which has been unaltered for nearly l20 years, is to be cut down. What is there in these three alterations likely to make the service more popular? Some of us have been disestablished; regiments have been reduced altogether because it was said they were not required in aid of the civil power. Within two years the. Government had to come and implore the old officers to raise those regiments again, and they did so. Then we suffered when the horse tax was taken off. Our men had the advantage of the £1, being released from the tax because they were in the Yeomanry. I do not think a single thing has been asked of the Yeomanry for more than a century that they have not undertaken and carried out. They may have grumbled a bit at times, but they have never refused to do anything they were asked, and their reward now is to be degraded and worse paid. We have put in these services in the face of much obliquy from Parliament and great indifference on the part of the War Office, but when the crisis came we were very useful. I remember a Secretary of State for War asking me at the bottom of St. James' Street whether I really thought the Yeomanry were any use at all. I do not know whether it was the result of my argument, or of the march of events— my argument only lasted to the top of St. James' Street—but at any rate we were not done away with. If during the war the same system had been followed with regard to the second contingent of the Yeomanry that was adopted for the first—that is that the colonels agreed to raise and train men—the second contingent would have been, if not as good as the first, certainly infinitely better than it was, because it was taken away from the colonels and the cadre and handed over to the authorities at Aldershot who took no interest in it.

That is the simple history of what the Yeomanry have done during these 100 years, and I submit that no consideration whatever has been given to their traditions or to the character of the service they have rendered. Under these circumstances is it possible for us to view with satisfaction the proposal of the Secretary of State, who knew so little about us that when he introduced his Bill he was actually under the impression that the pay we are now getting was something absolutely novel, whereas it is precisely the same pay as we have had for 100 years. What is new is that my noble friend gave us something for the horse, but that does not come under the specific term pay. I am glad of this opportunity of saying that what revived the force was what my noble friend did for us after the war. I was one of the four Yeomanry officers who had the honour of being summoned by the noble Marquess in the black week that followed our most serious disasters in South Africa, and as we went out of the room, one of my friends said to me, Is this going to make us or break us? As it turned out, it made us. But it was not the service we had given; it was not such credit as we had gained; the tradition of that would by degrees have died down, certainly in the minds of recruits. What made us was the fact that we showed we were worth something in the war. My noble friend below me realised this and introduced changes which, as chairman of a Committee, I had the honour of suggesting to him, which enabled us to get the men, and what helped us more than anything else was the £5 for the horse.

The Secretary of State for War has been going round the country preaching patriotism. To whom? Apparently he has been preaching it to the patriots themselves. He has been going round to the Volunteers and other branches of the service, but these are the very men who are doing the patriotic service. Does he really think that these County Associations will be able better than the colonels to persuade men who have not one atom of patriotic feeling in their breasts to be officers? Does he really think that they will be able to persuade to come into the ranks, men to whom we who have been troop and squadron officers have gone on our knees? Why should they be able to do it? Why should they be more successful than we have been? But, after all, patriotism does not come before a man's bread and butter. A poor man who has to think of his family puts patriotism a little in the background, and when the Secretary of State cuts down the pay of the Yeomanry it is a somewhat extravagant, idea of human nature to suppose he is going to make that force more popular and get either as many or the same class of recruits as we have been getting for 100 years.

But, after all, the important thing is to get officers. If you get the officer you may get the men. If you do not get the officers I do not think you will get the men. I very much fear that a demand is going to be made on the time of the officers which will not make it any the more easy to fill their ranks. Lord Lucas, to whose speech we listened with so much interest, and who showed a mastery of detail upon which I sincerely congratulate him, read out a portentous list of classes which officers in the future will be expected to attend. That is what has been going on since the war. My work as a commanding officer has since the war been increased quite 50 per cent. by correspondence. Not a single day passes during which I am not doing Yeomanry work of one kind or another. Since last night I have spent seven hours in the train for the purpose of doing Yeomanry business. There is a tendency to demand more and more. Inspecting officers ask more and more at the annual training, and officers are being asked to give more and more time to classes in order to get the instruction which they ought to have. I quite admit that they ought to know all these subjects. and I sincerely wish that many of our young officers knew more than they do. But one has to deal with facts. The class of officer who has been so much decried by certain Members of the Party opposite— the monied country gentleman of leisure — has practically disappeared. Nearly every country gentleman now, at least in my part of the country, has to work for his living, and, being young men— junior partners, for instance—they are unable to give the time which is asked for all these classes. The noble Lord's list yesterday was far longer than anything I had previously heard suggested, and I am afraid the Secretary of State is under a delusion if he supposes that the young gentlemen whom we get will be able to find the time. It is not a question of will. They would do it gladly, but they cannot afford it. If he is disappointed in getting the officers, I am afraid he will find great difficulty in getting the men.

Then I should like to say a word as to the degradation to which we are to be subjected. We are left in the Bill, but the Militia is taken out. Why should we be so treated? Why should we not be taken out of the Bill also 1 Why should we not be put upon our trial and asked whether we are ready to recruit for foreign service on embodiment? As I have said, we offered last year to do that. Why should we not be given the opportunity of trying? I believe there are a great many men whom we now recruit who would be willing to join on those terms. I realise there is a difference in the men of the Yeomanry and the men of the Militia in this sense: there are amongst them a great many employers of labour for whom it is difficult to undertake a liability for foreign service, seeing that they might be sued for breach of contract or for neglect of the business in which they are engaged. But there are a large number of young men who would not be deterred by that feeling, but would be ready to undertake the liability.

The third point I referred to was the question of pay. Noble Lords opposite are making a serious mistake if they suppose that the change of pay will not make a grave difference in the class of men they get. I have seen since the war a very marked change in the class of men we are getting. They are an excellent class, but there is one class we are not getting at all, and that is the real yeoman, the man who owns and farms land. They are most civil when I speak to them on the subject; they say they have so many engagements or something of that kind, but I know what is making the difference. When in camp they have to live in a tent with other men, and they will not run the risk of having to put up with men who are not accustomed to their manner of life. You expect to get for something like half the pay the same class of men. You will not get them. Why should you? I calculate that my men put in twelve hours a day during their training, and their horses five hours. Does the Secretary of State hope to make the Yeomanry more efficient or to get more work out of the men and horses for half the pay? That is really too great a strain upon human nature. You may get a Yeomanry, a mounted Territorial Force, but you will not get the class of man for which the Yeomanry has been noted for so many years. The Secretary of State has laid great stress upon the necessity for having the same rate of pay all through. The infantry must be on the same scale as the Regular infantry, the Yeomanry on the same scale as the Regular cavalry. I admit he has thrown in 1s. for messing, but he started upon the basis of the Yeomanry receiving the same pay as the Regular cavalry. That is a mistaken idea altogether. The Regular is a man who has had difficulty in finding work in civil employment; he is a half-a-crown a day man in the country or a 4s. a day man in London, whereas the men I am getting earn from 40s. to 50s. a week. Why should you expect to get that class of man for the same rate of pay as the man who can earn 2s. 6d. a day in civil life. It is a practical commonsense question based upon human nature. For these reasons I am afraid the Secretary of State is under a delusion in supposing that, three years hence if this scheme is applied to the Yeomanry—a great deal may happen in three years; the scheme may not be applied; I sincerely hope it will not be; but if it is, he and the country will suffer a serious disappointment as regards the class of men they will get. They will not get the present class who are accustomed to horses for the greater part of the year, and therefore are to a certain extent horse masters; they will have to take a class of men who know nothing whatever about horses, and teach them horse mastership as well as all the other matters necessary for a horse soldier.

I am one of the oldest officers in the service, and on the ground of my experience I venture to appeal to noble Lords who have the question officially under their hands at the War Office to reconsider this Bill as regards the Yeomanry. As far as I can see, it is just as easy to leave us out as it was to leave out the Militia, and, being the mounted branch of the Militia, we are entitled to claim that we should be treated in the same way as the infantry branch. There is this argument to be added. The Secretary of State hopes that this scheme will provide for the expansion of the Army for foreign service in time of war. I hope it may do so. I hope the Militia will consent to recruit for foreign service on embodiment, and that thereby the infantry portion of the Army, perhaps the artillery, will find that it has a reserve. But where is your reserve for the cavalry? Why is not one as necessary as the other? Why should you not treat us as you have treated the infantry branch of the Militia? Remembering that there is not a single thing that you have ever asked from the Yeomanry that they have declined to do, give us an opportunity of doing something more for the country.

THE MARQUESS OF LANSDOWNE

My Lords, when the Lord President rises presently to close the debate I shall be surprised if he complains of the manner in which the Government proposals have been dealt with on this side of the House. My noble friends have been critical—it would have been strange if they had not —and they have been inquisitive—I do not think we can blame them for that, for the Bill suggests many questions, some of which have been put and not replied to. But there has been throughout this discussion nothing which can fairly be described as unreasonable opposition to the Government proposals. I believe I may say that all of us who sit here realise to the full the great difficulties which any Minister must encounter who addresses himself to the difficult task of Army reform. I remember a discussion which took place early during the present session on the subject of London traffic, when the noble and learned Lord on the Woolsack, who had been, I think, a member of the Traffic Commission, told us that the reason why the London traffic was, as he described it, in a tangle, was because the thoroughfares, the tramways, and the railways of this great city had all been, in the first instance, constructed in a haphazard fashion. That is, I think, not untrue of the British Army system, which has been constructed—one might almost say has grown—in a haphazard fashion; and that is why it is so difficult to introduce anything like system or order into elements which are themselves confused and indistinct.

I think I may say that we are all of us in the main in agreement with the objects which the Secretary of State desires to attain. He wishes to provide this country with an efficient striking force. He wishes to provide means of expanding that force outside the limits of the Regular Army, and ho desires to provide us with an efficient Army for home defence. These are all in themselves commendable objects; and the only questions we have to ask are whether the striking force which we shall get under the Government Bill will be a stronger and better organised striking force than that which this country has hitherto been able to command, whether it will be easier than it has been hitherto to expand that force, and whether a better organisation is forthcoming for the unwieldy mass of auxiliary troops which are to be found in this country. I wish I could say that the whole of these questions could be confidently answered in the affirmative.

This Bill has been spoken of as a very elastic Bill. It is the most elastic Bill I have ever had the opportunity of perusing. It is elastic to the point of elusive-ness. If you strike out of it that which we can do without the Bill, if you leave out of account what depends not so much on the Bill itself as upon the discretion of the Army Council and the bodies which will be created under the Bill, there is not very much remaining. A good example may, I think, be drawn from what has happened lately with regard to that part of the scheme which affects the Militia. I will not, after what has been said by noble Lords on the back Benches, speak of the compromise which has been arrived at, but the fact remains that lately a considerable modification was made in the Government proposals with regard to the Militia; but yet we were told that that modification, important as it was, could be effected without altering a single line of the Bill. Under these circumstances, we are driven to look rather at the acts and the declarations of His Majesty's Government than at the provisions which are to be found within the Bill itself.

The noble Earl who has charge of the Bill referred in terms of commendation to the scheme of Lord Cardwell. I was glad to hear him do so, because I am one of those who believe that the foundations laid by Lord Cardwell were truly laid, and that, if we have been able to achieve anything since, it has been in a great measure due to the great work done by Lord Cardwell at the outset. I remember that Lord Cardwell was very fond of quoting a very often quoted passage in Horace, in which the poet, describing the happy life of the old-fashioned Roman farmer, draws a picture of him vigorously pruning his fruit trees, amputating the useless boughs, and inserting in their place grafts of a happier growth. Lord Cardwell used to say that that should be the motto for a Secretary of State for War, and I must ask your Lordships to consider a little the manner in which, on the one hand, that process of amputation has been carried out by the Secretary of State, and, on the other, what His Majesty's Government have done in the direction of making good that which they have themselves taken away from the British Army.

I do not think it will be contested that the amputations have been, not merely of a courageous, but I should almost say of a ruthless character. One battalion of Guards is gone, a second is doomed, and eight battalions of infantry are reduced—the strength of the battalion is reduced by 100 men. My noble friend behind me suggested that a good many of these reductions involve the wiping out of the increases which had been made to the Army during the Government of the late Lord Salisbury, at a time when I had the honour of being connected with the War Office. The noble Earl the Secretary of State for the Colonies, commenting on my noble friend's observations, said that that was, perhaps, not an unfair way of putting it, but that, at the same time, there was another way of putting it, and I think he said that, in spite of all that had happened, the strength of the Army was still 27,000 men in excess of the strength of 1895. That may be perfectly true, hut, to the best of my recollection, our additions to the strength of the Army amounted to something like 50,000. It may be the case that the whole of those large increases have not been taken away; but I still maintain, and I shall continue to maintain unless I am corrected, that the reductions which His Majesty's Government have decreed do involve a very serious diminution of the fighting strength of the British Army. But, my Lords, during the course of his statement, the noble Earl let fall one observation which I hope I did not misunderstand: it was, I think, to this effect. He said that, although the strength of the battalions had been reduced to 700— ^*THE EARL OF ELGIX:720

THE MARQUESS OF LANSDOWNE

That although the strength of the battalions had been reduced to 720, it was intended, he did not say when, but ultimately, if possible, to revert to the higher strength. That is a very important admission, and I am glad to have elicited it from the noble Earl. As to the reduction of the Royal Artillery, the noble Earl made a statement which was, if we have not misunderstood it, eminently satisfactory. He told the House that the Government were not prepared in any way to weaken the strength of the Royal Artillery. That is an observation of the utmost importance, for that statement appears to qualify in a very important manner the statements which have been made upon the same subject by the Secretary of State for War. We were certainly under the impression that the Secretary of State had announced that His Majesty's Government did propose a reduction of horse and field artillery by something like 3,700 men and sixty-seven officers. If that idea has been abandoned, all I can say is that the uneasiness which many of us felt on this subject will be to a great extent removed. I should like to know whether it is not the case that the Garrison Artillery has already been reduced and is now from 3,000 to 4,000 men below its former strength.

We have had explanations of the circumstances in which these reductions have been made. I understand that they are defended partly on financial grounds; but Lord Lucas, in his maiden speech, which showed so much ability and promise, spoke evidently not without authority when he suggested to the House that these ten battalions had been struck off because they were redundant to the scheme of organisation which found favour with the War Office. All I can say is that I cannot conceive the circumstances in which it could be a matter of congratulation to the War Office to find itself deprived of the services of eight or ten fighting units. Even if it be the case that they do not fit exactly into the scheme of the Government, we who have had anything to do with Army administration know that the difficulty has always been the shortage in the number of fighting units; and that if by any chance you found yourselves with one or two to spare, it would be a matter of congratulation rather than the contrary.

With regard to these reductions, there is also this to be said—that they involve a very serious loss to the Army owing to the number of officers whom we lose in consequence of them. The dearth of officers has always seemed to me to be one of the most serious difficulties that we have to face. A trained British officer is, after all, the most valuable military asset that we possess; and it fills me with despair to think that so large a number of such officers should be sacrificed in this manner. I believe I am right in saying that the Army Estimates of this year show a falling off of no loss than 500 officers and of something like 1,000 non-commissioned officers as-compared with the strength that formerly obtained.

There is another point to be considered, the effect of these reductions on the Army Reserve. That effect is twofold. If you weaken the numerical strength of your units you want a larger number of Reservists to fill them up; and even if the amended figures given by the noble Earl are accepted, it will still be the case that the Expeditionary Force will contain relatively a far greater number of Reservists and a far smaller number of men serving with the colours than the expeditionary force which could have been sent and was sent from these shores a few years ago. Besides that, you have to remember that by reducing the number of these battalions you diminish the output of Reservists. That is incontestable, because each unit is, so to speak, a machine which manufactures Reservists. There is, I understand, a conflict of opinion as to the precise extent to which these changes will, in fact, weaken the Army Reserve. I will not attempt to discuss so intricate a question at this hour of the night. I never doubt the arithmetic of the actuaries, but I always remember that they have to make their calculations on certain assumptions which are given to them by those for whom they act. But I maintain that it is absolutely inconceivable that if you diminish the number of your units and also diminish the strength of each unit you will not in the result have a much smaller Reserve than you would have with a greater number of units, and a higher strength; and when you consider in addition that the length of men's service with the colours has been increased, it seems to me to stand to reason that the policy adopted by His Majesty's Government must be one which tends to diminish the strength of the Army Reserve.

The noble Earl said that, in the opinion of the Army Council, the men who would be taken from the Special Contingent to be placed in the fighting line are men every bit as well qualified for a place in the fighting line as the ordinary Reservist. That is a statement which fills me with surprise. I should have thought that any commanding officer would prefer to have his battalion filled up with Reservists who had served their seven or even their three years continuous service with their regiment, who had been properly trained, properly disciplined, men who can be described as formed soldiers, rather than by youths taken from the Special Contingent, recruited at the age of seventeen, trained for a few months at the outset, afterwards for a few days at irregular intervals, and who can have no esprit de corps, no knowledge of their battalions, and no acquaintance with their officers. I think that the noble Earl said such men would compare with the Militia Reservists of old days. I do not know whether it is the case, but I would remind the noble Earl that it has not been our custom to put the Militia Reservists in the fighting line at the outset.

The noble Earl in charge of the Bill explained that under this scheme practically the whole Reserve would be absorbed by the Expeditionary Force at the outset of hostilities, and that these men from the Special Contingent would therefore have to be taken at the outset of hostilities, and, before any time was available to give further training, placed in the front rank to meet the disciplined troops of a foreign enemy. I can only come to the conclusion that the amputations to which the Government have resorted will have a very serious effect in weakening the fighting efficiency of the Regular Army.

One word with regard to the Militia. No point in the Bill was to my mind more obscure than the original intentions of His Majesty's Government with regard to the Militia. We were told that the continuity of the Militia tradition was to be preserved, that the distinctive character of the belongings of each regiment was to be maintained, that they were to pass from one side to the other of the Line without feeling the change in any material degree. But, my Lords, to most plain folk the original proposal of His Majesty's Government seemed to involve something very like the complete obliteration of the Militia as we know it. I might say it involved putting into the melting pot everything except perhaps the regimental plate. The original proposal has been considerably modified. My noble friend Lord Salisbury expressed his gratification at the change which has been made. It was not quite so cordially received on the Benches behind him. Noble Lords behind me have a practical acquaintance with the Militia, its history, its traditions, the composition of the force, to which I cannot pretend. I agree with them that on many points even the modified proposal seems to bear hardly upon the Militia, but in spite of that I am bound to say that to me it seems satisfactory that under the scheme as. we now know it the Militia does at all events remain apparently in existence as a separate and distinct force, instead of being as it would have been under the original proposal merged with the Volunteers in the Territorial Army. When we get to closer quarters in Committee, I have no doubt my noble friends will press upon the House proposals designed to obtain for the Militia some of those concessions for which they have so earnestly pleaded this evening, some of which at all events seem to me not at all unreasonable demands. I cannot for the life of me see the object of setting up an arbitrary distinction between the third and fourth Militia battalions—a most invidious distinction,, and one which I should think the Secretary of State for War will do well not to insist upon. I feel however convinced that I am only expressing the opinion of all the noble Lords in this House who are connected with the Militia when I say it is their desire to accept in the most loyal spirit any changes which His Majesty's Government deem indispensable, and that it will not be for want of their co-operation if His Majesty's Government are not successful in keeping alive and turning to good account the old constitutional force which has done such excellent service to the country in the past.

With regard to the Territorial Army, we understand that it is to be maintained for the double purpose of securing the safety of these islands and of acting as a kind of reservoir for the Regular Army. Both these functions seem to me to be essential. I am certainly not one of those who underrate the importance of providing an adequate garrison for the defence of these islands. I have often regretted the attempts which are made to divide us into those who belong to what is called the blue water school and those who do not. In my belief there is much less divergence of opinion on this subject than many would have us believe. I have never met a reasonable man who did not admit that sea power was only one branch of our national defence, and that behind the Fleet it was absolutely necessary that this country should have an adequate land force for the protection of these shores. It is indeed obvious that we require such a force to secure the mobility of our Fleet, and because the strength of our defensive force really determines the strength of the force with which the enemy can hope to invade these shores. The larger the invading force the greater the difficulty of the task which the invader will set himself to perform. For that reason, in order to deter an enemy from invading these islands it is absolutely necessary that we should have at home a force of sufficient strength and organised in such a manner that it is capable of meeting cither a raid or an attempt at an invasion on a larger scale in an adequate manner at whatever point the attack may be delivered.

Nor do I deny the necessity of a home Territorial Army for the purpose of supplying a reservoir from which the needs of the Regular Army may be supplied. Like my noble friend Lord Milner, I cannot forget the events of the South African war, nor how soon after we had supplied the force which we had been led to suppose was adequate for the purpose of dealing with our South African difficulties—and not only that force, but a very much larger force—we found it necessary to appeal to the patriotism of the country. We all know how greatly our difficulties were increased owing to the fact that although men were forthcoming in abundance, they were to a great extent men unfamiliar with military discipline and organisation and training.

I pass now for a moment to the County Associations. I am not sure that the obscurity of the Bill does not lie thickest at this point. That part of the Bill really is little more than an embodiment of an aspiration for a closer union between the local Army and the local authorities. That is an admirable aspiration. There are obviously many points of contact between the local authorities and the local Army—the pro vision of ranges, buildings, and land for the use of troops, questions affecting the relations of Volunteers with their employers, questions connected with rifle clubs, with the care of discharged men and their families, questions concerning camps and manœuvres, all of which are clearly matters which can be most advantageously dealt with by bodies of men of local experience and representing different aspects of public life in our country districts: but there is a great amount of uncertainty with regard both to the composition and to the duties of these Associations. I was very glad at the outset of this debate to hear my noble friend Lord Fortescue ask a number of pertinent questions with regard to the position of the Lieutenants of counties. I do not think those questions have yet received the answers to which they were entitled. We have been told that the lord-lieutenant will be the constitutional head of the Association, and will not be excluded from the chairmanship; but we want to know a little more than that. The president will have rather a motley team. There are to be officers of all arms and branches of the Territorial Force, representatives of county and borough councils, co-opted members representing employers of labour and trade unions, and, where universities are within reach, one or two dons from those universities. In addition there are to be general officers of His Majesty's Forces who are to be entitled to speak but not to vote.

We should like to know whether the lord-lieutenant is expected to drive this team or whether he is to be in the position of, as it were, a kind of patron—the kind of position he would occupy with reference to the Toxopholite Association of the county or other institutions of that kind. There is to be, not only a president of the Association, but a chairman and vice-chairman. I do not think I do the Secretary of State an injustice when I say that on one occasion he explained that they were to be men of business—a sort of suggestion that Lords-Lieutenant were not necessarily men of business, and that their shortcomings were to be supplied by these other officials. Then we should like to know whether, in all these cases, the procedure is to be by vote, and whether the president is liable to find himself left in a minority, and outvoted by the other members of the Association; or whether, on the contrary, he is really to be in the position of the Secretary of State at the War Office, with an advisory council, of which he is primus inter pares.

Then there is an amount of uncertainty as to the duties of the Associations. They to are give advice and assistance. That is obviously right, but they are also to be entrusted with the organisation, administration, and recruiting of the Territorial Army. It is, I think, pretty clear that these Associations are really miniature War Offices, which are to be spread all over the country and which are to have very extensive powers and very vast responsibilities. I cannot imagine a more difficult or a more responsible position than that of a Lord-Lieutenant of a county who finds himself called upon to preside over one of these bodies and to decide how the Exchequer grant, which, I understand, is to supply the financial requirements of the Associations, is to be distributed amongst the innumerable claimants who will, no doubt, importunately demand a share of it. But until these points have been further considered and explained, I am quite willing to suspend my judgment with regard to these Associations, and to accept them without demur as an indication of the desire of His Majesty's Government that the local army and the local authorities should be drawn together as closely as possible.

With regard to the Territorial Army itself, I think those noble Lords are perfectly correct who have said that, after all, it is the old Volunteer Force under a new title. It is, so to speak, the old dog in a new doublet. The Territorial Army is to be collected by "the enlisting of such persons in such manner and subject to such regulations as may be described." There is a delightful vagueness in that description, which is rather characteristic of the rest of this part of the Bill. In dealing with the Volunteer Force His Majesty's Government have to deal with the immemorial difficulty of reconciling the demands of military efficiency with the obligations of civil life, and I wish I could say that I found in this Bill anything to show that these conflicting interests have been thoroughly reconciled.

With regard to the Yeomanry, I may be allowed to express my entire concurrence with what was said by my noble friend Lord Scarbrough. He said, speaking, I believe, on behalf of a large number of Yeomanry officers, that the force was contented as it was, and that it was in a satisfactory state. I do not think that will be denied by anyone, because I believe there is no part of the British Army which has made more extraordinary progress or gained more in public confidence than has the Yeomanry Force within the last few years. I entirely agree with what fell from my noble friend Lord Harris on that subject. What we are doing with regard to the Yeomanry Force is, as has boon truly said, to ask them to do more work for less pay, and that, I am afraid, does not seem to be a very promising outlook.

My noble friend Lord Midleton dealt so fully with the financial aspects of the Bill that I will not travel over the ground which he traversed last night. It is impossible to represent this Bill as being one which effects a large saving of public money. My noble friend gave the figures to your Lordships. He showed that the saving that could be claimed for the Bill did not exceed £885,000, and of that £200,000 is prospective only; and he showed that this saving was due entirely to those reductions in the Regular Forces of which I have already spoken, and which I so greatly regret. In these circumstances we can scarcely regard this Bill, if we consider its financial aspects, as a triumphantly good bargain for the country. As to its destructive effects, there can be no doubt. As to its constructive proposals, there is much that must remain uncertain. We cannot yet judge what its results will be, but I trust that, worked courageously and with the loyal co-operation of the local authorities, the Bill may do much to increase the efficiency of our Territorial Forces. I am afraid, however, that I must add that it seems to me altogether too much to claim for the Bill that, as it stands, it is a complete and thoroughly-considered scheme of Army reform, or that the passing of it will at once render this country, for purposes either of offence or of defence, stronger and better equipped than it was a few years ago.

THE LORD PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL (The Earl of CREWE)

My Lords, I greatly regret that it falls to me to wind up this debate instead of to my noble friend who leads the House, and who unfortunately is not able to be here this evening, I have to ask the indulgence of the House in comparison with many of the noble Lords who have spoken, owing to the fact that the War Office is one the inside of which I have never seen. I have only, as one of the public, watched it from outside with a certain amount of terror due to the peculiar reputation which it has enjoyed, sometimes, I think, rather unfairly attributed to it.

I heartily concur with what fell from the noble.Marquess when he said that he was sure that we on this side of the House would not make the slightest complaint of the manner in which this debate has been conducted. Our proposals have been subjected to a great deal of criticism, and a great many questions have been asked, but we complain of neither. The noble Marquess, Lord Salisbury, seemed to think that my noble friend Lord Elgin had complained of the interrogative turn of the Opposition. That was not so. When questions are asked in the course of a speech by what I may call volley firing we do our best to answer them, but my noble friend only protested against what I may call the sniping habit of some noble Lords in rising to ask a single question, as was done rather frequently in the course of my noble friend Lord Lucas's speech.

This House is certainly distinguished for the number of those who can speak with authority on this subject. Both its Leaders on each side have been Secretaries of State for War. One very distinguished Member of the House, whose absence and the cause of it we so deeply deplore—the Duke of Devonshire—was also Secretary of State for War, and in addition to that we have the new and welcome presence of the noble Viscount opposite, Lord Midleton. I hope he will allow me, as an old friend, to say how much we welcome him here. His father was a very familiar and a very highly respected figure in this House, and, though we cannot say that either the Benches opposite generally or the Front Bench needs any accession of strength, still we welcome the noble Viscount none the less heartily on that account. In addition, there are six noble Lords in. this House who have been Under-Secretaries of State for War and other noble Lords who have held positions at the War Office; and I hope I maybe allowed to congratulate my noble friend behind me, Lord Lucas, on the very pleasant reception which his maiden speech, full of knowledge as it was, was received in all quarters of the House.

Now, my right hon. friend the Secretary of State for War has found, as other Secretaries of State for War have found, that his path is not strewn with roses, but rather resembles one of those caravan routes across the African desert, strewn with whitened bones which show the disasters of those who have passed that way before. I cannot help thinking how difficult it is for any Secretary of State for War to tackle the Army question at all. There is no subject in this country upon which change has been so often attempted, and upon which change is regarded with so much suspicion. I very well remember in 1881, when the territorial names were substituted for the numbers of the regiments, the excitement that was caused by what seemed to outsiders a reasonable process, but which was regarded by many of the senior officers of the Army and by others as marking one more milestone on that progress to the dogs which apparently the Army has been taking ever since we have had an Army at all.

It would not become me to pay any compliment to the ability with which my right hon. friend has tackled this question, but I can speak for the unwearying thought and pains which he has given to the production of this Bill. As noble Lords on both sides of the House have said with perfect truth, this measure is an attempt to carry on, and so far as possible to crown, the work which was initiated by the greatest of our War Ministers of recent times—Lord Card well; and I think an examination of the Bill will show that in no particular has it departed from the principles which Lord Cardwell laid down. It is in pursuit of the plan of Lord Cardwell that my right hon. friend has adhered to the system of linked battalions and has not attempted the experiment of large depots, which, I think, the noble Earl Lord Donoughmore regards with favour, as some other distinguished authorities do, but has preferred, I believe with the general approval of the great majority of military authorities, to stick to Lord Cardwell's system.

Before I say anything about the various criticisms which have been levelled against the Bill, I desire to say a word upon the subject which was introduced by the noble and gallant Earl (Lord Roberts) on the cross benches, whose opinions we naturally regard with respect, and carried on by Lord Milner and by Lord Newton—I mean what may be called either universal service for home defence, or, as I think noble Lords on the front Bench opposite more correctly described it, a system of conscription. That system has to be viewed, not merely as regards the Army alone, but in connection with the whole system of national defence. When you speak of a nation in arms as an abstract conception, it may, or may not, be an admirable thing. That entirely depends upon the purpose to which you wish to apply the arms. Now, Lord Milner—I regret the noble Viscount is not in the House—wanted to see a large Army of this kind, because, as he said, this country is not safe from serious invasion, and he asked how it was that the country was perfectly willing, apparently, to go any lengths to secure a paramount Navy, but was not willing to take similar steps in regard to the Army. Surely the answer is simple.

We are the strongest naval power in the world, and so long as there is a shot in the locker and a sixpence left in the purse we mean to remain so. But we do not pretend to be the strongest military Power in the world, or even one of the strongest military Powers. As I said, the question is one of the whole system of national defence, and if it really is necessary to keep in this country a trained army which is able to repel, not merely a raid, but what I may call a continuous invasion—that is to say, the pouring into this country of largo numbers of troops belonging to some Continental Power—then we have a land frontier. We are no longer, for any practical purposes, an island. If that is so, if we have a land frontier, you may be perfectly certain that the country will not consent to keep up an Army on a Continental scale, and at the same time to maintain the Navy at its present strength. If we have a Continental Army the country will insist upon a very large reduction in our Navy Estimates, because, if our Navy cannot protect us from invasion, undoubtedly we spend far too much upon it at the present moment.

The noble Lord opposite, Lord Ampthill, protested very strongly against the force referred to being spoken of as a conscript force. I confess I do not know what the difference is. I understand that the proposition is that a very large number of the youth of the country should undergo every year or two years, as the case may be, military training. The particular men who at that time are undergoing the training will be the people who are to repel this invasion. It is not proposed, I take it, to keep another fully trained Army also in this country for the purpose, and therefore they will be, it seems to me, precisely in the position which the conscript army of such a country as France is in when it is out for its training, and, of course, with the same immense reserve to call upon which continental countries have. But I also ask, like other noble Lords, what is this great army to do? I remember a speech which the noble and gallant Earl made, I think last year, in which he seemed to contemplate the possibility of our desiring to place a very large force of men at some time or other on the continent of Europe. If that is so, all I can say is, on behalf of the Government, that we do not contemplate any possibility of the kind. All that we contemplate that the British Army, in case of war, can do is to send out the striking force, and, of course, we should use such an Army as we have in combination with the Fleet in that kind of operations of which there have been so many examples in our past history. If this question of invasion is considered in the way that the noble Vi scount regards it, the whole view of our national position undoubtedly has to be altered. But, if not, I am perfectly certain that the people of this country will not consent to anything of the kind. I think it was Mr. Balfour who said— and said with great truth—that the country would not agree to pay a double insurance premium for a singe risk, and either the Navy is sufficient to guard us against the possibility of invasion on a large scale or it is not. The example of other countries was spoken of. Of course, we all know of the great muster of men in continental armies. The whole standing army of the United States, with its vast population and its vast area, consists of some 60,000 men; consequently it surely is necessary to consider all the conditions of the case, and not to attempt to form analogies for which no foundation really exists.

Much has been said on the question of the reductions which noble Lords state have taken place in the Army. We do not attempt for a moment to deny that financial considerations have operated, and as we maintain are bound to operate, considerably in determining what the size of the Army is to be; and, for this reason, that if it is to be the national rule that the expenditure on the Navy is not to be closely checked, the people of this country will certainly insist on the Army expenditure being very closely checked; while, if any Government attempts to forget this fact, and to spend money too lavishly on the Army, there is risk of a very dangerous reaction in the country, and a determination to cut down military expenditure on a scale which none of us would wish to see done, but which, if that reaction really took place, no Government in this country could possible resist.

Some noble Lords—not noble Lords who have had official experience—talk in a very light-hearted manner about the cost of the Army. The noble Viscount, Lord Milner, for instance, said that several millions more might properly be spent. Anyone who speaks in that tone seems to me to be in the position of a guest who goes to stay at a country house, and says to his host, "I wonder you do not cut away that hillside and make a series of Italian terraces." It is a light-hearted and irresponsible manner of talking of expenditure for which one has no responsibility. Of course, if we had an unlimited sum at our disposal it would be easy enough to provide an Army of almost any kind you might desire. It was a great Italian Minister who said that any fool could govern in a state of siege; and anyone could preside at the War Office if he had the purse of Fortunatus at his disposal. But the Secretary of State is tied down by restrictions, and his desire is to give the best he can for the sum at his dispssal.

Lord Midleton threw a tolerably heavy douche of cold water on our Bill, but he did not make any positive suggestions of a material character as to its improvement. He spoke specially, I think, of the Field Force— the first Line—and regarded the interests of the fighting Army as having been sacrificed to the Territorial scheme. Much has been said, and I think my noble friend has replied to it pretty fully, as to the reductions in the Army. But my right hon. friend claims that, in spite of those reductions, he is able to put into the field a larger organised striking force than has ever before been at the disposal of any War Office in this country. So long as he is able to state that, and to state it without contradiction, it appears to me that he is in a strong position; and the mere fact that certain battalions existed before which do not exist now was of no real service to the country so long as those battalions wore not available, as they were not for the purposes of mobilisation.

Several noble Lords have asked about the Artillery, and my noble friend behind me, Lord Elgin, made a statement which has been commented upon by two noble Lords opposite, and on which I wish to say a word, because it is important that before the debate closes we should be quite clear that we mean exactly the same thing. Now, my noble friend said that the strength of the Artillery would not be reduced. I am anxious to explain exactly what he meant by that. It is not the case that the peace establishment of the Artillery will necessarily remain, or indeed probably remain, at its present figure. Certain brigades will be utilised for the purpose of training the Special Contingent, and therefore the peace establishment will be lower. But these reductions in numbers will be compensated for in this way, that a certain proportion of the remaining brigades will be replaced by men engaged for three years, so that noble Lords will see that with the Reserves thus available the total will work out to a similar number of men existing at present, when the batteries are placed on a war footing. In addition, there are the men of the Special Contingent who will be employed for the ammunition columns, and those, of course, are a pure addition, because the work which they will do would under present circumstances have to be done by the more highly-trained men. Consequently the gain in men is represented by the ammunition columns of the Special Contingent, and the loss on the peace establishment is replaced by the greater number of men who will come forward from the Reserve when the batteries are placed on a war footing.

VISCOUNT MIDLETON

Will the number of Regular Artillerymen now serving be decreased?

THE EARL OF CREWE

Yes, they undoubtedly will. The number of men serving with the field force will be decreased when it is on a peace footing.

VISCOUNT MIDLETON

Can the noble Earl give us the figures? I make that request because there has been so very much misunderstanding about this matter. The noble Earl the Colonial Secretary told us that it was not proposed in any way to weaken the strength of the Regular Artillery.

THE EARL OF CREWE

Yes. I think the number is about 2,000 who are transferred for the purposes of training. My noble friend was quite accurate in saying that the Artillery would not be weakened, because, when the Reserves are called up, the number will be equalized with the present number by the addition of the Reserve men who are available. As regards the Garrison Artillery, that has been reduced by 3,000 men, consequent on the withdrawal of some of the garrisons of the West Indian stations. The noble Earl, Lord Donoughmore, complained that these reductions were undertaken from policy and not from military necessity. That seems to me to be almost a contradiction in terms. I cannot conceive how a reduction in any army can be made by a military necessity. All persons connected officially with an army would like to see it made as large as possible. We admit that the reductions are due to policy.

THE EARL OF DONOUGHMORE

I think I said political pressure. At any rate, that is the phrase I meant to use.

THE EARL OF CREWE

I would point out that, be these reductions right or wrong, they do not in any way affect the character of the scheme as a whole. The general substitution of the system of two lines for three remains altogether unaffected by these temporary changes which my right hon. friend has made. We have heard a great deal from the most competent authorities on the subject of the Militia. The position of the Militia, as I understand it, in the view of my right hon. friend is this, that given that he desired to create two lines of defence for this country, the Militia must either in practice join one or join the other. It might have become simply a part of the Territorial Force. That, as we know, was one proposition, and the number of men who were required for replenishing the line battalions in time of war would have been supplied by the Special Contingent; but under present circumstances the Militia becomes in practice part of the first line, and that, of course, involves distinct alterations of its position as it exists now under the Act of 1882.

The Duke of Bedford, and I think some other speakers, complained of the construction which had been placed upon what passed at various interviews between them and the War Office authorities. I am quite certain that nobody had the faintest intention of accusing the noble Duke, or anybody else who could speak for the Militia, of any unpatriotic refusal to do what he could on behalf of the Force. What, as I understand, the noble Duke and his friends did was simply to state their opinion of what was possible, and what would be the result of certain action taken or not taken by the authorities. But my right hon. friend, in stating what ho did, simply put in a terse form the fact that, in the opinion of the noble Duke, he as commanding a Militia battalion, and other Militia colonels, would not be able to supply the men for drafts abroad.

The noble Duke, unlike the noble Viscount, did make a series of positive suggestions. He asked that the Militia should be allowed to have charge of their own recruiting, and he pledged himself, if they were allowed to do that, to keep the Army going through the Militia. In fact, the noble Duke really asked for a blank cheque from the War Office to keep the Army going; but I am bound to put it to him in this way. He must see that before the War Office could undertake to hand that responsibility over to the noble Duke and other Militia colonels they must necessarily be convinced that the thing would answer, because the whole of the responsibility would rest, not upon the noble Duke, but upon my right hon. friend and the War Office.

The noble Marquess, Lord Salisbury, who also speaks with great authority on the question of the Militia, made various suggestions which I am quite certain my right hon. friend will consider. The noble Marquess, of course, will not expect me to say off-hand whether it is possible for the War Office authorities to entertain any of them or not. He specially desired, I think, in the first place, that the concession which was made to existing Militiamen, that they should not be drafted to any battalion but one of what I may call the superior battalions of their own regiment, should be extended to all Militiamen for all time. It certainly has been the desire and intention of the War Office that that course should, as far as possible, be invariably followed; "but it is, of course, possible to conceive a case in which it might be difficult to maintain it. If you were to take the case of two battalions engaged in a foreign war, one of which was almost cut to pieces and the other of which had never been under fire at all, it surely would be inconvenient if the drafts belonging to the second and more fortunate regiment were obliged to remain at home and could under no circumstances be used to replenish any other battalion. I am perfectly certain that the noble Marquess and all other Militia officers in this House, although they have been obliged very properly to state their own case strongly, do recognise that the well-being and the necessities of the Field Force are bound to be the first consideration, and that, although my right hon. friend would desire to meet them in every way, yet he is bound to consider that the necessities of the Army in the field must be paramount even over the desires and prejudices of those who serve in the Militia.

LORD RAGLAN

My Lords, the noble Earl is bringing forward the accusation that we Militia commanding officers are looking at this matter from a personal point of view. We regard it just as much from the point of view of the country as any Regular officer, and we tell these exceedingly foolish people that their scheme will not be successful.

THE EARL OF CREWE

I made no kind of accusation against Militia colonels; but it seems to me absurd to suppose that the noble Louis' views can fail to be some what coloured by what they conceive to be the interests of the branch of the service to which they belong. Lord Raglan has had a large military experience outside the Auxiliary Forces, and therefore e very thing which he says is listened to with respect. He thinks that the Army Council are wrong in this matter, and, of course, he is perfectly right to hold his own opinion. With regard to the question of supplying drafts, I would ask the House also to consider what a very remarkable step in advance is taken by the new arrangement for training the drafts before they go out. Noble Lords who remember what happened when drafts were sent out to South Africa will recollect that at that time everything had to be improvised. It was not the fault of those who were at the War Office, because nobody imagined that that kind of strain would be placed on the War Office. Ac any rate that provision is now very definitely provided for in this Bill.

The Yeomanry have been very fully dealt with by Lord Harris and also by Lord Scarbrough, and certainly I am not going to say a word of disrespect towards that very remarkable and very efficient force. But I should like to ask noble Lords to consider this. Is it quite certain that the impulse which was given to the Yeomanry by the South African war, and by the fine service which it did there, will not somewhat tend to diminish as peaceful years go on? A great and very deserved glamour hangs now about the Imperial Yeomanry, but those of us who remember what the force was before the war, cannot but consider that the kind of enthusiasm which now makes that force so popular can hardly be expected to be quite permanent after what we all hope will be a long series of years of peace.

I confess I did hear with some astonishment the suggestion that the Yeomanry should be taken out of the Territorial Force and placed in the Special Contingent. In the first place, is it really conceivable that the type of man who now joins the Yeomanry will be content to be drafted into a cavalry regiment in the manner which would take place in the infantry 1 In the second place, I would remind the noble Lord that to do what ho proposes would involve the destruction of the Territorial Army as an Army. It would leave the Home Defence Army with no cavalry at all. If the noble Lord thinks that a desirable state of things, that is his affair; but it is entirely foreign to the notion of my right hon. friend, who desires to make the Home Defence Army a real Army and not merely an aggregation of aimed men.

The County Associations have come in for considerable criticism, very largely of a merely jocular character. I do not exactly know what there is in these bodies which should appear to excite the amusement of noble Lords opposite, any more than there is in a county council or in any other organised body for local purposes. Lord Harris also compared the prospect that these Associations will attract men, at any rate to Yeomanry regiments, very unfavourably with what he and other Yeomanry colonels are able to do.]t is not every commander of an Auxiliary regiment or battalion who, like the noble Lord, has boon the captain of a very successful county cricket eleven, and I have no doubt that the noble Lord's powers of personal persuasion in Kent are quite equal to those which any Association could exercise. But I certainly should have thought that nobody would be found, in this House or out of it, to deny that it is a desirable thing to associate county fooling with national defence. I am sorry, therefore, that so many sneers have been levelled in the course of this debate at the idea of these Associations, and I confess it seems to me scarcely fair. I think it is obvious that, if you can get the Lord-Lieutenant, the country gentlemen, the trade union officials, and all those classes of people who are mentioned, to take a combined interest in that share of national defence that belongs to their county, you will achieve desirable work. I was sorry to hear Lord Raglan hint that it was likely that country gentlemen would sulk because they dislike some of our legislation or consider that the death duties are too high.

LORD RAGLAN

I said nothing of the kind.

THE EARL OF CREWE

Even if that class had been unjustly attacked, which I do not admit, I do not believe that any feeling of chagrin would prevent them from exercising the patriotic influence which they are able to bring to bear in their own neighbourhood, and I believe they will combine heartily and fully with all other classes in the county for this purpose. The noble Marquess Lord Lansdowne complained of the excessive elasticity of our suggestions with regard to the County Associations, but I cannot help reflecting that if we had attempted to lay down hard and fast rules of conduct for these Associations all over England we should have been condemned on that account for not making allowances for different localities. If this thing is to work at all, and I trust it may—it is, of course, an experiment—it can only be done by varying the conditions according to the needs of the locality, and although I admit that our proposals in this relation may appear to be of a skeleton character, they may have been made so because we conceived it to be absolutely necessary.

The noble Earl Lord Donoughmore said that, after all, there was really no change. It was simply a matter of leaving the Volunteers and Yeomanry alone. But he went on to say that some proposals of my right hon. friend, which he most heartily welcomed, did, in effect, weld together into a solid weapon the scraps of the Auxiliary Forces as they exist in different districts. He quite admitted—and I think noble Lords generally will be disposed to admit—that it is a very desirable thing that the various branches of the Auxiliary Forces, instead of standing entirely apart and in no relation whatever to each other, should become an organised corps, with guns, with army service, with medical service, and all that go to make up a complete army. If that is so, whatever force there may be in the different criticisms which have been levelled by various noble Lords at these proposals concerning the Territorial Army, we do maintain that we are giving the Second Line a higher standard of military efficiency to aim at; and consequently in certain cases we do ask particular branches of them to give up certain things, in consideration of becoming an infinitely more serious body for the purpose of national defence than singly they can possibly be said hitherto to have been. It has been said that this whole scheme is speculative, but we are entitled to ask in reply, Are you absolutely content to remain as you are? Do you think that the present Army, the Militia, the Yeomanry and the Volunteers, really represent the last word of perfection for an Army of such a country as this?

LORD NEWTON

No.

THE EARL OF CREWE

My noble friend Lord Newton, who is nothing if not candid, has, I believe, washed his hands of this Bill; but he admitted, with the utmost candour, that there was an extraordinary absence of positive suggestion on the part of the critics of this Bill.

LORD NEWTON

Hear, hear.

THE EARL OF CREWE

I am glad to hear my noble friend cheer that. Consequently, I think we are entitled to say, not that we have made an ideal Army, because we have to take things as we find them and do the best with the materials we have at hand, but that the suggestions which we have made, subject, of course, to any criticism of detail which noble Lords may make, are the ones which are before the country, and we are, I think, entitled to assume in the absence of others that they are the best that can be put before the country.

I repeat once more that we have no complaint to make of the character of the criticism which has been levelled against this Bill. We do not think it entirely reasonable in all cases, but it has certainly not been unfair, and it has been expressed uniformly with the greatest courtesy towards my right hon. friend and the Government generally. I can equally assure noble Lords that we shall desire to give the most patient consideration in the Committee Stage to any Amendments which they may propose. I am also quite certain that noble Lords opposite will rejoice quite as much as we do if, when this Bill becomes law, as I trust it may, it proves to be a real step forward—I quite admit that much must be left to future years—towards the solution of what, after all, is one of the most difficult problems affecting our whole national life and the security of the Empire.

On Question, Bill read 2^a

THE EARL OF PORTSMOUTH

My Lords, I propose, subject to the general convenience of the House, to put the Bill down for Committee on Monday and Tuesday, 8th and 9th July. I also ask most respectfully that noble Lords will put their Amendments down as soon as possible. It is our earnest desire to consider all the Amendments most fully, and to treat them with every consideration.

Bill committed to a Committee of the Whole House on Monday the 8th of July next.

House adjourned at ten minutes before Twelve o'clock, till To-morrow, half-past Ten o'clock.