HL Deb 17 April 1907 vol 172 cc924-35
LORD BRASSEY

rose to call attention to the programme of shipbuilding for the Navy as proposed for 1907–1908. The noble Lord said: My Lords, before dealing with shipbuilding, I may offer one observation with which my noble friend will certainly agree. He will admit that he is not unduly troubled with interpellations from these benches. Noble Lords in opposition are patriotic. They are silent because they are satisfied with the general administration of the Navy. The supporters of the Government know that the strength of the Navy in men and ships is being adequately maintained. Where economy has been possible Votes have been cut down. No pains have been spared to perfect the training of the Navy. The manœuvres recently carried out have been on a scale unprecedented in time of peace. The advance in gunnery has been notable, reflecting credit both on the gunnery officers of the Fleet and the seamen. Better provision has been made for the instruction of officers in naval strategy, in navigation, and in other subjects. The education of cadets has been revised and adapted to modern requirements.

The country has confidence, and rightly so, in the general administration of the Navy. There are always points on which suggestions may be offered. Briefly, I propose to deal with shipbuilding. The relative strength of Navies depends essentially on battleships. Looking back over a long term of years, our battleships, whether constructed by Sir Nathaniel Barnaby, Sir William White, or Sir Philip Watts, have been always equal, and often superior, to the ships of even date laid down for other Powers. Our latest battleships are those of the "Dreadnought" type. They show a great advance in armament and speed, and also in size and cost. The building of the "Dreadnought" type is commended by an overwhelming weight of authority—by the naval advisors and the technical advisers of the Admiralty, and by a Report obtained from a strong independent committee of naval officers, shipbuilders and men of science. There is testimony perhaps even more conclusive. Ships of the " Dreadnought" type are being laid down by nearly every maritime Power—by Russia and Japan, by France and the United States. We have been the first to lay them down and have stolen a march.

There must always be need for some ships of less dimensions than the "Dreadnought." The cost of the "Dreadnought" may be put in round figures at £2,000,000. Such ships must be few. And there are operations of war which can be more effectively performed by many ships than by few. The forces with which a superior fleet may have to deal may be widely scattered. There are the tactical considerations on which Admiral Sir Reginald Custance has insisted— No ship" (he contends), " however large, can stand up against the fire of two or three battleships. There are the many risks from which size will not secure immunity. There is the risk of instantaneous destruction by the submarine mine, fatal to both sides in the war in the Far East. There are the risks of navigation. Casualties have been numerous in the British Navy. We have lately lost a battleship. It would not be well to build ships for the British Navy inferior as to calibre of guns, armour, speed or endurance. We may adopt the suggestion put forward by Sir William White. We may lay down a type in which the armament of two "Dreadnoughts" may be distributed between three vessels, equal in speed, armament and defence, and possibly superior in fighting power to the larger ships.

If it is difficult to produce a type of battleship which shall be in all respects satisfactory, the difficulty is greater still in the case of cruisers. In the endeavour to combine offensive and defensive power, speed and endurance, our latest cruisers have become as large and costly as battleships. It has been contended that as armoured cruisers come nearer to battleships in armour and armament, it will be difficult to limit their sphere of action to that strictly belonging to cruisers. In the line of battle their speed would give no advantage, while in fighting power they would be inferior to the battleships to which they were opposed. It seems clear that the Admiralty should concentrate their resources as far as possible on battleships. By adopting this policy the fleet of Germany has been created with estimates relatively moderate in amount. Our cruisers must be sufficient to meet those of other Powers. There has been no neglect in this respect on the part of the Admiralty. As against armoured vessels, the protected cruisers must be reckoned as non-combatants. They are necessary to protect commerce. The British Navy has, in this class, an overwhelming superiority.

Vessels are necessary for scouting duties. They are the eyes of the fleet. Eight scouts have lately been built. They are costly, but not satisfactory, flimsy in construction, weak in armour and armament. Speed is the only merit. The scouts are too small for ocean service. No more vessels of this class are being laid down. A new and enlarged destroyer, the "Swift," has, however, been proposed. The estimated cost is £250,000, or nearly that of the scouts. The building of ships of this class is, I submit, open to question. In fine weather their speed will only slightly exceed that of the ocean destroyers now building; and the estimated cost of a destroyer is half that of the "Swift."

In view of the failure of the ablest constructors, both in the Admiralty and out of doors, to produce an effective cruiser for scouting duties, the policy of subventions to mail steamers merits attention. After the close of the War of Secession the policy of subsidies to auxiliary cruisers was strongly advocated by the Secretary for the United States Navy. It was recommended later by Sir Nathaniel Barnaby, and approved by the highest naval authorities of the day—by Sir Spencer Robinson, Controller; and Sir Frederick Grey, First Sea Lord of the Admiralty. Similar proposals were renewed by Sir Donald Currie, and again approved by the naval advisers of the Admiralty—by Sir Cooper Key and Sir Anthony Hawkins.

The latest testimony to the value of the ocean greyhounds as auxiliaries to the Navy is that of Lord Charles Beresford, who appeared as a witness before the Committee on Subsidies. He urged that a reserve of auxiliaries to the Navy should be formed by the enrolment of subsidised mail steamers in our Admiralty list. The auxiliaries would be used to keep open long lines of communication. It is not necessary that all the ships on the Admiralty list should have the speed of the two vessels now completing for the Cunard Company. Extreme speed is most costly. At a comparatively moderate cost we may secure auxiliaries with more enduring speed than has ever yet been attained in vessels of war, encumbered as they must be with the weight of armour and armament. The policy recommended by Lord Charles Beresford has been adopted by all foreign Governments, by France, Germany, Italy, and the United States. It has lately been advocated by President Roosevelt. The British Navy is ill-supplied with auxiliaries.

The mercantile auxiliary offers a twofold advantage. In peace it can be usefully employed. Swift communications are bonds of Empire. We are at this time seeking with one heart to make those bonds, by every practicable means, closer. Action must depend on opportunity. New services have recently been established between Canada and the mother country. Others are being proposed. A liberal policy on the part of the Home Government in giving aid to such undertakings would be wise. It should lead to economy by removing the necessity for laying down special vessels as scouts. It would strengthen the Navy; it would promote the unity of the Empire.

*LORD ELLENBOROUGH

My Lords, there is one remark I should like to make arising out of what has fallen from the noble Lord opposite on the subject of scouts. The whole practice of scouting has been altered by the invention of wireless telegraphy, and is now being worked out and studied on a totally different basis from what it was ten years ago. There is also the question of submarine bells which come in as a secondary method of communication with ships at sea. In consequence of this ships will not now require a large chain of scouts consisting of many vessels more or less in sight of one another, but considerably fewer vessels using wireless telegraphy. The demand, therefore, for scouting cruisers is less than it was ten or fifteen years ago. As regards the construction of smaller battleships, there is one point against putting the armament of two "Dreadnoughts" into three vessels, and it is that as your line will be longer you will not have your power concentrated so well.

Questions have arisen about the reduction of the Cawdor programme, and I think myself that that reduction was a mistake, not because the preponderance of the British Navy has actually been impaired by that reduction, but because it was a financial mistake. I was in Germany last autumn. The comments of the Germans sounded like a pæan of victory. England was showing signs of giving up the struggle. The feeling there, in view of that reduction, resembled very much the feeling of a jockey who, knowing that his own horse has plenty of running left in him, sees the only horse in front of him swerving across the course and faltering in his stride. He is thereby encouraged to fresh efforts. We have encouraged Germany in this respect to fresh efforts, and we shall have to meet them with corresponding exertions on our own part. I am afraid that, for every £100,000 we have saved this year we may have to spend £1,000,000 afterwards.

Though foreign programmes are important, what is actually being done in foreign dockyards is still more important. As far as I have been able to ascertain, the Admiralty of late years have been very watchful on this subject. A modern battleship requires so many persons to construct it that it is impossible to build it with any degree of speed without its being generally known. This does not apply to submarines and torpedo boats. The theory that Great Britain can build battleships so much faster than Germany, that we can let them have a start and then catch them up whenever we choose, is not at all accepted in German shipbuilding circles. They know all that we did when we built the "Dreadnought" so well and so quickly, and they think they could improve upon our methods, and build at least as fast if they felt themselves compelled to do so. At least six German firms undertake to build battleships, and between them they say they could put twelve battleships on the stocks every year; in addition to that there are the Imperial yards at Kiel and Wilhelms-haven.

Again, our method of voting Estimates is, to my mind, rather antiquated and unbusinesslike, as it exposes the country to a certain amount of risk if, when Parliament is not sitting, foreign countries start shipbuilding programmes. In that case they get a start of us. I think this might be remedied if the First Lord of the Admiralty had power, when any exceptional activity was noticed in foreign dockyards, to lay down fresh ships at once without waiting for Parliament to pass the Votes. A still better plan would be for both Houses of Parliament to pass Resolutions requesting the First Lord to do so. I think such a Resolution might be moved from one Front Bench and seconded from the other. It would not cost the country money in the long run, and it would lessen any risks to which we might be exposed. I venture to think that such a policy would be far better than waiting to pass Estimates on or about the 1st April, when they might be too late to achieve their object. I also think it would do more to check the activity of foreign countries in this direction than paper resolutions passed at the Hague and elsewhere.

THE FIRST LORD OF THE ADMIRALTY (Lord TWEEDMOUTH)

My Lords, my noble friend who initiated this discussion has had a long experience of the Navy and of ships generally, and always speaks with great authority in this House. I was very much pleased to hear from him that he approves of what the Admiralty have done up to the present time. He approved of our shipbuilding programme, although he made certain suggestions by which it might be supplemented. Before I go into details I should like to state in a few sentences what is the policy of the Admiralty, for during the last four or five months we have been subjected to some criticism which did not altogether take into account all the action which the Admiralty have taken with regard to our shipbuilding programme.

The Admiralty policy is practically founded upon three grounds which I think are accepted by every Party in the State. In the first place, this axiom will be accepted by every one, namely, that our country must at all events keep the command of the sea, without having any regard to the cost at which that may be done. The second ground is that at the present moment we are in an unquestionable command. Our position is one which it is impossible for any one to dispute. I claim for the present Board of Admiralty no credit for that. It is the result of twenty years of various Administrations, and to them the credit is due. There is the third point, upon which, with a reservation or two, all parties will agree—namely, that the burden of naval expenditure is a very heavy one. There has been already too keen a competition amongst the various Naval Powers. On those principles we founded the present Admiralty policy.

I will not attempt to give the House long details with regard to the comparative strength of the British Navy and the navies of foreign Powers. That I believe to be an unnecessary thing, and a method which is unnecessarily agressive, and which may be misunderstood, by flaunting before the world what is our position as regards predominance. It is perfectly clear to anybody who will refer to the very many works published in this country, in Germany, and in France,—such works as the Dilke Return, Lord Brassey's" Navy Annual," Jane's "Fighting Ships," the German book, and an excellent little book published by the French. Anybody studying the returns published in those books will be satisfied that at this moment the British Navy is in a very predominant position.

Then it is said, "Oh, but at some early future period we shall find ourselves caught up by our rivals, and we shall find ourselves in a weaker position than we ought to be." I do not think there is any fear of that in the near future. In the course of the next two years we shall have nine big ships. We shall have the four vessels of the "Dreadnought" type, the "Lord Nelson" and the "Agamemnon," and the throe big armoured cruisers of the "Invincible" type, all ready by the spring of 1909; and I do not believe by that time one single European Power will have one vessel constructed and on the sea equal to those vessels. The only Power that is likely by that time to have a vessel of the type of the "Dreadnought" is our ally, Japan.

The policy that we have adopted this year is to reduce slightly our battleship programme. I do not think that is really differing from the policy of those who preceded us. In 1904 and 1905 there Were considerable reductions in the Naval Votes, and the reduction was continued last year. No doubt we struck off one "Dreadnought." That was thoroughly justified, because, at this moment, the new class of ship is still largely under trial. It would have been a matter of very great and unnecessary risk for us to have entered into a very large or a very long programme. The fact of the matter is that the programmes of foreign countries which are so often brought against us are programmes on paper—they are pro- grammes extended over a great number of years—and it is not the view of the Admiralty that these long programmes should be adopted by this country. We believe it is a wiser plan to go on the lines that sufficient unto the day is the programme thereof, and that it is far better to have a programme limited to a comparatively short time, and then from time to time to change that programme, making additions to it if necessary, but not to enter into a long programme spread over a great number of years.

It is desirable, if possible, to put a check upon naval programmes throughout the whole world. His Majesty's Government have taken that line. They have endeavoured to show that they, at any rate, are willing to agree either to propose such a thing at The Hague Conference, or to assent to any proposals to that effect that might be made. So far as The Hague Conference is concerned, His Majesty's Government have distinctly said that, whilst they are ready to enter into an arrangement of that sort with other Powers, if other Powers are ready to discuss it, or to be bound by the decision of The Hague Conference, yet, if the other Powers refuse to do so, we go into the Conference absolutely unpledged, or pledged only to this —that if foreign countries do extend their programme, we, in our turn, will also extend our programme in order to keep our relative position amongst Naval Powers. I believe that to be a thoroughly sound method of action, and one that will generally commend itself to the people of this country.

I come now to some of the points raised by my noble friend. He began by arguing in favour of greater attention being paid to smaller ships. He suggested, as Sir William White has suggested, that our battleships of the future might to some extent be designed on lines not quite so big as the "Dreadnought." There are many things to be said on both sides of that question, but I should like to point out to my noble friend that we should not be able for the cost of two " Dreadnoughts " to build more than what is now represented by three cruisers of the "Shannon" class. If it is attempted to build three battleships to command the same armaments as two "Dreadnoughts," the three ships would cost a very much larger sum of money to construct than two "Dreadnoughts," and they would also be much more expensive to keep up. They would require more men to man them, and it is difficult to believe that such vessels would be of the same power or efficiency as the "Dreadnought" class itself. We believe the concentration of armaments on a big ship is very important. We believe the four great desiderata are speed, coal endurance, armour, and armaments.

The opinion formed by the Admiralty and adopted by all the other nations of the world is that the big ship, with its largo number of guns, is most likely to be effective if it has the speed to make the best use of its armament. The proposal to go back to a smaller ship is, I believe, a mistake. For us, battleships must be of great size and speed. I agree that the designing of cruisers is a very difficult matter; but here again the whole tendency of naval opinion is that the big armoured cruiser is more likely to be of advantage in war than the smaller cruiser. No foreign cruiser, I believe, would be able to stand up against cruisers of the "Invincible" class.

I agree that the Admiralty should concentrate in future on battleships. Battleships must be the first consideration, and in these days battleships and big armoured cruisers must go very much together and must be worked on very much the same lines. As the noble Lord said, the protected cruiser is nowadays almost a non-combatant ship. Mercantile cruisers can be relied on very doubtfully; they must be extremely fast or they will not be able to escape from ships of more formidable type. As to the two great ships which the Cunard Company launched in the present year, they were beyond any others in size and speed; and, if any mercantile cruisers were capable of being of service in war, it would be cruisers of this type, with great speed and coal endurance. As to the power which Lord Ellenborough proposed to give to the First Lord of extending the shipbuilding programme of the Estimates, I am afraid that Parliament would not be ready to grant such a power. I am afraid we shall always have the duty thrown upon us of putting forward Estimates year by year, and of being guided by what is accepted by the two Houses of Parliament. I believe that the present programme is one which the the House might accept.

EARL CAWDOR

My Lords, I should like to say a word or two with regard to what has fallen from the noble Lord, because in some respects the statement he has just made appears to me to be of vital importance. As to the programmes of foreign countries, the noble Lord is right in saying that what should guide us is not the paper programmes but the work that is actually being carried out in foreign dockyards. At the present time, the noble Lord said, the strength of this country is absolutely measured by the two-Power standard, and I believe that the noble Lord is right. But out of the present shipbuilding programme one battleship is to be dropped and perhaps others, if certain things take place at The Hague Conference. I hope the negotiations at The Hague will come to a successful issue; but I note with pleasure what the noble Lord said with regard to what our position might be after The Hague Conference, and also what his view is, and I assume that it is also the view of the Government, as to the duty of the Admiralty in maintaining the naval strength of this country.

I confess—and I have stated it in your Lordships' House before—that statements have been made in another place by the Prime Minister which have given rise to considerable anxiety in the country. In discussing the two-Power standard, the Prime Minister said that although he accepted it as a rough and ready basis of our strength, yet to consider it as incumbent on us, if it referred to Germany and France, was almost preposterous. Such words from such a source were very alarming; but the Prime Minister went further. Later on he said that, assuming France and Germany to be the two Powers with which comparison was made, it was not to be supposed that we in this country could go on laying down ship after ship to maintain such a standard. I should have thought there was only one possible answer to that proposition—that those responsible for the Navy would have to see to the laying down of the necessary ships, ship after ship, in order to maintain our two-Power standard. Therefore, I hail two observations which the First Lord has just made as specially important after those statements by the Prime Minister. The noble Lord has declared that the policy of the Admiralty is to keep the command of the sea regardless of cost; and he went further, in discussing the possible action of this country with regard to The Hague Conference. He said that if other countries increased their building programmes and their works, we should build so as to maintain our present position. My Lords, I hail that declaration as an absolute assurance from His Majesty's Government that they pledge themselves, under all conditions and at whatever cost, to maintain the two-Power standard. That is a most satisfactory statement, and I accept it absolutely, as it is doubtless intended to be accepted. If the noble Lord who originated this discussion has succeeded in nothing else, he has succeeded in drawing this most satisfactory declaration from His Majesty's Government.