HL Deb 21 February 1905 vol 141 cc725-51
THE DUKE OF BEDFORD

My Lords, I beg to call attention to certain pages of the summary of the speech of the Secretary of State for War with regard to the reorganisation of the Army, and to ask the noble Earl the Under Secretary of State for War if he can give any information regarding the intentions of His Majesty's Government respecting the Militia and the proposed territorial regiments of the Regular Army.

At the close of last session the Government brought forward a scheme of Army reorganisation which produced the impression that the abolition of the Militia formed an essential part of the proposed reconstruction of the military forces. In the course of a debate which took place in your Lordships' House in July last, the Government announced that the proposals, as far as the Militia was concerned, should remain in abeyance, and stated that the scheme of the Army Council dividing the Army into a General and a Home Service Army had their approval.

Meantime the Prime Minister has informed the country that the problem of the defence of the British Empire is the defence of the borders of Afghanistan. It is then from that point of view that reorganisation of our military forces must be considered. If the occasion arose, the sequence of operations would be as follows: The existing Army in India must hold its own till the command of the sea is assured. The Regular Army must then be embarked and transported to India, replacing the garrisons in India, which would be moved to the front as fresh troops arrived to relieve them. Then a supplementary force, whether the territorial Army or the Militia, must be in readiness to free the remainder of the Regular Army by undertaking all garrison duties at home and abroad. Thus no force assembled in this country as a second line to the Regular Army could possibly reach the scene of active operations under a year from the date of its first assembly at home.

To meet the problem of Afghanistan, the Army Council proposes to divide the Regular Army into a General Service Army and a Home Service Army, into which, if public opinion allows, the Militia is to be absorbed. That appears on pages 11 and 12 of the summary. The question is, Can you better supplement your General Service Army by a Regular Home Service Army or by a force raised on a Militia basis? That is a question which has never been discussed. I desire to bring it to your Lordships' notice, and to contrast the respective merits of the Militia system and of a Home Service Regular Army for the defence of the Empire.

The Army Councils scheme of reorganisation provides for a Home Service Army by cutting off certain battalions of the Regular Army and converting them into territorial battalions. But if the Regular Army is divided into parts, you do not at once and materially increase the sum total of men by that division. Your Army is in two parts instead of in one whole. Does such a division result in multiplication, and does it produce the additional supplementary force required? I presume the answer of the Army Council would be—"Our territorial regiments are reserve-creating machines. All that we, who exist to provide for instant war, require, is a prolonged period of peace in which to build up our Reserves." The aim of the Army Council seems to be to form a Home Service Army of some eighty battalions, partly by subtraction from the present Regular Army, and partly by the absorption of the Militia. This scheme of a Home Service Army of eighty battalions, if realised, would, at the end of eight years, give a Home Service Army with a total Reserve of 200,000 men—allowing 10 per cent, for waste, 180,000 available men. But it will be at the end of eight years, and the Army Council will have wiped out both the Militia and the Militia system. Eight years is too long a tether. Let us test the value of the scheme at the end of four years. The task is to defend the borders of Afghanistan against a great military Power, to occupy Afghanistan itself, to garrison India, South Africa, and all foreign stations, and to defend the United Kingdom. The Army Council proposes to accomplish this task by means of a General Service Army—but less numerous than the present Regular Army—the Indian Army, and a Home Service Army of 90,000 men, for that would be the extent of the Reserve at the end of four years. Behind those 90,000 men there would be nothing except the Volunteers.

There is a clear lesson to be learnt from the South African War as regards the value of the Volunteers. In 1900, when the country was in a tight place, the force was asked for two months of consecutive service at home, but was only able to contribute fourteen days. Their place in the scheme of national defence had to be supplemented by garrison battalions, raised in panic and at a cost of millions to the country. It is true that the Volunteers sent abroad, on an average, 6,000 men per annum for three years. But fourteen days of consecutive service at home and a yearly contribution of 6,000 men for foreign service for three years is not going to save the situation when the 90,000 men of the Home Service Army are used up, as they must be by the end of the first year of the war. The Army Council by favouring the absorption of the Militia into the territorial, that is, the Regular Army, limits military service to that very small fraction of our population which is prepared to serve in the Regular Army.

I find in the Report of the Royal Comimission on the South African War that the following opinion is expressed— No military system would be satisfactory which does not contain powers of expansion outside the limit of the Regular Forces of the nation. History shows that there are only two ways of creating a national Army. The one is by conscription, which has been perfected by the nations of the Continent of Europe and by Japan; the other is by the old English Militia system, which, although neglected by the country of its origin, has never failed to perform all that was required of it. The Army Council proposes to form territorial regiments on the Continental plan of two years training, but without the foundations of the Continental system, which is conscription. On the Continent men are not taken till the age of twenty, and are then trained for two years at the highest possible pressure. For our Home Service Army boys are to be accepted at the ago of eighteen, and at a minimum weight of 112 lbs., that is eight stones, which is a child's and not a boy's weight. If the Army Council is going to subject these boys, who certainly will not physically represent the average boyhood of the country, to the same severe strain of military training which prevails abroad for the manhood of the Continent from twenty to twenty-two, all I can say is that the Army Council should be prosecuted by that excellent society which exists for the prevention of cruelty' to children.

On second thoughts, it occurs to me that this contingency will not arise, because no recruits will join the Home Service Army if they are to be trained on the Continental plan. On the other hand, if the training of the Home Service Army does not differ from that of the General Service Army, and is made equally attractive, then it is certain that the Home Service Army will attract all the recruits, to the ruin of the General Service Army. Short service at home is preferable to long service abroad, in spite of the differences of pay. That is conclusively shown by the breakdown of the three years system of enlistment, mentioned on page 5 of the summary.

A statement has been issued showing the financial effect of the proposals of the Army Council. But that statement tells us nothing as to the cost of barracks and depots for these territorial regiments of the Home Service Army. They are to be located near the counrty-towns. That means the purchase of desirable building sites, and entails the provision near each barrack of some hundreds of acres of land for battalion and company training, also the acquisition and construction of many rifle ranges. All that points to a bill of very many millions. From the point of view of national economy, there is no doubt that the Militia system is the better.

No one can dispute the deficiencies of the Militia as now organised. But the true comparison is not between the territorial Army and the Militia in that parlous condition to which it has been reduced since its transfer to War Office administration thirty-five years ago. It is between the territorial Army and the Militia as it would be if properly administered. On page 8 of the summary four extracts are given from the Report of the Royal Commission on the Militia and Volunteers. We are told with respect to the Militia, first, that as regards the infantry, there— Is a consensus of opinion both among Militia officers, and those Regular officers who have ha dspecial opportunities of observation, that the average Militia battalion would not be fit to take the field except after several months continuous embodiment. It is necessary to remember that the Duke of Norfolk's Commission was considering a problem, now declared to be of very minor importance, namely, that of the defence of this country after a successful lauding by foreign invaders. The Militia was to be embodied on Monday and fight a second battle of Hastings on British soil against lie flower of Continental chivalry on the Tuesday following. Hence the stress laid upon the lack of efficiency to meet the best troops of the Continent until after several months continuous embodiment.

But, as the Prime Minister has stated, the problem now is the defence of the frontiers of Afghanistan, and, as your second line cannot be brought into action under twelve months, there is ample time for that improvement which may confidently be expected from a Militia force within some months of embodiment. The proposed territorial regiments are no better situated for the purpose of immediately taking the field than Militia regiments. Both these forces are a second line; neither is more ready than the other at a moment's notice. But the advantages are in favour of the Militia. In the territorial regiments the eighteen-year-old boys with the Colours will not be fit for service, and the imperfectly, because far too hurriedly, trained Reservists must be summoned back from civil life. They will return, having forgotten most of their slight military training, and they will be complete strangers to their officers and non-commissioned officers and to each other. Indeed, the mobilisation of a territorial regiment will, to a great extent, be the assembly of a crowd of men who have never seen each other before. That is consequent upon two years of boy service with the Colours, and then six in the Reserve.

The Reserve of these territorial regiments must be for a moment compared to the Reserve of the Regular Army in 1899. That Reserve had been trained for seven years, mostly abroad, and, to a very great extent, on active service. Such was the Reserve which saved the situation in South Africa, and whose creation we owe to the genius of Lord Cardwell and to the loyal insistence of Lord Wolseley. The Reservists of the territorial regiments will have been trained near their homes, during boyhood, for two years, less intervals spent in hospital, and may possibly have once seen Aldershot, or even gazed upon Stonehenge.

The Militiaman, although trained for a short period, by being brought up regularly for several years in succession acquires a certain solidarity which is not attained under the rival system. The embodiment of a Militia regiment for service is exactly the same as the assembly for the annual training. The Militiaman, on embodiment for service, takes his place in the same section in which he stood for the annual training the year previous. The second extract on page 8 is to the effect that— The training of the Militia officer is inadequate to enable him to properly lead troops, especially incompletely-trained troops. The Militia officer has to make his living by the exercise of his civilian profession. On that account he is often a far more capable and a much more widely educated man than the Regular officer, for no man who is obliged to use his brains in his youth in order to secure a competence in his old age can afford to enter the Army, but he can and does serve in the Militia.

Now, as for the training of the Militia officer being inadequate, the War Office is not in a position to reproach him on that score. I quote from Colonel West-ropp's note to the Report of the Duke of Norfolk's Commission— The military education of the Militia officer is a most serious problem. In nothing is competence more essential in an officer than in musketry. These are the facilities offered during the year 1903. Of the officers of the Militia 315 applied to undergo a course of musketry at Hythe; 121, or just over one out of three, were received there for instruction. My own experience is that between 1903 and 1901 I forwarded three applications from officers to attend courses of signalling, but all were refused. The War Office is an educational authority, paid to carry out its educational duties. Yet it closes its schools in the face of would-be students, and then denounces their lack of learning, sp'endidly unconscious of where the responsibility rests. The third extract on page 8 is— That the force is imperfectly equipped for war. That is no reflection on the Militia, but on those who have been responsible for its administration. It is a complaint of very long standing. But it is useless to dwell on this point until the intentions of the Government regarding the Militia are known. I now come to the fourth extract, that— The Militia, in its existing condition, is unfit to take the field for the defence of this country. Of course if a force is imperfectly equipped for war by the military administration, it must be unfit to take the field for any warlike purpose. But what of the military administration?

I add one more extract from the Report of the Royal Commission on the Militia and Volunteers, which is not on page 8 of the summary, but which is the conclusion arrived at by the Commission— We are forced to the conclusion that the Militia, in its existing condition, is unfit to take the field for the defence of this country. We think, however, that its defects arise from causes beyond the control of its officers and men. I read in the summary of the speech of the Secretary of State for War on page 7 that— The decay of the Militia is the natural and inevitable consequence of the way in which that force has been treated. The fact, then, that the decadence of the Militia is due to mistaken military administration, is admitted. The question for the country to decide is whether the Militia system is to be abolished because of the incapacity of successive military administrations to get the right value out of that particular form of service.

It is not surprising that the administration of a force, which combines civil employment and military service, by a controlling body absolutely without any knowledge of civilian business and labour should end in failure. Take the education and training of the average officer of the Regular Army. As a small boy at school he joins the Army class and begins to specialise before he has received any general education. He leaves school for a crammer's establishment where he intensifies the specialisation. He joins the Army and serves abroad. The only method of administration and system of business known to him is the one that he learns in his regimental orderly room. He can always fall back on the Army Act, and that never fails him. It gets him out of any difficulty that he may have created for himself. In due course he fills various unimportant staff appointments abroad. He is certain to be the author of many foolish orders, but still not so extravagant as to bring upon him the censure of his superiors. All his orders must be obeyed by his subordinates, whose duty it is to make the most impossible orders as workable as circumstances will allow, and whose interest it is never to ruffle the temper of their superior officer. Hence he is never subject to criticism, consequently he regards himself as a heaven-born administrator. He returns, home as a field officer, and gets an appointment upon some district staff which entails the administration of all the branches of the Auxiliary Forces.

Without such a curriculum the following case, of which I have had personal experience, could not occur. The recruits of a Militia battalion were ordered to assemble for preliminary drill on Easter Monday. To the military mind, trained as I have described, a Bank Holiday meant a holiday for persons employed in a bank. The Militia recruits of the regiment in question were not bank clerks. Therefore Bank Holiday should make no more difference to their assembly than the full moon. Orders must be obeyed. A military force which cannot or will not obey orders is useless. The military mind of the Regular officer is intolerant of excuses for non-compliance with orders based on what to him are petty local reasons. The civilian mind of the Militia officer chafes sorely at having his business transacted by a gentleman to whom he would scarcely offer a stool in his business office as a second or third clerk.

The necessity of a link between the War Office and the Auxiliary Forces was recognised by the appointment of adivisory boards in February, 1903. These were abolished by the Army Council in April, 1901. At present there is a Director of Auxiliary Forces, but it is impossible for any Director of Auxiliary Forces, or for any staff with which he may be provided, located in the War Office, to be in touch with the varying conditions of civilian life and labour all over the United Kingdom. Those conditions can only be represented to the Army Council by Militia commanding officers who live constantly in the same neighbourhood as their men. If it is the intention of the Government to retain the Militia, I would strongly advise the re-establishment of the advisory boards, whose mouthpiece should be the Director of Auxiliary Forces.

Advocating, as I do, the retention of the Militia system adapted to modern conditions, I may fairly appeal to some well-known facts in our military history. In the last hundred years we have had three periods of great wars. The Peninsular and Waterloo campaigns, the Crimean War and the Indian Mutiny, and, lastly, the Boer War. In all these wars the Militia has played its part. But I need not detain your Lordships by entering upon the particular conditions of , service of the Militia at home, abroad, and in the field with the Regular Army, which prevailed at each epoch. The fact is undisputed that in none of the wars which I have mentioned could the Regular Army have maintained itself in the field and carried on the necessary garrison duties without the assistance of the Militia. The history of the Militia system goes back for hundreds of years, and the continuity of its existence affords evidence that this form of military service is congenial to the people of this country. I believe, therefore, that the Militia system is the only system by which we can create a national citizen Army.

As to foreign service, there is no doubt that a Militia force will only serve abroad if the war is popular. But in what respect will you be better off with the Reservist of the territorial regiments? After two years of boy-service close to their homes they will have returned to civilian life, looking at, and voting upon, the police of this country from a Party point of view. They will think and act as civilians, not as soldiers. If they disapprove of the war, and on that account do not obey the summons to rejoin, will you discover them and bring them back by the aid of the police, and send them as prisoners across the seas? Your Lordships may depend upon this. If the war is a just war, both Militia and Home Service Reserve will come forward for foreign service. If the war is held by the country to be an unjust war, neither will. My conviction is that if you attempt to enlist men for foreign service outside the Regular Army as at pressent constituted, under the impression that you can compel them to serve abroad in an unpopular war, the last state of your military forces will be worse than even the present. Therefore I should never enlist the Militiaman for foreign service. I should add to the form of enlistment a distinct warning that, if Parliament considered it necessary, the whole Militia force would be asked to volunteer for foreign service, but that each man was free to say "Yes" or "No" when that question was put to him by his country.

The reorganisation of the Militia to convert it into a truly national force will require some effort, and, more than that, some sacrifices from every class of the community. In the first place, Parliament must explain the reasons which demand such sacrifices. They are not far to seek—the experience of the Boer War, the memory of the disastrous week in December, 1899, the military and also the moral lessons to be learnt from events now taking place in the Far East, the defence of the borders of Afghanistan, are the reasons which make that problem so pressing. If anything more be needed, the speech of the Prime Minister at Southampton in October is surely sufficient. If we aim at a national force, we must stop recruiting for the Militia by means of the War Office, and invoke again the aid of local civil authorities. So long as it remains the business of the War Office to find men for the Militia, the responsibility of recruiting is not regarded as a national duty, but merely as a departmental matter in which the country, as a whole, is not in the least concerned.

It is scarcely necessary to remind your Lordships that the Lord-Lieutenant is purely a military officer, appointed under the authority of the Militia laws, and that Deputy-Lieutenants owe their existence to the same legislation. Their constitutional position should be made a reality. Lord-Lieutenants and Deputy-Lieutenants in association with county and borough councils should be made responsible by Parliament for finding the officers and men needed for the Militia. The staff for recruiting purposes would be the officer commanding the Militia regiments with his adjutant and permanent staff. This staff, acting under the immediate orders of the Lord-Lieutenants and Deputy - Lieutenants, in conjunction with the county and borough councils, would be an entirely different agency from the recruiting staff at present employed by the War Office, and controlled by an officer of the Begular Army who has probably served most of his life abroad, and is unknown and unheeded by the countryside. This officer must still trust to the recruiting sergeants, who attend fairs and other gatherings, haunt street comers, and seek for the idle and the unemployed. Traditions cling to the recruiting sergeant which make him an object of dislike and distrust to the parents and friends of the working classes.

Parliament should require each county or town, according to the number of the male population, to furnish its quota of men for service in the Militia. If the quota was not forth- coming, then a fine should be inflicted by Parliament for every man deficient. The county or borough, would pay this fine out of the general county or borough rate, in the same way as the police rate is now paid. It might be known as the Militia deficiency rate. Neither the duty nor the fine is new. The duty which would be imposed on the county council is inherited from the quarter sessions. The liability for a fine rested, in the reign of Charles II., upon owners of personalty as well as owners of real estate. Any owner who failed to provide his quota was fined. A hundred years later the liability was transferred to the parochial authorities, and any parish which failed to provide its quota was fined by means of a rate levied for the purpose. I would gladly revert to the early principle, and throw the liability not only on realty but on personalty also. But for the present I am concerned only to show that the existing machinery can be utilised to enforce the liability.

At present, service in the Militia, in the case of both officers and men, is regarded by their friends and relations as a pleasant pastime, but one which must never be allowed to stand in the way of the real business of life. If Parliament imposed a penalty for deficiency in the Militia service, the importance and the true meaning of that service might become apparent to the country. The system of recruiting for the Militia which I suggest would not damage recruiting for the Line, because you would be once more opening the door for the Militia soldier, that is, a man who has employment in civil life, and who would under no circumstances join the Regular Army. Does the Government still consider that the proposals of the Army Council respecting the Militia must remain in abeyance? In the summary, on page 12, I read— But the Militia cannot be left in its present unsatisfactory condition. Prompt measures must be taken to improve it so as to make it a more serviceable fighting force. Therefore I ask the noble Earl if it is the intention of His Majesty's Government to adopt in whole or in part the proposals of the Duke of Norfolk's Commission. I also read on page 12 that in July last the Secretary of State proposed— To take into consultation representative officers of the force in order to discuss any further changes that might with advantage be introduced. I beg to ask the noble Earl if that course has been followed, and, if so, with what results?

I trust that the noble Earl may be in a position to give a definite reply on these points, because at present everybody connected with the Militia is in a state of absolute uncertainty as to the intention of Parliament. Uncertainty as to the future paralyses action and produces that condition when no one cares to do anything, because nobody knows what is going to happen next. Take the case of recruiting. How can any Militia commanding officer at the present moment have an interest in getting recruits for his regiment when he knows that it is the earnest wish of the Army Council to remove him from his command and request, him to hand over his regiment to an officer from the Line? I hear now of instances of men who are thinking of joining the Militia saying to the recruiting officer—"We want to join the Militia, but we do not want to join the Line. We hear some talk of turning the Militia into the Line. Can you tell us before we enlist what is going to happen to the Militia?" Well, my Lords, the recruiting officer returns exactly the same answer that any member of your Lordships' House, not being a member of His Government, would give, namely, "I have not the smallest idea what is going to happen to the Militia." I trust that the noble Earl the Under-Secretary of State for War will be able to give an answer which will at once remove all uncertainty.

VISCOUNT HARDINGE

My Lords, we are greatly indebted to the noble Duke for bringing this subject before your Lordships this evening, for there is no doubt that this is a most important and urgent problem. I trust the noble Earl the Under-Secretary will not evade the questions which the noble Duke has put, but will give us a definite answer. Since the Secretary of State for War brought forward his proposals in the other House at the end of last session, the Militia, as the noble Duke has said, has been in a state of great uncertainty as to its future, which can only be described as having an effect disastrous to that force; and I believe the same thing applies to the Volunteers. Therefore, my Lords, the sooner some definite answer is given the better, not only for the good of those two services, but of the nation at large.

If I understand the proposals of the Secretary of State for War rightly, I gather that he wished not to imply that he was desirous of abolishing the Militia; in fact he said that nothing was further from his thoughts. What he intended to do was to raise its status by drafting the Militia into the territorial regiments, and thereby mixing up officers and men of the Militia with those of the home Line battalion. If such a course is adopted, I venture to think, with all due deference to the Secretary of State for War, who I know conscientiously believes that it is the true solution of this question, and is in the interests of national defence, that the Militia generally will look upon it as the abolition of that old constitutional force, without the aid of which we should have been unable to bring the late South African War to a satisfactory conclusion. For several years past the Militia has not received any encouragement from the War Office; in fact, it has been most unfairly treated. The War Office have always worked on the principle that anything was good enough for the Militia, whilst if the same consideration has been meted out to them as had been extended to other branches of His Majesty's Auxiliary Forces, I am confident we should not hear, as we do now, of the inefficiency of the Militia.

Take, for instance, the shooting of the Militia. I was told the other day by a general who holds a responsible position at the War Office, that he thought the shooting of the Militia was far from satisfactory; in fact, he considered it was very bad. If your Lordships only knew what sort of rifles and ammunition are served out to the Militia, and the way that their annual course of musketry is hurried through—in most instances the officers commanding districts want to clear the ranges for the other branches of the Regular Forces and for the Volunteers and Yeomanry—you would not be surprised at their defective shooting. Until quite lately officers of Militia were unable to attend a course of musketry instruction at Hythe without having to pay their own expenses. Bearing all these points in mind, I think it is matter for wonder that the shooting of the Militia is as good as it is.

From the speech of the Prime Minister to Unionists in Glasgow on January 13th, I gather that he, at any rate, is perfectly satisfied with the present state of the Army. Yet only a short time before this speech was made, the noble Earl the late Commander - in - Chief (Lord Roberts) deemed it his duty to write his opinion of the state of the Army in the Nineteenth Century and After in words to this effect:— I maintain that it is the bounden duty of the State to see that every able-bodied man in this country, no matter to what grade of society he may belong, undergoes some kind of military training in his youth, sufficient to enable him to shoot straight and carry out simple orders if ever his services are required for national defence. No man calling himself an Englishman can fail to doubt the truth and wisdom of these words; and I trust His Majesty's Government, before they finally decide either to abolish the Militia or to change its present organisation, will ponder over these words of warning from so great an authority; for if there is one branch of the service which is suitable for the training of the youth of the country, that force undoubtedly is the Militia.

LORD RAGLAN

My Lords, I feel some diffidence in addressing your Lordships on this subject, as I have on more than one occasion inflicted long speeches with regard to it upon the House; but this is a matter on which I feel so very strongly that I cannot refrain from saying a few words in support of what has fallen from the noble Duke. The noble Duke has fully explained the position in which we, as commanding officers of Militia, fee ourselves, and do not think it necessary to follow him in regard to that. But I do appeal to the noble Earl the Under-Secretary of State for War to answer as fully as he is able the questions put by the noble Duke.

I would like to draw the attention of His Majesty's Government to the fact that while the War Office Council is deliberating the Militia is dwindling. As Jar as I am able to make out, because the Returns for 1904 have not yet been published, the numbers of the Militia have fallen by 600 officers and something like 6,000 men from what they were before the commencement of the late war. That perhaps in itself would be a small thing, but the falling-off had been going on for many years before the war. I must emphasise what the noble Duke says, that we commanding officers of the Militia have considerable difficulty in putting pressure on our friends to send their sons into Militia regiments, because we are unable to say exactly what will be the result to the Militia force of the present changes.

The question of the training of officers, alluded to by the noble Duke, is one which I have before mentioned in your Lordships' House. The proper training of Militia officers is prevented by the difficulties put in the way of their getting proper instruction. I was informed the other day that for the year 1905 the number of vacancies allotted to the Militia of the Western District for the course at Hythe is only twenty-two. According to the new regulations, an officer is supposed to obtain a high certificate before he can qualify for promotion to the position of captain, and your Lordships will be able to calculate how many of the subalterns in the Western District will be able to qualify as captains. The noble Duke has explained most fully the reasons why men do not join the Militia. They previously joined a Militia regiment because they knew what it was, but while there is a possibility of the Militia being turned into a new-fangled territorial regiment, recruits will not readily come forward.

There is one point on which I differ from the noble Duke—the question of the enlistment of the Militia for general service in the event of war. That is a point which I have urged for many years, in season and out of season. It was originally advocated many years ago by the late Sir George Walker in a lecture at the United Service Institution. Sir George Walker commanded the old Scottish Borders' Militia, and no man ever lived who was a better soldier or more thoroughly acquainted with the Militia. Sir George Walker was a strong advocate for enlisting the Militia for general service, and I, many years afterwards, followed humbly in his wake.

I look upon the existing condition of things as unfair both to the officers and men of the Militia. They are engaged on the distinct understanding that their service is limited to the United Kingdom; in fact, if I am not mistaken they cannot proceed even to the Isle of Man or the Channel Islands without volunteering. But the first thing that happens in the event of war is that they are asked to volunteer for foreign service. That is putting an unfair pressure upon them, for no officer or man likes to hold back when his regiment is proceeding on foreign service. I am fully persuaded of this fact, that if the Militia were frankly told that they were liable to proceed on foreign service in the event of a national emergency, you would not lose a single recruit or a tingle officer. Moreover, when it is understood that the Militia ii liable to go on foreign service, the force will receive a new status, and it will become the duty of the War Office to see that it is properly trained and equipped for war. As long as the Fleet commands the sea, this country can never possibly be invaded, but we must have from somewhere a large force of men to defend the great land frontiers of the Empire.

Many years ago we were told that there was no fear of our land frontiers being invaded, but what has happened in the Far East is a lesson to all of us. We have seen enormous arms and immense quantities of guns and ammunition transported gigantic distances by means of a single line of railway. Railways are no great distance from our frontier, and thousands of men can be conveyed on those railways to within very short distances of our bases. You would require a large Army to deal with a crisis of that sort, I hold, if the Militia is enlisted and equipped for general service, and receives proper consideration, it can do all the work that a hastily-raised force can perform. I hold that no other force can succeed to the traditions of the Militia, and that if it is properly treated the Militia can perform any duty which may be required of it.

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE FOR WAR (The Earl of DONOUGHMORE

MyLords, the noble Duke who introduced this discussion laid considerable stress on the necessity of an early decision of the principle at issue. I can assure him that I am entirely with him in desiring to see such an early decision. But we must not forget—the tendency is to forget it—what the principle at issue is. The noble Duke assumes that the principle at issue is whether the Militia is to be amalgamated— absorbed was the word ho used—in the proposed short-service Army. I think that description is rather too bald adequately to describe the question under discussion. I do not deny that I have myself argued in favour of such absorption, and I wish I could have persuaded the noble Duke that it was an advisable thing; but I think the position of the Government was made perfectly clear last year, particalarly by my noble friend the First Lord of the Admiralty, and perhaps I may be allowed to remind your Lordships of the position. The scheme which has been submitted to Parliament by His Majesty's Government involves the separation of the Army into a General Service Army and a Home Service Army, and the question we have to decide is, what part the Militia is to play in that division. The Home Service Army is that part of the Army which is to be ear-marked for service at home in time of peace and service abroad in time of war. It has now, I think, been universally accepted that our Army is chiefly needed for service abroad; and yet, while we have, in round numbers, a Regular Army of 250,000, a Militia of, say, 90,000, Imperial Yeomanry amounting to 25,000, and 240,000 Volunteers, making a total of 605,000, it is a notable fact that only 250,000 out of that total of 605,000 are ear-marked for service abroad. Therefore, it was with considerable satisfaction that I heard the conclusion of the speech of the noble Lord who spoke last, and who was one of my predecessors in office.

We have drafted a Bill, and I propose to ask your Lordships to read it a first time at the end of this debate in order to have it printed and circulated, authorising us to enlist, the Militia for service abroad in time of war or emergency, or perhaps I should say for service abroad when embodied. Care is taken in the Bill to safeguard the rights of existing officers and men in the Militia, and it is not intended, for reasons which I shall be prepared to explain when the Bill comes up for Second Reading, to include the Imperial Yeomanry. I venture to suggest to your Lordships that this is a logical step for us to take in view of our belief that the Army as a whole is primarily needed for service abroad. The old custom, which I am sorry to say still holds favour with the noble Duke, of asking the Militia to volunteer to go abroad on the outbreak of war is cumbersome in view of your definite decision that you want them to go abroad. There has hardly ever been a big war—indeed, there has never been a big war—in which we have been engaged when we have not needed the Militia to go abroad; and I think it is therefore better that we should enlist them for that purpose. The noble Duke and the noble Lord who spoke last, complained, quite rightly, I think, of the uncertainty in which the Militia find themselves in regard to this matter. But on the last occasion on which my noble friend Lord Raglan addresed us on this subject he urged the Government to defer these drastic changes, and my noble friend, Lord Wemyss, whose absence I regret today, urged us, not once, but twice, to do nothing until Parliament had had an opportunity of discussing the proposal. I deplore the uncertainty existing.

It has often been stated in your Lordships' House that the great problem before us in time of peace is to provide adequate drafts for India. Three months ago, in considering the state of the infantry and framing Estimates for this year, we were naturally anxious to make a start with the system of general and short service; but those who are particularly acquainted with these matters came to us and advised us that owing to the very small number of extensions of three- years men, Indian drafts in the next few years would be in serious jeopardy. It was, therefore, decided to make every effort by nine-years enlistments to make; the Indian drafts safe. I am happy to be able to inform your Lordships that the result of the nine - years recruiting has been distinctly satisfactory. Since the Army Order was issued on October 26th last, and up to February l1th, 8,427 nine-years men have been enlisted, considerably improving the position, though not making the drafts absolutely safe. Perhaps I may be pardoned if I give one short example to show the position we were in when we decided upon this change. A very distinguished regiment, the Norfolk Regiment, were in 1898 some sixty-eight over establishment, and they had 534 men available for drafts. Last year they were 254 over establishment, but had only 108 men available for drafts.

It followed, the nine-years enlistments having been decided upon, that the enlisting for the short-service battalion; had to be postponed. This is the cause of the uncertainty we all deplore; we are not able to contemplate immediately; the organisation of a short-service Army, or of finally deciding what form the I Militia will have in the organisation. I do not think that the present position can possibly be lasting. Long service alone gives us no Reserve, Short service alone creates anxiety about drafts, and I believe the only true remedy is to be found in a combination of the two, but until we are able to say that the drafts for India are made safe provisionally by the number of long-service men in the Army, we shall not be able to start our short - service battalions. I am afraid the state of uncertainty which nobel Lords to deeply deplore must continue, but I can assure them no one will be better pleased than my colleagues on the Army Council when who are able to start our short - service battalions and come to a final decision in the matter.

I should like to say a word or two with regard to what the noble Duke said about the Volunteers. The noble Duke suggested that the Volunteers are an unreliable force.

THE DUKE OF BEDFORD

I gave their record of service, which I believe was perfectly accurate.

THE EARL OF DONOUGHMORE

I think the noble Duke's suggestion was that the Volunteers are an unreliable force, and that the only method of raising a citizen Army is through the Militia. Here we differ from the noble Duke, it is our intention to look to the Volunteers for home defence against raids. Though they cannot be relied upon as units for service abroad, we have full confidence in the Volunteers as units for home service. They are slightly more numerous than are now required, and by a reduction in numbers we propose to increase their efficiency. My right hon. friend the Secretary of State for War stated yesterday in another place that the Volunteer Vote would be taken at the same sum this year as last year. Who hope to make a saving on that Vote by reductions of numbers, and with the co-operation of the Volunteers themselves, which we are confident we shall obtain, we shall be able to apply the money saved in considerably increasing their efficiency for the purpose for which they are intended.

The Militia, being made reliable for service abroad, will, ipso facto, become the Reserve of the Regular Army. The noble Duke drew rather a pessimistic picture as to the efficiency that we could expect from a short-service home force. He suggested that their Reserve it would go down after two years training, and on mobilisation would come back to strange regiments, not knowing their officers, and being generally rather a breed of lost sheep, who could not compare with a Militia regiment which had being embodied. What is the position? The Militia have their preliminary drill, very often not under their own officers. That drill is at present, I think, six weeks and there are suggestions to increase it is length. They then serve for one month a year for a number of years, and on embodiment they come up, I admit, and serve under their own officers is the regiment they have been accustomed to. It is suggested that the men in those short-service battalions should serve for a certain time in the depot and should then join their short-service battalion, in which they would be at least twenty-one months out of the two years. They would then go to the Reserve for six years, and twice during that service they would go back to their short-service battalions for one month's training, practically a Militia training. I do not think it can seriously be argued that these Reservists would go back to a strange regiment under strange officers, when they would go back to the regiment in which they had served twenty-one months, and possibly the two month reserve training. I think the noble Duke is rather unduly favouring the Militia when he says that the Militia would provide a more efficient Reserve than the Reserve we should get by the short-service battalions.

I now come to the important point raised by the noble Duke as to the present deficiencies in the Militia. The noble Duke says those deficiencies are due to the War Office. I think that that is very largely true, but it is a great deal easier to say that the deficiencies in the Militia are due to the War Office than to provide a remedy. I would be more inclined to suggest that the deficiencies are due to certain inherent defects in their position. They are mere adjuncts to the Line, little more than a feeding-machine, both a regards officers and men, and claim that the line of progress which the Government suggest will do a great deal to remedy the evils that have arisen.

We have received hundreds of remedies as to how to increase not only the Militia but all branches of His Majesty's forces. But there are two necessities which must be satisfied before any remedy can be adopted. The first, I think, will be admitted by everyone. It is absolutely necessary that no remedy must involve a serious increase in the total amount of Army Estimates. Your Lordships will remember that my noble friend supplied me last year with a scheme for obtaining subalterns for the Auxiliary Forces. I think we could easily get them on the terms he suggested—namely, by giving them all a retaining fee of £100 a year. But that would have involved aseriousincrease in the Army Estimates. Secondly, it is of no use to suggest a remedy for one branch of the Army that will injure some other branch. What is the proposal of the noble Duke? The noble Duke suggests that a remedy for the present state of affairs might be found if local authorities were permitted to recruit for the Milita, and if Militia recruiting were taken out of the hands of the War Office and absolutely separated from recruiting for the Regular Army. According to the noble Duke's proposal, competition would be set up between the Army and the Militia for recruits, so that in every county in the Kingdom in which there is a Militia regiment there would be a sort of "pull devil, pull baker," going on between the recruiting agent of the local authority and the Army recruiting officer who wanted recruits for the Army. I cannot admit that that is a proper remedy.

The matter of better provision for the training of officers is continually before us at the War Office, and we are doing our best to increase the accommodation, but even expenditure on buildings is bound between certain necessary limits, and we have rather to content ourselves with doing one thing at a time. But this is a question on which we feel quite as strongly as the noble Duke, and we are just as anxious to give facilities for the training of officers of the Auxiliary Forces as we are to afford them to officers in other branches. I do not wish to refer at any length to the noble Duke's amusing description of what he considers the intellectual attainments of an officer in the Regular Army and his utter inability to understand any question affecting the Auxiliary Forces. I think he will admit that there are officers in the Regular Army who are fully equal to the intellectual requirements of the time, and I regard what he said on that matter as nothing more than good-natured chaff.

The noble Duke advocates a revival of the Auxiliary Forces Advisory Board which we had at the War Office for some time, and I think his argument is that its revival would be a very useful method for bringing the views of the Auxiliary Forces before the War Office. There are certain disadvantages in that system. I am speaking in the presence of two colleagues of mice on that board, and I am sure they will admit that the procedure was a little cumbersome, for we could never have a meeting at less than, I think, twenty days notice owing to our constitution. But I claim that we have already gone a great deal further than the Advisory Board in what we have done. We have a Militia colonel always in the War Office now, in the department of the Director of Auxiliary Forces, who is available to any member of the War; Office for the purposes of information.

As to the question whether the recommendations of the Duke of Norlolk's Commission are to be adopted in whole or in part, it must be evident that to carry them out will involve some considerable expense, and at the present moment we would not feel justified in i increasing the Army Estimates. But I am permitted to tell your Lordships that a request will be made in another place for the same amount of money on the Militia Vote as was given last year. There are a great many units, infantry and artillery, which are really past praying for as efficient units, and there I are certain regiments of garrison artillery, which, as your Lordships know, have never yet been utilised in any known defence scheme. We hope by a reduction and amalgamation of certain units to effect certain saving, which we intend to apply solely for the improvement of the Militia, largely, of course, in the direction of the recommendations on the noble Duke's Commission. At the same time your Lordships will understand that it we are still bound by the fact that we are not yet able to start the short-service Army.

As to whether we have had opportunities of discussing this matter during the autumn with colonels of Militia, I can assure the noble Duke that such is the case. There is one colonel present, sitting beside the noble Duke, whom Mr. Arnold-Forster has had the pleasure of interviewing, and we were also able to obtain the views of a great many colonels of Militia through the Director of Auxiliary Forces. That is in addition to personal interviews which my right hon. friend had. We deplore the delay which has occurred just as much as my noble friend. We shall be glad when the position of the drafts enables us to start a short-service Army, and will rejoice when the end of the present period of tension is reached.

LORD TWEEDMOUTH

My Lords, I do not propose to go at length into the whole question raised by the noble Duke, but I desire to say a few words with regard to the remarkable announcement which the Under-Secretary of State for War has made to-night. At any rate, I am glad to congratulate the Under-Secretary of State, rising as he did from between two colleagues, both of whom are colonels of Militia, on the role he had to fill, because last year the Secretary of State for War, in the other House, appeared as the stern judge, pronouncing the sentence of early execution on the Militia force, whereas on the present occasion the Under-Secretary has appeared more like the peaceful dove, bringing the leaf of a reprieve to one of the most ancient forces of His Majesty the King. But whilst I recognise the importance of the announcement made by the Under-Secretary of State, I must say that we have not received very much information as to what the future of the Militia is to be. The noble Earl has told us, very clearly indeed, that they are to have a further condition of service imposed upon them. Seeing that such a condition as compulsory foreign service is to be imposed upon a force which has not hitherto been subject to that liability, I think we ought to have been fully informed as to the conditions under which the force is to serve in the future. For my own part, I should be inclined to look upon the proposal with favour, but before we can consent to it we must know exactly the position the Militia are to hold in the future, and the duties that are to be imposed upon them. The Under-Secretary of State told us—and I am glad he was able to do so—that we should find on the Estimates of this year a sum not less than that applied to the Militia last year. If I remember rightly, the amount was something over £2,000,000 That, again, is a guarantee that the Militia are to be maintained.

THE EARL of DONOUGHMORE

I was speaking of the Militia Vote—the Pay Vote of the Militia—which amounts to about £800,000. The total spent on the Militia does, I think, amount to about £1,800,000, but a large portion of it is borne on other Votes.

LORD TWEEDMOUTH

Last year it was £2,017,000. I should like to have, if possible, some further explanation with regard to this Home Army, as to which, principle, most of us are agreed. There s a general consensus of opinion that this Country must have an Army for foreign service whose conditions of service will be somewhat different from those of the Army which is to serve at home. But is it held, has been put forward by many Army reformers, that the Militia would form the very best nucleus that could be used for a form of short-service Army, primarily for service at home, but which might be called upon in time of war? There is a great deal to be said for such a proposal—that it is possible so to revivify the Militia, so to improve its conditions of service, and to give it such attention and care, that it would form the nucleus of your Home Service Army, and in that way expand into a very useful part of His Majesty's troops. Everybody agrees that the Militia cannot remain in its present condition; nobody holds the opinion more strongly than distinguished Militia officers. But I would add to the War Office a second agent of mischief to the Militia, and that is the Regular Army itself. You have sacrificed the Militia to the Regular Army and you go on sacrificing it. When you get your Militia recruits what do you do with them? You send them to the depots of the regiments, where they are drilled by sergeants whose first duty it is to endeavour to get the recruit to leave the Militia and enter the Regular Army. That is not the way to obtain a strong branch of the service. The Under-Secretary of State seemed to be afraid that the noble Duke was going to set up a sort of competition between the Regular Army and the Militia in the matter of recruiting. If you are going to recruit men for two different services under different conditions there must be a certain competition. But, my Lords, I think that it will be a wholesome competition. The man who is willing to serve for a limited time, and under limited conditions of service, will not really be a competitor with the man who is willing to serve abroad, to serve for a longer period, and to serve under more stringent and rigid conditions. But if you are to have your Army divided into two parts, subject to different conditions of service, you must have a certain competition between the recruiting for the two branches. I can only say—and I am sure my noble friends beside me will agree with me—that we should be ready to consider fully the proposals His Majesty's Government may have to make on the subject of the future of the Militia. At this moment we do not consider that we are in a position to give a final opinion on what has been proposed to-night, but the Government may be sure that, so far as is possible, it will be our endeavour to make our view favourable to a proposal that is likely to be of advantage to the country.

LORD BURGHCLERE

My Lords, I do not wish to make a speech; I merely want to supplement my noble friend's remarks by asking a question. My noble friend said that he did not know exactly what the position of the Militia was to be in the future. I have no doubt that when the Under-Secretary of State brings in the Bill he has promised we shall be able to understand more clearly what the position of the Militia is to be. My question deals with a portion of the Under-Secretary's promises which, to my mind, is most important, namely, with regard to the future service of the Militia abroad. If any Member of the Government is to reply to my noble friend, will he tell us whether the service of the Militia abroad is to be at all times, or only in the case of a great war. That is a very important distinction which must be in the mind of the noble Earl opposite, and I shall be very glad if he will tell us the exact position in that respect.

THE FIRST LORD OF THE ADMIRALTY (The Earl of SELBORNE)

My Lords, I do not intend to make a speech, because I do not think that this is the occasion on which we can discuss the proposal at length. But there is no difficulty in answering the question of the noble Lord opposite. When the Bill is printed it will be seen that the Militia are liable to be sent abroad only when they are embodied. That does not cover the ordinary annual training. It covers occasions such as the late South African War, the Crimean War, and all past wars in which the services of the Militia have been called upon.