HL Deb 13 April 1905 vol 145 cc6-28
LORD REAY

rose to call attention to the Correspondence respecting Contraband of War, Russia No. 1 (1905), and to ask the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether the invitation of the President of the United States of America to a second Conference to complete the postponed work of the first Peace Conference has been accepted by His Majesty's Government, and whether the following subjects will as taken into consideration at the Conference in order that an understanding may be obtained between the Powers represented at the Conference—

  1. 1. The recognition of a demarcation between absolute and conditional contraband.
  2. 2. An indication of the categories of articles constituting absolute contraband.
  3. 3. The circumstances under which foodstuffs and coal, and raw material such as cotton, can be declared to be contraband.
  4. 4. The limitation of the right of search of mail steamers in cases where the neutral Government has a contract with the company owning the steamers preventing it from carrying contraband.
  5. 5. he limitation of the right of destroying prizes, under very exceptional conditions with guarantees for compensation.
  6. 6. The adoption of precautionary measures for the purpose of securing immunity from the danger of drifting of mines.
  7. 7. The discussion of rules with regard to wireless telegraphy.
  8. 8. The restriction of the right of search to a certain distance from the theatre of the war.
  9. 9. The recognition of the doctrine of "continuous voyages."
  10. 10. The constitution of Prize Courts.
He said: My Lords, I wish in the first place to call your Lordships' attention to the correspondence which has been communicated to us respecting contraband of war in connection with the hostilities between Russia and Japan. This is a most interesting correspondence, containing a bold vindication of the rights and duties of neutrals by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. There are several principles laid down in the correspondence which are of such great importance that I do not think I need ask the indulgence of your Lordships in calling attention to them. At page 13 there is a vindication of the distinction between absolute and conditional contraband. There it is stated— In transmitting the Order from which these Rules are taken, the Russian Government stated that all articles enumerated in Rule 6 were regarded as" unconditionally contraband.' This Declaration, it is needless to say, attracted the attention of His Majesty's Government. The description of contraband of war which it contained went far beyond that which has been hitherto accepted. It has been held by this country, and our officers have been so instructed, that the term 'contraband of war' includes only articles having belligerent destination and purpose. Such articles have been classed under two heads:— 1. Those that are primarily and ordinarily used for military purposes in time of war, e.g., arms and munitions of war, military material, etc.—articles of this kind being usually described as absolutely contraband. 2. Those that may be, and are, used for peaceful or warlike purposes according to circumstances, such articles being usually described as conditionally contraband. Articles of the first class destined for ports of the enemy or places occupied by his forces are always contraband of war. Articles of the second class are contraband of war only when actually and especially destined for the military or naval forces of the enemy. Coal and provisions are among the articles which are only conditionally contraband. I do not think that it is possible to give a better definition of what ought to be, but is not, generally accepted as international law, and the noble Marquess was successful in persuading the Russian Government to give way about provisions but not, I believe, as regards coal, cotton, horses, and beasts of burden. This despatch was dated from the Foreign Office on August 10th, 1904, and I may perhaps ask whether since that concession was made about provisions the Russian Government have given way about cotton and coal, which they could easily do as regards coal when we recollect that the Russian Government in the year 1884, at Berlin, made a Declaration at the West African Conference and refused categorically to consent to any Treaty, Convention, or Declaration of any kind which would imply the recognition of coal as contraband of war.

It is very important that in a matter of this kind our action should be the same as that of the United States Government, and it is very satisfactory that all through these negotiations there has been absolute agreement between the position taken up by His Majesty's Government and by the American Government. There is a circular of June 10th, 1904, issued at Washington by Mr. Secretary Hay, from which I have been allowed to quote, in which the following passage occurs— We are also informed that it is intended to treat raw cotton as contraband of war. While it is true that raw cotton could be made up into clothing for the military uses of a belligerent, a military use for the supply of an army or garrison might possibly be made of foodstuffs of every description which might be shipped from neutral ports to the non blockaded ports of a belligerent. The principle under consideration might, therefore, be extended so as to apply to every article of human use, which might be declared contraband of war simply because it might ultimately become in any degree useful to a belligerent for military purposes. Coal and other fuel and cotton are employed for a great many innocent purposes. Many nations are dependent on them for the conduct of inoffensive industries, and no sufficient presumption of an intended warlike use seems to be afforded by the mere fact of their destination to a belligerent port. The recognition in principle of the treatment of coal and other fuel and raw cotton as absolutely contraband of war might ultimately lead to a total inhibition of the sale by neutrals to the people of belligerent States of all articles which could be finally converted t3 military uses. Such an extension of the principle by treating coal and all other fuel and raw cotton as absolutely contraband of war, simply because they are shipped by a neutral to a non-blockaded port of a belligerent, would not appear to be in accord with the reasonable and lawful lights of a neutral commerce. It is clear from this very definite expression of the views of the Government of the United States that their attitude was identical with that of His Majesty's Government. At page 13 of the correspondence there is another principle of very great importance vindicated by my noble friend, viz.— While thus protesting in regard to this particular category of so-called contraband of war, His Majesty's Government felt themselves bound to reserve their rights by also protesting against the doctrine that it is for the belligerent to decide what articles are as a matter of course, and without reference to other considerations, to be dealt with as contraband of war, regardless of the well-established rights of neutrals. That protest I believe to be a vindication of this most important principle, that a belligerent has no right arbitrarily—and that was the contention of the Russian Government as communicated in Sir C. Hardinge's despatch of June 8th, 1904—to impose on neutrals his own interpretation of what constitutes contraband of war. And then the noble Marquess went on to explain that— We should not consider ourselves bound to recognise as valid the decision of any Prize Court which violated those rights, or was otherwise not in conformity with the recognized principles of international law. That principle, again, I hold to be absolutely correct, and it was admitted by Count Lamsdorff. He added that in case the Government were not satisfied with the decision of the Court of Appeal at St. Petersburg, there was always arbitration or some fresh measure to which recourse could be finally had. I need not point out how important it is that Prize Courts should be constituted in such a way that it would be unnecessary to appeal further to arbitration, and so that their decisions could be accepted. If Prize Courts were composed, as they are in the United States and in the United Kingdom, of men well versed in the law, and not only of sailors, or officials not having the requisite knowledge of International Law, their decisions would probably be more in accordance with the recognised principles of international law.

Now I come to page 20 where we read that His Majesty's Ambassador at St. Petersburg informed Count Lamsdorff as follows— I told Count Lamsdorff that I presumed that, in the event of the seizure of articles of a conditionally contraband nature addressed to private individuals in the enemy's country, the burden of proof would necessarily rest with the captor. He assented, with the observation that it would be equally to the advantage of the owner of the articles in question to disprove the charge that they were destined for the military or naval forces of the enemy. That is a departure from what I believe to be the existing rule, which is that usually the burden of proof does not rest with the captor but with the owner of the prize, and I suppose it is not the intention of my noble friend that that principle should be, altered, but merely that on account of the concession made with regard to articles addressed to private individuals it should be in this case only that the burden of proof should rest with the captor. Then at page 25 there is this exceedingly important principle laid down:— As I have already had the honour of explaining to your Excellency, His Majesty's Government have no desire to place obstacles in the way of a belligerent desiring to take reasonable precautions in order to prevent his enemy from receiving supplies, but they cannot admit that the right of adopting such precautions implies a consequential right to abolish by a stroke of the pen the long-established distinction between articles which are conditionally and those which are absolutely contraband of war— —and I would call your Lordships' special attention to the words which follow— and to intercept at a distance from the scene of operations and without proof of their ultimate destination, a numerous category of articles in themselves of an innocent description, and largely dealt in by neutral Powers, but which that belligerent may have announced his intention of regarding as unconditional contraband of war. That principle of not intercepting at a distance from the scene of operations is one which is as yet not recognised as a general principle of international law, but we ourselves gave an instance of a concession on the subject during the recent war. At the request of the German Government, Lord Salisbury gave instructions that no examination should take place at Aden or at any place equidistant to Aden from Delagoa Bay. I need not point out how extremely important for our trade would be the general recognition of this limitation of the right of search when obviously it could only be vexatious and could serve no really useful purpose.

Another extremely important principle is laid down at page 11, where the rule of giving hospitality in neutral harbours to belligerent warships is thus limited— The rule above quoted is not to be understood as having any application to the case of a belligerent fleet proceeding either to the seat of war, or to a position or positions on the line of route, with the object of intercepting neutral vessels on suspicion of carrying contraband of war. Such fleet cannot be permitted to make use in any way of a British port for the purpose of coaling, either directly from the shore, or from colliers accompanying the fleet, whether the vessels of the fleet present themselves at the port at the same lime or successively. His Majesty's Government further direct that the same practice be pursued with reference to single belligerent war vessels, if it be clear, that they are proceeding for the purpose of belligerent operations as above defined. This is not to be applied to the case of a vessel putting 'in on account of actual distress at sea. The limitation here imposed is more severe than that imposed by other Powers, and though I cordially agree with the action of the Government, I quote it because it shows how important it is that this matter should be discussed at a conference in order that it may receive the assent of other Powers. The next extract of great importance which I will quote is that in which the noble Marquess alludes to the sinking of prizes. At page 12 the statement is made as follows— The position, already sufficiently threatening, is aggravated by the assertion on behalf of the Russian Government that the captor of a neutral ship is within his rights if he sinks it, merely for the reason that it is difficult, or impossible, for him to convey it to a national port for adjudication by a Prize Court. We understand that this right of destroying a prize is claimed in a number of cases; amongst others, when the conveyance of the prize to a Prize Court is inconvenient because of the distance of the port to which the vessel should be brought, or when her conveyance to such a port would take too much time or entail too great a consumption of coal. It is, we understand, even asserted that such destruction is justifiable when the captor has not at his disposal a sufficient number of men from whom to provide a crew for the captured vessel. It is unnecessary to point out to your Excellent' the effects of a consistent application of these principles. They would justify the wholesale destruction of neutral ships taken by a vessel of war at a distance from her own base upon the ground that such prizes had not on board a sufficient amount of coal to carry them to a remote foreign port—an amount of coal with which such ships would probably in no circumstances have been supplied. They would similarly justify the destruction of every neutral ship taken by a belligerent vessel which started on her voyage with a crew sufficient for her own requirements only, and therefore unable to furnish prize crews for her captures. The adoption of such measures by the Russian Government could not fail to occasion a complete paralysis of all neutral commerce. A very important principle is here laid down which has not been generally recognised. Of course, where a cargo is only partly contraband it will be generally admitted that you ought not to sink the ship, but protect it and the innocent cargo from destruction; but it cannot be denied that there may be cases of overwhelming necessity in which it would be rather difficult to avoid the extreme measure of sinking the ship, and I should think that would be the view of the Admiralty on the subject. I suppose that the noble Marquess would admit that where a ship is found with a cargo consisting wholly of absolute contraband, such as arms and ammunition, and where it is not possible for the captor to take the ship for adjudication to a Prize Court, that, in such a case, the destruction would be justifiable, unless the delinquent surrendered to the jurisdiction of a Prize Court. I should, of course, wish that when this matter is discussed the opinion of the noble Marquess should prevail, but I am afraid that at a conference it would be found rather difficult to have this prohibition accepted as an absolute rule. I have shown that the principles asserted in this correspondence are of far-reaching effect, that they are a bold defence of neutral rights; but I think the correspondence also shows how important it is that at a conference of the Powers the views of His Majesty's Government should meet with general agreement, in order to avoid friction on account of divergent claims of belligerents and of neutrals.

I now come to the very opportune invitation of the United States Government to submit these matters to a further conference. The United States Government have not laid down a programme for that conference. They state that— It is only by comparison of views that a general accord can be reached as to the matters to be considered by the new conference. That shows the necessity for negotiations which have to be undertaken, between the various Powers in order to settle the questions to be discussed. Obviously the question of the topics to be brought before that conference is one of enormous importance. I may remind the House that the Final Act of the Hague Conference itself contemplated a future conference and left certain matters, to be decided at that future conference, and the most important are those mentioned in the invitation of the United States Government and in the Final Act of the Hague Conference, namely, the rights and duties of neutrals, the inviolability of private property in naval warfare, and the bombardment of ports, towns, and villages by a naval force. In the United States invitation it is stated that the— Three points mentioned cover a large field. Mr. Secretary Hay continues— The first especially, touching the rights and duties of neutrals, is of universal importance. Its rightful disposition affects the interests and well-being of all the world. The neutral is something more than an on-looker. His acts of omission or commission may have an influence—indirect, but tangible—on a war actually in progress; whilst on the other hand he may suffer from the exigencies of the belligerents. But there is another reason why that conference is important, which, I think, I can illustrate by showing the divergent interpretation at the present moment given to the duties of neutrals. We have only to look at the various notifications which are issued by Governments when war breaks out, to see how very differently that duty is interpreted by different Powers. Here again we are in the fortunate position that our notification and that of the United States Government hardly differ, with this one exception, that in our Proclamation of February 12th, 1904, there is this clause— We hereby further warn all our loving subjects…if any of them shall presume…to do any acts in derogation of their duty as subjects of a neutral Power in a war between other Powers, or in violation or contravention of the Law of Nations in that behalf, more especially by breaking or endeavouring to break any blockade lawfully' and actually established… will rightfully incur and be justly liable to hostile capture. That is very clear, but then there is this rather mysterious addition— And to the penalties denounced by the Law of Nations in that behalf. Although I have tried to discover what those penalties are, I have not succeeded. That warning does not appear in the American Proclamation, and I think that it would be well, on a future occasion, to omit this rather vague threat, which, I think, it would be extremely difficult to apply. The French Proclamation is less explicit than ours, and there is one very important difference between our Proclamation and the French Proclamation with regard to prizes. In our Proclamation armed ships of either belligerent are interdicted from carrying prizes made by them into the ports of the United Kingdom. That, I admit, is the right principle. But the French Proclamation allows prizes to be taken into their harbours and to remain for twenty-four hours, and to remain even longer in case of need. The French Proclamation also allows men-of-war to take any provisions and stores required for the crew and 'the safety of navigation. The most curious Proclamation is that of the German Government, which only informs Germans that they have to abstain from all acts which would endanger the neutrality of Germany. Now, it would be impossible to be more brief, and also to make it more difficult for a mercantile community to discover what are the acts which would endanger the neutrality of Germany. Perhaps we have the explanation in a speech delivered by the Chancellor of the German Empire on January 19th, 1900, in which he used these very remarkable words— The German Empire would not withhold its concurrence and support if a prospect were to arise for defining more distinctly than heretofore, in conjunction with other Powers, the lines for an international settlement of the disputed points of maritime law. I believe the German Government have accepted the invitation of President Roosevelt. Then the Chancellor went on to say that— For the moment, however, the speaker, whom he was answering, and who was an expert, was— only too right when he observed that maritime law is still in a liquid, elastic, and imperfect state…. In the domain of maritime law the standard of might has as yet been by no means superseded by the standard of right. I think that language is rather exaggerated, but these various notifications and the correspondence I have quoted show how very important it is that at the earliest moment, as the United States Government wishes, this conference should meet in order that we may get a more satisfactory agreement as to what are the recognised principles of international law.

I need rot, after what I have said enlarge on the various subjects which I have suggested in my Question, and which I should wish to see submitted to the conference. As regards the sixth— The adoption of precautionary measures for the purpose of securing immunity from the dangers of drifting of mines. It is at present accepted that mines can only be laid in territorial waters. The question of territorial waters itself is an important one, because it is desired in many quarters that the old three mile limit should be extended so as to be more in harmony with the present range of guns. How important this question of mines is, I think, can be shown by the fact that quite recently British ship owners have effected a novel insurance against all risks of floating mines and all damage by fire from naval engagements. That is quite recent, and it shows the anxiety which prevails among the mercantile community with regard to the drifting of mines. Then an entirely new series of questions arises from the introduction of wireless telegraphy. The Chinese Government gave orders to destroy the installation of the Russian wireless telegraphy station near Chefoo. That is an entirely new development, and one which certainly will have to be considered at the next conference. With regard to the recognition of "continuous voyages," that is a subject which towards the end of the nineteenth century was one of very great controversy, but of which since not so much has been heard. But still it would be desirable that the view which has always been taken by our Government should be generally accepted, at all events, with regard to contraband. "With regard to the connection of continuous voyages and blockade, the question is, I admit, more doubtful, and it was only in the American Civil War that the doctrine of continuous voyages was applied to a blockade.

It seems to me that the object to be attained at the conference is not to hamper trade between the subjects of a neutral and a belligerent State for peaceful purposes, a policy so well vindicated by the noble Marquess in this correspondence. It is in the interests of belligerents not to provoke the hostility of neutrals, and it is in the interests of neutrals not to arouse the suspicion of belligerents. It is of the utmost importance that the mercantile community of a neutral State should be informed by the Government when war breaks out, of the nature of the transactions which are legitimate and those which are the reverse. If its subjects act contrary to the warning they have received, they do so at their own peril. I think it is extremely important that this principle should be vindicated, that no Government undertakes any responsibility for individual breaches of neutrality, such as the carriage of contraband by its subjects. It is different where an expedition is organised on neutral territory.

I hope I have not trespassed too long on your Lordships' indulgence on a matter which is undoubtedly of a very technical character. My object has been to strengthen the hands of the noble Marquess the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in the endeavour which I suppose he will make to obtain a general agreement to the principles he has so ably vindicated, and which I trust will be accepted when the conference summoned by President Roosevelt meets as soon as peace is restored. A benefit will thereby be conferred, not only on our own mercantile community, but a further guarantee will be given to the maintenance of peace by the removal of obstacles to harmonious international relations.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (The Marquess of LANSDOWNE)

My Lords, the earlier part of my noble friend's observations was addressed to a criticism of the correspondence which lies on the Table with regard to contraband of war during the progress of hostilities between Russia and Japan, and I shall certainly not take exception to anything that fell from him during the course of his observations. On the contrary, I was glad to notice that he gave His Majesty's Government credit for having desired throughout this long and somewhat difficult controversy to uphold the rights of neutrals to the best of their ability. But while I am grateful to my noble friend for that admission, I am bound to say that I cannot myself regard this correspondence with any great feeling of satisfaction, because it seems to me to illustrate in a striking manner the extremely unsatisfactory position in which we find ourselves with regard to so many of these important questions of international law. When I say questions of international law, I think we ought not to allow ourselves to forget that there is no code of international law to which either neutrals or belligerents can, in circumstances like this, appeal, feeling that they can look there for sufficient support. All we have are certain rules which have been laid down from time to time by the Powers themselves, and which, unfortunately, are very differently interpreted by those Powers when they are put in operation. In such circumstances all that a neutral Power, when it finds itself at variance with a belligerent Power, can do, short of resort to means which one would rather not contemplate, is to do what we have done in this case—to press its views as strongly as possible and make energetic protests and remonstrances whenever we conceive that wrong is being done. That is what His Majesty's Government have done in the present case, and perhaps we may, at any rate, say that those remonstrances and representations have not been wholly without effect. They have, as my noble friend has admitted, at all events led to this result—that in the case of foodstuffs and certain other articles the Russian Government accepted our contention that those articles were not absolute, but only conditional, contraband of war.

My noble friend asked me, with regard to the protest which was made as to the inclusion of coal among articles absolutely contraband of war, whether we had since the publication of these Papers obtained any admission from the Russian Government that our view was correct. I am sorry to say that the Russian Government have not departed from the position they first assumed, in spite of all our arguments and of the use of that argument which my noble friend used—I mean the argument that in 1884, on the occasion of the West African Conference at Berlin, the Russian plenipotentiary adopted an attitude diametrically opposed to the attitude which the Russian Government has adopted on the present occasion. But, although we have not obtained any admission from the Russian Government on this point, it is perhaps not unsatisfactory to point to the effect which has been produced by those supplementary instructions which Count Lamsdorff undertook to issue: instructions to which reference is made in these Papers, and the effect of which seems to have been that since last summer there has not been a single case in which a British vessel has been interfered with by Russian cruisers.

I wish before going any further to express ray concurrence with what was said by my noble friend as to the identity of view which has obtained throughout these discussions between the Government of the United States and the Government of His Majesty. I believe that in regard to all these points we have seen eye to eye, and that our diplomacy has been directed towards the accomplishment of the same ends.

My noble friend asked me for information with regard to the invitation lately addressed by the President of the United States to this country and other countries to participate in a second conference at the Hague. My Lords, the facts are these. In the month of October we received from the United States Government a circular despatch, in which Mr. Secretary Hay dwelt upon the great work which had been accomplished by the conference of 1899, but expressed the view that, although that conference had done much to bring about the peaceful adjustment of international disputes by reference to arbitration, and although it had done a great deal to procure amendments in the law and custom of war, both by land and sea, it had left unnoticed a considerable number of questions closely connected with those which it had under consideration. In these circumstances the President of the United States desired to know whether the Government of this country would be prepared to associate itself with the United States and with other Powers in a second conference to deal with those further questions. Mr. Hay explained that he had no desire to couple with the tentative invitation which was being issued to us anything like a full and complete enumeration of all the subjects which such a conference might discuss; but he did mention several subjects. Amongst them were these—the rights and duties of neutrals, the inviolability of private property in naval war, the question of the bombardment of ports, towns, and villages, the distinction between absolute and conditional contraband of war, the inviolability of correspondence, whether private or official, of neutrals, and the treatment of refugee ships in neutral ports. These subjects were mentioned, but with the reservation that the list did not by any means presume to be a complete or exhaustive one.

I need not tell your Lordships that the President's invitation was accepted by His Majesty's Government without a moment's hesitation. We, of course, made the reservation that at the proper time it would be necessary for us to consider what questions might be submitted to the conference. With regard to the time at which the conference might be assembled we placed ourselves in the President's hands, and said that whenever he issued his summons we should be prepared to accept his invitation, the date being no doubt selected with reference to the general convenience of all the Powers concerned. Since that time we have heard from the Government of the United States that the result of the President's communications with the Powers has been of the most satisfactory description. He has received a unanimous adhesion in principle to his proposal. Most of the Powers, like ourselves, have made a reservation with regard to the subjects which might be referred to the conference, and in the case of one Power, at all events, reluctance was expressed to take part in such an inquiry while the great war now in progress unfortunately continues. But pending the selection of a date for the meeting of the conference, the President suggested that there might be a preliminary exchange of ideas as to the scope and matter of the reference to the conference, which, he proposed, should take place at the Hague. He also suggested that the International Bureau of the Permanent Council at the Hague might, at the proper time, be authorised to draw up a programme for the conference. To those suggestions, also we expressed our adhesion, only adding that in our opinion it would be perhaps unnecessary to begin the consideration of the subjects to be referred until the date of the assemblage of the conference was more nearly in sight. That is how the matter stands at the present time.

Now, my noble friend questioned me with regard to the subjects which, in the view of His Majesty's Government, might profitably be dealt with by the conference. He must allow me to say that it would be quite impossible for me, on the occasion of a conversation of this kind, to take upon myself to describe or to limit the subjects which at the proper moment might be selected for reference to the tribunal. But I have looked at the list which my noble friend put on the Paper, and it seems to me to contain a large number of extremely important subjects, most of which have been lately under discussion, and most of which, or some, at all events, of which, might no doubt be considered with a view to their inclusion in the reference. The first three points, for example, which my noble friend has put on the Paper—the distinction between absolute and conditional contraband, the indication of the categories of articles constituting absolute contraband, the circumstances under which foodstuffs and coal and raw material can be declared contraband—those are questions which, as my noble friend knows, we have been constantly discussing, and it seems to me highly probable that those questions, when the time comes, might be considered appropriate for the conference. The limitation of the right of search, I think, is also a question which has been similarly discussed.

Then my noble friend asked me to favour him with an expression of the views of the Admiralty on that extremely difficult question, the right to destroy prizes, by which, I think he meant neutral prizes. [Lord REAY nodded assent.] That is a very much controverted question, which is at this moment before the Prize Courts, and I wish to guard myself from in any way appearing to lay down the law in regard to it. As to the adoption of measures to avoid risk from drifting mines, that seems to me to be a new and very terrible development of modern warfare; and personally I should be delighted, as all of us probably would, if some means could be found to diminish the extent of the danger. As to the other questions, wireless telegraphy, the vexed question of "continuous voyages"—these are questions about which I would rather be excused from saying more than that I recognise their importance, and that my noble friend may be sure that His Majesty's Government will at the proper time carefully consider whether they might not be amongst those to be referred.

On all these points it is quite clear that it would be most desirable, if it were possible, that a general agreement should be arrived at amongst the Powers. I am sure we all agree with my noble friend in what he said in the concluding sentences of his speech. We feel that, if war is at times inevitable, we should all of us do what lies in our power to restrict the area which has to suffer from hostilities, and that even within that area we should spare no pains to minimise the suffering and inconvenience occasioned to all those who are directly or indirectly brought within reach of hostilities. That is our feeling, and holding that feeling, we cordially welcome the initiative of the Government of the United States, and at the proper time we shall gladly associate ourselves with that Government in dealing with these important questions; I share my noble friend's hope that the time when we may be able to address ourselves to that most humane and honourable task will not be far distant.

LORD ELLENBOROUGH

My Lords, the noble Lord's Question appears to me to assume that Great Britain will always be a neutral, and that she will never be engaged in a life-and-death struggle on her own account for the supremacy of the Channel and North Sea. Now, such a conflict is sure to come; perhaps not for very many years, but still it is one for which we should always be prepared. In our own interests and in those of posterity, we have no right to throw away weapons that may be of use to us in such a contest.

I shall now deal seriatim with the different sections of the noble Lord's Question. As regards the first three sections referred to by the noble Lord, I think it unlikely that any advantage would be gained by an international discussion or by laying down a number of fixed rules. When actually called into operation such rules would probably be found to be unsuited to the circumstances of the case. The President of the United States refers in his letter to the exemption of all private property at sea from capture if not contraband of war. Well, any country at war with England would be sure to declare food contraband if it could get even a partial command of the sea, so that we should be starved without a chance of reprisals. It will be time enough to declare property at sea not liable to capture when property on land I is inviolable. Is private property in Manchuria inviolable? Was private property in Georgia inviolable when Sherman's troops marched through it with a broad front applying the torch every morning to the farms in which they had slept on the previous night. Was private property inviolable when the fertile Shenandoah Valley was so pillaged and plundered that it was said that— If a crow came there he would have to bring his own provisions if he meant to stop. Section 4 limits the right of search when the neutral Government has a contract with the owners of mail steamers. Now, such a contract would certainly be evaded, whenever there was a benevolent neutrality, or whenever the profits that could be obtained by evasion amounted to considerable sums. Besides, has the noble Lord never heard of carrying truck, of cargo being put on board a ship by the officers or by leading members of the crew, without any corresponding entry being made in the ships's papers, or any information being given to the owners? Although owners do all they can to stop the practice, it is still occasionally done. Vacant spaces such as double bottoms, empty tanks, or bunkers are made use of for the purpose. The only effective restraints of the abuse of the right of search are the common sense of the belligerent and the power of the neutral to check his proceedings. For instance, the steamship "Malacca" was seized by a Russian vessel in the Red Sea and was sent to the Baltic to be tried before a Prize Court. The ship that seized her was not a bona fide man-of-war, and the noble Marquess succeeded in obtaining her release, because he had the British Navy behind him.

According to international law, as written on paper, Russian men-of war have a right to search and seize any British ships outside the three-mile limit and to send them to the Baltic to be tried. But it is quite certain that had Russia insisted on interfering with British commerce to such an extent as that we should have gone to war to protect our trade. At one time several seizures and examinations were made, but eventually common sense prevailed and instructions were issued which had the effect of restraining the more foolish of the Russian officers. Before negotiations are entered into which may have the effect of causing further legal limitations of the right of search, I hope that the naval advisers of the First Lord of the Admiralty, and naval opinion in general, will be consulted and that a full opportunity will be given for a public discussion of these questions both in the Press and in Parliament.

I confess that I do not understand Section 5, which is as follows— The limitation of the right of destining prizes, under very exceptional conditions with guarantees for compensation. Does it refer to prizes taken from a neutral or from the other belligerent? Ships taken from neutrals should, of -course, be taken before Prize Courts. The sinking of the "Knight Commander" was an unjustifiable outrage, an act of war against England, whereas the Dogger Bank affair was only an error of judgment, a stupid mistake, perhaps, but still a mistake. But, as long as war lasts, a belligerent will always insist on retaining the right to burn, sink, and destroy an enemy's shipping whenever it suits him. No further conferences appear to me to be necessary for the purpose of discussing either of these points.

Section 6 refers to the adoption of precautionary measures for the purpose of securing immunity from floating mines. Under-water explosives as at present worked are comparatively modern institutions. Inventors are irrepressible. All descriptions of under-water weapons are being improved every day. We ought to be very careful not to tie our hands by assenting to propositions, the full meaning of which we do not yet know, and cannot know unless we have the gift of prophecy. I think that all who have studied the question will admit that if we were at war with any one of the Powers whose sea-coast lies opposite our own, that there would be considerable but unavoidable danger to neutral commerce both in the North Sea and Channel. If a neutral vessel was struck by an explosive below the water-line, it would be impossible to know who was to blame, and, of course, each belligerent would lay the blame on the other.

Section 7 refers to the discussion of rules with regard to wireless telegraphy. Wireless telegraphy is in its babyhood. To lay down laws for all time, to make rules with regard to what we know so little about would be a great mistake. If any agreements are made about it, they should be for a limited period only.

Section 8 restricts the right of search to a certain distance from the theatre of war. The question arises—What is a theatre of war? When this war began it was confined to the Gulf of Pechili and the Japanese seas. It has now extended to the Indian Ocean. A Russian admiral recently thought that it included the North Sea and started a little one sided war on his own account. Whenever two ships, belonging to different belligerent Powers, are within a thousand miles of one another there will be a theatre of war. If Great Britain was at war with a maritime Power, the theatre of war would be co-extensive with all the oceans and seas of the Globe, with the exception, perhaps, of the Antarctic and Caspian seas.

The doctrine of "continuous voyages" has two sides to it, and I scarcely know which of them the noble Lord wishes to see adopted. With regard to the tenth section, there might be some advantages to be derived by laying down rules about Prize Courts.

If we sign away belligerent rights and find ourselves obliged to resume some of them when at war in the North Sea and Channel, we shall be giving far more serious offence to neutrals, and shall be more likely to involve ourselves in a war with them than if those rights remained ill-defined and we could make out a fair case for argument. It is far better for us to maintain in theory the rights of belligerents as laid down by Lord Stawell and our Prize Courts, and for the Admiralty to issue confidential instructions to the captains of our men-of-war limiting the actual exercise of such rights. It is better to rely on common sense and expediency than to submit to the hard-and-fast restrictions of a conference. We have now definitely committed ourselves to the blue-water school. Well, I believe that our present Navy is strong enough to protect us once the war is in full swing, but not if its hands are tied by the resolutions of a conference. Our admirals must have a free hand in the North Sea. I hope, therefore, that we shall not enter into such a conference without giving full opportunities to nautical men and others to discuss the expediency of so doing. These are not matters to be left to the decision of inland lawyers who do not know the difference between a sailing brig and a torpedo vessel.

I regret to say that I cannot see a single word in the noble Lord's Question about the duties of neutrals. How about destroyers and submarines creeping along within a three mile limit in those labyrinthine channels between the shoals and islands which form so large a portion of the Dutch, Danish, and Norwegian coasts? Are they to be unmolested if the neutral Power is unable to deal with them with the necessary promptitude, or are our ships to follow them up? As a matter of policy, Belgium keeps up a powerful army to protect her land frontiers, but has no Navy whatever. She relies on England to shield her from maritime attack. Are our enemies to take temporary refuge on her coasts during the day, and then to sally forth and destroy our ships at night? This is a question that should be settled in a friendly manner by Belgium and ourselves, and not by a hard-and-fast rule. These and other kindred subjects are, I think, of more importance to us than any of those that are mentioned in the noble-Lord's Question. In conclusion, I would point out that to other nations these maritime questions are matters of secondary importance, but that as Great Britain is dependent on the sea for her food, to her they are matters of life or death.

LORD COLERIDGE

My Lords, the House, I am sure, is grateful to the noble Lord for introducing this subject, and, if possible, still more grateful to the noble Marquess the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs for the answer he has given. We all listened with the greatest possible pleasure 'to the clear and satisfactory account given by the noble Marquess of what the Government has been doing in this most vexed question. I only rose for the purpose of desiring the noble Marquess to consider carefully the attitude of mind which the representatives of this country should, have towards the policy of this country in an international conference.

The noble Lord who has just sat down declaimed to the House about the rights of belligerents. In those days when this country commanded the seas, but when our mercantile marine was small, the rights of belligerents were of overwhelming importance to this country, and by exercising and enforcing those rights we again and again in the war with France attacked the commerce of the enemy, and by such attacks entirely crippled her resources. But since the Declaration of Paris in 1856 the attitude of this country, and I think the interest of this country, have undergone a very marked change. Owing to steam and facility for inter-communication the great trans-oceanic commerce has grown and grown to an extent that would have been thought impossible if predicted by our forefathers. I am happy to say that we, that this country, are the carriers of the world, and our interests very largely differ in this question of neutrals from the interests which were our predominant interests at the end of the last century. Our interests now lie in preserving neutral commerce from interference when other nations are at war, and I hope that our representatives in this forthcoming conference will keep mainly before their minds two important questions—first, that the rights of belligerents over neutral Powers should be, as far as possible, limited, in accordance, of course, with reason and sense; and, secondly, that the classes of goods that should be placed under either conditional or absolute contraband should also be limited, as far as possible. In the limitation of the lights of belligerents over neutral ships and in the limitation of the class of goods which should be declared absolute or conditional contraband—in those two limitations lie the interests of our country, and our representatives should go into the conference imbued with the idea of, as far as possible, insisting upon them.

I only want to draw the noble Marquess's attention to one matter, in connection with which, in my opinion, the Government have taken a somewhat retrograde step. In the last war they certainly did not follow the doctrine which, I thought, had been the doctrine of this country in maintaining the rights of neutrals when proceeding to a neutral port, because, as the noble Marquess is well aware, we seized a German steamer on its way to Lorenzo Marquez, which was a neutral port. I do not know whether the Government of the day quite realised the far-reaching result of that action, but I notice that in "The British Manual of Prize Law," the official Admiralty book of the period, the doctrine with regard to the safety and security of goods on a neutral ship proceeding to a neutral port has been altered; and in the last book of 1904 the doctrine is laid down, I believe, for the first time since the Declaration of Paris that if that neutral port is hard by the confines of the territory of the enemy and if it be thought that the goods, though they pass through the neutral port, are ultimately destined for the enemy, those goods are liable to seizure at the hands of the belligerent. That is a very far-reaching doctrine, and I can conceive circumstances under which it might be applicable in a manner disastrous to British neutral commerce. I hope the decision then taken is not one that is irrevocable, and that at any rate His Majesty's Ministers will consider the subject temperately before they uphold that far-reaching decision. I desire before sitting down to again say how indebted we are to the noble Marquess for his most satisfactory speech.