§ * THE EARL OF WEMYSSMy Lords, I beg to ask the Prime Minister—(1) whether he or his colleagues have ever received information or expressions of opinion from reliable sources confirming the view of one of our foreign military 1459 attachés, recently quoted in debate, to the effect that—
It is all important that England should be strong and unassailable in the month of November next:(2) whether he is of opinion that the European situation is now less alarming than it seemed to him on the 9th of May last when he spoke to the Primrose League as follows—It is not necessarily because in themselves they are more important, but if you look around you will see that the elements and causes of menace and peril are, though slowly, accumulating, and may accumulate to such a point as to require our most earnest and active effort to repel them";(3) whether, as Prime Minister responsible for our national safety, he has carefully inquired into our home land defensive means and organisation, and has satisfied himself that these are such as, failing the Fleet, will render all attempts at invasion by any hostile nation futile and impossible of success; (4) whether, if not satisfied as to the sufficiency and organisation of our home land defences, he will cause such measures to be taken as will give us the required security against the possibility of successful invasion by any hostile Power. I have to apologise to my noble friend the Prime Minister for venturing to put these questions on the Paper, but I think he and your Lordships will admit that the matters to which they refer are sufficiently important to justify my having done so. I think your Lordships will also admit that, as we are approaching the close of the present session, it is desirable that we should receive, if possible, from the Prime Minister, a more comforting assurance as to the state of our home defences. In the few words which I think it necessary to utter in putting these questions to the noble Marquess I shall, I hope, avoid saying anything that could possibly give offence to the susceptibilities of any nation; indeed, I propose not to refer to any nation, but to make my remarks general on the subject of home defence. It will be remembered that in the debate on 20th February last on the Militia Ballot resolution, * I quoted from a letter I had received from one of our military attaches abroad, in which he expressed his satisfaction that I was* See The Parliamentary Debates [Fourth Series], Vol. lxxix., p. 504.1460 endeavouring to get a Volunteer Reserve, and then used these words, which I have placed on the Paper:—It is all-important that England should be strong and unassailable in the month of November next.Within the last three days I have received another letter from my correspondent in which he says he still holds to what he wrote eight or nine months ago. This seems to me to establish a rather serious and critical situation, especially as I have been informed that Her Majesty's Government have received—I do not know whether they attach weight to it or not—similar information from many quarters. In February last my noble friend Lord Rosebery, defending a motion designed to make the Ballot Bill workable, said, in almost passionate language, that he considered that we were in a national crisis, or used words to that effect. My noble friend the Earl of Kimberley followed in the course of that debate, and also used words as to the importance of the crisis in which we found ourselves, and argued that it was most desirable that we should make our Militia strong for home defence. All this only leads to what I am about to say. On the 25th May the Prime Minister, addressing the members of the Primrose League, used the words quoted in the second paragraph of my question—But if you look around you will see that the elements and causes of menace and peril are, though slowly, accumulating, and may accumulate to such a point as to require our most earnest and active efforts to repel them.I have now to ask whether anything has occurred since May last to modify the view of my noble friend the Prime Minister. The danger we run is this: that these evils will go on accumulating until the thundercloud bursts. The question which arises is: shall we be prepared to meet it? Has the noble Marquess come to the conclusion, after full inquiry, that our home defences are in a thoroughly satisfactory state? There are, in this country, two schools of national defence. My noble friend Lord Rosebery and others have been at Eton, and they will remember that at Eton there are two sets of boys. One set delight in the river, and say the river is everything; the other set take their pleasure in the playing-field. Those who devote themselves to the river are called "wet bobs," and those who look to the playing fields for their 1461 amusement are termed "dry hobs"; and the "wet bobs" are apt to look down on the "dry bobs." As it is at Eton so it is in these schools, if I may so call them, of national defence. You have one school that swears by the Navy and the Navy alone, who say that all we want is a strong Navy, and that if we have a Navy stronger than any other two this nation is perfectly safe. But there is this inconsistency in their views. If it is necessary to anchor part of our Navy in the Channel for the protection of our shores, we pro tanto diminish the power of our Fleet for operations elsewhere, no matter how large that Fleet may be. When they are asked, "Are you so satisfied with what the Navy can do for the protection of our shores that you are ready to give up all home defences?" they immediately reply, "No." Therefore, the whole of the Navy "wet bob" argument falls to the ground, because we cannot trust absolutely to the Fleet. I am not ashamed to say that in this matter of defence I am a "dry bob." I quite feel that we ought to have the largest possible Navy for the purpose not of home defence, but of pursuing the enemy's fleet and commerce, shutting them up in ports, and protecting our own commerce. But I want the country to be absolutely independent of the Navy for home defence, and the home defences to be so organised as to give us—to quote the words of my question—the required security against the possibility of successful invasion by any hostile Power. I have asked my noble friend to himself see whether we are in that state. We never have been in that state since 1815. Everything that has been done since has shown it. What was the Duke of Wellington's letter to Sir John Burgoyne but an admission that we were not in a satisfactory state so far as our home defences were concerned? What was his last speech in your Lordships' House? It was in favour of the Militia Ballot Bill of Lord Palmerston, and contained an admission that we were not strong at home and required an efficient Militia. What was General Peel's letter which summoned the Volunteer force but an admission that as things then were we were not in a satisfactory state as regards home defences? What was Lord Card-well's Army Bill but an admission that we were not, in the year 1870, in a satisfactory state of home defence? But how as to now? Will my noble friend be 1462 able to say that we are in a satisfactory state now? The noble Marquess sitting on his right, the Secretary for War, is satisfied that we are not in a satisfactory state for home defence, for every measure he brings in is what he calls a measure of emergency; and the last thing, apparently, from the answer he gave yesterday, is his proposal to put the whole military system into the crucible or smelting-pot. The noble Marquess shakes his head, but is it not putting the military system into the smelting-pot when he is going to do away with the Militia Reserve and to change the constitution of the Militia, so that instead of being only for home defence it is to be liable to be sent abroad? That may be right or it may be wrong, but it is a revolution in our Army organisation and in the principle of the defence of this country. I venture then to ask my noble friend if he has inquired into this question and compared the facts obtained as regards our means of defence with the means of aggression of other Powers. If he has done that, I hope he will be able to answer the questions by saying that our home defences and organisation are such as, failing the Fleet, will render all attempts at invasion by any hostile nation futile and impossible of success. I have only to say one word with regard to the last question. If my noble friend's inquiry has not satisfied him that we are in that state, will he take care that we are put in a condition of absolute security against the possibility of successful invasion by any hostile power? To contemplate, not invasion, but the possibility of the threat of invasion, and preparations for invasion such as were made in the early part of last century is something to give one a cold shudder as to the effect it would have in this country. There was an excellent book—I strongly advise your Lordships to read it—published in 1852 by Sir Francis Head, Bart., entitled "The Defenceless State of Great Britain." After showing the dangers we ran in the early part of last century, he has two chapters on the "Capture of London." The first chapter begins as follows—As soon as by a few quivering motions of two needles there had almost simultaneously appeared upon the white dials of all the electric telegraphs throughout the United Kingdom the three words 'They are landed,' 1463 what a variety of sensations would be created in the hearts of fundholders, landowners, place holders, owners of property of every description!One set of gentlemen he has not referred to, and those are the gentlemen who live in Pall Mall. I wonder in such a case what their feelings would be. My opinion is that they would decorate the lampposts in Pall Mall. We owe it not only to our homes, not only to everything that is dear to us, not only to the past history of this country, but we owe it to our colonies, who have so nobly come forward in the Empire's defence, and whose sons have shown their gallantry and so freely shed their blood in South Africa; we owe it to them as well as to ourselves that we should be strong at the heart and impregnable at home. I do not know whom the noble Marquess has consulted with reference to the answer he will give to these questions—I hope they are not all official answers from Pall Mall—but I wish he would consult the illustrious Duke who was for so many years the Field Marshal Commander-in-Chief of the Army. If he consulted the noble Duke I should be very surprised if he did not find that his views on home defence and the duties of the Government in that respect—which are to enforce the existing law, and not to go tinkering and tailoring with some other law—are not far from being in accordance with those with which on more than one occasion I have troubled your Lordships. I now venture to ask the questions standing in my name.
§ THE PRIME MINISTER AND SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (The Marquess of SALISBURY)My Lords, I shall best comply with the wish of my noble friend that I should answer the questions which he has put on the Notice Paper by taking them one by one. The first question is, "Whether I or my colleagues"—I cannot answer for my colleagues—"have ever received information or expressions of opinion from reliable sources confirming the view of one of our foreign military attaches"—I wonder who that person is; I know nothing about him— "recently quoted in debate"—yes, quoted by the noble Lord. And he has the courage to come here and quote himself as an authority, for he has no other authority whatever—
§ * THE EARL OF WEMYSSI beg your pardon; I do not quote myself as an authority.
§ THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURYYou quoted it; nobody else did.
§ * THE EARL OF WEMYSSWhat I quoted was a letter from one of your own officials.
§ THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURYWho is he?
§ * THE EARL OF WEMYSSI decline to say; you have no right to ask me.
§ THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURYYou have no right to say that.
§ * THE EARL OF WEMYSSI beg your pardon—
§ THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURYThe noble Lord has no right to use a private letter in this way, and quote it in this House as an evidence of a public fact, when he cannot bring the testimony of the man from whom it comes as evidence that it is not a pure invention. I have only to reply that I have never heard that "it is all-important that England should be strong and unassailable in the month of November next." I believe there is to be a great collection of shooting stars in the early part of November—that is the only peculiarity in the month of November that I know of that we need apprehend. The noble Lord then asks me whether it is my opinion that the European situation is now less alarming than when in the month of May I used certain words of which he quotes a very small portion. My Lords, I did my best on that occasion to express myself clearly, and I was anxious to avoid precisely that misconception into which the noble Lord has fallen. I pointed out at that time what was well known to everybody—that the attitude of foreign Powers towards us was absolutely correct, and showed the utmost goodwill towards this country; that we had in this respect nothing to complain of; that there was nothing in their action from which we could deduce any unfavourable inferences. I stated that in debate, I think in answer to the noble Lord opposite, and I repeated it afterwards at the meeting in Albert Hall, to which the noble Lord has referred. At 1465 the same time, I drew attention to another class of phenomena having nothing to do with the attitude of the Governments of the day. It was impossible to conceal from our eyes, especially then, that there was, not assuredly in the language of Governments or statesmen, but in the organs of popular opinion in many parts of the world, and especially in Europe, that which indicated a state of feeling towards this country which could not but fill us with feelings of apprehension, or at all events of regret, and which we could not dismiss from our minds. The object I had in drawing the attention of my fellow-countrymen to this state of things was that they should not allow themselves to rely too entirely upon the correct and benevolent attitude of Governments, but bear in mind that in the long run Governments are influenced by the feeling of the people over whom they rule, and that if that feeling continued hostile to us we must be prepared to take account of the phenomenon in making our preparations. That was undoubtedly true then, but nobody, I should have thought, would have read that speech without knowing that I was not pointing to any immediate danger or necessity for immediate precautions. The mere fact that again and again I carefully guarded myself from seeming to imply that there was anything in the conduct or attitude of foreign countries to cause us disquiet or apprehension, showed that it was not to immediate danger that I was pointing the attention of my countrymen, but that I was urging upon them a general consideration of the duties imposed on every nation by the increase of means of communication in the present day, and urging that the apprehensions which might be caused now from these circumstances and from the proximity of danger were greater than they would have been many years ago, and that, therefore, we were bound, not by any sudden revolutionary measures of defence, not by any startling efforts or any violent change of the policy we had pursued, but by a steady concentration of our view upon the special danger of our own generation and our own time—we were bound to bring our nation gradually to the performance of those duties of self-defence which have been long imposed by necessity upon other nations of the world, and which, perhaps, have lain upon us in a less formidable character in consequence 1466 of the defence which we enjoy from the possession of the sea as a barrier. I am not going to trouble the House with reading my speech made at the Albert Hall—I would not so waste the time of the House—but no one can read that speech without seeing that I did not speak then of any imminent pressing danger, or of any precautions that required immediate adoption. I was trying to guide, so far as it was given me to do so, the minds of my fellow-countrymen into the conduct with respect to national defence which the changing conditions of national security are slowly pressing on the nation to which we belong. That is what I have to say of my speech to the Primrose League. I do not wish any noble Lord, unless he chooses, to undertake the somewhat severe condition of reading it in its entirety, but I am convinced he will not, if he does, attribute to it such a false interpretation as that which has commended itself to the noble Lord. Then he asks me whether I have satisfied myself that our home land defences are such as, failing the fleet, would render all atempts at invasion by any hostile nation futile and impossible of success. I really do not know how I should begin to address myself to that inquiry. Nobody has yet succeeded in invading this country since William the Conqueror unless he has had assistance from inside. Of course, that is not what the noble - Lord meant; he has some fanciful or personal test of national security which he requires us to fulfil. But I maintain that the onus is on the other side; it is for him to show the dangers to which he says we are exposed, and if he shows this correctly, then I admit he is doing good and patriotic service in calling attention to their existence, and I fully acknowledge the duty which lies upon us above all other things of preventing any real and substantial danger of the kind. But I cannot prove a negative. I cannot prove there is no danger unless he indicates to me from what side it is to come, or in consequence of what circumstances that danger exists. I do not profess to be able to go into the minute details of our national defence by sea or by land. I am afraid that in our complex civilisation it is necessary for us to trust largely to the testimony and to the vigilance of experts in whom you have confidence; and I should rather refer, and I hold it to be 1467 my duty to refer, in the first instance to the great precaution which I have had a share in taking for protecting this country, and that is by recommending an adequate and thoroughly trustworthy head of the War Office for the defence of the country. I cannot profess to tell the noble Lord whether all our muskets are of the right calibre, or whether all our guns are of the best pattern that can be adopted—that is not my business. I must in such matters rely on the assurances of experts. As far as my judgment goes, as far as my knowledge carries me—I do not think it is very far—it appears to me that our defensive systems are quite as effective and in as thoroughly satisfactory a condition as ever they have been before. I suppose the fact that they have led us up to this particular point of security without any serious danger or apprehension may give us confidence in the future. I do not profess to have examined the details of every circumstance of defence; I can only say that, as far as they have come under my observation they are thoroughly satisfactory and such as to give us sufficient confidence in the future. The noble Earl appears to think that he has made out an excellent case by speaking of all the changes which all the Ministers for a hundred years past have from time to time proposed for increasing and developing our national defences. Of course such proposals have been made, and of course such proposals are now being made by my noble friend the Minister for War. If it is the doctrine of the noble Lord that you cannot propose any amendment of your defensive system without admitting that that defensive system is unsatisfactory, of course you may much simplify the duty of defence and of legislation in respect to Army matters. But that is an absurd test to apply. We believe that we are satisfactorily defended; we believe that we have been so defended for some time past, and we appeal to history as our test, but we do not think that we are by that fact relieved from the duty of constantly watching the organisation over which we preside and trying to introduce into it every improvement which experience or reflection can induce us to adopt. That, I think, is the only course possible with respect to national defence, which manifestly must be progressive, and the merits of which up to a certain extent must depend upon hypothetical dangers such 1468 as the noble Lord has adopted to himself. We do not see these dangers, we do see the necessity for constant improvement, and as we go on, and as facts and the guidance of experts induce us to modify our system, we shall not fail to do so; but we indignantly repudiate the insinuation that, because we attempt constantly to make improvements and add to the efficiency of our national defence, we are therefore admitting that we all this time have been sitting down under an inadequate system, and that most serious dangers have really beset us in the past, though we professed the greatest security. I need not say that I am not dissatisfied as to the sufficiency and the organisation of our home land defences; that I do not admit that inefficiency is proved by the fact of our having attempted to develop, expand, and strengthen our system. We shall continue so to develop and expand it. But we cannot for a moment accept the suggestion that we have not taken, as our predecessors have taken, the required security against the possibility of a successful invasion by any hostile Power, which was only once dreamed of, and idly dreamed of, by Napoleon at the culmination of his career, and which no foreign Power now dreams of as a possible contingency for an enemy of England to contemplate. I do not admit the possibility of successful invasion on the part of any hostile Power. If the noble Earl can prove it, can show it, and give us ground for believing it, let him do so; but if he cannot do so, I do not think that he serves his country by the constant repetition of impossible apprehensions and unfounded complaints.
THE EARL OF ROSEBERYMy Lords, I cannot help regretting that the noble Marquess the Prime Minister has imported so much heat into his reply to my noble friend on the Cross Benches. I am not here to defend the motion or the questions of my noble friend. He is imbued with a perpetual youth and a perpetual vitality which put his questions beyond the reach of my observation or criticism. But I confess I think he would have been better advised if he had left out the reference to the letter of the anonymous military attaché, who I trust will always remain anonymous. But at the same time, he touched upon a point as to which the Government seem to be quite 1469 unaware—I mean with regard to the anxiety which is felt in the country. That anxiety has been greatly intensified by the speech which the noble Marquess delivered to the Primrose League, and which, no doubt, caused a much greater impression than could have been caused by the remarks of an irresponsible person. The noble Marquess wishes us to go home and read it in its entirety. I do not think I should sleep tonight if I did; at any rate, I do not propose to take that course; but what I do recollect distinctly, after my first, and probably my second, perusal of that speech, was the extraordinarily inadequate conclusion up to which these depressing arguments of the noble Marquess led. What he said, and said with perfect truth, was that though the attitudes of the Governments on the Continent were essentially correct, yet they were the dams to a flood of public opinion hostile to this country which might at any moment break down those dams and sweep in a torrent—I think the metaphor is his own—against the rocks of this island. Now, my Lords, after all, if that be the condition of things—I think it may have ameliorated since then, but not altogether, for no one can put a foot on the Continent of Europe anywhere without knowing that that is the state of things, and that we are surrounded with an atmosphere of hatred unprecedented, I hope, in the history of this country—if that be the condition of things, the conclusion of the noble Marquess was totally inadequate. It is not enough to tell the Primrose League, however numerous, however efficient, and however intelligent that body may be, to form itself spontaneously into rifle clubs to protect our liberties, our properties, and our national existence. I know it has been said on high authority that we are only hated because we are so strong—the argument apparently being that under former Governments we were feeble and beloved—but that now because we are so strong, because we have so vast a body of our national resources locked up 7,000 miles away, and because we have the prospect of another great body of our national resources being locked up still further away—because we are now so strong we are now hated. Suppose we are hated and not so strong! On what does our strength rest? What are the assurances that we have had that 1470 we are so strong? The noble Marquess gives us his assurance on that point, but he will forgive me for saying that that will carry no conviction to my mind whatever. He was asked, with a directness which was, perhaps, more enthusiastic than discreet, if, as Prime Minister, responsible for our national safety, he has carefully inquired into our home land defensive means and organisation, and if he has satisfied himself, and so forth. Well, that is a question which I can well understand the noble Marquess not desiring to answer directly and by itself. It is a very direct and a pertinent question, but what was the answer of the noble Marquess? It was that, so far as the matter had come to his notice, he was of opinion that our resources were adequate. Now, I have the greatest respect for the noble Marquess, but I confess that that gives me no feeling of security whatever. He says, again, that we rely on our past history to give us a sense of security. Unhappy is the nation that relies for its security on its past history! Then the noble Marquess tells us he relies on the opinion of experts. If he will give us the opinion of experts we will rely on them too. My noble friend the Secretary of State for War has made innumerable statements in this House. He has led a most laborious life, both inside and outside this House; and I for one am the last to disparage his administration of the great Department over which he presides or the success which has attended his efforts. He has developed schemes for our national defence, but when he has been developing them I have been asking myself the question which I ask the noble Marquess, and which I ask your Lordships now—where are the experts? The noble Marquess the Secretary of State for War cannot be an expert; it is part of our extraordinary policy never to put an expert at the head of our naval or military services; but he has an expert in that office, the Field Marshal Commanding-in-Chief He is practised in oratory, he is fond of oratory. I do not think I am going too far in saying that, but on no one occasion has it been my good fortune to see the noble Lord the Commander-in-Chief present to give the weight of his assurance in support of the schemes suggested by the noble Marquess the Secretary of State for War. I must say this, with all the deference 1471 that I feel for the two noble Marquesses and for my noble friend the President of the Council of National Defence, who, I fear, is no exception to the rule to which I have alluded—that we do not place experts at the head of our naval and military services—there has not been one single sentence from the noble Viscount the Commander-in-Chief assuring us that we were amply prepared for all contingencies in view of the known facts of the hostility of the people of Europe, of the drain on our Indian resources, of the drain on our home resources, and the increasing requirements which events in the Far East are likely to place on those resources. I should be more satisfied, my Lords, with one single sentence from the noble Viscount than with a thousand speeches to the Primrose League. My Lords, this is a very grave matter. We are about to separate for a prolonged recess. It will be the good fortune of your Lordships, whatever may happen in the Long Vacation, to reassemble in your full numbers, without damage to life or limb from any political occurrence, when Parliament reassembles next year. But there are probabilities, possibilities, I know not what to call them, of which I know that the Prime Minister knows nothing, because I heard him say so last night. But there are possibilities and probabilities which point to a great political convulsion in the course of the autumn, and which, of course, implies that the House of Commons, on adjourning for the holidays in August, will adjourn not to meet again. Is it too much to ask of the Government that before that event occurs we should be placed in possession of the opinions of those experts which are so reassuring to them and would be so reassuring to us? I would not limit the wish to what my noble friend, in his racy manner, calls the "dry bobs" of military defence. I should be very glad to hear the export opinion of your "wet bob" chiefs—I do not mean Mr. Goschen, but the men in command of our fleets—the Mediterranean fleet, for example—to know if they are quite satisfied as to our preparedness for the dreadful issue of battle. God grant that it may not occur, but the facts to which the noble Marquess has called our attention, and to which others called our attention even before his Primrose League speech, are matters of public notoriety. Speeches, however eloquent, will not remove or got over them; and I venture to say that it is 1472 the opinion of the vast majority of the community of this country that a few reassuring words founded on expert knowledge with regard to our preparedness for the eventualities which may occur either this year or the next would be a profound consolation.
§ * THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR WAR (The Marquess of LANSDOWNE)My Lords, I do not know whether it is altogether becoming that I should intervene in this discussion. I call to mind an old saying which is, I think, of classic origin—that those who were fortunate enough to obtain the attention of Jupiter could afford to disregard altogether the minor divinities. The noble Earl has appealed to Jupiter, and has had his reply. I should not intervene but for what has been said by the noble Earl who has just sat down. The noble Earl said he was not contented with mere assurances from this Front Bench. He said, "Give us some facts." Well, my Lords, I have on more than one occasion—
§ * THE MARQUESS OF LANSDOWNEI will come to the experts in a moment. We were asked, in the first place,' for the facts. I believe on more than one occasion I came down to the House and submitted to your Lordships statements of facts supplied by those very experts whose opinion the noble Earl wishes to obtain. Let me enumerate one or two of the facts of the ease. We have at this moment in South Africa the largest military force this country has ever put into the field. We have been maintaining that force in point of numbers and equipment for some months past. I trust that hostilities may now be drawing to a close, but up to the present time we have been steadily pouring into South Africa the drafts of men and the supplies of horses and of materials required to keep that great army in the field. In spite of that, it is a fact that there are at this moment in the country under arms about 50,000 more men than we have barrack accommodation for in the United Kingdom. I cite that to your Lordships as some evidence that the country is not in that denuded state which the two noble Earls would have us suppose. Then we have raised emergency battalions. 1473 The noble Earl (the Earl of Rosebery) was not in the House the other night when I read textually the opinion of the Commander-in-Chief upon the efficiency and value of those battalions. Lord Wolseley spoke of them—I read his own words*—in the highest possible terms. Then there is in this country a great force of embodied Militia. With regard to the state of the Militia, I quoted to your Lordships not the opinion of War Office civilian officials, but the opinion of an expert, of the general officer whoso business it is to inspect the embodied Militia. I also referred to the measures which have been taken to increase the efficiency of the Volunteer force, of whom, as your Lordships know, a very large number are going into special camps for special instruction altogether different from that which they have received in ordinary years. Again, with regard to these Volunteer battalions, I gave to your Lordships the verdict of the military expert whose business it is to inspect these battalions and to visit one camp after another during the training season. In addition to all that, we have for some time past been engaged upon the task of rearming our defences. We are increasing our horse and field artillery, and we have made considerable progress in doing so, and we have, besides that, added to the permanent strength of the infantry. The noble Earl is not satisfied when I come to your Lordships from the War Office and tell you what I learn from my military advisers there. He says, "Why do you not bring down your Commander-in-Chief and put him up to deliver reassuring speeches in your Lordships' House?" I confess there is a view of that proposal which presents itself forcibly to my mind, and which, I suppose, has not occurred to the noble Earl. I think if you were to make it a sine qua non that the military officer whom you put in command of the forces of this country is to have assigned to him as part of his official duties the duty of coming down to Parliament and making speeches in defence of Government measures, you would be very apt to do what to my mind would be a very mistaken thing indeed—to turn your Commander-in-Chief into something like a political partisan. I trust I shall not live to see that practice introduced
* See The Parliamentary Debates [Fourth Series], Vol. lxxxv., page 204.1474 into your Lordships' House. The noble Earl who spoke first read us a long lecture upon the danger of depending entirely upon the protection of the Fleet. I do not think any one of my colleagues has ever adopted the extreme view that it is possible to secure the safety of these islands by reliance on the Fleet alone. We have, on the contrary, all of us, invariably admitted that it was necessary not only that we should have for our first line of defence a strong and thoroughly-equipped Fleet, but also, for home defence, a sufficient force to defend these shores from the attack of an invader at a moment when a large part of the naval forces of the Crown might be engaged at a distance. I cannot help asking your Lordships whether these infructuous criticisms really carry us very much further towards the attainment of that degree of security for which the two noble Earls sigh so much. When I have asked the noble Earl below the gangway (the Earl of Rosebery) what he had to propose, he has replied, "It is your business to tell us. It is not my business, so long as I am out of office." But I do think that when we have these perpetual attempts to belittle and ridicule everything which is done by Her Majesty's Government we have a right to ask the noble Earl that he should at least give us some indication as to the defects of what we ourselves propose, and some indication of the measures which, if he were called to power, he himself would adopt. On no occasion has the noble Earl ever come to that point. He repeats these turgid sentences, belittling and ridiculing what we have done, but he never gives us the slightest hint or indication of what he would do in a position of equal responsibility. The noble Earl does not very much differ in his practical proposals from the noble Earl who spoke first. The Earl of Wemyss has two practical proposals to make. One is, "Give me the Militia ballot." I have shown your Lordships again and again that if you had the Militia ballot to-morrow it would not give you that accession of strength which the noble Earl desires to obtain for the purpose of meeting the present emergency. The noble Earl knows perfectly well that it would not give him a trained man by the 1st November next—that magical date which he has insisted upon so much tonight. The other remedy of the noble 1475 Earl is a far simpler one. He proposes to hang somebody. When he made his last speech he was contented with hanging a single individual. I imagine I was the destined victim. But to-night he proposes to hang the whole of the Secretaries of State who have held office at the War Office since the Crimean War.
§ * THE EARL OF WEMYSSNo.
§ * THE MARQUESS OF LANSDOWNEI am sorry I cannot place myself at the disposal of the noble Earl for that purpose, but I do trust that when he next brings this subject before the House he will at least have some practical alternative to offer in place of the measures which we, after deliberation and careful consultation with our expert advisers, have laid before Parliament and the country.
THE EARL OF KIMBERLEYI shall say very little, because most of the arguments which can be used have been already exhausted; but I should think myself wanting in my duty if I did not express the opinions which I hold upon the very serious matters which have been brought to the attention of your Lordships by the noble Earl the Earl of Rosebery. The noble Marquess who has just sat down twitted my noble friend with not having made adequate proposals to, I suppose, increase our military and naval power. He says he criticises and finds fault with the present Government, but he does not give a hint to show what might have been done better. That is a very old gibe against the Opposition, which has no effect whatever on my mind. It is not the business of the Opposition to propose measures. It is the business of the Government of the day to propose measures on its responsibility, and it is the duty of the Opposition, if they are not satisfied with those measures, to point that out, and, if need be, to take the opinion of Parliament and of the country upon them.
§ THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURYHear, hear!
THE EARL OF KIMBERLEYI am not going to place myself in a position of violent antagonism to noble Lords opposite. I recognise, in the first place, that the times are extremely critical. The 1476 occurrences in various parts of the world are such as may perplex the wisest statesmen, and although I by no means approve and commend everything which noble Lords opposite have done, I hope I have shown some consciousness that if I have any power at all I should not use it to weaken the Government in the conduct of affairs in times which are difficult and even dangerous in their character. I rather regretted the very strong expression in the speech of the noble Marquess to the Primrose League. I am not speaking now from an opinion formed at this moment, but I rather regretted it at the time. I thought the views he enunciated as to the hostility which existed in so many countries against us were sound and well founded, but I thought, if he will allow me to say so, considering the position he occupies—one that is not only very important as Prime Minister of the country, but even still more important from the long experience he has had of foreign affairs—I thought, if he will allow me to say so, that he somewhat exceeded what was desirable in the very strong opinion that he expressed on that occasion. Those who read and hear platform speeches are very apt indeed to not thoroughly comprehend the precise meaning attached to them by men experienced in the very difficult subject of foreign affairs, and I think that when they read the speech of the noble Marquess the greater mass of them did not appreciate—I certainly did myself—the distinction which he drew with regard to a danger which is accumulating and which may have very considerable effect as regards the necessity of strong military and naval defences in this country at a period not yet arrived. I do not think the ordinary public would discriminate, as no doubt they ought to have discriminated, between that and the expression of opinion, as they read it, that they were surrounded by a danger of an immediate and dangerous imminency. I thought the expression of that was somewhat unfortunate. I have myself always thought it was a very satisfactory thing that, so far, notwithstanding this hostile feeling, the Governments of the various countries have shown no unfriendly feeling towards us. I have always felt that that was a phenomenon which might make us seriously reflect that possibly, certainly not in my remembrance, never was there so unfriendly a feeling all over Europe 1477 towards this country as there is now— a feeling the real foundation for which I have never been able to understand, but which makes it the more dangerous in my view, because an unreasoning hostility is just the one which is the most difficult to meet. But I think my noble friend Lord Rosebery was justified in what he said as regards the desirability of knowing what the expert opinion is; but I agree with the noble Marquess the Secretary of State for War, and differ from my noble friend, upon the point of whether we ought to have the Commander-in-Chief appearing in this House and undertaking duties which, in my opinion, can only be discharged by a responsible Minister. I should myself, like my noble friend, attach the highest importance, no doubt, to a speech made by the Commander-in-Chief, but our Parliamentary system is such that if you were to bring experts down to this House, and they were to usurp the position of the Minister, you would sap the very foundations upon which our whole political arrangements are based. If the Commander-in-Chief comes here and makes his statement, the First Naval Lord must come here and make his statement. I think it would be impossible for any Minister to undertake the conduct of either the Military or the Naval Department of the State if the experts were to be set up as the great authorities in Parliament. But whilst I say that, I limit it entirely to the point of the expert appearing here or in the House of Commons, and I do think the Government ought to carefully give us, on their own responsibility, the authentic statements they have received from their experts, so far as the interests of the public service permit of the public expression of such opinions. That course would not tend to weaken the Government. On the contrary, it would tend to strengthen the Government by strengthening the public confidence in the statement made by the Government, and the public would under stand that, when the statement of a Minister was not accompanied by the expert's opinion, circumstances rendered it necessary that that opinion should not be published. I do not think that the laying of the experts' opinions before Parliament would have the effect of calming the public mind. There is no doubt that there is a feeling of uneasiness in the public mind; and no one can deny 1478 that there is cause for it. Look around upon the position of affairs. We have the flower of the British Army locked up in South Africa in a war that may drag on for some time, and upon the top of that great undertaking we have a state of affairs in China which seems to puzzle the wisest statesmanship of Europe and America. I do not think anyone would venture to foretell what will take place in China. It may be that the revolutionary movement will subside, and that we may obtain satisfaction from the Chinese Government for the terrible atrocities we have only too much reason to fear have been committed. It may be, on the other hand, that portions of that enormous country may fall into a state of disorganisation and disturbance which may, in the first place, endanger the life of every European and American who has the ill-fortune to be in that country, which may, in the second place, destroy the trade carried on with that country, and, in the third place, place the European and American Powers in a position of extreme difficulty; for if they have to destroy the Government of China they will have to substitute another in its place, and can you conceive a duty more difficult that could be laid on what is called the European Concert, or more likely to lead to most serious results? As my noble friend has said, we are about to separate for probably a considerable time, and we must earnestly hope that Her Majesty's Government will devote themselves to seeing that, in the opinion of those experts whom they consult and trust, everything is being done that can properly be expected to be done to place this country in a position of thorough safety, and to induce a feeling of public contentment.