DISAPPLICATION OF QUALIFYING PERIOD AND UPPER AGE LIMIT FOR UNFAIR DISMISSAL (Hansard, 29 March 2004)

§ Mr. Deputy Speaker (Sir Alan Haselhurst)
With this it will be convenient to discuss new clause 15—Burden of proof on employer to show reason for dismissal in trade union related cases—

Section 154 of the 1992 Act (exclusion of requirement as to qualifying period, etc) is amended as follows.

(2) After subsection (2) insert—

(3) On a complaint under section 152 or section 153 it shall be for the employer to show the reason (or, if more than one, the principal reason) for the dismissal.".'.

§ Mr. Sutcliffe
Both new clauses relate to protections provided for by section 152 of the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992 against dismissal on grounds of trade union membership or activities. Section 153 of the 1992 Act provides similar protections against being unfairly selected for redundancy on grounds of trade union membership or activities.
Currently, those important protections apply to all employees. In other words, the usual qualifying period of one year's service for bringing an unfair dismissal application does not apply in those cases. The usual upper age limit for unfair dismissal does not apply either. The disapplication of the qualifying period and the upper age limit is achieved by section 154 of the 1992 Act. It works by disapplying the qualifying period and the upper age limit "if it is shown" that the sole or principal reason for dismissal, or selecting the employee for redundancy, was an inadmissible reason under section 152 of the 1992 Act.
The protections against dismissal on trade union-related grounds are long-standing rights. Indeed, they were among the first "day one" employment rights ever introduced, in the mid-1970s. Perhaps as a result, the language used in section 154 to disapply the qualifying period and upper age limit is peculiar to that section. It has not been followed by later provisions that have created day-one rights against unfair dismissal on other grounds. 1313 The wording of section 154 has caused problems. It has been interpreted by the courts as placing the onus on the employee that is complaining of unfair dismissal and who has under a year's service, to show that the employer's decision in dismissing him was taken for an inadmissible trade union reason. In other words, the burden of proof is on the employee to show the employer's reason for dismissal. That is intrinsically difficult for the employee to do, given his lack of detailed knowledge of the employer's behaviours and motivations. That approach contrasts sharply with all other cases of unfair dismissal where the burden of proof is on the employer to show the reason for the dismissal.
In other words, the peculiar wording of section 154 has created an anomaly. Indeed, the burden of proof would vary where two employees—one with more than 12 months' service and the other with six months' service—complained of being dismissed for belonging to a trade union. In the first case, the burden of proof would rest on the employer and in the second it would rest on the employee. There are no justifiable reasons for such differential treatment. It is basically an accident of history.
New clause 4 will rectify the anomaly by replacing the current version of section 154 with a new one that uses different wording drawn from other day-one rights to disapply the qualifying period and upper age limit. The new wording ensures that the burden of showing what the reason for dismissal was will now rest on the employer.
New clause 15 also attempts to rectify that anomaly by inserting a new subsection into section 154 that provides that the burden of proof for the reason for the dismissal is on the employer. It does not, however, replace the "it is shown" wording that has caused difficulties for the courts. For that reason, the wording of new clause 4 is to be preferred.
The number of individuals affected by the change is small. I am glad to say that cases of alleged dismissal on trade union grounds are few, but that is no reason why we should leave the current imperfect wording of section 154 as it is.

§ Mr. Henry Bellingham (North-West Norfolk) (Con)
As the Minister pointed out, the new clause reverses the burden of proof and we do not necessarily have any difficulty with that, but we are very unhappy at the complete lack of consultation on the new clause with any of the key bodies.
The Minister said that the so-called anomaly dated back to 1992, and if his legal advice has persuaded him that there is indeed an anomaly he is right to correct it. However, although there has been a lot of consultation on the Bill—it was published a long, long time ago and there have been various White Papers and endless discussions with organisations and bodies—most of the employer organisations did not see the new clauses until today. The Government tabled the new clauses only on Wednesday and did not tell those organisations, so they had only two and a bit working days to discover that the provisions had been tabled, which is not good enough. 1314 The Minister made great play of the fact that the Bill was about partnership and that there was a consensus-building process. He talked about always getting everybody on board and discussing things with all parties and when we began our consideration of the Bill the atmosphere was reasonably positive, because everyone felt that they had been consulted. However, as my hon. Friend the Member for Eddisbury (Mr. O'Brien) pointed out, the Government are hanging new provisions on this measure as though it were a Christmas tree. Such provisions could do not only positive things, as the Minister claims for the new clause, but many other things. The Minister told us not to panic because the Government would do nothing that was untoward or would break the spirit of consensus built up with the various organisations, yet unfortunately that is exactly what has happened.
We are not especially enamoured of the changing of the burden of proof under new clause 4. As the Minister explains, it will be up to the employer to show that it was not trade union activity or involvement that led to either discipline or dismissal. He claims that there is an anomaly, but any change in the burden of proof is a serious matter, as it is a precious component of our legal system. Why did the Government not consult the employer organisations? Why were they left in the dark until this morning? He has created much ill will owing not to the substance of the new clause and the other proposals but to the lack of consultation.
How many tribunal cases will be affected every year by the change in the burden of proof? That is a serious matter.

§ Mr. John Gummer (Suffolk, Coastal) (Con)
Does my hon. Friend agree that when the Government make a superficially sensible proposal it is even more important to discuss it with those who have to deal with it? Although they think that they are producing something that will be very good, something might have been missed, which is why consultation is so important, even though most people might feel that the proposal seemed perfectly sensible.

§ Mr. Bellingham
My right hon. Friend is right. He brings a huge amount of experience to the discussion, having done an excellent job not only when he served in the Minister's place some years ago but in more senior positions. The key is consultation—working things out with the various organisations. It is obvious that lawyers for various trade unions have been pushing the matter, so will the Minister tell the House why he did not properly consult the Institute of Directors, the Engineering Employers Federation, the British Chambers of Commerce and the CBI?

§ John McDonnell (Hayes and Harlington) (Lab)
I welcome new clause 4, which is better worded than my proposed new clause 15. In the spirit of consensus, I merely point out that, in unfair dismissal cases that are trade union related, the new clause simply maintains consistency with other cases, where the burden of proof is with employers. It is on that basis that we should move forward. Whatever lack of consultation there may have been, there is general approval for such a provision and 1315 an awareness that it was required, especially since the case of Smithv. Hayle town council. It is an improvement in the law and should be greatly welcomed.

§ Mr. Jonathan Djanogly (Huntingdon) (Con)
In relation to the comments that have just been made, I merely point out that although new clause 15 includes the words, "After subsection (2) insert", section 154 of the 1992 Act does not have a subsection (2).

§ Mr. Sutcliffe
I am sorry that we have started off in a different vein from our time in Committee.
The point about consultation was well made. We want to hold full consultation with everybody who is affected by the Bill, but Members will be aware that we held an important debate about the Wilson and Palmer judgment and its effect in bringing about significant changes in the rights to trade union membership. That also relates to issues such as those dealt with by new clause 4. The provision is not a bauble on a Christmas tree, as the hon. Member for North-West Norfolk (Mr. Bellingham) claimed earlier and during the debate on the programme motion last week. He ended his contribution to that debate by saying that he was not a happy camper, but I hope that we can make him a happy camper this evening by explaining that there were appropriate reasons for our proposals. A small number of tribunal cases are affected and I shall write to him with the number. In fact, we informed the CBI, the EEF and TUC that we would be tabling the provisions.
I am grateful to my hon. Friend the Member for Hayes and Harlington (John McDonnell) for not pressing new clause 15. It is entirely sensible to put the burden of proof on employers for reasons that have been outlined and accepted, so I ask the House to accept the motion.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause read a Second time, and added to the Bill.