HC Deb 29 March 2004 vol 419 cc1346-8

'After paragraph 171 of Schedule A1 to the 1992 Act insert—

Appeals

171A Any of a union or a company or a relevant worker may appeal against any decision of the CAC to the High Court.".'.[Mr. Mr. Bellingham.]

Brought up, and read the First time.

Mr. Bellingham

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

The only route of appeal from the Central Arbitration Committee is judicial review. My argument is simple and I shall not go into great detail: surely there is a need to build a simple mechanism into statute to allow appeal to the High Court. After all, an appeal to the High Court can be made from the Employment Appeal Tribunal.

One of my concerns is that the CAC is being asked to do more and more. With the inclusion in UK law of the EU information and consultation directive, there will be many more referrals to the CAC. I take the view, as do my hon. Friends, that more protection should be given to employers—and, indeed, employees and trade unions alike—in taking appeals to the High Court. I appreciate that things are improving, but I looked at some CAC cases from the past few years and I have to say that often the CAC does not spell out its decisions clearly or comprehensively. On a number of occasions, all that the CAC has said is: In our industrial relations experience, this is our decision". If we are not to have a right of appeal to the High Court, the Minister should certainly ask the CAC to be much clearer and to spell out in much more detail the background to and reasoning behind its decisions. I ask him to consider the new clause carefully.

Mr. Djanogly

I support the new clause, which would give unions—as well as all companies and all workers for that matter—the right to take an appeal against a CAC decision to the High Court. The workings of statutory recognition are complex and the procedures, as we have deduced over the past two months, can be complicated.

In deciding between the parties, the CAC sometimes has to make value judgments. I accept that the CAC is a worthy body and that it normally gets it right, but in those less frequent examples where one side is not happy with the decision—presumably in an industrial conflict—there should be a right of appeal.

In Committee, the Minister said that the CAC annual report notes that it has a satisfaction rating of 80 per cent. That is borne out in the report, which also notes that the response rate to the survey was only 40 per cent. In considering the judicial powers of the CAC, the people consulted might not want to go too public on their attitudes towards it, because it could judge them. Does the Minister know whether the CAC or an independent third party collected that data? That would be relevant to our consideration of whether an appeal would be fair. From what my hon. Friend has said, and from the statistics as given, such an appeal would be right.

Mr. Sutcliffe

I am grateful for the hon. Gentlemen's contributions to the debate.

As the hon. Member for North-West Norfolk (Mr. Bellingham) explained, the new clause concerns whether there should be a mechanism for appeals against decisions of the Central Arbitration Committee in addition to the possibility of seeking a judicial review on any such decision. While in many areas of law it is useful to have a right of appeal to a higher authority when one party feels aggrieved about a court's decision, the Government think that it would be inappropriate in this case, in which there are statutory recognition procedures. The CAC must make a large number of judgments in the course of its consideration of an application. An additional right of appeal against individual decisions of the CAC would introduce serious delays into the process, particularly if it had to be halted until the appeal was heard. It would encourage legalism and the type of legal wrangling that undermined recognition procedures in the 1970s. Such delays are not neutral and in most cases favour the employer.

Most importantly, the CAC is a specialist body operating in a specialist area, as hon. Members have accepted. Its decisions often turn on the application of its members' industrial relations expertise and experience. No appeal court—including the High Court—could match that. That view was judicially endorsed in both the High Court and Court of Appeal in the Kwik-Fit judicial review. In the High Court, Mr. Justice Elias stated that courts do not have the relevant expertise, nor is it desirable that these procedures should become a happy hunting ground for lawyers. In the Court of Appeal, Lord Justice Buxton agreed with this statement and added that the CAC was intended by Parliament to be a decision making body in a specialist area that is not suitable for the intervention of the courts.

Of course, the CAC's decisions can be challenged through judicial review. There have been only six applications for judicial review, four of which proceeded to a full review. In only two of those cases was the CAC found to have acted improperly in any way. The outcome of those few cases demonstrates that the CAC has used sound judgment in interpreting the extent and nature of its powers.

In addition, the amendment is defective in that it refers to the "company'" not the "employer". It thereby ensures that employers that are not companies have no right of appeal. The hon. Member for Huntingdon (Mr. Djanogly) asked about the response rate to the survey on the CAC. Unless I receive some in-flight information, I cannot give him that answer now, but I will write to him in due course—[Interruption.] I think that the CAC has its own information, but I will clarify that, as he also asked that question in Committee.

The new clause would damage the smooth functioning of the recognition procedure for little discernible benefit, and is also defective. I hope that I have answered the hon. Gentleman's concerns and that he will withdraw his amendment.

Mr. Bellingham

I am grateful for the Minister for those remarks. In his customary charming way, he has explained why he does not like the amendment and feels that it is technically undesirable. I forgot to declare my interest as a barrister—he mentioned a happy hunting ground for lawyers, and I take on board his point. I reject his criticism of the High Court, which is made up of a large number of judges with huge expertise. In the light of what the Minister said, however, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Motion and clause, by leave, withdrawn.

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