HC Deb 16 March 2004 vol 419 cc292-300

Motion made, and Question proposed, That this House do now adjourn.—[Mr. Kemp.]

9 pm

Llew Smith (Blaenau Gwent) (Lab)

The Government's opposition to weapons of mass destruction was given as the reason for going to war with Iraq. Those weapons did not exist in Iraq, but they exist in Israel, and not only does Israel have weapons of mass destruction; it has the ultimate weapon of mass destruction—nuclear weapons. Indeed, it has 200 nuclear warheads. However, there is no talk, and quite rightly so, of any kind of war with Israel, partly. one would have thought, because of its weapons of mass destruction, partly because it daily invades its neighbour, Palestine, and partly because it daily treats UN resolutions with contempt. Obviously, our Government are selective in their opposition to weapons of mass destruction: they are okay as far as Israel is concerned, but they are certainly not okay as far as Iraq is concerned.

The threat of weapons of mass destruction, and in particular of atomic and nuclear weapons, has been with us since 1945, and the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the tragedy that went with that and the tragedy that followed it, with the deaths of hundreds of thousands of Japanese civilians and, probably, a similar number of injuries. On some of the anniversaries of those bombings a message has come from the Japanese people: "Step back and learn from us." Sadly, we have failed to act on that message, which the Japanese people wanted to be not only heard but acted on.

Sadly, too, the Government are refusing to support some of the peacemakers, the people who have had the good sense and the courage to warn of nuclear proliferation and its threat to this planet. In particular I think of Mordechai Vanunu, who for the past 18 years has been rotting away in an Israeli jail. His crime, if crime is the right word, and it certainly is not, was telling the truth about Israel's nuclear capability when all around him were lying.

We are also selective in our opposition to weapons of mass destruction, and in particular nuclear weapons, when we consider our own position. I am not saying that the Secretary of State of Defence has learned to love nuclear weapons, but he has accepted the need to use them in certain circumstances. I remember him saying a while back: The United Kingdom would, in the right conditions, in extreme circumstances of self-defence, be prepared to use nuclear weapons."—[Official Report, 10 April 2002; Vol. 383, c. 30W.] For me, there are no conditions and no circumstances that would justify the use of nuclear weapons. Pressing that button would, for a number of reasons, be the ultimate act of madness.

Nuclear weapons are madness because they are a total waste of money. Trident alone has cost the United Kingdom in the region of £15 billion, and the annual cost of operating those weapons is in the region of £280 million. It is madness to use that money on such a weapon when it could be spent for far more socially useful purposes, such as providing some of the services that for many years people took for granted. If we stopped spending money on nuclear warheads, we could, for example, use it to return to the old socialist principle of free higher education or, indeed, provide more decent pensions for our senior citizens—the list of uses is endless.

Our nuclear industry involves another financial cost. On 2 July 2002, the Department of Trade and Industry announced that the clean-up liability for the civil nuclear industry was about £48 billion, and rising. The Ministry of Defence has not revealed the equivalent figure for the military today, but hopefully the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, my hon. Friend the Member for Harlow (Mr. Rammell), will provide the House with such information when he replies to our debate.

There is one cost that I would welcome, but which the Government have failed to meet—proper compensation for the atomic veterans and their families for the suffering caused by events many years ago. It is estimated that the United States spent $3 trillion between 1940 and 1995 on a possible nuclear war. Annually, it spends $27 billion on preparations for such a war. Those figures do not include the costs of environmental clean-ups.

Another act of madness is the waste of skills, talents and creativity in the design and production of nuclear weapons. Imagine what could be achieved if we transferred those skills from military to civilian use. How much more dignified life could be for many more people. The greatest act of madness is the fact that nuclear weapons would kill not only our so-called enemy but our supporters. Ironically, they would kill the people who designed and produced them. Not only would they kill the enemy, our own people and the people who designed and produced those weapons of war but they would kill civilisation as we know it. They would literally cost us the earth.

That is not just my opinion, but the opinion of many eminent statespeople. Many years ago, the former US President Jimmy Carter argued: In an all-out nuclear war, more destructive power than in all of World War II would be unleashed every second during the long afternoon it would take for all the missiles and bombs to fall. A World War II every second—more people killed in the first few hours than all the wars of history put together. The survivors, if any, would live in despair amid the poisoned ruins of a civilisation that had committed suicide. Khrushchev expressed similar sentiments, when he said that after a nuclear war the survivors would envy the dead. President Carter made his statement more than 20 years ago, and our capacity to destroy our beautiful planet has increased dramatically in the intervening period. No individual or Government has the moral right to agree to the use of nuclear weapons. We have no moral right to take away from our children the opportunity to experience the many beautiful things on our planet. We have no right to take away from them the opportunity to avoid the mistakes of our generation or to achieve something good with their lives. But that is what we would be doing if we ever agreed, as the Secretary of State for Defence has agreed, to use nuclear weapons in certain circumstances.

The use of nuclear weapons would be not just an act of madness, but an act of hypocrisy. We cannot tell other states that they should not produce nuclear weapons or that they should abandon the nuclear weapons that they have if we continue to go down the nuclear road. It has been estimated that 128,000 nuclear warheads have been built worldwide since 1945, 70,000 of them in the United States. Our continued nuclear role is not only an act of madness and hypocrisy, but in my opinion and in the opinion of many lawyers it is illegal. We are signatories to the non-proliferation treaty, yet we daily breach the laws enshrined in that treaty.

While we continue to have nuclear weapons of mass destruction, we are clearly in breach of article VI of the treaty, which calls for each party to the treaty to enter into negotiations at an early date in good faith to achieve nuclear disarmament. That is not happening. Article I forbids any country that has signed up to the NPT, including countries that possess nuclear weapons, to collaborate directly or indirectly with any other country on nuclear weapons. It is obvious that Trident breaks this article. We breach article VI because, as the Secretary of State for Defence admitted, Negotiations to implement Article VI have not yet commenced and are not scheduled.—[Official Report, 26 February 2004; Vol. 418, c. 498W.]

Because Trident represents a significant increase in our capability, it is in breach of article VI as a serious act of proliferation. Even if the number of warheads is kept similar to the number deployed on Polaris, the qualitative difference in targeting capacity and accuracy of the missile system makes it a much more potent weapon. On 16 June 2002 an Atomic Weapons Establishment spokesperson at Aldermaston told TheObserver that it had to maintain the capability to design a successor to Trident. Once again, that breaks articles of the non-proliferation treaty.

The UK is in breach of article I of the NPT, which states: Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly. The Trident nuclear WMD system was bought from the USA and its warheads were tested in the USA, which provides targeting technology and command and control support. By any judgment that is indirect support. I would argue that it is direct support.

What is particularly disgraceful about the continued military co-operation between the United States and the UK, which neither Tory nor, apparently, new Labour Administrations can grasp, is that these countries are two of the three depository states for the NPT. In effect, the treaty is held in trust by them. How do they show their respect? By breaking the very first article of the treaty.

The bilateral US/UK mutual defence agreement on atomic energy matters dating from 1958, which facilitates this co-operation, comes up for renewal later this year. It should be cancelled as an international gesture of good faith. Until decision makers and law makers in the nuclear armed powers recognise that the US and the UK in particular have obligations as part of the NPT bargain, no amount of lecturing other states how to behave in the face of nuclear proliferation temptations will have any credibility. If we continue to ignore the NPT or to break its articles, the greater will be the global threat of nuclear weapons. The policy of successive Governments, Tory and Labour, is that we simultaneously support both our non-proliferation treaty commitments to nuclear disarmament and our need to retain nuclear weapons of mass destruction to protect our national security. Some might perceive a significant internal inconsistency in those policy positions—indeed, some might consider them to be in direct contradiction. That is in stark contrast with a decision that was taken at a Labour party conference in the early 1990s that we, as a future Labour Government, would, among other things, scrap Trident.

In 1985, the UN Secretary-General, opening a review conference on the non-proliferation treaty stated: The most safe, sure and swift way to deal with the threat of nuclear arms is to do away with them in every regard. This should be our vision of the future. No more testing. No more production. No more sales or transfers. Reduction and destruction of all nuclear weapons and the means to make them should be humanity's common cause. Sadly, almost 20 years later they are more of a threat than they were when those words were first spoken.

In my opinion, nuclear weapons will continue to be a threat to global security if we continue to ignore our obligations under the non-proliferation treaty. My hopes, and those of many other people committed not only to the anti-nuclear cause, but to world peace, are embodied in the NPT. If this Government and the Government of the United States continue to treat that treaty with contempt, the hopes of world peace and of avoiding nuclear catastrophe will be sorely diminished.

9.16 pm

The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (Mr. Bill Rammell): I congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Blaenau Gwent (Llew Smith) on giving us the opportunity to air these exceedingly important issues. In the time available to me, I hope not only to respond to several of the points that he raised, but to set out the Government's overall position on the possession of nuclear weapons and on nuclear proliferation. I hope to rebut some of the very serious accusations that he made.

The Government's policy on nuclear weapons remains that which was set out in the 1998 strategic defence review and the 2003 defence White Paper. We are explicitly committed to working towards a safer world in which there is no requirement for nuclear weapons and where we continue to play a full role in international efforts to strengthen arms control and to prevent the proliferation of hugely critical chemical, biological and nuclear weapons.

However, because of the continuing risk from the proliferation of nuclear weapons—which I genuinely believe to be one of the most serious threats that we face in the modern world—and the certainty that a number of countries will retain substantial nuclear arsenals, our minimum nuclear deterrent capability, which is currently represented by Trident, is likely to remain a necessary element of our security. We nevertheless continue to support multilateral negotiations towards mutual, balanced and verifiable reductions in nuclear weapons worldwide. When we are satisfied that sufficient progress has been made to allow us to include British nuclear weapons in any negotiations without endangering our security interests, we shall most certainly do so.

Let me deal with the key arguments that my hon. Friend advanced in respect of our progress in meeting article VI of the non-proliferation treaty. We remain fully committed to all aspects of the NPT regime, including global and verifiable nuclear disarmament. In contrast to my hon. Friend's comments, we have an excellent record on fulfilling our NPT obligations on nuclear disarmament. Looking at the issue objectively across the world, we are justly recognised as the most forward leaning of the nuclear weapons states—although one would not have believed that in listening to my hon. Friend.

It is worthwhile setting out in some detail what we have done to meet the provisions of the article.

First, we withdrew and dismantled the RAF's freefall nuclear bomb, so that Trident is now our only nuclear weapons system.

Secondly, we dismantled the UK's last Chevaline warhead in 2002, demonstrating our commitment to irreversibility in reductions in the UK's nuclear weapons.

Thirdly, we reduced our operationally available stockpile to fewer than 200 warheads—that is a reduction of more than 70 per cent since the end of the cold war in the potential explosive power of our nuclear forces.

Fourthly, we have reduced the readiness of our nuclear forces so that only a single Trident submarine is now on deterrent patrol, carrying 48 warheads. The submarine on patrol is normally on several days' notice to fire, and its missiles are de-targeted. I believe that all of those are significant de-escalatory measures.

Fifthly, we signed and ratified the comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty and continue to promote its early entry into force. Sixthly, we have placed fissile material no longer required for defence purposes under international safeguards. We have also continued to press for negotiations to begin at the conference on disarmament in Geneva on a fissile material cut-off treaty. Indeed, we stopped the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices some time ago.

Finally, in respect of these specific measures under the NPT regime, we signed and ratified the relevant protocols to both the treaty of Rarotonga, in relation to the south Pacific nuclear weapons-free zone, and the treaty of Pelindaba, in relation to the African nuclear weapons-free zone. All those actions have been undertaken since 1997 as a result of the commitment of this Government.

Llew Smith

The Minister has cited many reasons and many weapons to prove that we are supporting article VI of the NPT. He has not yet mentioned Trident, or told the House how that fits in with the NPT. While I am on my feet, will he tell us whether, in certain circumstances and under certain conditions, he would be willing to press the nuclear button?

Mr. Rammell

I am going to discuss the issue of Trident explicitly in a moment. Before I do so, I want to emphasise that all the measures that I have outlined are significant steps that this Labour Government have taken since 1997, in accordance with our NPT obligations.

My hon. Friend questioned the legality of our possession of nuclear weapons, but it is very clear, in terms of the view of the International Court of Justice on this issue, that our nuclear weapons possession and capability is in accordance with international law. It is important to make that point very clearly. He also referred to the views of my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Defence, and it is important to put in context what my right hon. Friend said. He made it very clear that the circumstances in which any use of nuclear weapons might have to be contemplated would be extremely remote, and that we would use them only in extreme circumstances of self-defence and in accordance with our obligations under international law. That is a very different slant from the one that my hon. Friend put on that proposition.

The UK continues to play a full part in the NPT review process. Indeed, we played a key role in achieving international agreement to the final document that was produced at the last NPT review conference in 2000. We have made considerable progress on the 13 steps set out in that final document. At the second session of the preparatory committee for the 2005 review conference, which was held in Geneva in April and May last year, we issued a working paper on our research into methodologies for the verification of nuclear disarmament. That is a cause that we intend to continue to pursue.

Let me now turn to whether the possession of Trident is consistent with the spirit of article I. I would certainly contend that we are not in breach of article I. The Government have repeatedly made it clear that the UK nuclear deterrent is, and always has been, independent. The UK's nuclear weapons cannot be part of a US system, as the transfer by a nuclear weapon state of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices, is prohibited under article I of the NPT. We have, of course, purchased from the US Trident missile bodies on which we mount our nuclear warheads, which are manufactured at the Atomic Weapons Establishment. Those missiles are carried on UK-built Vanguard class submarines. Decisions on whether to replace Trident are not needed during this Parliament, but are likely to be required in the next one. We will therefore continue to take appropriate steps to ensure that the range of options for maintaining a nuclear deterrent capability is kept open until that decision point.

My hon. Friend made a number of points about Israel and the middle east. It is undoubtedly the case that a peaceful and secure middle east is a critical and continuing goal of this Government's foreign policy. We are strong advocates of a middle east WMD-free zone, which we believe to be an important part of any solution to the conflict there.

We support the principle generally of the establishment of such nuclear weapons-free zones. Indeed, we have already signed in conjunction with the other nuclear weapons states recognised under the NPT protocols to four such agreements covering Latin America, the south Pacific, Africa and Antarctica. In that context, we therefore continue to support the proposal for a middle east nuclear weapons free-zone. Indeed, since it was formulated in United Nations Security Council resolution 687 in 1991, the UK has supported the wider idea of a middle east free of all weapons of mass destruction. I genuinely believe that working towards that objective can only contribute to the prospects for a wider settlement of the region's problems.

Llew Smith: Will the Minister now answer the question whether, under the extreme circumstances referred to by the Secretary of State for Defence, he too would be willing to press the nuclear button?

Mr. Rammell

I set out very clearly the position on our possession and use of nuclear weapons: they would be used only in extreme circumstances of self-defence. That point is very clear.

Let me return to the issue of the middle east. My hon. Friend made a number of comments on the situation in Israel. We have made it clear that we want Israel to sign up to the NPT as a non-nuclear state and we will continue to argue that point. It is also important that, in any debate on nuclear weapons and the dangers that we face, we also consider the considerable dangers that we face from the proliferation of nuclear weapons materials across the world. I said earlier that that is one of the most significant threats that we face in the modern world. We have to ensure that we are vigilant about and focused on it. That is why, for example, we have committed ourselves to the global partnership.

In June 2002, the Prime Minister made a commitment of up to £400 million over 10 years to tackle the weapons legacy of the former Soviet Union—a significant step forward. Those activities are aimed directly at reducing the proliferation risks posed by that weapons legacy. As the Foreign Secretary said in his written statement of 25 February, it is intended that that work should be expanded to include other states such as Libya and Iraq. We are undertaking a scoping study, looking at the requirements for co-operative threat reduction work in Libya. We are working alongside the United States to gauge the needs in Iraq.

It is also within that context that we consider the important proliferation security initiative, which was launched in May 2003. The UK has rightly been one of a core group of countries working to drive that initiative forward. The PSI aims to prevent trafficking in weapons of mass destruction and related technology by states and non-state actors—for example. terrorist groups or criminal networks—through increased interdiction efforts. That is hugely important.

The prospect that such weapons capability can get into the hands of terrorists who have no regard for human rights or for the effect of their actions is one of the most serious and dangerous threats that we face. We must work multilaterally to ward off the dangers that exist in that regard and it is critical that we remain focused on those issues.

I understand the concerns that my hon. Friend has raised: none of us who has lived through the cold war and the continuing dangers, threats and risks that exist with nuclear weapons can look on those issues with equanimity. The track record that I have described, our commitments under the non-proliferation regime and the significant steps that we have taken since 1997 to reduce our nuclear weapons on a multilateral and verifiable basis emphasise that we are committed to working for peace throughout the world, reducing weapons of mass destruction and protecting ourselves from such weapons. The Government are committed to hose aims and will continue to take their arguments forward.

Question put and agreed to.

Adjourned accordingly at half-past Nine o'clock.