§ Motion made, and Question proposed, That this House do now adjourn.—[Vernon Coaker.]
7.29 pm§ Mr. James Clappison (Hertsmere) (Con)The Potters Bar derailment was, and continues to be, a subject of the gravest importance to my constituents, members of the travelling public and everybody who saw the terrible pictures of the carriage wedged beneath the canopy of Potters Bar station. In that tragic accident, seven people died and 70 people were injured, some of them very seriously.
One of my constituents, the late Agnes Quinlivan, was among those who died. Two members of her family—her daughters—are here tonight, as is a Hertfordshire man who was sadly affected by the incident. That man is a constituent of my right hon. Friend the Member for Hitchin and Harpenden (Mr. Lilley), who is also here this evening. I should add that the hon. Member for Cunninghame, South (Mr. Donohoe) has taken a particular interest in the subject, and I know that he wants briefly to intervene at the conclusion of my remarks.
This is the second short debate that I have obtained on this subject—the first occurred on 15 November 2002, six months after the derailment. Since then, the first and second anniversaries of the crash have occurred. The first anniversary was marked by a moving ceremony, where all those who attended were struck by the dignity of the bereaved families and survivors. At about the same time—May 2003—the third and most recent report from he Health and Safety Executive investigation board was published. I understand that the HSE plans to conclude its investigation into the accident by September or October of this year, and that a final report will then be published. When that investigation is concluded and concomitant legal decisions have been taken, the Secretary of the State will decide whether to hold a public inquiry.
It would be preferable if the Secretary of State had already decided to hold a public inquiry, because the case for such an inquiry is very strong, and I have pressed the Government to hold an inquiry for some time. As it stands, the earliest point at which a decision will be taken is two and a half years after the derailment.
§ Mr. Henry Bellingham (North-West Norfolk) (Con)My hon. Friend knows that the train in question was heading to King's Lynn in my constituency, and that constituents of mine were on the train—mercifully, none of them was killed, although some of them were injured. He will understand why I feel very strongly about the situation, and why I feel that the Government have prevaricated—it is a disgrace that they have not announced a public inquiry hitherto. Does my hon. Friend find it extraordinary that the HSE is taking so long to produce its final report?
§ Mr. ClappisonMy hon. Friend is right that it would be better if we knew more of the answers at this stage. Along with many other hon. Members, he had constituents who were travelling on the train, and I know that he has taken a particular interest in the subject.
409 The stretch of line is very busy, and large numbers of people, including many of my constituents, travel up and down it. All those who use it are conscious that the tragic accident at Hatfield occurred a short time before the Potters Bar derailment. The fact that it has taken so long to make a decision must concern all those who use the line, but it particularly concerns the bereaved families and the survivors, who have had to wait for a significantly long time. That is not the only matter that I seek to raise on behalf of my constituents. The case for a public inquiry is strong, and I shall renew my request and give the Minister three reasons why one should be held.
First, from what we have seen of the HSE report so far, it appears that many questions remain to be answered about how the derailment occurred. The HSE report of May 2003 is very clear about the immediate cause of the derailment—the technica1 factors that led to the failure of the points—and it also makes some recommendations in respect of points elsewhere. However, it does not give anything like a full picture of the state of affairs that led to the points being in the lethal condition that they were in on 10 May 2002. It does not give a full picture of the state of affairs regarding the installation, maintenance and inspection of the points. Nor does it give a full picture in respect of what happened to the points—of who did what to them to leave them in that condition—or who exactly was responsible for what was going on. I make no criticism of the work of the HSE, which has been thorough, but all the questions arising from this tragic crash can be adequately dealt with only by a public inquiry that is held in the open with all the powers that are available to it. I put that forward as the principal reason for holding a public inquiry.
Secondly, I believe that in this case only a public inquiry can meet the legal obligations of the Government under the Human Rights Act 1998. I ask the Minister to take into account the implications of that Act and its case law, particularly that relating to article 2, on the right to life, and the findings of the European Court of Human Rights in respect of the right to an effective investigation where death is caused and a public authority is responsible. I respectfully invite the Minister to consider that very carefully. I also invite him to take on board the ECHR's judgment that any deficiency in the investigation that undermines its ability to establish the cause of death or the person or persons responsible will risk falling foul of this standard.
Thirdly, in the absence of a public inquiry there would be a coroner's inquest. However, there limits on the proceedings and evidence of such an inquest under the coroner's rules, and an inquest would not meet the obligations to which I referred; no would it meet the need to establish where responsibility lies for the state of affairs underlying the crash.
I put those three reasons to the Minister. In addition, I invite him to bear it in mind that holding an inquiry would be in keeping with the holding of statutory public inquiries into previous major rail crashes such as Clapham, Southall and Ladbroke Grove. I put it to the Minister quite simply: without a public inquiry into such a major rail crash, vital questions about an equally tragic incident will go unanswered.
410 I mentioned the issue of responsibility. In April this year, nearly two years after the crash, Network Rail and Jarvis made a joint announcement of acceptance of liability. There seems to have been some question, to say the least, about whether that was an acceptance of responsibility or of liability. In a carefully crafted statement, the two parties said that they would accept liability for all claims justified in law brought by the bereaved and injured, but there seemed to be some ambiguity about whether they actually accepted responsibility for the derailment.
Whether or not that amounted to an acceptance of responsibility, I am afraid that anyone who was led to believe that the families would in all cases receive appropriate compensation for their suffering will be sadly disappointed. I believe that the treatment of the families in that respect has fallen way below what it should have been, as can be demonstrated by the case of my constituent the late Agnes Quinlivan. Before turning to the particulars of her case, I should like to make it clear that the paramount concern of her family, and other families, has been to establish the cause of the crash and, in so far as possible, to prevent any other families from having to go through what they have gone through. However, most fair-minded people would agree that the families should receive compensation to recognise the value of the lives of their loved ones and the trauma they have gone through.
Agnes Quinlivan was an 80-year-old lady who had lived an exceptionally valuable life in her church and community in Potters Bar. As it happens, she was the only local victim of the crash. She died, tragically, when part of the bridge fell on her as she was walking through an underpass. Immediately after the accident, Network Rail and Jarvis gave £10,000 to her family on a without-prejudice basis and with a view to covering their immediate expenses. Since then, Network Rail and Jarvis have interpreted the law so as to refuse any further compensation to the family. As far as I can ascertain, they have no plans to make any further compensation available.
For the Quinlivan family, the acceptance of liability by Jarvis in April was meaningless. I understand that other bereaved families have been treated similarly. At least five of the seven families have been offered compensation that most fair-minded people would regard as low, and in accordance with an especially strict interpretation of the law by Network Rail and Jarvis. It would be open to those companies to take a more appropriate approach to compensation, as I believe happened in the case of the Ladbroke Grove crash.
Things are made even starker for the families by reports that appeared in the newspapers three months after the Potters Bar crash and appeared to suggest that much more generous compensation would be forthcoming to them from the railway industry. Three months after the accident, when it remained fresh in the public mind, there was talk of £1 million in compensation for each bereaved family.
There is little doubt about the source of the reports. In The Times of 13 August 2002, the chief executive of Railtrack is quoted as saying that a compensation package worth about £12 million would be offered to the injured and the families of people killed. In the case of 411 the Quinlivan family and, I believe, in that of four of the other seven families who suffered a bereavement, the compensation is a small fraction of that figure. The Quinlivan family have not received a single penny beyond the sum that was made available immediately after the accident to meet their expenses. The treatment that that family and others have received is unsatisfactory. I suspect that most fair-minded people would regard it as downright shoddy.
There has been far too much delay; far too much consideration has been given to media management and far too little to doing justice to the families. I hope that all those in the railway industry, especially Network Rail and Jarvis, will reconsider the issue. I am tempted to ask the Minister to say what he thinks about the treatment of the Quinlivan family, although I fully understand the limitations on his position. However, I ask him in any event to use his influence and that of the Government with Network Rail and Jarvis to ask them to re-examine the way in which they are dealing with the matter.
It is not acceptable to leave matters as they stand. Those who suffer injury and bereavement should not have to wait years for answers to questions about how this all came about. They should not be put through more agony when seeking a fair reflection of the life of a loved one; they deserve better than that.
§ Mr. Brian H. Donohoe (Cunninghame, South) (Lab)I asked the hon. Member for Hertsmere (Mr. Clappison) whether I may have one minute of time on the subject. I congratulate him on securing an important debate and concur with most of what he said. I look forward to a positive reply from the Minister to the question of why we have a position whereby the family of a woman who was the mother of a constituent of mine are denied what I believe to be a given right to some form of compensation from two companies that have been very negligent in the conduct of their business.
§ The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Transport (Mr. Tony McNulty)I congratulate the hon. Member for Hertsmere (Mr. Clappison) on securing this debate. I endorse his opening remarks about the continuing impact of the derailment, and thank him for the manner in which he made his speech.
I should first like to extend my sympathies to the families and friends of all those who lost their lives or were injured in this tragic rail accident. The pain and suffering that those people have had to endure over the past couple of years is difficult to imagine, and it is hard for any of us to put ourselves in their shoes and imagine the extent of the ongoing trauma and difficulties that the loss of loved ones causes.
The details of the accident are well known. The rear coach of a four-coach West Anglia Great Northern commuter train, travelling from King's Cross to Cambridge and King's Lynn, derailed while passing over points number 2182A just before Potters Bar station. The hon. Gentleman evoked the images of the pictures that we all saw subsequently. Seven people died 412 and more than 70 ware injured. However, the raw facts mask the intense emotional and psychological impact that the accident has had on so many lives. I totally understand the desire and determination to find answers to why this tragic accident happened.
The joint investigation into the accident by the British Transport police and the Health and Safety Executive is continuing. It has been the objective of the BTP to establish whether there was any deliberate criminal act or any breach of duty, other than health and safety at work offences, that could be described as grossly negligent. The HSE investigation has focused on establishing the direct and root causes of the accident and has published three reports, on 14 May 2002, 4 July 2002 and 29 May 2003. Two of those reports included recommendations designed to prevent a similar accident from happening again, and generally to make safety improvements on the railways.
The most recent report by the HSE's investigation board covered the HSE's investigations up to May 2003. It described the technical, forensic and other work undertaken by the Health and Safety Laboratory and the railway inspectorate. The report indicated that the most likely underlying cause of the derailment was the poor condition of points 2182A at the time of the incident, and that this had resulted from inappropriate adjustment and insufficient maintenance. The report made a number of recommendations further to improve safety on the railways. Those recommendations cover the rail industry's safety culture, management systems for safety, general design and engineering aspects, selection and control of contractors, and the regulation of railway health and safety.
The HSE is satisfied that the industry is making progress on implementing those recommendations, although it recognises that there is still more work to be completed. The HSE has appointed an experienced inspector to monitor progress on implementing the recommendations and validating the action taken. A final report can be published only when any legal proceedings that may arise have been concluded or ruled out.
The lead in the investigation was transferred in March 2004 from the BTP to the HSE, because the emphasis of the investigation now focusing on systems and procedures which fall within the specialist skills and experience of HSE investigators. The BTP has some remaining lines of inquiry to complete and continues to hold regular review meetings with the HSE to consider whether all the objectives of the investigation have been met. If evidence emerges that would lead to the possibility of prosecutions for serious offences other than health and safety at work offences, the HSE, the BTP and the Crown Prosecution Service will consider whether it would be appropriate for the BTP to resume the lead.
The HSE investigation is targeted at staff competency, the maintenance and inspection regime, and equipment design and supply issues. The HSE has estimated that its investigation team will be in a position to report to the investigation board in September or October 2004. That report will include the HSE's analysis of the statements taken and evidence gathered, and will include the issues that the HSE has identified as being the root cause of the points failure. If necessary, the investigation board expects to be in a position to 413 make further recommendations in addition to those already published, to prevent a recurrence of the accident. This is also the time at which the relevant prosecuting authorities and their legal advisers will review all the evidence to determine whether matters are to be brought to court.
I know that many of those affected by the accident have been calling for a public inquiry, as the hon. Gentleman eloquently stated. Public inquiries are not convened after every rail accident Prior to the public inquiries into the 1997 Southall and 1999 Ladbroke Grove accidents, there had not been one since the public inquiries into the 1987 King's Cross fire and the 1998 Clapham accident. They tend to be convened to look at general principles and major structural issues rather than merely establishing what the immediate cause of an incident was. The Southall and Ladbroke Grove inquiries produced many recommendations, which the industry has been implementing. I will happily pass on to the Secretary of State the hon Gentleman's three concerns to justify a public inquiry.
At this stage, however, the Secretary of State considers that it would be premature to make a decision on a public inquiry. Instead, he intends to await the conclusion of the HSE investigation and decisions about the preferment of charges. The Secretary of State expects the HSE to provide him with an overview of the outcome of the investigation at this point, which should allow him, as the hon. Gentleman suggested, to take a decision later in the year.
In a statement made through the British Transport police on 18 March 2003, the coroner made it clear that he was preparing for an inquest by asking for relevant information from various parties but no proposed timetable was given for a full inquest. The coroner has since indicated to the Department that he intends to await the outcome of all further investigations before holding the full inquest.
I know that the Potters Bar derailment once again brought forward concerns about track maintenance and the use of contractors. A report by the HSE made it clear that the use of contractors is not a problem in itself, but the contractors need to be properly managed and to have a properly trained work force. The hon. Gentleman will know that in October 2003 Network Rail announced the decision to take in-house all maintenance contracts for the rail infrastructure.
There has been recent public concern that Jarvis was awarded a major contract for rail replacement in the Potters Bar area. That is, of course, a track renewal contract and not a maintenance contract. Network Rail—not Jarvis—will decide what work will be done and where, and it will instruct Jarvis to carry it out to a nationally applicable standard method.
§ Mr. ClappisonThe Minister has mentioned the rail replacement contract for Jarvis, which I had not. As he has brought the subject up, may I suggest that we should not set too much store by the distinction between rail replacement and maintenance, because it is important that the same culture of safety should govern both operations?
§ Mr. McNultyI accept that point and I suggest that most of the industry would accept it, too. I merely put those things on the record as matters of fact.
414 Compensation is a key issue for those bereaved or injured in the accident. In a joint statement on 27 April 2004, to which the hon. Gentleman also alluded, Network Rail and Jarvis announced that they have formally accepted liability on behalf of the rail industry for all legally justified claims brought by the bereaved and injured, despite the continuing investigations into the root cause of the accident. I understand that a significant percentage of the claims have been processed, and that most outstanding claimants have received interim payments. Again, as a point of general fact, I shall pursue the matters that the hon. Gentleman raises, not simply about Mrs. Quinlivan but about the others, too. At the end of the day, as he will know, the issue of those who are aggrieved by whatever compensation is put in place is to be determined by the courts rather than by ministerial intervention.
More generally, the Government are committed to ensuring a safe, reliable and customer-focused railway.
§ Mr. ClappisonOn the previous point, I acknowledged the limitations on the ministerial position. The Minister has mentioned the courts, but there is no legal action at the moment. My plea to Network Rail and Jarvis is to consider this matter again, including from the point of view of the public interest, and to examine whether they are doing justice to those people, bearing in mind the compensation that has been made in other cases, such as Ladbroke Grove, which was a similar situation.
§ Mr. McNultyI am sure that, given this debate, they will have heard that plea. I appreciate what the hon. Gentleman said about the limitations on ministerial intervention. It is not for Ministers to intervene in specific cases. Perhaps I should have made it clear that, ultimately, only the courts can intervene if no agreement is reached.
Since the 1970s, the frequency of fatal train accidents has reduced from roughly five a year to about one a year. The hon. Gentleman will also know that the number of signals passed at danger in 2003–04 was the lowest total for 12 months since records began in 1985. However, I take very much to heart what the hon. Gentleman has said about the need to get the overall culture of health and safety right, and I think that that is happening.
Although the general safety record of the railways is good, a number of rail crashes, including the Potters Bar crash, have demonstrated that there must never be complacency and that much still needs to be done. The industry is, I think, focusing on remedying the weaknesses revealed by the series of accidents and subsequent reports. Most of the recommendations that emerged from the public inquiries into the Southall and Ladbroke Grove crashes have now been implemented. The Health and Safety Executive is continuing to monitor implementation of the outstanding recommendations and—as I have said—will publish a third progress report later in the year.
Progress is also being made in the establishment of an independent rail accident investigation branch. As the hon. Gentleman will know, the Transport Safety Act, passed in July 2003, provides for that. It implements recommendations on accident investigation made after 415 Lord Cullen's public inquiry into the Ladbroke Grove crash. The chief inspector was appointed in May 2003, and the recruitment of investigators began in November 2003.
The RAIB has begun to develop the regulations that will underpin its operations and related policy and procedures. It will undertake investigations into railway accidents or incidents with the aim of learning lessons that will improve railway safety. The chief inspector will report directly on accident investigation to the Secretary of State.
A key component of the strategy to improve rail safety is the implementation of the train protection and warning system. The fitting of TPWS to all trains across the national rail network was completed on time at the end of last year. TPWS automatically applies the brakes of any train that has passed a red signal, or is travelling too fast on the approach to a red signal, speed restriction or buffer stop. It will safely stop trains attempting to pass a red signal at up to 75 mph. At higher speeds it will slow the train, thus reducing any impact.
Network Rail plans to fit TPSW-plus to a number of signals, which will be effective in the case of trains travelling at up to 100 mph. The Strategic Rail Authority is continuing to take the lead in developing a single national programme for the European rail traffic management system.
416 The Government are committed to ensuring that we have a safe railway and that the lessons from past accidents are learned. I agree with the hon. Gentleman that, collectively, we owe it to all affected by the Potters Bar derailment to ensure that happens. I also agree with what he said at the outset: there is still much to find out about what happened at Potters Bar and—as I tried to make clear earlier—the Health and Safety Executive, the British Transport police and others are still trying to get to the bottom of it. All those processes are unfolding.
We owe that not just to the bereaved and their families, but to all on whom Potters Bar has had an impact of any kind. As the hon. Gentleman said, the line is extremely busy. There will have been an impact not just on those who used it on the day, but on those who use it regularly—and, indeed, on rail users and the rail industry everywhere.
I wish the hon. Gentleman well in pursuing his case with Network Rail and the Health and Safety Executive. The sooner we can reach a stage at which the final reports have been submitted and the Secretary of State is in a position to decide on whether there should be an inquiry or whether other avenues should be explored, the better.
It is almost a cliché now, but I entirely understand that for many of the people involved, what is required is closure.
§ Question put and agreed to.
§ Adjourned accordingly at one minute to Eight o'clock.