HC Deb 08 July 2004 vol 423 cc1100-8

Motion made, and Question proposed, That this House do now adjourn.—[Mr. Jim Murphy.]

5.47 pm
Sir John Stanley (Tonbridge and Malling) (Con)

From the world of intelligence, I turn to the even more crucial issue of rail safety at the Medhurst Row rail level crossing in my constituency, outside Edenbridge. The level crossing is not lightly used, because it crosses a twin-track, cross-country railway line, which is the mainline from Tonbridge to Redhill. The line carries a substantial amount of passenger traffic and is one of the freight routes to the channel tunnel.

Serious safety concerns have been expressed about the level crossing for a number of years, and my constituent, Mr. Roger Kennedy, wrote to me on 4 September last year: I have been given permission five times in the last seven years to cross in front of oncoming trains. Last year after a meeting at this crossing with your chief safety officer at Ashford, we were all told that it would never happen again, within two weeks my neighbour was given permission to cross and was confronted by an oncoming train. Recently a friend, whilst trying to cross, had to tell the signalman twice that he thought he heard a train before the signalman realised there was a train approaching the crossing. Three months ago our gardener gained permission to cross, then crossed the line, rang back to say the gates were closed, only to find a train going through the crossing. This train must have been on his section of line when he crossed. The incident was caught on camera and Mr. Hamneill was told at Ashford, but we doubt if anything was done, because only three weeks ago the same fate befell our postman, he again was given permission to cross in front of an oncoming train. That letter was addressed to Network Rail, and a copy was sent to me.

I raise the issue today because of a further serious incident on 3 March this year. That involved the eldest son of my constituent, Mr. Roger Kennedy—Mr. Alex Stedall. He, too, was certain that he had been given permission to cross and found himself crossing in front of an oncoming train.

Before I come to the incident on 3 March, it might be helpful to the House and to the Minister if I explained the crossing procedure. Before initiating the debate, I went to the crossing and went through the full crossing procedure personally. Unlike a normal level crossing, the Medhurst Row crossing is a so-called private crossing, of which there are about 5,400 in total. It can be used by any member of the public on foot, because it is a public right of way, but those who wish to use their vehicles can do so only if they are authorised to cross at that particular crossing.

The crossing is not like a conventional rail crossing where the gates are normally closed across the railway line and open to the traffic, shut against the traffic when a train goes past, then reopened to the traffic and closed again across the line. In the case of the Medhurst Row crossing—and, I suspect, many other private crossings—the position is reversed. In normal circumstances, the gates are open at all times to trains going up and down the line, and closed across the road. When a train goes past, the gates remain in the closed position across the road. If someone wants to take their car across, they turn the gates not across the railway line, but back across the road at right angles to the line. That means, in effect, that a train driver will never see the gates closed across his path, even though the gateway may be open to road traffic. That is a significant and dangerous feature of this particular type of crossing.

I shall describe the crossing procedure for somebody who wants to make the crossing by car. They go to the telephone beside the closed gate, pick up the telephone to contact the member of staff in the Ashford signal box, and ask for permission to cross. If permission is granted, they open the gate that is nearest to them, folding it back away from the railway line, cross on foot over the active railway line, go to the far gate, and open it. They cross back over the railway line a second time, on foot. They get into their car. They make a third crossing, in their car, over the active railway line. They get out of their car. They make a fourth crossing back on foot over the railway line, close what is now the far gate, and make a fifth crossing back over the active railway line to close what is now the near gate. They go to the telephone, ring the Ashford signal box, as required, and report that they have made the crossing and closed both gates.

The procedure involves no fewer than five crossings of an active railway line—four on foot and one by car. For those who are used to it, it takes a minimum of two and a half minutes. I imagine that it would take considerably longer for someone who was not familiar with it. It was a challenging experience to make five crossings of an active, twin-track railway line when I did it in broad daylight on a summer day. I would not wish to have to perform that procedure at night or in foggy or misty conditions.

My constituents who live in the specific area that we are considering have no alternative route for reaching the main road system. The only way is to go down the private road and use the Medhurst Row railway crossing. There is no other option when they go to work, take the children to school and so on.

Let us consider the incident that took place on 3 March. This morning in the Palace, with the assistance of Network Rail and the rail safety inspectorate in the Health and Safety Executive, I was able to look at the closed circuit television evidence of what happened. I was also able to listen to the available transcript of the telephone conversation between Mr. Alex Stedall and the Ashford signal box.

At approximately 7.50 am on 3 March, Mr. Alex Stedall, the eldest son of my constituent Mr. Roger Kennedy, drove to the Medhurst Row crossing on his way to work. He lifted the phone and asked whether it was safe to cross. He was given permission to cross and, in the normal way, was told by the Ashford signal box to call back when he had crossed to confirm that he had shut both gates. He opened the near gate, got on the line, mercifully looked and saw the Edenbridge to Tonbridge school train bearing down on him. He got off the line, shut the gate and, a few seconds later, saw the train go past. Clearly, a fatal accident had been averted—just.

The risk of fatality is not merely to those who use the crossing. The Minister well knows the sadly documented fact that when a train hits a vehicle, it can be derailed, with the risk of loss of life or injury to those on the train as well as those on the crossing. For the Kennedy family, there was the potential for an appalling tragedy at that moment on 3 March, because Mr. Kennedy's two younger sons were on the Edenbridge to Tonbridge school train when their elder brother came close to being hit and almost certainly killed by it on the Medhurst Row crossing.

The incident has been the subject of considerable investigation and I have been involved in presenting additional evidence to Network Rail and the Health and Safety Executive. After seeing the CCTV evidence and listening to the tape recordings, I find some worrying aspects to the adequacy of the crucial safety monitoring equipment.

It being Six o'clock, the motion for the Adjournment of the House lapsed, without Question put.

Motion made, and Question proposed, That this House do now adjourn.—[Jim Fitzpatrick.]

Sir John Stanley

First, the tape recording is incomplete; there is at least one crucial sentence missing. Secondly, the closed-circuit television evidence is unsatisfactory because the cameras are activated only by vehicle movements, not by pedestrian movements. There is therefore no CCTV evidence of Mr. Stedall walking to the telephone. There is only evidence of him when he comes close to moving his vehicle. So there is a lack of completeness there, too.

The third area of concern is that, on the data that I have seen, there appears to be a material degree of time mis-match between the CCTV material and the timings on the tape-recorded material. This could be a consequence of computer software, but the Minister will understand that if it is not possible to rely on identical timings on the CCTV and the tape recording, it is very difficult to be certain about the time relationship between a particular telephone conversation and the passage of a particular train. Some serious questions have been raised in my mind as to the adequacy of this monitoring equipment, and I think that that will be a matter of concern for the Minister. I hope that it will also be a matter of concern for the Health and Safety Executive.

I turn now to the main parties that have been involved in the investigation so far. My constituent, Mr. Alex Stedall, is in no doubt whatever that he sought permission to cross, using the telephone in the normal way, that he was given that permission, and that when he got on to the line, he faced an oncoming train. I have put all the evidence that my constituents have put to me to the chief executive of Network Rail, Mr. John Armitt, who wrote to me on 27 May as follows: Our conclusions, again shared with HMRI, are that the evidence leads us to believe that no technical or operating failure on behalf of Network Rail occurred. I have also pursued this issue with the director of rail safety at the Health and Safety Executive, Mr. Allan Sefton, who wrote to me in May to say: I am advised that there is no reason to doubt the thoroughness of Network Rail's investigation. I subsequently received a letter on 25 June, contrasting with those two views, from the deputy director general of the Health and Safety Executive, Mr. Justin McCracken, in which he states: Network Rail's report does contain a recording of a user of the crossing (who is believed to be Mr Kennedy's son) asking for permission to cross the line and permission being granted. That would indeed suggest that there was a serious failure; whether it was of a human nature or of equipment I have no means of knowing. However, that is a significant comment by Mr. McCracken.

Having viewed the CCTV evidence this morning, I believe that it is incontrovertible—this was not denied by the Network Rail people who were there, or the HSE people who were there—that it clearly showed Mr. Stedall opening the gate, going on to the line, going back behind the gate, shutting it, and the train going past a few seconds later. Again, that would seem to me to be clear evidence that he was given permission to cross in front of an oncoming train.

It is not surprising that Mr. Roger Kennedy has been concerned as to whether there has been an element of cover-up by Network Rail. He has made that allegation, and he has contacted the British Transport police. I have put his allegations to the chief constable of the British Transport police, Mr. Ian Johnston, who said to me in his letter of 28 June: I have asked Acting Detective Chief Superintendent Mark Smith to address the points raised in your correspondence. I have also asked him to review the case to ascertain whether the allegation of a 'cover up' should be the matter of investigation by BTP. Whatever the outcome of the current investigations that are still continuing, by Network Rail, the Health and Safety Executive and British Transport police, into the incident on 3 March, I am in no doubt that the present situation at the Medhurst Row rail crossing presents an unacceptable degree of risk, both to those crossing and to passengers on the trains involved, should there be a collision with a vehicle. This is a crossing that has no automatic gates, and no automatic warning lights when a train is approaching. Those using the crossing are totally dependent for their safety on there not being human error at the Ashford signal box, and there not being equipment failure. In life, human errors occur, and equipment failures occur. If either of those should happen, those using the crossing have only one protection: what those in the armed forces are inclined to call the mark one eyeball. That is the only protection available, and it probably saved the life of Mr. Alex Stedall on 3 March.

The mark one eyeball has its limitations: it is not much use at night, it is not much use in fog, and it is not much use in mist. My conclusion from all the material that I have seen so far is that, as it stands, the Medhurst Row railway crossing is a fatal accident waiting to happen, possibly involving multiple fatalities. I hope that when the Minister replies, he will tell me what he will do to try to prevent such a tragedy occurring.

6.8 pm

The Minister of State, Department for Transport (Dr. Kim Howells)

I congratulate the right hon. Member for Tonbridge and Malling (Sir John Stanley) on securing this debate. He has raised an issue that is clearly of great concern to him and to his constituents, and which should properly be the concern of anyone who wants to see safety enhanced on and around the railways. He described for us with great clarity reports of a serious incident, which have concerned him a great deal. Were I in his place, I would do exactly the same. It has given me the opportunity to try to reassure him that we are determined to ensure that the country's rail network is operated safely, whether at the Medhurst Row crossing in Edenbridge, or in any other part of the country.

There are more than 8,000 level crossings operated by Network Rail. Had the right hon. Gentleman not initiated the debate, I should not have known that. It is an incredible number of level crossings. Just 1,500 are public vehicular crossings, and 5,400 are private vehicular crossings. The remainder are public footpaths.

Public crossings are found where a public right of way crosses the railway, for instance a public road or footpath. The rail operator has a legal responsibility to ensure safe operation, and Network Rail risk assessors look at all level crossings and try to provide appropriate protection, as we would expect them to. Private crossings are provided by Network Rail for authorised users only—typically, occupiers of adjacent land like the right hon. Gentleman's constituents—who need to cross the line to gain access to their property. Network Rail provides briefings for authorised users on the procedures to be followed, and users are responsible for ensuring that crossings are used safely—in particular by following the procedures advised by Network Rail, and obeying the instructions displayed in crossing signs at each location. The right hon. Gentleman helpfully described in some detail what that entails at the Medhurst Row crossing.

Network Rail published a level crossings strategy in 2003, designed to reduce risks associated with level crossings through—among other things—effective operation and maintenance, a programme of risk assessment leading to risk reduction, and communication with users and external stakeholders to promote safe usage. As the right hon. Gentleman said, the Health and Safety Executive investigates serious incidents on both public and private level crossings, and keeps the safety standards under review. It can require action to improve protective arrangements at level crossings, depending on changes in the level or frequency of risk. It works closely with Network Rail, the Rail Safety and Standards Board and the British Transport police to increase road users' awareness of the risk of misuse at level crossings. I am very glad that the right hon. Gentleman had an opportunity to meet Network Rail and HSE representatives to discuss that problem.

The Medhurst Row crossing is a private crossing restricted to authorised users, namely the occupants of four houses and a farm who need to use it to gain access to their properties. As the right hon. Gentleman said, users in vehicles must telephone the signaller at Ashford to confirm that it is safe to cross. I understand that Railtrack, as it was then—it is now Network Rail—wrote to all users in July 2000 to remind them of the procedures, and that Network Rail sent a further reminder in 2003.

Let me deal specifically with Mr. Kennedy's complaints. These are serious allegations. I want to reassure the right hon. Gentleman that all the complaints made to the HSE have been thoroughly investigated by it or by Railtrack. I understand that Mr. Kennedy first raised the matter with the HSE in November 2000, complaining that the crossing was unsafe and that he and his family had been given permission to cross in front of oncoming trains. That is about as serious an allegation concerning a crossing as it is possible to make.

There were two earlier incidents, in 1994 and 1998. Mr. Kennedy had been given permission to cross when trains had been on that section of line. Both incidents were dealt with internally by Railtrack at the time. In the case of the latter incident, disciplinary action was taken against the signaller.

The HSE investigated Mr. Kennedy's allegations, along with Railtrack representatives, and met him on the site in January 2001. It asked Railtrack to carry out improvements to the crossing, to re-brief signallers on the correct procedures—a very important move—and to carry out spot-checks, all of which were done. The HSE wrote to Mr. Kennedy about that at that time.

Mr. Kennedy subsequently wrote to the HSE on eight further occasions between January and June 2001, making allegations of three further incidents of permission being given to cross in front of trains. In one case, on 27 January 2001, Railtrack found that the signaller had made a mistake, and it took disciplinary action. In the other cases, investigations failed to provide evidence to substantiate the allegations, and Mr. Kennedy was informed accordingly. Nevertheless, the HSE again reviewed the working of the crossing with Railtrack on 1 June 2001. Mr. Kennedy was invited to this meeting, but did not attend. Written correspondence to Mr. Kennedy seeking his version of events was returned by Royal Mail as "being refused". Further improvements were recommended, including the installation of CCTV, which was put in place in 2002.

The right hon. Gentleman said that Mr. Kennedy's son alleged that he was given permission to cross and was confronted by a train. Network Rail held an internal investigation and the report was passed to the HSE. It shows that Network Rail considered various forms of independent evidence available to it to establish what happened. As the right hon. Gentleman told us, that included tape recordings, CCTV and train monitoring systems, as well as speaking to the staff concerned. Network Rail concluded, on the evidence available, that permission to cross the line was given after two trains that had been approaching had passed. The HSE has reviewed Network Rail's report, and I understand that it has no reason to doubt its conclusions. It has informed the right hon. Gentleman and Mr. Kennedy accordingly.

I am very glad to hear that the right hon. Gentleman met representatives of the HSE and Network Rail today to review the evidence relating to the latest incident. He has told us of doubts concerning some of the detail of the recordings that he has seen and heard. I undertake to contact Network Rail and the HSE, and to seek from them specific answers to the questions that he has raised as a result of this morning's meeting.

Sir John Stanley

I am grateful to the Minister for giving that undertaking. I am well aware that Network Rail has taken the view that Mr. Kennedy's son, Mr. Alex Stedall, made the telephone call after the train had passed. There was another train, which had gone past. I myself have seen this morning the closed circuit television videotape. It shows incontrovertible evidence, which was not denied by the Network Rail and HSE representatives present. It shows Mr. Stedall—who was identified by his father and by himself, so there is no doubt about identification—opening the gate, going on to the line, looking, going quickly back and closing the gate, and the train then going past. There is no question whatever but that Mr. Stedall saw the train approaching him. The videotape evidence shows that he went back and closed the gate, and that the train then went past.

Dr. Howells

I thank the right hon. Gentleman for that intervention. I shall certainly communicate his description of what he saw on the CCTV footage, and I will ask for answers that I hope will be useful to him.

Of course, one has always to try to place trust in the experts, and there is no doubt that the rail inspectorate has great experience in such matters. We have one of the very finest safety records in the world. Indeed, I was fortunate enough recently to visit Japan, where level crossings pose the biggest problem in terms of railways incidents. Level crossings pose difficult problems—and I am not talking about only private ones, or ones where special permissions have to be sought and granted, but public level crossings when people do idiotic things.

I want to know exactly what happened at this incident and I will certainly try to find out for the right hon. Gentleman. I want to reassure him that the necessary measures are being taken across the country. It is important that all our colleagues understand that because most of us have level crossings in our constituencies and we need to be aware of the fact that the HSE and Network Rail are concerned to ensure that we have safe level crossings.

I understand that further improvements to this particular level crossing using existing technology are unlikely to be cost-effective in relation to the level of risk in usage. I hate to be so utilitarian in saying that, as I am not insensitive to the risk in the light of what the right hon. Gentleman has told us about what happened to Mr. Kennedy's son.

I take the point, which the right hon. Gentleman has made vividly, that we are not talking about only one or two people on the level crossing who might be injured: if a vehicle is on the crossing, it could endanger the train itself. That is an important point, and we saw a terrible accident recently on the Worcester line, which resulted in deaths. That accident was the consequence of the misuse of a level crossing. There are thousands of level crossings and one wonders how much it would cost to ensure that every single one of them was protected by much safer mechanical devices and procedures than we have at the moment. We have to look further into that matter.

I understand that the cost of installing miniature warning lights at this particular crossing has been estimated at £800,000. The right hon. Gentleman raises his eyebrows, as I did when I read that. I will certainly try to test that figure and see if it is true, but there are an awful lot of crossings up and down the country just like that one. If the cost of installing that sort of equipment at each of those crossings runs at about £800,000, one wonders how any Government or any rail company—it is a privatised railway these days—could afford to do such a thing. As I said, I will certainly test the figure for him.

Automatic barriers would be even more costly and I fear would probably be regarded by the auditors of this place as being wholly inappropriate, given the relatively small number of households served by the particular level crossing. However, Network Rail and the HSE are aware of the new developments of standalone warning-light systems driven by existing track circuiting, which could be cost-effective. We will take a look at that one. Trials are planned and, if successful, it may prove to be a better solution to the problem of level crossings.

I do not want to give the right hon. Gentleman too bleak a picture in responding to the problem. There are certainly some interesting technological developments nowadays. I will examine them and I hope that we may be able to apply such solutions to such crossings. On the other hand, I do not want to give the right hon. Gentleman any false hope about what will be done at this crossing, as I am not even sure that it is appropriate or whether the technology will prove to be successful on British railways.

I am very grateful to the right hon. Gentleman for raising this issue. I want to reassure him that the HSE and Network Rail are committed to ensuring the safe operation of all level crossings, especially the one about which the right hon. Gentleman has expressed considerable concern. I will ask the HSE and Network Rail for their response to the issues that the right hon. Gentleman has raised so that I can satisfy myself that the crossing does not constitute, as he put it, an accident waiting to happen.

Question put and agreed to.

Adjourned accordingly at twenty-five minutes past Six o'clock.