HC Deb 11 July 2001 vol 371 cc862-90

Further considered.

Mr. Wilkinson

I beg to move amendment No. 40, in page 1, line 9, after "(i)", insert— 'Article 1 (other than paragraph 1),'.

The Second Deputy Chairman of Ways and Means (Sir Michael Lord)

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following amendments: No. 41, in page 1, line 9, after "(i)", insert— 'Article 1 (other than paragraph 2),'. No. 42, in page 1, line 9, after "(i)", insert— 'Article 1 (other than paragraph 3),'. No. 43, in page 1, line 9, after "(i)", insert— 'Article 1 (other than paragraph 4),'. No. 44, in page 1, line 9, after "(i)", insert— 'Article 1 (other than paragraph 5),'. No. 45, in page 1, line 9, after "(i)", insert— 'Article 1 (other than paragraph 6),'. No. 46, in page 1, line 9, after "(i)", insert— 'Article 1 (other than paragraph 7),'. No. 47, in page 1, line 9, after "(i)", insert— 'Article 1 (other than paragraph 8),'. No. 48, in page 1, line 9, after "(i)", insert— 'Article 1 (other than paragraph 9).'. No. 53, in page 1, line 9, after "(i)", insert— 'Article 1 (other than paragraph 15),'. No. 78, in page 1, line 9, after "10", insert— 'other than Article 2, paragraph 47'. No. 29, in page 1, line 12, after "occasion", insert— 'except for Article 3, paragraph 1(b) of the Protocol on the Enlargement of the European Union in so far as that relates to the appointment of a special representative in the area of common foreign and security policy'. New clause 1—Special representative in the area of common foreign and security policy— 'In relation to Article 1, paragraph 3 of the Treaty of Nice, amending Article 23(2) TEU, prior to a vote in the Council on the appointment of a special representative in the area of common foreign and security policy, Her Majesty's Government shall lay a report before Parliament setting out its preferred candidate for the post and shall lay a further report after the Council meeting if that candidate has not been adopted.'. New clause 2—International agreements under Article 24 TEU— 'In relation to Article 1, paragraph 4 of the Treaty of Nice, amending Article 24 TEU, prior to casting a vote in the Council on any such international agreement, Her Majesty's Government shall lay before Parliament a report setting out the implications for the United Kingdom of such an agreement.'. New clause 7—Western European Union and North Atlantic Treaty Organisation— 'This Act will not come into effect until Her Majesty's Government has laid before Parliament a report showing the implications for the Western European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, for the future functioning of these organisations, and for the United Kingdom's role therein, of Article 1, paragraph 2 of the Nice Treaty, revising Article 17 TEU, and Article 1, paragraph 5 of the Nice treaty, revising Article 25 TEU.'. New clause 8—Adoption of decisions under Article 17, paragraph 1, TEU— 'For the purpose of Article 17, paragraph 1 of the Treaty on European Union, as amended by Article 1, paragraph 2 of the Treaty of Nice, the constitutional requirement of the United Kingdom before any decision under that paragraph (common defence) may be adopted by the United Kingdom shall be that the decision shall have been approved by an Act of Parliament.'. New clause 33—Eurojust— 'This Act shall not come into force until Her Majesty's Government has obtained, and laid before Parliament, legal advice from the Attorney General on the effect on the criminal and judicial processes in the United Kingdom of Article 1, paragraph 8 of the Nice Treaty, revising Article 31 TEU, as they relate to the provisions on Eurojust.'.

Mr. Wilkinson

I speak in support of new clause 7 in particular, which is of great significance. Under the treaty of Nice nearly all the functions of Western European Union, as laid down in the treaty of Brussels and modified by the Paris protocols of 1954, are taken over by the European Union. Only two remain, and to some extent there is a third, residual, function as well. The first is the mutual defence obligation under article 5 of the treaty of Brussels. The second is the existence of the Assembly of Western European Union, which sits in Paris and of which I have had the honour to be a member for some twelve and a half years. The third is the residual function relating to armaments co-operation— the supervision of the West European Armaments Group.

Article 5 of the Brussels treaty is the fundament and heart of European defence. It is the mutual security guarantee among the European members of the alliance to come to the defence of a member state if it is subject to aggression. It is an explicit, clear and total guarantee. It is a commitment to mutual defence, and nothing less. Interestingly, article 5 of the Washington treaty commits the signatories to consult in order to take appropriate action, or words to that effect, but article 5 of the Brussels treaty is firmer even than the Washington treaty in the obligations that it places on member states. I am pleased that this function, which is regarded as residual by European Union policy makers, is retained as Western European Union's raison d'être in its remaining form.

8.15 pm

The Parliamentary Assembly of Western European Union is an invaluable body. It is a forward-looking institution that has produced countless reports, often well ahead of their time. It brings together representatives of no fewer than 28 states, which is significant because it bridges the gap between the European Union and the wider Europe. The security of our continent has to be considered in that wider context.

The aim of the treaty of Nice is to narrow European security and defence to member countries of the European Union. When a crisis emerges, they have an obligation to consult on what response should be taken. Of course, they voluntarily commit themselves to inviting other members of the alliance into the consultation procedure, but those countries are not part of the decision-making process to the same extent as the EU member states. European NATO countries such as Norway and Turkey and others that have more recently joined the alliance, such as the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary, are therefore second-class citizens within the security apparatus of their own continent. It is a particularly grotesque fact that Norway and Turkey, which were literally in the front line against the former Soviet Union during the cold war inasmuch as they shared a boundary with the Soviet Union, should be deemed in any way to have a lesser share in decision making about the security of our continent.

We would do well to bear in mind the fact that, apart from the virulent and dangerous phenomenon of terrorism from ETA in Spain and the Irish Republican Army and loyalist paramilitaries in Northern Ireland, there is no immediate security threat within the EU itself. There are, however, grave developments of major consequence to the security of our continent of which we are all too well aware in parts of Europe that lie outside the EU. This is especially true in the Balkans, with the threat of civil war in Macedonia and the difficulties of maintaining an uneasy peace in Kosovo and of retaining a presence of peacekeeping troops in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The non-EU countries have just as great an interest in the security of our continent as do the EU nations.

It is a thoroughly retrograde step to arrogate to the European Union a more exclusive right to a premier role in European security. Indeed, it is a somewhat perverse arrogation of duty to the EU nations, inasmuch as many of them are neutral states which throughout the long period of the cold war deliberately eschewed membership of NATO and of WEU. Furthermore, we are reminded of the implications of this fact by the outcome of the Irish referendum, which came about to some degree because a significant number of Irish electors believed that by virtue of the treaty of Nice they were giving away their treasured neutral status and that Irish forces might find themselves under British or NATO command. That was anathema to a significant minority of voters in Ireland who, with other strands of opinion, came together to form the majority who voted down the treaty of Nice.

I urge Her Majesty's Government to think long and hard and to recognise the implications. Our Turkish friends, who are in a pivotal strategic situation, feel especially disadvantaged. It is from Turkish bases that British and other allied aircraft fly missions over northern Iraq under the policy of restraining Saddam Hussein in the no-fly zones. It is the Turks who, as the bridge between Asia and Europe, are vital in the Balkans. It is also the Turks who. with their perspective to the Caucasus and other zones of conflict and threat, are especially interested in those areas. To give the Turks a lesser status in decision making over European security, which is inherent in the Nice proposals, is anathema to the Turkish Government and they have not been able to acquiesce in that initiative.

Dr. Nick Palmer (Broxtowe)

In view of the hon. Gentleman's comments on Turkey. I am sure that he is aware of Turkey's ambition to join the European Union. If it did so, presumably that objection would fall away. The reason that it is not altogether welcome at this stage has to do with the activities of the Turkish army, to which he refers so favourably. Does he feel that the development would be desirable?

Mr. Wilkinson

There have always been difficulties in the body politic in Turkey. Wise commentators understand that. However, the interests of mutual security transcend those difficulties, do they not? It was on Turkish soil that NATO felt it necessary to deploy Jupiter ballistic missiles against the Soviet Union in the 1950s. Turkish troops were shoulder to shoulder with our forces and other allied troops maintaining the freedom of South Korea during the Korean war. We would be foolish to be as critical as the hon. Gentleman of internal affairs in Turkey to the extent of allowing that critical frame of mind to prejudice our appreciation of the security value which Turkey contributes to the continent of Europe.

Mr. Spring

My hon. Friend always sets out his case clearly. He will know of the genuine anxieties in Turkey about the proposed new European defence arrangements. In the view of many Turkish commentators, the arrangements may cause the dismemberment of NATO and possibly the ultimate withdrawal of United States forces from Europe. Given Turkey's difficult geographical position, that is why the Turks are concerned. That is why we should express considerable support for Turkey's anxieties at this stage, as we consider the future of the European defence effort under the proposals emanating from Nice.

Mr. Wilkinson

How right, as ever, is my hon. Friend, but I must address the point made by the hon. Member for Broxtowe (Dr. Palmer), which I did not answer in full. Turkey may be knocking on the door of the European Union, but we should consider how long other European countries have waited—applicant nations supposedly in the forefront of eligibility for entry. They started knocking at the door at the beginning of the previous decade. They are still not yet inside the EU house. We do not know exactly when they will come in, and the Turks' admission may be postponed sine die. I can imagine all kinds of barrier being put in their way—especially the kind described by the hon. Gentleman relating to Turkish domestic politics and so on. That is not to take on board subtler and more implicit objections relating to Turkey's predominant Muslim faith, although it is of course a strictly secular nation.

Let us not say, "Turkey may participate fully when it is a member of the European Union", because it may be an unconscionable time a-coming, and in the intervening years all sorts of crises may emerge which will necessarily involve Turkey and should involve it as a full front-line partner in the decision-making process. I say that advisedly, because what nation would wish its troops to be deployed in situations which may evolve into combat when it is not involved in decisions on those deployments from the outset?

The question is crucial to the NATO context too, is it not, Mr. Lord? Under the proposals of the European security and defence initiative, the Europeans are to make good the deficiencies in their own capabilities. We all know about the headline goals that are supposed to be met by the year 2003 to allow 60,000 troops to be deployed in two months, with an armada of naval vessels and a panoply of air power over the top, but crucial capabilities will still depend on the United States: heavy lift, strategic reconnaissance, intelligence, smart munitions for all-weather operation and much else besides. Many of those capabilities will require the employment of US service personnel, because no one else has the training to operate the equipment concerned. What Congress of the United States will allow its personnel to be deployed in support of a European operation of which it is inherently critical? We are told that the Europeans will go it alone only if the Americans feel that they should not, or will not, take part; so there is an inherent veto from the United States from the outset over those key capabilities that are necessary to the success of any operation.

8.30 pm

Let us not delude ourselves about the Petersberg tasks. We all know that it is the small conflagrations—the situations which we suppose we can solve with a brush-fire type operation of peacekeeping and containment—that smoulder and ignite into a major conflagration, which involves the deployment of large numbers of forces with supporting services. That is what has happened in the Balkan wars until now, and we cannot assume that things will be different in future.

We cannot assume that the concept of the Petersberg tasks—of providing the inventory of capabilities and the complement of units up to the 60,000—will be confined to the limited operations for which the Labour spokesmen, the drafters of the Nice treaty, designed it.

Mr. Cash

I am much persuaded by my hon. Friend's arguments. Does he accept that it is impossible to sustain the distinction between peacemaking under the present arrangements in the treaties of Amsterdam and Nice and the previous understanding of Petersberg tasks? Under Petersberg tasks, stealth bombs and smart bombs were used, and there was a full-scale war in the Balkans. It is unworkable for this matter to be dealt with using vague wording. It is obviously a movement towards a European army and all the support services, as my hon. Friend said.

It is also deeply worrying to discover, by tracing through the complicated procedures described, that qualified majority voting is involved. It is absolutely impossible to imagine that anyone would have any proper command and control system in such circumstances.

Mr. Wilkinson

My hon. Friend is very wise. I shall not take up all the points that he makes. Suffice it to say that I find one feature particularly perplexing and deeply worrying. I cannot comprehend what benefit is construed from the duplication of military and political staffs between NATO and the European Union. Those who manage a crisis want one clear chain of command and, above all, one set of analysts and one set of staff specialists; otherwise, there will be two interpretations of the crisis as it develops, one by NATO staffs and one by the European Union staffs, and who will know which should predominate? There will be bitter conflicts between the two.

I am reading the late Robert Rhodes James's book on the Gallipoli campaign, which describes the confusion between the military staffs under Hamilton and the naval staffs under De Robeck. What did we then get in the Balkans? The biggest allied tragedy in joint operations that occurred in the 20th century, even allowing for Dieppe. There is a serious possibility of delay, confusion and even conflict and recrimination between the two sets of military political staffs—those in NATO and those in the European Union. I do not see how the cause of European security will be advanced thereby.

Mr. Menzies Campbell

I do not always agree with the hon. Gentleman, but I certainly recognise his expertise in this field, based as it is on much practical experience. Is it not clear that there is increasing reluctance on Capitol Hill to commit American forces on the ground in Europe? If such is to be the future attitude of the House of Representatives and the Senate, does it not make sense for the Europeans to have a capability to deal with issues such as those in Kosovo or other parts of the Balkans, in circumstances where we know that we cannot automatically expect the Americans to come to Europe?

Mr. Wilkinson

Of course I agree with the right hon. and learned Gentleman. There is no need to create such a European Union architecture for the evolution of an autonomous security and defence policy just to achieve the goals that we all know need to be met.

As with NATO, the Western European Union's great strength is that it is a free association of sovereign, independent states, which for their common good came together to work for their mutual security. This approach will not exist in the EU because there is a political dynamic and a political objective to create a European army, to use the expression of my hon. Friend the Member for Stone (Mr. Cash).

That policy involves a capability for autonomous action on the part of the EU, per se, as an embryonic state, ultimately to give it the characteristics of a fully fledged state. The EU has much of the other apparatus, but it has not yet been fully put in place. Let the Europeans do their best to build up their capability, but they do not need to abolish most of the functions of WEU and subsume them within the EU and to create an architecture that competes with NATO.

It is noteworthy, Sir Michael—forgive me for downgrading you most unworthily and inappropriately in the nomenclature which I used earlier—that one of the noblest features of the modernisation and transformation of NATO has been the partnership for peace programme, whereby the countries of central and eastern Europe, which were formerly our adversaries, have been taken into the bosom of the western defence community in NATO and helped to bring their armed forces under civilian, democratic control, thus learning how to work under democratic Governments, how to harmonise their procedures and operational methods with those of the NATO alliance and how to exercise together, breaking down barriers and becoming all part of one happy family.

That has worked very well, but the EU's objective is just the opposite; it is to keep at arm's length and to exclude to some degree those who are not members of this sacred union, which is acquiring a political dimension and capability for autonomous defence action. This is thoroughly retrograde. It is recreating divisions which we hoped had ceased to exist in our continent, with the ending of the cold war and the dismantlement of the Berlin wall. So new clause 7 is entirely wise. A report on all those implications should be put before Parliament, but of course we have had nothing of the kind and I think that thoroughly remiss.

In conclusion, I shall argue this final point: there is much talk about how democratic scrutiny of European defence will be maintained on a transnational basis. In the current review of whether the European Parliament should assume that function, whether a new assembly should be created or whether we should use the Parliamentary Assembly of the Western European Union, I urge that we use the Assembly. I say that not because I am particularly parti pris but because the WEU Assembly actually works well, and it does so because of its wide membership. All the countries—whether EU nations, NATO nations outside the EU, or countries from further east whose representatives work alongside us—are essentially on one footing. Our Parliament has the right to question Defence Ministers and an obligation to vote funds for defence. Other Parliaments have the ability to modify defence budgets, and it is from the ranks of national parliamentarians that national Defence Ministers are drawn.

The European Parliament, by contrast, is déraciné—it does not have the same roots or legitimacy; it does not even have the same treaty competence. I cannot comprehend why we should arrogate the oversight function to an Assembly which is more remote from the peoples of western Europe. We risk creating a hybrid entity with no clear mandate or treaty responsibility, which the Parliamentary Assembly of the Western European Union has. Whatever the outcome of the debate on European security and defence, I hope that we will maintain transnational democratic parliamentary scrutiny, as provided by WEU.

Dr. Palmer

I want to respond to some of the comments made by the hon. Member for Ruislip-Northwood (Mr. Wilkinson). I agree that it is probably correct that the European force is unlikely to take a controversial role without the consent of the United States. He referred to a veto, although I am not sure that I would express it like that. However, a major commitment in the real world, even under the Petersberg tasks, is unlikely to be carried out in the teeth of opposition from Washington.

Involvement is much more likely if the United States decides, for whatever reason, that it does not want to commit ground forces but has no objection to—perhaps even welcomes—an active European commitment. I respect the hon. Gentleman's historical view and think that he will agree that for many years, since the first world war, Congress has been sceptical about the willingness of European countries to put their troops where their mouths are and commit themselves to concrete engagements instead of relying on US troops to rush over and bail us out when we have a problem. Many members of Congress would have put it that brutally. Although opinions vary in the US just as they do here, a few people on both sides of Congress welcome the prospect of the Europeans taking seriously the job of pursuing peacekeeping and other Petersberg tasks independently, in consultation with our American allies.

We are all aware that the debate on security is a proxy for the broader debate on the direction of the EU. It would be illusory to suggest that the hon. Gentleman is not partly motivated in his criticism by his aversion to the idea that the EU might move beyond what it already is and begin to resemble a joint state or entity.

8.45 pm

If we have a common foreign and security policy, it is difficult to argue that we should have no capability to implement even the smallest, most peaceful activity that comes under that heading under our own steam. I assume that the hon. Gentleman would argue that a common foreign and security policy is essentially wrong-headed and that we do not need the EU to develop such a policy. I do not want to put words in his mouth, but I think that he would regard that as a dangerous development. The debate in which we are currently engaged is inextricably linked to the question of whether we favour the whole concept of a common foreign and security policy.

If we were to reject such a policy, it would be logical to reject the provision before us and to welcome new clause 7. However, to do that would be to reject the serious commitment of the EU to maintain peace on our borders. I appeal to hon. Members' sense of history. The history of Europe does not support the idea that it is sensible for western European countries not to take an active interest in events on the fringes—an interest that extends to having a joint foreign and security policy that affects how they behave, and includes a willingness to commit forces to reinforce the peaceful objectives of that policy.

Mr. Julian Brazier (Canterbury)

The Opposition entirely endorse the very striking point that the hon. Gentleman has just made, but it does not follow that we need a separate structure to achieve those ends. There is a danger. How do we avoid becoming sucked into an effort for which we do not have the capability through a structure that was not designed for the purpose?

Dr. Palmer

That is a reasonable point: we must be careful not to become involved in a peacekeeping operation that develops into a war-fighting operation when we do not have the infrastructure to support such an action. That challenge will be faced by the EU as it develops its new capability. However, with respect, one cannot have it both ways: if we want significant war-fighting operations to be reserved for NATO, as most hon. Members on both sides of the House do, we cannot escape the fact that we will have to draw the line somewhere and acknowledge that certain operations are beyond our capability.

Mr. Hendrick

Given the problems that developed in Bosnia and subsequently in Kosovo, does my hon. Friend agree that it is important that we have a rapid reaction force that can act quickly? Such a force is not a European army: it will not be a standing army, but one that comprises volunteer forces from member states, so it cannot be considered a Euro-army, as the Opposition argue. Does he also agree that, with only a handful of staff based in Brussels, the WEU hardly has the administrative power or clout needed to do what must be done by the EU, given the EU's political clout and the structures that already exist within Europe?

Dr. Palmer

I am grateful for all those points. The more we can define the rapid reaction force's precise role and objectives in our debate and the broader debate across Europe, the more effective it will be. I accept the point made by several hon. Members that it is necessary to attempt a precise definition; otherwise, in practice, we will have problems in the grey areas. However, that does not mean that we should not make the attempt; we must do so because, as my hon. Friend said, the force is essential for the security of the EU.

Dr. Julian Lewis (New Forest, East)

The hon. Gentleman is typically generous in giving way. He got to the nub of the problem when he talked about reserving serious war fighting for NATO and confining the work of the EU force to crisis management. The flaw at the heart of that argument is that there is no way of having such a fire break. The major wars that have been fought in history have, as often as not—indeed, more often than not—started when attempts at crisis management spiralled out of control. Creating a structure outside NATO reopens the deadly prospect of war breaking out in Europe without the Americans being involved from the outset. That is the nub of the problem and the cancer at the heart of the project.

Dr. Palmer

I am afraid that I do not agree, as the position is the reverse. There are a number of serious situations, such as the recent conflict in the Balkans, that go beyond the normal scope of diplomatic endeavours and cannot be tackled within the broader ambit of NATO, which would effectively require a full-blooded commitment from the United States. The USA is not willing to give that commitment routinely or intervene regularly in what it may see as every brush fire or little conflict in parts of Europe, so we need an alternative option. I accept that we must be careful not to get involved in something that is beyond the scope that we have set, but if we do not have that option at all, it is likely that serious situations will be allowed to get more serious because of the lack of a relatively limited response to deal with them. Recent history in Europe, notably in the Balkans, provides support for that belief.

Finally, in response once more to the hon. Member for Ruislip-Wilkinson—I am sorry, the hon. Gentleman and his constituency have become synonymous over the years, and I mean the hon. Member for Ruislip-Northwood—I listened with surprise to his belief that the WEU is less remote to the peoples of western Europe than is the European Parliament. I would have agreed if he had said that there is a problem with democracy and with people identifying with the institutions of the EU. We all recognise that there is a democratic deficit and limited interest in the European Parliament. As we know, the turnout for European elections does not even reach the dizzy heights that we achieved in the general election this year. However, I wonder what percentage of our constituents have ever heard of the WEU, let alone regard it as the less remote body that represents them on those issues.

Mr. Wilkinson

The hon. Gentleman is most courteous and indulgent. May I clarify the distinction? The membership of the WEU Assembly is drawn entirely from national parliamentarians, who sit on the defence and foreign affairs committees of their Parliaments and take part in all the defence debates, the procurement process and the voting of funds. It is from their ranks that national Defence Ministers are drawn. The European parliamentarians in Strasbourg or Brussels often do not even have proper constituencies and are seldom seen in them, let alone in their national Parliaments, lobbying or trying to influence events.

Dr. Palmer

The belief that democracy is best served by indirect representation through national parliamentarians is most strongly held by national parliamentarians. I do not believe that the man or woman in the street would consider that a particularly impressive way of representing his or her views at European level. The hon. Gentleman says that the European Parliament is not perfect, and I accept that.

I am using my freedom of the Back Benches to take a somewhat critical view of the WEU, which I am sure that my Front-Bench colleagues would not wish to do. The hon. Gentleman suggests in new clause 7 that the proposals could have grave consequences for the WEU. That is not necessarily the case, as long as the membership of the European Union is only a subset of the broad scope of nations across Europe. As long as that is the case, the WEU will provide a contact point for many countries that are not, for the next few years, likely to be members of the European Union. That is a healthy balance.

I am sure that the hon. Gentleman considers me a raving Europhile. I will not conceal from him my hope that there will come a time when the membership of the EU and the current membership of the WEU are not all that different. At that stage, we might reconsider the matter, but for now his fears do not seem to be justified.

Mr. Spring

Several issues are covered under this group of amendments, as the Nice treaty makes a number of changes to the treaty on European Union. I shall touch on just a few of those issues.

Amendment No. 40 concerns the so-called early warning mechanism agreed at Nice. Under the revised article 7 of the treaty on European Union, the treaty of Nice allows the EU to "address appropriate recommendations" to a country if there is a risk—I repeat, a risk—of a serious breach by a member state of the fundamental principles listed in article 6(1) of the treaty on European Union: liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law.

Does the Minister agree that that runs the risk of damaging and divisive interference in the internal affairs of member states, on the basis of mere speculation? Of course, as the House knows, under article 7 countries can already take action if there is a "serious and persistent breach" of those principles by a member state.

How exactly will the new provision work? It is no secret that it was formulated in response to recent events in Austria. Presumably, when they signed up to the article, Ministers had an idea when it might be used, so perhaps they will now tell us what the intention is. Would the provision have been exercised in the case of Haider's inclusion in the Government of Austria? If so, what would the recommendations to the Government have been, and when, if ever, would the mechanism have come to an end?

How will the article 6(1) principles be assessed, both under the new mechanism and under the existing article 7 provision? In particular, will the Minister guarantee that those principles, which include respect for human rights, will not be interpreted through the prism of the charter of fundamental rights? For example, article 19 of the charter states: No one may be removed, expelled or extradited to a State where there is a serious risk that he or she would be subjected to the death penalty". If the charter will affect national law only in so far as it implements Union law, what is the point of that particular article?

9 pm

Let me cite one example. Will the Minister assure the House that the provision that the Government agreed at Nice will not be used to decide that a member state that intends to extradite a suspected murderer to the United States is in danger of contravening article 6(1) principles and will therefore be given recommendations by QMV, under revised article 7 TEU? I am sorry that those are technical points, but they must be explored.

The second issue that I want to speak about is the European defence identity. We heard an absolutely outstanding speech from my hon. Friend the Member for Ruislip—Northwood (Mr. Wilkinson). I was especially pleased that he referred in some detail to Turkey, which feels concerned about the recent developments in Nice. As the House will appreciate, although European defence policy is not contained in the treaty, some changes were agreed to pave the way for it.

First, references to the Western European Union in article 17 TEU have been deleted. Amendment No. 41 would deal with that problem by removing paragraph 2 from article 1 of the treaty. Secondly, article 25 TEU, as amended by Nice, provides an enhanced role for the Political and Security Committee. Under the authorisation of the Council, the committee will exercise political control and strategic direction of the crisis management operations and may, with Council authorisation, take decisions in that context.

Finally, declaration 1 of the final act of the intergovernmental conference, which does not form part of the Bill, relates to European security and defence policy, which it says will become operational quickly. It foreshadows a decision to be taken by the European Council no later than the Brussels summit.

New clauses 7 and 8 would ensure greater parliamentary scrutiny of those developments. New clause 7 would require a report to be submitted to Parliament on their effects on NATO and the WEU, and new clause 8 would require a Bill to be introduced before any decision on common defence is taken.

The House has debated those issues several times, and I do not intend to cover familiar ground for too long, but I should like to make some specific points in relation to new clauses 7 and 8. The background to the debate is that the Conservatives strongly support greater European defence co-operation and a stronger European commitment to NATO. Indeed, it was a Conservative Government who started that process. We genuinely believe, however, that the European defence policy that is currently being developed represents an evolution towards a European army in all but name. The documents agreed at Nice and elsewhere make it clear that the force will exist outside NATO, which flatly contradicts repeated assurances made by Ministers and confirms the major reservations of the Americans. We believe that the structures agreed at Nice will weaken and undermine NATO.

I have some specific questions for the Minister. First, how does he reconcile the removal of references to the WEU in article 17 TEU and the decline of the WEU with what the Prime Minister said to the House four years ago? He said that getting Europe's voice more clearly heard in the world will not be achieved through merging the European Union and the Western European Union or developing an unrealistic common defence policy."—[Official Report, 18 June 1997; Vol. 296, c. 3141 Does the Minister accept that although changes to the WEU were agreed at Maastricht, it was developed as the forum for expressing European defence interests within NATO and was formally recognised as such by the EU? The idea was that the WEU was to be balanced halfway between NATO and the EU. Its development posed no threat to NATO and all the units available to it were either to be borrowed from NATO, or if they were outside NATO they were available to it in an emergency.

Does the Minister not accept that the establishment under the Nice treaty of the Political and Security Committee is another sign that, by creating new, stand-alone EU structures, the European security and defence policy duplicates existing NATO structures? What is the point of doing that unless it is to rival NATO, with all the consequences that flow from that?

Despite assurances from the Prime Minister that planning for military operations would happen in NATO, the Nice accords and the statements of the Secretary of State for Defence make it crystal clear that many operations can and will be planned outside NATO. National headquarters can be used under the auspices of the EU. The Nice accords further make it clear that there is no onus on the EU to involve NATO at any stage of a crisis. It is evident that a defence entity that is a clear rival to NATO is being established. It could undermine the Atlantic alliance and the United States' commitment to Europe's security.

The hon. Member for Broxtowe (Dr. Palmer) made a thoughtful contribution. I emphasise to him that the Americans want burden sharing, and they are not getting it. Our anxieties are shared by the head of the EU's military staff, Major General Messervy Whiting, who said earlier this year that the EU's rapid reaction force would start to compete with NATO when it acquired a full range of strategic military assets. He said: In the early years, we'll be looking at things below the NATO threshold, things NATO doesn't do, like disaster relief and evacuation of citizens. In due course. once our collective capabilities are developed and we have strategic transport, the EU should be in a position to go higher … At that point, there will have to be a critical conversation between the European Union and NATO over who takes on what". In the light of such issues, we have tabled new clauses 7 and 8. One attempts to provide for analysis of the developments that I have outlined and their effect on NATO and WEU. The other proposes a mechanism to provide parliamentary scrutiny by means of a Bill. The changes have serious implications for the future of NATO, and I trust that the Minister for Europe will understand the need to be open about them so that the House can hold a rational debate on the matter. The future of NATO and our relationship with it are crucial to the continued security and stability of Europe.

Amendments Nos. 46 and 47 and new clause 33 deal with Eurojust. After the Tampere summit in October 1999, when Eurojust and related measures were discussed, the Conservative party made it clear that we supported moves to improve co-ordination. We do not intend to oppose Eurojust if co-operation and co-ordination are involved. However, we seek a guarantee that we shall not go beyond that, and that the Bill does not pave the way for harmonisation. New clause 33 would provide for a report from the Attorney-General about the implications of Eurojust for the criminal and judicial processes of the United Kingdom.

Perhaps the Minister will take the opportunity to update hon. Members about developments on Eurojust since the Select Committee on European Scrutiny published its sixth report in February. The Committee welcomed the Government's view that they could not accept any wording on Eurojust's remit that accorded the Commission any operational role in national investigations or prosecutions. However, it expressed anxiety about what is described as ambiguity in the draft documents, which related to the amount of influence that Eurojust is expected to exercise.

The report stated: The requirement that a prosecuting authority in a Member State should be obliged to account to Eurojust for its reasons for not complying with a request to prosecute, or for not complying with a request to co-ordinate prosecutions with those of another Member State, suggests to us that Eurojust is intended to have some influence over prosecution discretions; otherwise there would seem to be little point in asking for the reasons to be stated". I trust that the Minister can reassure us on the latest discussions.

Angus Robertson (Moray)

May I ask the hon. Gentleman why there is no recognition in the proposal of the fact that Scotland has its own legal and judicial system? Why has that fact not been incorporated in the amendment?

Mr. Spring

I am glad that the hon. Gentleman has brought that point to my attention. I am sure that we shall bear it in mind, as will the Government.

Ministers should act to allay the concern in some quarters that, while initially promising nothing more than co-operation between prosecuting authorities, Eurojust may be the first step towards having an EU public prosecutor able to conduct investigations outside our legal system and corpus juris—the EU body of criminal law. For example, Commissioner Vitorino has said: A provisional judicial co-operation unit, which will serve as a kind of laboratory, enabling us to conceive and simultaneously test Eurojust, will take up its work soon. We may in the longer term also agree on the concept of centralised prosecution as a further logical step along the path of co-operation and co-ordination within the Union, at least for a number of sectors of particular European relevance. The explanatory statement of a report voted for by Labour and Liberal Democrat MEPs in November, the Gebhardt report, said: Eurojust must … be so constituted that it can be regarded as a forerunner of a future European public prosecution service designed to strengthen the European Union's judicial dimension in relation to criminal law. But institutionalisation alone is not enough. The Council must draw up, in co-operation with the European Parliament and the Commission, appropriate rules of law on the basis of which Eurojust will be able to operate. Parliament has already indicated the form that such a 'corpus juris' might take … The acquisition of such a body of law would enable the European Union to clearly counter the charge that its structures were undemocratic because it did not possess an independent legislature, executive and judiciary with counterbalancing powers, the hallmark of all democratic societies. We are seeking important reassurances from the Government on those issues. We need to be assured that, by providing treaty articles in this area, EU leaders are not paving the way to moving beyond mere co-operation towards the kind of development—such as the creation of a European public prosecutor—for which many in the EU have been calling for some time.

Amendments Nos. 45 and 48 also raise important issues relating to enhanced co-operation in the second and third pillars. We are particularly sympathetic to amendment No. 48, which concerns the loss of the so-called "emergency brake" veto in the justice and home affairs pillar. However, we will be discussing the principle of enhanced co-operation later in the proceedings, and I intend to address the veto issue in relation to its loss in the Community pillar at that time.

I apologise to the Minister of State for asking a series of very specific questions. but I hope that he will recognise that these are genuine concerns, and that he will address them during the course of the Committee proceedings.

Mr. Hendrick

I shall start by saying how much some Labour Members deplore the scaremongering of the hon. Member for West Suffolk (Mr. Spring) and some of his colleagues when they say that the treaty threatens NATO in some way. The European rapid reaction force will give the European Union the capacity to conduct military operations in response to international crises when NATO is not, and does not wish to be, engaged. I find it incredible that the Opposition should want Europe to have a capability to intervene in crises across Europe, yet are unwilling to give it the means to do so. I also find incredible the suggestion that the Western European Union might serve as the body capable of co-ordinating such operations, because it has a staff of less than 100, based in Brussels.

Dr. Julian Lewis

I think that the hon. Gentleman is missing the point of the Opposition's objections. What we object to has nothing to do with the capability of European countries to defend Europe. It has to do with the structures that organise and apply those capabilities. We want European defence capabilities to be organised and applied within the structure of NATO. Under the treaty, we are getting new structures without capabilities, whereas we need new capabilities within existing tried and tested structures such as NATO.

9.15 pm
Mr. Hendrick

I thank the hon. Gentleman for that intervention. Clearly, if the United States does not wish to be involved, we need a coherent political structure that can direct operations, and the only political structure that can do that is the European Union. The Western European Union has very little clout, so it is bizarre to suggest that such a structure should be built around the WEU when most of the countries involved are members of the EU. That says more about the Opposition's attitude to the EU than it does about the capability of the WEU to conduct such operations.

The range of potential missions is described as humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace making. For many months during the war in Bosnia, the United States was unwilling to get involved in a European conflict, and that unwillingness led to the deaths of hundreds of thousands of Bosnian people. The ethnic cleansing in that part of the world was an atrocity that had not been witnessed since the second world war, and the unwillingness of the Americans to get involved because they were reluctant for any of their troops to come back in body bags led to the deaths of hundreds of thousands of people.

Mr. Cash

The hon. Gentleman is really testing the patience of the House. Is it not inconceivable for him to present this argument when it is perfectly clear that it was impossible for the EU to generate anything in the way of heavy lift or the response that was required to deal with the catastrophe in Bosnia? The hon. Gentleman is talking total rubbish because he has not referred to the increase in function, the shift away from NATO and the absolute refusal of member states to provide the resources that were necessary. In fact, the Germans are continually decreasing their defence capability. The hon. Gentleman is talking absolute rubbish and, most unusually, he is making a fool of himself.

Mr. Hendrick

I thank the hon. Gentleman for that intervention, and I hope that he will not pull his punches so much in future.

The ink was not dry on the common foreign and security policy when the conflict in Bosnia broke out, and it is quite clear that the Americans did not want to get involved. For many years now, they have made it plain that they are not prepared to spend American tax dollars on defending European nation states. Now that Europe has produced a constructive set of proposals, many of which the United States accepts. we are hearing arguments—not from Colin Powell or any other American representative—about possible Turkish opposition to the proposal. Indeed, the outcome of the Irish referendum has been put forward as the reason why Europe should not move in this direction. To anyone who says that it leaves out Turkey or Norway, I would say that I certainly do not remember Turkey or Norway arguing for strong intervention in Bosnia or expressing any great wish to sort out the problems there.

Mr. Wilkinson

Can the hon. Gentleman explain why the Danes are not contributing any forces at all to the so-called rapid reaction force?

Mr. Hendrick

I am not here to answer for the Danes, but to speak for the interests of the British people and my constituents in Preston, so I shall not go down that route. The Opposition constantly refer to Denmark and Ireland as though they were the most significant and weighty states in the EU.

Angus Robertson

Perhaps one of the advantages of the European rapid reaction force is that it brings in countries that are not involved in NATO, such as Austria, Finland and Sweden. That may benefit everybody in Europe.

Mr. Hendrick

I agree. More nations are involved than would have been had any other method been adopted. Had the treaty not been agreed, the Opposition would not have made any constructive proposals to deal with any of the crises that may arise in Europe as a result of the current political problems.

For the benefit of Opposition Members, I must explain that the treaty does not involve the creation of a European army. The commitment of national resources by member states to any operations will be based on their sovereign decision as nation states, not the decision of the European Commission or the European Parliament. The European Union has not been given a role in collective or territorial defence, which remains the sole responsibility of NATO, and anybody who, like the hon. Member for West Suffolk, says that the proposals in some way rival NATO obviously does not understand the treaty and has not read it very well. The treaty acknowledges that NATO remains the base of its members' collective defence and will continue to play an important role in crisis management.

European military capabilities must be strengthened as a priority. The Euro-army is the latest Conservative anti-European myth. The proposal is for a stronger Britain and a stronger Europe, and the Opposition know it.

Dr. Julian Lewis

The hon. Gentleman has been exceptionally generous in giving way, and I thank him for that. He says that there is no conflict between the rapid reaction force and NATO, but if the rapid reaction force is not to have standing forces of its own—which it is not—and if it is only to deploy forces that are normally allocated to NATO, what would happen if it were engaged in a large-scale peacekeeping operation, taking forces away from NATO, and another crisis arose in which NATO and the United States wished to act, but found that their forces were depleted because they were engaged in some escapade with the rapid reaction force? Which of the two crises would come out on top? Is all this necessary, when if the force remained within the structure of NATO, all such matters would be resolved internally?

Mr. Hendrick

The number of troops committed to any such operation is likely to be relatively small in relation to NATO's total capability.

Dr. Lewis

Sixty thousand.

Mr. Hendrick

Yes—relatively small.

There is nothing to stop two crises arising at the same time. Presumably, NATO would have the capability to deal with the situation. The hon. Gentleman's hypothesis is unlikely, but if that happened, it could still be dealt with under the current system.

I want to deal with a few of the myths. Opposition Members say that European defence will weaken NATO and undermine relations with the United States. Better European capabilities will strengthen the contribution of European nations to NATO as well as to the EU. Most of the Opposition's arguments are not really about defence capability or our ability to deal with conflict—although their proposals would inhibit that—but about a political objection.

Let us consider what Opposition Members have said in the past. The Maastricht treaty, which was signed by the right hon. Member for Horsham (Mr. Maude), said: The common foreign and security policy shall include all questions related to the security of the Union, including the eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might in time lead to a common defence. Sir Malcolm Rifkind said: The recent NATO summit agreed that European allies should take a greater responsibility for common security and defence. This will be achieved through the development of a European security and defence identity expressed through the WEU, which will in turn strengthen the European pillar of the alliance. Statements from a previous Secretary of State for Defence and the current Opposition Foreign Affairs spokesman fly in the face of what has been said by Opposition Members today.

I repeat that what has been said today has nothing to do with the defence of the EU, or NATO; it has a lot to do with the opposition to the proposals for the further development of the EU.

Mr. Menzies Campbell

I shall address my brief remarks to the issues raised so eloquently by the hon. Member for Ruislip-Northwood (Mr. Wilkinson). I did not entirely agree with him, but I most certainly did agree with some portions of his thoughtful speech. He struck a chord with me when he spoke about defence expenditure, because there will be no capability unless there is defence expenditure.

If we cast our minds back to the general election, none of the three major parties committed itself in the course of this Parliament to any material increase in defence expenditure. There is a certain amount of creative accounting going on around Europe that justifies some officials saying that defence expenditure is going up. I do not believe that, because the way in which expenditure is allocated is often done differently in different countries. The real question is not what is being spent, but what we are getting for the money that is being spent; to use an expression that was current about 10 or 15 years ago, how big a bang are we getting for the buck?

If there is a strong European security and defence policy, it will strengthen NATO; if there is a weak policy, it will most certainly weaken NATO. Those of us who support a European security and defence policy have an overwhelming obligation to ensure that what is put in place does not damage or affect NATO's capability. We must also argue the case as persuasively as we can—within our parties and this House, and outside—to ensure that sufficient expenditure is made available to make a European security and defence policy a reality.

Respectfully, I say to the hon. Member for Preston (Mr. Hendrick) that to characterise the problems in the Balkans as being related entirely to US intransigence is not to take a sufficiently broad view of what took place, especially in the period when Bosnia was the source of such difficulty. I have been critical of the fact that the US has been unwilling to commit troops, but we must recall that there was a critical—to use the word in its alternative sense—meeting of the EU here in London at which a lot of warm words were expressed and commitments given. However, there was then no follow-through action or deployment of the necessary forces.

Another element of the Bosnian situation that cannot be avoided is that the mandates handed down by the UN Security Council, and the terms upon which the UN was first operating in Bosnia, were, to say the least, ambiguous. We need a longer historical perspective on Bosnia to see why the international community found it so difficult to deal with something that, as the commemoration today in Srebrenica reminds us forcefully, was horrific to an extent that people thought we were unlikely to experience after the end of the second world war.

On the relationship between NATO and the EU, I adhere strongly to a view that I have persistently expressed in the House; persistently is perhaps the right adverb to use. What we need is a formal protocol between NATO and the EU in which NATO is given a formal right of first refusal. The annexe to the Nice treaty talks about where NATO is not involved. On that point also, I agree with the hon. Member for Ruislip—Northwood. We need to locate operational planning in NATO, and I would go further and argue that strategic planning should also be located in NATO.

I part company with the hon. Gentleman on a further point and I shall try to explain my logic. If NATO decided not to become involved in an issue, it would be standing back not only militarily, but politically. If the EU, in furtherance of the provisions we are discussing, decided that it would proceed militarily, it would make no sense to look for political direction of that EU activity from NATO. Some form of political direction must be available on occasions when NATO declines to become involved. We need a structural element in addition to what we have at the moment.

On the issue of scrutiny, we have heard much special pleading for the Western European Union in the House in the past 18 months, but if we are to scrutinise the provisions before us, the place for that scrutiny is in this domestic Parliament. I feel strongly that decisions about sending young men and—increasingly—women to war should be taken in a forum in which I, as an elected representative with a front-line air base in my constituency, have the right to hold Ministers to account for their decisions. Whatever the merits of the WEU or the European Parliament, I am not willing to cede my responsibility for that scrutiny to a body that has no real constituency—as the hon. Gentleman suggested of the European Parliament—or is essentially an appointed body like the WEU, however distinguished it might be. I disagree with the suggestion—made, I think by the Prime Minister in Warsaw—that one possible feature of a second chamber for the European Parliament would be the exercise of scrutiny on defence matters, because that scrutiny should rest with the House of Commons.

Mr. Wilkinson

Is not the point that while ultimate responsibility for sending British troops to war remains with the House, we nevertheless benefit from the fact that our colleagues in the House and in the other place are members of the WEU? In that body, which provides another forum for transnational responsibility in Europe, our colleagues are informed of the obligations, stresses, strains and problems of other member countries that impinge on our national security decisions. The WEU can exert a common will to persuade other Parliaments to do things to our mutual benefit, such as creating heavy lift and other capabilities.

Mr. Campbell

The hon. Gentleman and I may be moving, slowly but inexorably, towards agreement on that subject. It may be a question of emphasis, but the WEU and other such bodies—I speak as someone who has been a member of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly for some 10 years—have a tremendous role to play in allowing us to understand the principles and priorities of the other countries involved. However, formal scrutiny is our responsibility and it should not be ceded.

Mr. Hendrick

Will the right hon. and learned Gentleman give way?

Mr. Campbell

No, I wish to make progress because I know that others wish to speak, including the Minister.

I believe that Turkey should be a member of the European Union—a view not always popular in my party—but it has considerable obstacles to overcome, not least in the conduct of its police and its army and in relation to the universal recognition of human rights. However, Turkey overplayed its hand at first, because it appeared to believe that it could influence the opinion of the EU on its application for membership by displaying a mailed fist on the proposals for the European security and defence policy.

I shall end by referring to new article 17.2 of Command Paper 5090, which is the document that sets out the treaty. It states that the policy shall respect the obligations of certain Member States, which see their common defence realised in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation … under the North Atlantic Treaty and be compatible with a common security and defence policy established within that framework. That shows that NATO is recognised in that part of the treaty. Moreover, article 17.4 states: The provisions of this Article shall not prevent the development of closer cooperation between two or more Member States on a bilateral level, in the framework of the Western European Union … and NATO, provided such cooperation does not run counter to or impede that provided for in this Title. Those provisions show that the primacy of NATO is not affected, and that the capacity for bilateral arrangements between two or more states in the WEU and NATO is also provided for.

Finally, the hon. Member for New Forest, East (Dr. Lewis)—east is east, and west is west, and ne'er the twain shall meet—spoke of the deadly prospect that a war might break out and that the Americans might not be willing to come to Europe. That is a prospect that we must consider, as it is more possible now than for a long time. However, a further deadly prospect exists: that if we do not have in place the arrangements that we are discussing, a war may break out in Europe, the Americans might decline to come and the Europeans could be left unable to do anything about it.

As long as the money is spent and the capability is achieved, I believe that we can make a contribution to NATO, and offer the capacity for the European Union to operate when NATO declines. That is why I believe that these provisions are worthy of support.

The Second Deputy Chairman

I call Mr. William Cash.

Mr. Cash

I am sorry, Sir Michael, for not rising immediately to my feet, but I was distracted by a representative of the usual channels. My eagerness to engage in the debate means that such tardiness is very unusual for me.

My hon. Friend the Member for Ruislip—Northwood (Mr. Wilkinson) has already made it clear that the amendment deals with a matter of immense importance. It is a matter that I have raised with the Prime Minister and the former Foreign Secretary, now the Leader of the House, several times. At issue is the movement towards a European army represented by the establishment of the rapid reaction force.

My noble Friend Lord Tebbit used to be the Member of Parliament for Chingford. He and I opposed the then Conservative Government—our own Government—over the Maastricht treaty, and we made compelling speeches on the treaty's defence implications. Those speeches have subsequently proved justified.

My hon. Friend the Member for Ruislip-Northwood also made a valuable and important contribution in the Maastricht debates. Indeed, he and my wife managed to transport another hon. Member—whose name must remain undisclosed—away from a secret location a few hundred yards from here and into the Lobby to vote, with the result that we won a crucial Division. I therefore owe my hon. Friend a great debt of gratitude for his sterling—indeed, Special Air Service—assistance at that time.

Let there be no doubt that the genesis of where we are now is the Maastricht treaty, which contained provisions that we do not need to go into, and indeed cannot go into today. It was followed by Amsterdam, whose provisions were negotiated by yet another Conservative Government and handed over to the present Government under the chairmanship of another distinguished Minister for Europe. I do not think that I need to mention his name, but he was one of the revolving chairmen of the Westendorp group.

I wrote a pamphlet in reply to the White Paper that Sir Malcolm Rifkind and the said Minister for Europe produced. It was called the "Blue Paper"; it was 25 or 30 pages long and took the White Paper apart line by line, because I felt so strongly that the Government were going in the wrong direction.

The said Minister for Europe is currently competing strongly for the attention of other Conservative Members of Parliament. I have a letter written in 1995 from yet another contender for the Conservative party leadership, in which he set out his reply to me with respect to the questions that are before us under the Nice treaty. It shows the evolution of the thought processes and policy making en route to the present debate

The letter went, "Thank you for your letter" I am paraphrasing a little bit [Laughter] "about the mischievous piece in The Sunday Telegraph on 12 November, which you also raised with me in the House last week." So, it is all on the record. He went on, "I trust I set your mind at rest then"—some chance—"I and the Government remain totally opposed to any suggestion of a separate European army. Nothing that Malcolm Rifkind and I agreed to in Madrid moved us one jot in that direction. As for our memorandum on European defence which the Prime Minister launched in March, the article misses the point completely. The essence of our position is that the defence of Europe is founded on NATO. NATO also has a role in smaller scale missions like peacekeeping—witness Bosnia."

Now the House may understand my intervention on my hon. Friend the Member for Ruislip-Northwood. My point has always been that keeping the peace in places such as Bosnia and making the peace according to the Petersberg tasks—on which I have tested the Foreign Secretary on many occasions—cannot be distinguished from the greater development not merely of a rapid reaction force but the panoply of warfare. Such equipment was exemplified by the stealth bombers, smart bombs and heavy-lift operations provided by the United States under the umbrella of NATO, although attempts were made to claim that such action had been carried out by a chameleon of the Western European Union.

The letter continued that it was unreasonable to expect the North Americans always to want to get involved in such smaller scale missions, such as peacekeeping, and that that was where WEU came in. It stated, "It cannot really do the job at present, so we want to make it more capable, but it has no military forces separate from NATO, nor is it subordinated to the EU. That is how we want to keep it. Hardly a slippery slope to federalism, I think. Yours ever."

The significance of that is that I argued in the House that it was a slippery slope to federalism. Now that we have the Nice treaty, I think that I can reasonably say that the predictions made in those days of rebellion by me and my hon Friends the Members for Chingford and Woodford Green (Mr. Duncan Smith) and for Ruislip-Northwood about what would happen after Maastricht demonstrate that we are now in the business of having a European defence capacity.

We could call it by one of thousands of acronyms—ESDI, CFSP, or whatever. However, the question is: what is the function of that body? What is it intended to do and what does it actually do? Does it have the properties and the resources to enable whatever has been created to perform effectively in the interests of whatever defence capacity is being provided?

9.45 pm

I hold a simple view. I believe in alliances and in co-operation, but in no circumstances will I subscribe to those points of the compass that take us into the single, autonomous capacity described in various statements such as the one made at Feira, which annoyed the Turks beyond endurance. I attended a meeting held under the auspices of the Ministry of Defence and the Foreign Office at the Institute for Strategic Studies with a Turkish general, the ambassador and others. There was a heated exchange of views. I was very much on the side of the Turks, because—bluntly—they had been cheated. There is no time to go into every detail, but the bottom line is that the Turks felt cheated and they were extremely angry—with justification, in my judgment.

Subsequent meetings took place, including at Cologne, followed by the Nice arrangements. The important point is that under those arrangements, we are talking about a single autonomous structure, which dovetails with the single structure prescribed by the treaties and from which there is no escape. I look at the Minister for Europe with great interest and concern at this point because there is no way in which he can escape the unequivocal wording of the treaties. That is why my hon. Friend the Member for Chingford and Woodford Green was able to visit the Pentagon before the Secretary of State for Defence did so. That is why he was able to see Mr. Rumsfeld and Mr. Cheney before the Foreign Secretary. I am open to correction if I am wrong, but that is my understanding.

The bottom line is that hosts of indicators have been given by the most distinguished US generals, advisers and senior members of the Administration. My hon. Friend had opportunities to give evidence to the Senate and to Congress on these questions. There were some attempts to retrieve the situation, prompted understandably but regrettably by the Labour Government. However, if one weighs up all the comments that have been made, one realises that my hon. Friend established an international reputation in this field, and that was recognised by the United States Administration.

Dr. Palmer

Is the hon. Gentleman absolutely sure that leading US military figures will welcome his attempt to involve them in the Conservative leadership campaign?

Mr. Cash

I have no idea. The matter is one of historical record. Indeed it is already on the record, so I am saying nothing that has not been said already.

The significance of all this is very simple: through Feira, St. Malo and Cologne we are moving towards not merely a rapid reaction force or enhanced Petersberg tasks, but a European army I believe that it was Romano Prodi who said—I am paraphrasing—"You can call it Mary or Marianne or whatever you like", but his emphasis was that it would be a European army. That is why he is asking for all those billions of pounds from the European Union, to fill the gap in order to fulfil the functions that will be provided.

There are honest Members of Parliament on the Labour Benches, and they know the truth. Some of them are prepared to say that there should be a European army because they genuinely believe that. I wait with interest, as the debate proceeds, to hear what they have to say. However, it is impossible to provide the defence or military capacity that is needed without providing the money to go with it. As I pointed out in an intervention, it is rubbish to say that the Americans are at fault, when the bottom line is that it was the Americans who provided the mechanics, operational lift and the capacity to bring to an end the tragic warfare that ensued for a range of reasons that we do not have the time nor the opportunity to go into tonight—

Mr. Hendrick

indicated dissent.

Mr. Cash

The hon. Gentleman shakes his head. I wish that I could remember the name of his constituency.

Mr. Hendrick

Preston.

Mr. Cash

I was brought up at school only 15 miles from Preston, so perhaps I should remember that from now on. [Interruption.] Well, the school produced seven VCs, so we did not do too badly. The hon. Gentleman attacked the United States. He mentioned intransigence, and he was extremely critical of the US. He referred in derogatory terms to its concern about body bags.

Mr. Hendrick

I will not be as aggressive in my response to the hon. Gentleman's speech as he was to mine, but although the Americans did eventually broker an agreement at Dayton, they did so only after very many months of violence, attacks on civilians and massacres throughout Bosnia, and with hundreds of thousands of people dead from ethnic cleansing. I would have liked to see the Europeans broker a deal in Europe, but the common foreign and security policy had only just been drafted and the means and capability did not exist. Does the hon. Gentleman agree that we should have those means and capability, because that is what Nice is all about?

Mr. Cash

No, I am afraid that I really do not, because the problems of the Balkans have an immensely long history and will not be resolved by trying to stitch up arrangements for the sake of what has been described as a moment of glory. I believe that it was Mr. Poos who, during the Bosnian or Kosovo crisis, said, "This will be the moment of glory for the European Union", or words to that effect. It was a moment of disaster, because the EU does not have the capacity to deal with such a crisis. There are too many national interests at work to be able to create the necessary so-called identity or co-ordination. The hon. Gentleman, in his ideological mind, does not seem to understand that. It is not a workable proposition.

If I may, I shall glance at Edward Gibbon for a moment. In 1787, in "The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire", he wrote about the Balkans in the fourth century AD in a manner that was no different from the commentaries that we would see today. It is a very difficult problem, and it will not be resolved on the back of ideological or wishful thinking. It is a practical problem, which even at this stage has not been resolved properly, and may yet not be resolved. Therefore, I am afraid that I really cannot give any credibility to the hon. Gentleman's remarks.

Roger Casale

The hon. Gentleman and I served together on the European Scrutiny Committee and, with the greatest respect to him, surely what is rubbish is scuppering the opportunity to strengthen European defence co-operation, thereby compromising this country's national defence interests on the specious argument that, by strengthening European defence co-operation, we are building some kind of European army. All we are doing is trying to get other European nations to contribute more to actions that are in our national defence interests.

Mr. Cash

First, those contributions are not forthcoming on the scale required and, secondly, those nations simply cannot catch up with the technology, the rocketry, the capacity for heavy-lift aircraft or any of the fundamentals required in modern warfare. Furthermore, they will not catch up for perhaps 15 or 20 years, or more.

Surveillance is also important. Again, I raised that issue with the Prime Minister and the then Foreign Secretary. I asked them about the exchange of confidential defence information between the United States and the United Kingdom. Let us remember that during our involvement in the early part of the Balkan crisis, it was clearly understood that the French had disclosed secrets. The United States is simply not prepared to provide information to the EU that will then be leaked. That is incredibly important—it is not just a semantic argument; it is about the reality of warfare. We cannot have the sort of defence system that is being devised when any of the parties is liable to divulge information, as that completely undermines the trust and confidence of the main ally, which provides all the operational equipment, personnel and the surveillance system itself.

Peter Hain

If there is a crisis in the Balkans, for example, and the US is not willing to provide assistance and NATO is not willing to intervene, do we just turn our backs? Is there not a role for a European capability? Is it not the case that a European security and defence policy provides exactly that capability? What would the hon. Gentleman do?

Mr. Cash

I have raised that very point with the Prime Minister, and the words "where NATO as a whole is not engaged" are the very ones that I used. The Minister will recognise those words, but their use presupposes the involvement of the United States in the reference to NATO, so it is not a credible policy to turn that on its back by asking what we shall do in the EU. The bottom line is that without the involvement of either the US per se—or through article 5, the US and NATO—the EU is capable of producing no such defence capacity. By the way, it is also well understood that, time and again, the British forces are regarded as the linchpin to enable the delivery of a European capacity. So we are in deep territory.

I know that the Minister is extremely intelligent and well versed in such matters—at least, he soon will be. [Laughter.] Therefore, I have great confidence that he will extend his capacity, as Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, to a real understanding of the role that he must adopt in relation to the treaty and the defence capacity. We need to get the balance right. The truth is that, under the treaty and under the representative role of the new Secretary-General, Javier Solana, who—I say this with respect, although I wrote an extremely tough article about him in The Times when he was appointed because it struck me as a little odd that the Secretary-General of NATO had campaigned against NATO—

It being Ten o'clock, MR. DEPUTY SPEAKER, resumed the Chair.

To report progress and ask leave to sit again.—[Mr. Caplin.]

Committee report progress; to sit again tomorrow.