HC Deb 14 November 2000 vol 356 cc914-20

Motion made, and Question proposed, That this House to now adjourn.—[Mr. Betts.]

10.49 pm
Dr. Ian Gibson (Norwich, North)

I shall approach this subject by illustrating how the chief executive of Broadland district council, which covers part of my constituency and that of the hon. Member for Mid-Norfolk (Mr. Simpson), managed to achieve early retirement, a glorious pay-off and, for all I know, wonderful references. I raise it as a case study that requires Government action on two fronts: a public inquiry into this particular case, and an examination of the need to standardise the terms, conditions and powers of chief executives. The terms and conditions enjoyed by chief executives should safeguard their security of tenure—against political whims, for example—but they should not prevent a council from taking appropriate action where there is a clear need.

The individual concerned, Mr. John Bryant, banned elected persons from entering council premises outside of council or committee meetings, thereby interfering with the councillors' ability to carry out their duties on behalf of their voters. He negotiated his salary to disproportionate levels, given the size of the council, and became one of the best paid chief executives in England. There was no link to average earnings or inflation, as is the case with other groups of workers and constituents. He played a prominent role in his own work appraisal, and took on extra duties—at elections, and by monitoring affairs—to increase his earnings. He generally expanded his duties, and it was all done without council approval.

Mr. Bryant initiated a court case against the leader of the Labour group. That caused further court cases, and a court case is still pending that may cost the council tens of thousands of pounds. He made statements to the press without the council's approval. He brought the council into disrepute by attempting to control councillors, accusing them without foundation of breaking national codes, and in general took major decisions on his own, without recourse to elected members.

The zenith of Mr. Bryant's career came when he instructed that all the mail addressed to councillors at the council offices should be opened by council officers. Those officers could act on that mail if they felt it appropriate to do so, without disclosing that they had done so. Clearly, councillors did not like that and complained. Mr. Bryant said that he had the official approval of internal auditors. He stated publicly: I cannot agree to your request not to open mail addressed to you and would suggest that in future you ensure that any mail is not routed through these offices. In other words, he was telling constituents that they should write to their councillors only at home, if they did not want their private correspondence to be opened. The Controller of the Audit Commission, Andrew Foster, wrote that the general principle must be that mail should be opened by the councillor to whom it is addressed or by someone authorised by them to do so. I have had an influx of letters, from constituents and non-constituents alike, on those matters. One parish council clerk wrote: I have written to Broadland District Council stating that members of my council were disgusted that the District Council was giving a person, reprimanded for alleged gross misconduct, an early retirement package worth around £270,000, and asked how the District Council could justify spending such a large sum of taxpayer's money for this purpose. The answer that she received stated that matters between a local government employee and employer were dealt with as exempt matters and therefore no information could be provided. My correspondent adds that district councils should have informed parish councils, which have been encouraged to keep their precepts down. She said that the pay-off of £275,000 did not set a good example, and pointed out that it meant that council tax would rise. Finally, she wrote: Mr. Bryant had taken jobs on and … was looking after himself rather than the tax payer. Parish Council members feel that he is being paid for being incompetent and that this situation should be re-addressed. I am sure that such events are rare. Broadland district council was led for a time by a Conservative-Liberal Democrat alliance, and is now run by a Conservative majority. In most circumstances, such arrogance would not have been allowed to flourish. Where there is transparency and partnership between elected representatives and non-elected officers, such events could not occur. That they have happened requires that the public have alternative ways to access council procedures and hold a local government accountable.

Although a source of leaked information has suggested that there were five serious counts against Mr. Bryant, there was no public disclosure, and it was not possible for me to access information. When I wrote to the Minister for Local Government and the Regions, the answer was again that such matters were between the employer and the employee, and that they could decide whether they were disclosed.

In a written question, I also asked whether the Audit Commission Act 1998 was appropriate to access the accounts of public bodies. The answer again was that it is the responsibility of each local authority to decide whether information on personal or contractual matters in a particular case is owed a degree of confidentiality, and to act accordingly.

I suggest that the events that I have discussed raise issues beyond the personal and contractual which, while a feature of the events, do not address the situation that set this whole sad affair into motion. For example, how are chief executives held to account in situations in which they practice autocracy, secrecy and bullying tactics, as in the case at Broadland? Dismissal of a chief executive is a cumbersome process and, as happened here, it is obviously easier to pay someone off than to have a proper investigation, which would happen in most employment situations.

In her letter of 10 May, the Under-Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the Regions also suggested that if I had any queries on value for money, I might approach the district auditors. Many councillors went to the district auditor because they were concerned about the credibility of financial information on particular matters. Despite Mr. Bryant's entreaties, the auditor declined to identify the councillors who had raised the matter with him. In a confidential report to the council, Mr. Bryant alleged that the councillors had breached the national code of conduct by going to see the auditor. I think that that allegation would have been laughed out of any court in the land.

Even more bizarrely, not being able to identify the councillors, Mr. Bryant wrote: In the absence of any other information— that is, identity— I assume the councillors were acting on behalf of the Labour Group and, therefore, the Group Leader must take responsibility for this breach and must be held accountable to the full council. He went on to invite the council to take action against the leader by removing her from the policy and resources committee, which they did. The irony was that the leader of the Labour group was on holiday abroad during the whole period. On legal advice, the Labour councillors called a special council meeting and moved the reinstatement of the group leader to the committee, threatening the council with immediate legal action if councillors pursued the improper course put to them by Mr. Bryant.

I submit that nothing short of an inquiry into the behaviour of the council in this affair will satisfy my constituents. We need disclosure of the total on-going costs and the details of the final settlement. How were they negotiated, over what best years were they attained and how much employee time was involved in all this public hoo-hah?

We must ask how to prevent this from happening again. I would love to see the document giving the details of the early retirement package, and I think the public would too. They are certainly demanding that in their letters to me.

At a time when we are democratising local government, with cabinet structures and more public scrutiny, does my hon. Friend agree that this case illustrates the need to define the role and accountability of chief executives? We need to initiate procedures for councils to use when the chief executive is seen to be failing.

Last, but not least, and most importantly, councillors and the public should have the right to access key information. Will my hon. Friend please act?

10.59 pm
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the Regions (Ms Beverley Hughes)

My hon. Friend has raised matters of great concern to him and his constituents. As he said, he has raised a number of points using Broadland council as a case study.

My hon. Friend has covered the following issues: he has referred to the events at Broadland council, particularly those concerning the actions of the chief executive. He has questioned whether those actions are consistent with what it would be reasonable to expect a chief officer to do in fulfilling his or her role properly. He asked what powers my Department has if a chief executive falls short of what is expected and a council wants to initiate disciplinary action. He also asked whether the outcome of events at Broadland, particularly the settlement agreed between the council and the chief executive, was reasonable. Finally, he asked what steps the Government can and will take to ensure that concerns about the behaviour of council employees or even members can be dealt with more transparently in future.

My hon. Friend mentioned that legal proceedings are under way in relation to events at Broadland. An appeal by Mrs. Barbara Lashley against the decision of Mr. Justice Munby not to grant a judicial review will happen in a few weeks' time. That fact means that I must be careful about what I say since issues remain sub justice. I hope that my hon. Friend will not take that to mean that I am ducking the issues.

I have read all that I can on the case, including Mr. Justice Munby's report and reports prepared by my officials on what was going on at Broadland. Certain basic facts are in the public domain following events in May 1999. The chief executive, following discussions and events shortly after the election, barred Barbara Lashley from council premises—except for formal meetings—and applied several other sanctions to her which curtailed the extent to which she could fulfil her duties as a local councillor. The sequence of events that began then continues and will not be resolved until the further appeal is heard.

I am puzzled about one matter relating to events as they have panned out. The grounds on which the initial application for judicial review was made concerned the actions of the standards committee to which the case had been referred after the chief executive lifted his sanctions following correspondence from Mrs. Lashley's solicitors. The grounds for the review did not relate to the actions of the chief executive, which, as I understand it, have not been questioned in relation to his competence as monitoring officer to the council in applying the sanctions that were applied to Mrs. Lashley. We are yet to receive an answer to that point.

I cannot comment much more on circumstances at Broadland because of the point that we have reached in the legal process. My hon. Friend, however, more generally questioned whether the actions taken were consistent with what might reasonably be expected of a chief officer in fulfilling his or her role. By statute, councils are required to have a monitoring officer as well as a head of paid service and a chief financial officer. The post of chief executive is not specified in law; only those three posts are. Where a council appoints a chief executive, the post can combine the posts of head of paid service and monitoring officer or chief finance officer. The position varies from council to council.

Whatever the precise duties of the chief executive—in this case, I understand, he combined with that post the role of monitoring officer, which is a significant point—he or she has an important role to play in ensuring the proper discharge by the council of its statutory functions and the building of effective working relationships between elected members and council staff. Clearly, one can at the very least, without stepping too far over the mark, question whether that was the case at Broadland. Traditionally, chief executives have had to balance a number of overlapping roles: providing advice to councillors on policy and on the discharge of council functions; and building the corporate and managerial capacity of the organisation—working with councillors for the benefit of their communities.

In future, under legislation that we shall introduce, it will not be possible for a chief executive to combine the role of head of paid service with that of monitoring officer—as is currently the case in several authorities, such as Broadland. The increased demands that will be placed on those officers both by the new political structures and by the new conduct framework that we are introducing will, in our view, make the ability of one individual to hold both posts untenable, as well as increasing the likelihood of conflicts of interest between the two roles. My hon. Friend may feel that that has been the case at Broadland.

The roles of chief executives and monitoring officers in councils will be pivotal to the efficient operation of councils in this new environment. It is extremely important—as my hon. Friend points out—both that officers have the confidence of councillors and that councillors respect the integrity and independence of those officers, especially when they provide advice to councillors on the discharge of council functions.

Such advice may on occasion be unwelcome. It would undermine the impartiality of officers if the council were simply able to get rid of its chief executive when councillors disagreed with the advice of their officers. The statute therefore provides the chief executive officer and, in future, monitoring officers with protection by law. A designated independent person has to be appointed to investigate any alleged misconduct by a chief executive, or any attempt by a council to dismiss him or her. The person appointed must be acceptable to both parties and, if agreement cannot be reached, such a person must be appointed by the Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the Regions.

Although I realise that my hon. Friend is not happy with the resolution of the case involving the chief executive of Broadland district council, the matter has been resolved locally and my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State has thus not been required to—and cannot—play any part in the process. I must stress that any involvement is strictly limited to the appointment of an independent adjudicator. Once the adjudicator is appointed, the Secretary of State plays no further role—under current law—in the matter under investigation.

I acknowledge the strong views expressed by my hon. Friend on the case, but the council has dealt with the issue—however well or inadequately. It has not called on my right hon. Friend to appoint an independent adjudicator—under current legislation, that is the only route available to the Secretary of State.

Mr. Keith Simpson (Mid-Norfolk)

The Minister points out that, as the council had followed certain procedures, she could not get involved unless there was a request for an independent adjudicator. Have there been cases involving a dispute with a chief executive, such as that at Broadland, which followed a similar pattern, or do the majority of councils in such situations ask for the appointment of an independent adjudicator?

Ms Hughes

I am sorry that I cannot offer the hon. Gentleman much help, because my ministerial experience is limited to the past 15 months, during which time this is the only case that has come to our attention. I cannot speak with certainty about what happened before that.

My hon. Friend asked whether the outcome of the process agreed between Broadland council and the chief executive is a reasonable settlement. We do not yet fully know the outcome, because an appeal has been made against the decision not to grant a judicial review to Mrs. Lashley. If she were to be granted a judicial review, there would be a wider judgment on some of the issues that have been raised. That might have a bearing on the outcome.

At one level, the settlement that has been reached is a matter for the council and the chief executive in that the council apparently did not initiate proceedings to dismiss him. We do not know what took place in the discussions between the chief executive and the council and we do not know whether he wanted to go or whether councillors had concerns that led to the discussions being initiated.

My hon. Friend referred to the district auditor and I was going to come to that point. From what my hon. Friend said, it was not clear whether the district auditor had been approached at an earlier stage in the proceedings to intervene to consider the proprietary of what was happening. However, the use of public money to reach a settlement with the chief executive is clearly a matter on which anyone can ask the district auditor to adjudicate. The question of whether there has been a good use of public money in the circumstances is one that the district auditor would be required to examine. It is in his remit to adjudicate not so much on value for money, but on whether public money has been used appropriately. If the auditor has not been asked to examine the settlement, that is one course that my hon. Friend can pursue.

Dr. Gibson

What would happen if the agreement around the settlement is secret and confidential and if everyone who took part in the discussions swore not to disclose the details of the agreement? How can the district auditor overcome that secrecy? I understand that the public cannot discover the details, but can the auditor override a council that has made a secret and confidential agreement?

Ms Hughes

I shall obtain proper advice on that point. However, subject to that advice, I would say that nothing is outside the bounds of a district auditor's inquiry into the use of public money. I would be very surprised if the terms of an agreement that require the use of public money could be kept secret from a district auditor if he decided to examine the case. I shall obtain advice on that point, but it might provide a route that my hon. Friend might want to pursue.

One of my hon. Friend's main requests was for me to instigate an inquiry, possibly a public inquiry. In law, I cannot do that. Councils are directly elected bodies, and people who write to me with complaints about their councils are constantly surprised by the lack of powers that central Government have to intervene in their business. In the normal course of events we can trust our councillors and their senior managers to deal with issues appropriately, and it is right that we cannot intervene willy-nilly. Even when there is a belief, such as that described by my hon. Friend, that matters have not been handled properly, we cannot intervene. However, there may be recourse through the district auditor, and if my hon. Friend wants to pursue that, I will seek an official view on how best he can do so.

Question put and agreed to.

Adjourned accordingly at fifteen minutes past Eleven o'clock.