§ Mr. Andrew GeorgeI beg to move amendment No. 79, in page 88, line 16, leave out subsection (4), and insert—
'(4) For the purposes of sub-paragraph (3)(b)—The purpose of the amendment is entirely serious: to clarify the definition of "disability". Under applications for a variation of provisions in schedule 2, the Secretary of State is oddly left to define "disability". Although it is conceivable that the Secretary of State may need discretion over defining "illness" and "long-term", we have in the Disability Discrimination Act 1995, under which a commission is to be set up, a firm definition of "disability". Section 1 states:
- (a) "illness" may have such meaning as may be prescribed; and
- (b) "disability" shall have the same meaning as in Section 1(1) of the Disability Discrimination Act 1995; and
412 - (c) the question whether an illness or disability is long-term shall be determined in accordance with regulations made by the Secretary of State.'.
a person has a disability for the purposes of this Act if he has a physical or mental impairment which has a substantial and long-term adverse effect on his ability to carry out normal day-to-day activities".There are two main arguments for the amendment, on which I can be brief because they are self-explanatory. The first is an administrative argument. The Disability Discrimination Act must be used. If the Government do not get into the habit of using it where they should do so, its worth will be devalued and it will not automatically be referred to as a benchmark.
The second reason is ideological, and I would have thought the Labour Government would approve of it. The Government have committed themselves to civil rights and equality of opportunity, for which I applaud them. In this instance, however, they are leaving aside an important piece of civil rights legislation. That undermines the Disability Discrimination Act 1995 and the Government's wider aims of social inclusion.
I therefore ask the Minister at least to acknowledge the fact that there is legislation that provides a more helpful definition of "disability". The Secretary of State could be left with some discretion over the terms "long-term" and "illness".
§ Angela EagleI hope to persuade the hon. Member for St. Ives (Mr. George) of the fact that the Bill applies a reasonable definition of "disability", and to explain to him why we do not think that it is appropriate that the definition suggested in the amendment should apply in such circumstances.
Amendment No. 79 relates to the provision under which the Secretary of State may agree to vary the normal child support maintenance calculations on the ground that a non-resident parent is incurring costs attributable to the long-term illness or disability of a child who lives with him as a member of the second family. That is the sole reason why we need a definition in this context.
The provision, and the associated definitions of "disability" and "long-term", are features of the departures scheme, which was introduced by the Opposition when in government in December 1996. As the hon. Gentleman has explained, the amendment would re-define "disability" by reference to section 1 of the Disability Discrimination Act 1995.
In considering a variation on such a ground, the Secretary of State will be concerned with the costs associated with any disability. Given that there is already a benefit that is dedicated to helping disabled people with the extra costs that they may have to meet—disability living allowance—we propose to provide in regulations that a child will be considered "disabled" if either the care component, the mobility component or both components 413 of DLA are in payment to any person on his behalf, or if he is registered blind. The same qualifying conditions apply to awards of the disabled child premium in income support. That creates consistency across the range of benefits, which is important for administrative purposes.
Having established that such conditions are met, the Secretary of State will need only to consider the evidence that the non-resident parent provides on the additional costs associated with the disabling condition. Our view is that the definition of "disability" that we intend to prescribe is a reasonable one, and that it will be a much more straightforward and objective test for the Child Support Agency to apply than the one proposed in the amendment. The latter would require the agency to make judgments of a medical nature—a task for which it is not qualified—aimed at employers, defining "disability" in employment. It is complex, running to 15 pages of guidance, and appealable to courts and industrial tribunals. In this context, we do not think that that is the best definition of "disability".
I hope that the hon. Gentleman recognises that we have a good, quick, simple and consistent definition of "disability" in the social security system and that our suggestion will be much simpler, quicker and easier to apply. It will not disadvantage anyone; the appropriate people will still be described as "disabled". I hope that, on that basis, he will withdraw the amendment.
§ Mr. Andrew GeorgeI am grateful to the Minister for that clarification. I am pleased that I probed the matter because it was unclear. Her reassurances have been helpful. I am sure that the organisations for the disabled that expressed concern about the phraseology will be, as I am, reassured by her response. On that basis, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
§ Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.