National Air Traffic Services

HC Deb 19 June 2000 vol 352 cc21-7 3.30 pm

Mr. Bernard Jenkin (North Essex) (by private notice)

To ask the Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the Regions if he will make a statement on the failure of National Air Traffic Services computer systems on Saturday 17 June and the ensuing chaos for air travellers.

The Minister for Housing and Planning (Mr. Nick Raynsford)

As has been widely reported, the flight data processing system—FDPS—at the London air traffic control centre at West Drayton suffered a software failure last Saturday, 17 June. That resulted in extensive disruption to air traffic and consequent delays to air passengers over the weekend. I naturally very much regret the serious inconvenience that that failure caused to passengers and to airlines, and I understand that the chief executive of NATS is issuing an apology to his customers today.

The main concern of NATS is to maintain and enhance safety in air traffic control. When faced with problems with the FDPS software on 17 June, NATS therefore acted immediately to maintain safety standards by imposing tight limits on the flow of aircraft in UK airspace. It maintained service to aircraft and safety standards, in the first instance, by using stand-by procedures. Those procedures involve the manual transcription of flight details, which creates additional work for controllers who can therefore handle safely fewer flights than normal. The delays experienced by airlines and passengers were a direct consequence of these measures.

NATS staff have been working hard to identify and correct the problem with the FDPS software, which had malfunctioned on one previous occasion on 9 June. The software in question was upgraded some three months ago to meet changes in the way that NATS manages UK airspace. Upgrading the software is a common occurrence. The FDPS is a relatively modern computer system, but it has to be upgraded regularly to match growing levels of traffic and changes in NATS operating procedures to cope with that growth.

My understanding is that NATS has yet finally to resolve the underlying problem with the new software. NATS continues to work on that, but in the meantime has reverted to the fallback system, which involves using the previous well-tried version of the software. This takes some hours to set up and therefore could not be immediately deployed when the software problem came to light. However, this back-up system, which was the main system until three months ago, is now functioning well and air traffic should substantially be back to normal today. It is the intention of NATS to continue to operate this well-tried system until the problem with the new software has been identified and remedied.

This incident demonstrates the importance of the air traffic control system to the well-being and smooth operation of the United Kingdom. It also demonstrates the commitment of NATS and its staff, at all levels, to maintain safety in our skies. It shows the importance of building on NATS operational excellence with investment in new technology and world-class project management skills, so as to meet the demands of the growing market in air transport.

Mr. Jenkin

I thank the Minister for the regrets and the apology from NATS management that he has conveyed. However, I reflect on the irony of the fact that the answer to this vital question was given by the Minister for Housing and Planning, which is not an entirely satisfactory situation for the House.

This weekend, thousands and thousands of air passengers' journeys were disrupted. Their flights were cancelled and they found themselves stranded at airports around the United Kingdom. Will the Minister join me in congratulating and thanking all those who made Herculean efforts to manage the crisis and to recover from it? That includes not just airline and airport staff, but the air traffic controllers who had to resort to the manual information system that he described.

For all its efforts, the House must surely agree that NATS completely failed its customers on Saturday morning, causing not just massive inconvenience, but damaging the reputation of Britain as a place to do business. In this country, we pride ourselves on having the most advanced, best managed and safest air traffic system in the world. Air passengers from Britain and abroad are entitled to be reassured that this totally unprecedented breakdown is an isolated incident and not a fundamental deterioration in the service provided by NATS.

First, for the record, will the Minister confirm absolutely that safety was not compromised in that breakdown? Secondly, will he say more about the causes of the computer breakdown and confirm that it was caused by the failure of completely standard software which has been used in various forms around the world for many years? Will he confirm that the volume of air traffic on Saturday, while heavy, was not exceptional at the time that the failure occurred? Is there any truth in the rumour that the software that failed was reinstated after a failure in the upgrade?

Thirdly, is it not a matter of concern that this is the second breakdown in a few days and that the two incidents appear to be unconnected? Fourthly, will the Minister confirm that he is not yet in a position to advise the House on the underlying causes of the failures and therefore cannot reassure the House and air passengers that this will not happen again? Related to that, when the West Drayton system transfers to the new Swanwick centre near Southampton, will controllers still be able to fall back on manual systems in the event of a similar failure?

Has the Minister made an assessment of the outlook for the viability of the public-private partnership in the light of this major failure? Do the Government intend to press ahead regardless with their unnecessarily complex proposal to dispose of 51 per cent. of the shares in NATS. I remind the House that the Transport Sub-Committee described that as

the worst of all the possible options.

Mr. Raynsford

I am sorry that the hon. Gentleman has not become used to my presence at the Dispatch Box. After all, we sparred with each other for five months over the Transport Bill. I should have thought that, by now, he would be used to me speaking on these matters. The hon. Gentleman asked whether I would join him in congratulating NATS staff and all concerned on dealing with the problems created by the software malfunction. Of course I do. I made it clear in my response to his original question that the fallback system works effectively in the interests of safety, although it inherently involves delay as it is not possible to process as many flights manually as it is when the computer is operational. I find that slightly difficult to reconcile with the hon. Gentleman's request that I confirm that NATS failed its customers. As he acknowledged, I made it clear that I very much regretted the failure and said that NATS would be writing to apologise to its customers. As he acknowledged, NATS responded well to the crisis and put in place stand-by arrangements to ensure that safety was paramount at all times, which must be the main consideration.

The hon. Gentleman asked me to confirm that this was an isolated incident, not a fundamental breakdown. I think that I have made it clear that the problem, which has not yet been fully identified, is associated with the new software package introduced three months ago. Until the problems with it have been identified, the previous well-tried software will be operated by NATS. For that reason, I must reject the hon. Gentleman's suggestion that I am not able to give any reassurance. He will understand that, until the faults with the new software are identified, the system now operating is that which was operating successfully until just three months ago.

The hon. Gentleman asked me to confirm that safety was not compromised. I think that it is clear from what I have said that safety is paramount at all times. He made the point, which I reiterate, that the problem was not to do with exceptionally heavy traffic. Newspaper reports that there is therefore the prospect of further difficulties over the summer when traffic volumes rise are not a correct analysis of the problem—which was to do with a software malfunction, not the volume of air traffic.

The hon. Gentleman asked whether the software involved was reinstated software. I made it clear in my original response that it is a new software package, which was introduced some three months ago. He asked whether the two incidents were unconnected. Until the cause of the failure has been fully explored, understood and corrected, we will not know for sure whether the latest incident was a repeat of the malfunction that occurred on the previous occasion, but it is likely that there is a connection. Apart from those two incidents, the software has worked successfully since its introduction.

The hon. Gentleman asked what will happen when the transfer to Swanwick takes place. It was always envisaged that the existing system would continue to operate from West Drayton until 2005, so it is not affected in any way by the move to Swanwick or the delay in that move. However, under the two-centre strategy there will be an added safeguard because Prestwick and Swanwick will both be operating on comparable systems, so in the event of a failure of either of those systems, the other system will be able to provide assistance.

Finally, the hon. Gentleman asked me about the implications for the public-private partnership. It should be clear to him that although the way in which air traffic control deals with its primary responsibility, which is ensuring safety, has been proved to work well on this occasion, once again we have seen the difficulties associated with the introduction of new software or systems. That reinforces the Government's belief that it is essential to get increased private investment through the public-private partnership and to bring in world-class project management skills to ensure that those new investment proposals and programmes are introduced efficiently and effectively.

Mrs. Gwyneth Dunwoody (Crewe and Nantwich)

Is my hon. Friend aware that the excellence and experience of the air traffic controllers in dealing with their little bits of paper kept people safe in the skies over the weekend? It is noticeable that the system, which should have been replaced some 15 years ago, is in need of constant upgrade. Moreover, because its private manufacturing suppliers have not been able to fulfil the conditions that they offered air traffic control, there will be continuing difficulties; indeed, that is the problem for NATS at Swanwick.

Will my hon. Friend point out to the general public that most of us would prefer to rely on the responsibility of air traffic controllers, in looking after our safety in the skies, moving bits of paper around, rather than on the private suppliers of software which may be very expensive and extraordinarily unreliable?

Mr. Raynsford

I say at once to my hon. Friend that she and I entirely agree about the excellence of NATS staff in responding to the problems created by the software failure. However, I do not agree with her about the excellence of NATS in relation to new software and investment in the necessary equipment to enable those controllers to do their job properly. This incident, sadly, is a further instance of a failure of a new system. The Government believe that the right way forward is, as I have already said, to combine the possibility of attracting substantial additional private investment for the considerable new investment needs in the years ahead with world-class project management skills—which, sadly, have not been too much in evidence in new investment in NATS in the past.

Mr. Don Foster (Bath)

I, too, congratulate the air traffic controllers and others on working so tirelessly to minimise the difficulties created by the breakdown. Does the Minister agree that part of the problem may well have stemmed from the failure to invest in air traffic services in the 1980s, which was characterised not least by the failure to bring Swanwick on stream quickly enough? Does he therefore agree that the introduction of the part-privatisation of NATS may well prove a distraction from the urgent work of getting Swanwick on line and resolving the problems? Given that the busiest time of the year is now upon us, what assurances has he been given that similar occurrences are unlikely?

Mr. Raynsford

I thank the hon. Gentleman for his kind words of congratulation for the staff at NATS who, as hon. Members have said, did a first-rate job in responding to difficult circumstances when the software failed. He asked whether the problem may be to do with past failures in investment. I believe that, in this case, the problem is associated with a software package that was introduced recently as part of a continuous process of upgrading. That will be confirmed only as and when the various checks have been carried out that are necessary to identify the fault and remedy it.

On the hon. Gentleman's final point, he will understand that I cannot give an absolute assurance. However, the problem was to do with software failure rather than with the volume of air traffic using the system, so there is no reason to believe that further failures will occur this summer because of growing volumes of air traffic in the area. We have coped well. In fact, Britain has coped better with rising volumes of air traffic than Europe as a whole. The average delays to flights into and out of the United Kingdom are less than the European average, and it is certainly our intention that NATS should continue to maintain that good record.

Mr. Tony Baldry (Banbury)

Is the Minister aware that the Minister for Tourism, Film and Broadcasting was one of those who managed to get away this weekend? In a few hours, she is due to make a 20-minute keynote speech to an international conference on tourism in Las Vegas. Having been carried there at vast expense, will she be able to reassure the United Kingdom and the international tourism industry, during those 20 minutes, that such an incident will not happen again this summer? Or will there be a persistent repetition of such incidents at Heathrow, greatly damaging the United Kingdom tourism and travel industry?

Mr. Raynsford

The best possible assurance that can be given is to compare the record of air traffic control in Britain with other European countries. Throughout the first four months of this year, we have achieved an average delay of about one third of the average across Europe. That is a proud record, and it is certainly our intention that it should continue. As I have made clear in response to earlier questions, the failure was not due to the volume of traffic; it was to do with a computer system that has recently been introduced. The software system was introduced just three months ago, but by reverting to the well-tried and proven software system that was previously in operation, and which worked without such a failure, we should be able to ensure that there will be a fully adequate service for people coming to this country during the months ahead. I hope that my hon. Friend the Minister for Tourism, Film and Broadcasting is able to convey that message to anyone who expresses any doubt about coming to Britain by air.

Mr. Gerald Howarth (Aldershot)

May I, too, salute the professionalism of our air traffic controllers, who have done a magnificent job in very difficult circumstances? Is the Minister aware that the airlines, too, regard their efforts as having been Herculean and that there is no criticism of NATS for what it has done in that respect? May I ask him two specific questions? First, is the software that failed the same as that which is proposed to be installed in Swanwick? Clearly, if it is there are severe implications for Swanwick. Secondly, given that British Airways alone lost about 200 flights this weekend and that other airlines also suffered losses, can the Minister tell us whether there will be any compensation?

Mr. Raynsford

I welcome the hon. Gentleman's congratulations on the performance of the air traffic controllers. We all recognise that they have done a very good job in difficult circumstances. I remind him of my earlier comment that the current flight data processing system at West Drayton was not intended to be replaced until 2005—long after the move to Swanwick and the introduction of the new systems there. The two systems would have operated in parallel and, therefore, there would have been no reason to be concerned as a result of this incident about the proposed arrangements being made at Swanwick. The delay in introducing Swanwick did not cause this particular problem.

There is no provision for compensation either in the existing legislative framework or in the one proposed under the Transport Bill. If the hon. Gentleman reflects on the matter, he will immediately realise that there could be perverse incentives, which could work against the interests of safety, should air traffic controllers face a serious financial risk if delays were caused by introducing procedures that guaranteed safety. As he will be aware, the delays that occurred during the weekend, although regrettable, were necessary to ensure that safety was given primacy in all circumstances. It would be perhaps more difficult to do that if there were a potential liability because of compensation claims. That is the background to the absence of such provision.

Mr. Michael Fabricant (Lichfield)

How long did it take to go from the computer system that crashed to the manual system? During that period, how many aircraft were circling? The Minister stated that the manual system cannot run at the same speed or handle the same number of aircraft as the computerised system. How was that dealt with? For how long was the upgrade piloted?

Madam Speaker

Order. One or two questions at a time. We have two statements to come.

Mr. Raynsford

The introduction of the manual fallback system was immediate. The introduction of the alternative—the old tried and tested computer software system to which I referred—took a matter of hours. As I have explained to the House, it is not possible for the two systems to run in parallel. There is a start-up time on the alternative software system and, therefore, during the gap before it could be brought into use the manual fallback system operated. That is why NATS—to avoid any repeat of the two previous incidents—has decided to run the old tried and tested software system until the faults with the new system have been identified and put right.

The hon. Gentleman asked about the number of flights affected. The answer is a substantial number—virtually all flights into the United Kingdom were affected in one way or another. However, I am pleased to say that as a result of the excellent work of NATS, the position has been restored to virtual normality.

Mr. Owen Paterson (North Shropshire)

Will the Minister please give a straight answer to the question posed by my hon. Friend the Member for Banbury (Mr. Baldry)? What will the delays be later this summer?

Mr. Raynsford

The hon. Gentleman clearly did not listen to my earlier responses. The two failures that occurred some 10 days ago and last Saturday were both the result of a malfunction of a new computer software system, which was introduced three months ago. As a result of the experience of those two failures, NATS has reverted to the former well-tried and tested software system that worked successfully up to its replacement three months ago. There is no reason, therefore, to fear any recurrence of the incidents that occurred 10 days ago and last Saturday. People abroad can have every confidence that they can come to Britain in the usual way, depending on an excellent air traffic control system operated efficiently and effectively.

Miss Anne McIntosh (Vale of York)

May I press the Minister further on the particular model that he has chosen for the Transport Bill—the privatisation of NATS? Is he persuaded that that model will release enough funds from the private sector to allow for the type of investment to which he referred?

Mr. Raynsford

Yes.