HC Deb 16 February 2000 vol 344 cc992-1002
Mr. Stunell

I beg to move amendment No. 13, in page 64, line 28, at end insert— '(5A) In making any designation of a permitted participant under section 101(2) or (4) the Commission shall have regard to

  1. (i) the separate levels of support for each of the permitted participants which have given notice under section 99(1)(b) or section 99(3)(b) that they propose to campaign for the same outcome, and
  2. (ii) evidence submitted to it by any permitted participants relating to their principal reasons for campaigning for that outcome.
(5B) Where the Commission is satisfied that more than one permitted participant has demonstrated
  1. (a) substantial support, and
  2. (b) a distinct "principal reason" for campaigning for the same outcome, and
  3. (c) that it would be unreasonable to refuse designation under section 101(1),
it may designate 2 or more permitted participants for assistance under section 103. (5C) Where the Commission makes any designation under subsection (5C) above, they shall make such an apportionment of eligibility for assistance between the designated permitted participants as they think fit.'.

The Chairman of Ways and Means (Sir Alan Haselhurst)

With this, it will be convenient to discuss amendment No. 12, in clause 103, page 64, line 40, at end insert— '(2A) Where more than one designation has been made under section 102(5B), that amount shall be apportioned in accordance with section 102(5C).'.

6.30 pm
Mr. Stunell

I refer hon. Members to clause 101(1), which states:

The Commission may … designate permitted participants as organisations to whom assistance is available". We have a small language problem here in that there are designated organisations and permitted organisations. I do not claim that the Bill is ambiguous, but it is easy to become ambiguous when one is speaking about them.

Clause 101 establishes that the designated participants that meet certain criteria may receive financial assistance, and the decision on that will be made by the Electoral Commission. Clause 102, to which amendment No. 13 relates, deals with how permitted participants will be designated. Clause 102(5) provides for a situation in which designated participants make competing applications to become the organisation that will receive assistance. The special use of language in the Bill means that it is possible to lose sight of the fine distinctions between the two types of body, but a person, political party or organisation that fulfils certain criteria can become a designated participant, which allows them to take part in the process. Beyond that, one or more of those designated participants can then apply to become an organisation that will receive assistance.

The amendment would extend the options available to the Electoral Commission when deciding between competing designated participants who wished to become the organisation eligible to receive assistance. The Bill, as drafted, provides the commission with two options—it can establish which of the permitted participants has the greatest popular support, or, if it is not satisfied that any of the applicants adequately represents those campaigning for a particular outcome, it can make no award. In other words, the commission has to make an all or nothing choice if there are competing demands for support.

The amendment would give the Electoral Commission more flexibility so that it could consider a third option. For example, in the feasible prospect of a referendum on the United Kingdom's joining the euro, it is likely that several bodies that are opposed to joining will compete to become the designated organisation. At one end of the spectrum of those opposed to joining will be the Socialist Workers party. Its reasons for opposing it might be complex and various, but they boil down to the argument that the euro is a capitalist plot that should be resisted at all costs. At the other end of the spectrum will be the so-called Democracy movement, which is equally ferociously opposed to the euro, essentially because it is a communist plot. Perhaps somewhere in the middle will be a large body of Conservatives, some of whom are what I call quitters and some of whom are stayers but all of whom are committed at the moment to opposing joining the euro.

As the Bill is drafted, all three of those umbrella bodies would be able properly to participate in the campaign, but it would be for the Electoral Commission to decide which body would receive financial support for making its case in the campaign. If people are confident that their factional view is likely to be seen as the majority view among those seeking a particular outcome, they would not have to worry because the commission would designate them and they would receive the money. However, there is a problem if—perhaps in some future referendum—the forces that want one particular outcome are all strongly motivated and strongly supported, and it is not so evident which should receive the financial support of the commission.

At the limit, the commission could toss a coin and say that the money would go to, for example, the SWP; or the commission could be unable to make up its mind, because there was too much controversy or uncertainty, and allocate no money to one side of the argument. While it may not be too helpful to pursue the specific case of the euro referendum to its logical conclusion, because people will argue that it is unlikely that the SWP would receive the money, I use it as an illustration of the fact that people can have fundamentally different reasons for supporting a particular outcome in a referendum. In some cases, it may be appropriate and proper for them to form an umbrella body that can qualify for support, but on other occasions that will not be possible.

Let us suppose that the line of thought represented by Lord Shore, the right hon. Member for Chesterfield (Mr. Benn), the hon. Member for Bolsover (Mr. Skinner) and the SWP was the ascendant view in popular opinion as we approached a referendum on the euro. I put it to Conservative Members that they would not be happy if all the money to support the no campaign went to that faction and none went to the Conservative faction.

Another likely future referendum is on stage 2 of the reform of the House of Lords. It is possible that some might want to vote against the reform package, their opposition being based on the fact that they wanted a wholly elected House of Lords and that what was being offered was a miserable and unworthy compromise. Some others might also be strongly opposed to the reforms because they wished to return to the hereditary principle. As the Bill stands, those two factions would either knock each other out, with the Electoral Commission making no grant, or one of them—if it could establish some ascendancy in its views—would be supported and the other would not.

We have said several times in previous debates that the Bill is fundamental. It is the first reworking, in detailed and substantial form, of legislation that goes back 117 years, and we do not know how frequently it will be updated in the future. We heard earlier that it is a framework Bill on which other legislation dealing with referendums will be based. Therefore, the issue that I have drawn to the Committee's attention requires careful consideration. It may be that the examples I have mentioned—of the referendums on the euro and the House of Lords—are not appropriate, but it seems likely that over the next few generations the situation I have outlined will arise. If so, the absence of a third option in the Bill will be a drawback that will have considerable consequences.

Amendment No. 13 would require that before the commission could adopt any sort of third-way approach, it would have to be satisfied that each alternative choice had substantial support. The Bill uses the phrase "to the greatest extent" to describe the necessary level of support, but that might be only 36 or 37 per cent. Alternative factions, with other views, might achieve support levels of 30, 32 or 33 per cent.

The amendment retains the need for support to be substantial: it would not mean that some crackpot from Hazel Grove could turn and claim a share of the money just because he said that he had a distinctly different way of looking at things. It also requires that there be a "distinct 'principal reason''' for seeking the same outcome. If those two conditions were met, the amendment would give the Electoral Commission the authority to split the amount of financial support given to those supporting a particular outcome—but only if it would be unreasonable not to do so.

The amendment would also provide that the split of the financial support available should be decided by the Electoral Commission. Amendment No. 12, to clause 103, is the consequential amendment that would implement that requirement.

Amendment No. 13 would prevent a difficulty that is certainly possible in theory, and which I submit is quite feasible in real life—namely, that it is possible for there to be more than one completely distinct and separate reason for wanting a particular outcome. I do not know how many such reasons for wanting a particular outcome it might be possible to have, but I suggest that three is a practical limit. The amendment would prevent money going to an organisation that enjoyed only 35 per cent. support, when a larger number of people—the collective total of those who support the same outcome—would not get anything. It would also prevent the outcome whereby no money would be given to anyone simply because the Electoral Commission had lost patience with them all.

The amendment would remove unfairness and prevent the undesirable and undemocratic outcome that such unfairness might produce. It would provide a third-way alternative for the Electoral Commission when it was deciding how to allocate resources in a referendum campaign. It is designed to ensure that those resources are not fragmented and that coherent and separate arguments opposing or supporting a particular outcome are taken into account.

The amendment would safeguard democracy. I hope that the Minister will bear in mind the fact that the Bill puts in place a framework that will last for a long time. Many different circumstances will arise, and the circumstances in which there will be distinct and separate principal reasons should be a factor that the Electoral Commission takes into account when allocating resources.

Mr. Walter

I am rather concerned about amendment No. 13, which I call the chaos amendment. The hon. Member for Hazel Grove (Mr. Stunell) described the third way and where it leads. I suspect that I am beginning to find out where it leads. This delightful amendment sums up my understanding of the Liberal Democrats, especially when they campaign in elections. For them, the desired outcome is clear—that Liberal Democrats should get elected. However, they believe it reasonable to use different—even conflicting—arguments to get to the same point.

That propensity reminds me of a story arising from some local council elections in Dorset. In one village, a lady who had recently moved in complained that there were no street lights. The candidate told her that his party was going to make sure that street lights were installed. However, when the lady in the next house told him that she had heard that his party was going to put in street lights, he told her that she was safe and that his party had no intention of going against the village's tradition of not having them.

6.45 pm
Mr. Miller

The same thing happened in my constituency.

Mr. Walter

I am pleased that it does not happen only in Dorset.

The amendment is worrying because, instead of allowing for the designation of one umbrella organisation on each side of the argument, it would allow several such umbrellas to exist. People would then run around looking for cover under the umbrella that most suited them. Under clause 103 and schedule 3, designated organisations will get £600,000. The precedent for that was set in the 1975 referendum, and the amount has been uprated to allow for inflation.

However, designated organisations are also allowed to send an address to every household or elector, so if there were more than one designated organisation, which organisation would send the address? Would those messages be sent to only a third of the available households or electors, or to every other one?

Under the amendment, would the designated organisations get the use of public rooms free of charge? If there were several such umbrella organisations on each side of the argument, that would come to an awful lot of rooms.

How would the broadcasting authorities cope with referendum campaign broadcasts? For instance, umbrella organisations that support a single currency from capitalist and socialist points of view, respectively, might both seek time for referendum broadcasts. However, one organisation may fear that the broadcast made by the other might kill off the case for the single currency for all time.

The Bill's provision that only one umbrella organisation should receive the grant from Government is the correct approach. The Electoral Commission may wish to knock heads together to determine which body should receive the money, or it may leave it for the relevant groups to work out for themselves. However, such an approach would not preclude other points of view being expressed, as the Bill allows political parties and other bodies to participate in the referendum process. The Bill means that the commission will have to deal with only one body on each side of the argument, and we are content with that.

Mr. Tipping

The hon. Member for Hazel Grove (Mr. Stunell) struggled with the language when he spoke to his amendment. The matter is difficult, but he made it clear that his intention was to find a third way when it comes to funding. The amendment departs from the Bill's provision that the Electoral Commission will designate money to one umbrella organisation on each side of the referendum campaign, and would instead provide that there might be more than one such organisation on each side. The Government would strongly oppose taking that line. The essence of the Neill committee's proposal is that there should be one organisation on each side of the campaign. The committee's work in Wales persuaded it that a grant of £600,000 and facilities should be available to enable a minimum campaign to be run.

As the hon. Member for North Dorset (Mr. Walter) said, the real advantage of an umbrella organisation is the mailshot—I had better be careful what I say about mailshots in view of last night's debate on election expenses for the mayor of London and the assembly—the free use of rooms and the right to broadcast. It is difficult to see how those resources could be shared among competing claims. The hon. Member for Hazel Grove said that the Electoral Commission would face a difficult task in identifying the umbrella organisation when there were competing demands.

The hon. Gentleman's amendment states: Where the Commission makes any designation under subsection (5C) above, they shall make such an apportionment of eligibility for assistance between the designated permitted participants as they think fit. It is unclear how the Electoral Commission could be unable to identify an umbrella organisation and then do a more sophisticated analysis, in what the hon. Member for North Dorset called a chaotic situation, to identify the share-out within the umbrella group.

The Government have always recognised that it will not always be possible for everybody to work together under an umbrella group, and the hon. Member for Hazel Grove gave us some examples. However, the Bill does not prevent that from happening. It will be possible to have an umbrella organisation and groups working alongside it, which are not part of it, and have a slightly different view. That is the plurality of the situation.

It must be right to have only one umbrella group on either side. It is also right that others who want to participate will still be able to do so. There are rules in the Bill governing that. However, they will not have a right, unless they are part of the umbrella campaign, to a share of the public resources—the £600,000, the right to broadcast and the free mailshot. The hon. Member for North Dorset said that the financial pot will lead people to bang their heads together. I am not sure whether the Electoral Commission will be banging heads together. The prospect of substantial sums of money will, after a lot of discussion and some heartache, force bodies to work together as part of an umbrella organisation.

To have an umbrella organisation on each side of the argument must be the way forward. It is what the Neill committee recommended, and it is the approach that the Government would like to adopt to avoid a chaotic situation. With that, I ask the hon. Member for Hazel Grove to reflect on his amendments.

Mr. Stunell

I shall not talk about the intricacies of street lights in Dorset. However, I once made an issue out of two Conservative leaflets in my constituency—one was strongly in favour of a road, and one was strongly against it. They seemed to be distributed in adjacent areas, depending on what it was thought people in each area would like to hear. No one has a monopoly on distributing leaflets or talking to electors with what is sometimes called a forked tongue.

I apologise to the House and the Hansard reporters if I got my "permitted participants" and "designated organisations" mixed up at various points in my speech. I hope that my intention was clear; in any event, the Minister has clarified what I was trying to say, and I thank him for that.

I freely concede that there are some difficulties. My amendment may not be comprehensive enough in its scope and precise enough in its detail to achieve its objective. I understand the point that is being made. I am less happy, however, with the view that the scenario that I have described is unlikely or that if it does occur, it is not greatly to be feared. We are setting in place framework designation that is designed to last for a long time. The intention of my amendment is to provide a seldom-used but available alternative in a particular set of circumstances. However, I understand the Minister's reluctance to proceed, and recognise that there is no support for the proposal elsewhere in the House. Having aired my case, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Mr. Grieve

I beg to move amendment No. 49, in page 64, line 32, leave out "shorter or".

This is a small amendment that can be considered without having to consider some of the wider issues that were before us earlier. Nevertheless, it cannot be completely divorced from those issues, because it concerns the power that clause 102 gives the Secretary of State to vary the periods that are provided for in that clause. It may be worth setting out briefly what this part of the Bill aims to do.

Certain organisations may become designated organisations and receive funding, so there will be competition among various organisations to become so designated. All permitted participants will be eligible for designation, and will doubtless be rooting to be the designated group and receive the funding. Clause 102 provides: A permitted participant seeking to be designated under section 101 must make an application for the purpose to the Commission. He must provide statements saying that he adequately represents those campaigning for the outcome of the referendum. He must make his application within 28 days, beginning with the first day of the referendum period. Thereafter, the commission will have to get to work and, with considerable rapidity—given that dozens of organisations may be vying for designation—decide within 14 days which of the applications should be determined favourably or otherwise.

If there is one application in relation to a particular outcome of the referendum, the commission will designate that applicant unless it is not satisfied that the applicant adequately represents those campaigning for that outcome. If there is more than one application in relation to a particular outcome, which I venture to suggest may well be the case, the commission has to make almost a judgment of Solomon between the various organisations. It must pick the one which appears to represent, to the greatest extent, those campaigning for that outcome, unless it is not satisfied that any of the applicants adequately represents those campaigning for the outcome.

It is a complex and bureaucratic process, which will undoubtedly attract much public comment. One can envisage circumstances in which members of organisations may become upset and angry if they do not achieve designation. That is the task given to the commission.

7 pm

The clause sets out an extremely tight timetable, which is linked to the rest of the timetable for referendum periods. As the Home Office Minister pointed out earlier, in reality there may be a long preliminary period for most referendums, during which all the parties would vie for position. Everyone would know that the referendum was due to be held, so no one would be taken by surprise. However, the measure is framework legislation and it must take account of contingencies, some of which might include circumstances when a referendum is sprung on an unsuspecting electorate by a Government. One example—dare I offer it to the Parliamentary Secretary, Privy Council Office?—might be that of a Government who had been promising a referendum for a long time, who lulled the electorate into a false sense of security because the referendum never seemed to happen, and then suddenly announced that it would take place immediately.

If that were to happen, it would create an immense logjam. Indeed, in those circumstances the 28-day period for designation might be too short. Similarly, the poor old commission might be hard put to find the time to choose between competing organisations. It strikes me—and the official Opposition—as astonishing that in subsection (6) we give the Secretary of State the power to make by order a variation in the 28 and 14-day periods to make the period not only longer, but, if he sees fit, shorter.

That appears completely crazy. I can understand the need for a longer period, but I cannot fathom how a shorter period could be just. The mere fact that the measure includes that provision gives me some cause for anxiety. Technically, it would allow the Secretary of State to move, by order, that the period for the submission of designation could be limited, for example, to six or seven days—let alone the absurdity that it might be reduced to 24 hours. One consequence of that would be that individual organisations seeking to be the designated party in a referendum campaign would be hamstrung because they would have insufficient time to mount their case.

I should be grateful if the Minister would explain the justification for providing a shorter as well as a longer period, although I can well understand why a longer period might be provided.

Mr. Tipping

indicated assent.

Mr. Grieve

The Minister nods.

However, if we consider the matter realistically, a period of 28 days to put in a designation request and 14 days for its consideration is the bare minimum. In that case, the Committee can safely tell the Government to adopt the amendment and delete the possibility of a shorter period because, in practice, that shorter period could never happen. At least, it could never happen if a Government were acting properly.

Although I have confidence even in the Government of whom the Minister is a representative, one has to look ahead, in framework legislation, to possible occasions when that might not be so. In those circumstances, unless the Minister can offer me some clear examples of why he thinks that the existing provision is useful, I urge him to reconsider the matter. If he thinks that my remarks make some sense, will he adopt the amendment or, at least, assure me that he will consider it?

Mr. Tipping

I was struck by the hon. Gentleman's comment that provisions were needed so that contingencies could be taken into account. He rightly pointed out that, in this case, the contingency is the power of the Secretary of State to provide for a longer or shorter period than the 28 or 14 days. I shall not go over the provisions in the measure because he explained them so well.

As the hon. Gentleman pointed out, the argument for a longer period is that there will be much pressure on the commission. According to the provisions set out in the measure, the quickest time in which a referendum could take place is 10 weeks. Usually, there would be far more notice than that. There may be a case for some flexibility and for a longer period because of the difficulties that the commission might face. That is why provision for a longer period has been included.

Sir Michael Spicer

Will the Minister clarify whether it is possible that the use of the 28-day period in clause 102 would cause the designated 28-day period in clause 97 to run out? Is it possible that the umbrella group might never be formed during the referendum period?

Mr. Tipping

That is certainly not the intention of the measure. It provides money and resources to umbrella groups—for the first time, £600,000 will be available, as well as free mailshots and so on. The intention clearly is not to stop the formation of umbrella organisations.

Sir Michael Spicer

I accept that that is not the intention, but is it a possible outcome that the 28-day period mentioned in clause 97 would be the same 28-day period mentioned in clause 102? If so, the commission would run out of time for designation.

Mr. Tipping

I think that the hon. Gentleman is taking the Committee back to a point that I made a few moments ago—that the minimum time for a referendum could be 10 weeks. The 10 weeks comprise two 28-day periods and a 14-day period. There is a 28-day period for the formation of the umbrella group; 14 days for the commission to deal with designation; and a campaign period, beyond that, of not less than 28 days. I think that covers the hon. Gentleman's point.

The hon. Member for Beaconsfield (Mr. Grieve) asked why there was provision for a shorter period and why flexibility was needed. He asked for clear examples. The most obvious example is in Northern Ireland, where it is sometimes necessary quickly to seek the consent of the people on a particular settlement. In the referendum on the Good Friday agreement, only 32 days elapsed between the laying of the Northern Ireland Negotiations (Referendum) Order 1998 and the holding of the referendum. That is the reason for the inclusion of a reference to a shorter period.

The Government believe that, occasionally, there might be situations where it is necessary to act quickly, but that will not be the norm. Ministers and officials feel that we should reserve that flexibility; in extreme circumstances, there should be the chance to move to a shorter period. The object of the Bill is to conform to the time periods that it establishes—the 28 days and the 14 days, which, as the hon. Gentleman points out, will be most demanding. However, there could be occasions—especially in Northern Ireland—when some flexibility might be used.

Given that reassurance, I hope that the hon. Gentleman will reconsider the amendment.

Mr. Grieve

I am grateful to the Minister for his candour, although I do not find the Northern Ireland example entirely reassuring. Indeed, it is a good example, because one might say that what was being sought was to take a snapshot of public opinion in the Province and to do it so quickly that people did not have time to change their minds on the issue. Dare I say it to the Minister, but I thought that the whole idea behind the Bill was to create a fair framework that would prevent sudden advantage being taken of public moods? I make that point even though, if I had been living in Northern Ireland, I might have voted yes in the referendum there.

I am not wholly persuaded by the Minister's argument. He is honestly telling us that there may be circumstances in which the Government think that it is to their advantage to ask a question and get a quick answer. However, those who disagree with the answer that a Government are seeking look to the rules and regulations, as set out by Lord Neill, to do the opposite. They look to them to offer a sufficient time frame in which debate and reasoned argument can take place, so that everyone can go to the polling station on the day of the referendum having had a real opportunity to consider the issues.

We cannot get away from the fact that, historically, referendums have often been used by tyrannical regimes to seek endorsement for matters to their advantage from waves of public opinion. Sometimes, they come unstuck. For example, in the past 48 hours, a Government, who seem to have pretty dubious democratic credentials have received a slap in the face from the electorate when they thought that they had it all stitched up.

We are trying to do something different. I am not persuaded by the Minister's argument, but I shall not press the amendment to a vote. However, I hope that he will reconsider the issue, because the limits set out in the clause are the absolute minimum on which a fair campaign could possibly be based. If that is so, the only possible ground for having a shorter period would be to introduce a measure of unfairness. In those circumstances, the Committee should have nothing to do with the provision. However, subject to those comments—and I hope that the Minister will bear them in mind—I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Sir Michael Spicer

I wish to make two brief points. First, I believe that it is unhealthy for the state to fund political campaigns. Down that path are all sorts of threats to democracy. However, I shall put that point to one side. Secondly, if the state is going to make such payments, it is right that there should be an independent commission as outlined in the clause. It should be responsible for allocating state payments. If it is right for the commission to have designation and authoritative powers under the clause, why is it not given similar powers in other clauses? I have returned to that point time and again, because it is illogical. If the commission is correctly given such authoritative powers by this clause, could not the Government reconsider, as I sense they might, the whole philosophy, so that they strengthen the authority and independence of the commission?

I hope that the clause will act as a precedent for the Government and that they will continue the process of giving as much independence to the commission—as opposed to the Secretary of State—as is possible.

Mr. Tipping

I will not comment on the hon. Gentleman's view that we should not go down the road of state funding, except to point out that he, his party and all of us receive such facilities during a general election campaign. The proposal in the clause is not as new as he suggests.

7.15 pm

I agree entirely with the hon. Gentleman that the commission must be seen as independent and authoritative, and it must have the support of all the political parties and players. I have never said that the Bill is in the best shape possible; we have already improved it in our discussions and there will be further opportunities to do that. I also draw his attention to clauses 4 and 5, which will give the commission the task of preparing reports after each election and reviewing its work regularly so that it can take stock of what it has done. Referendums are a new area for legislation, and the commission will want to revisit the issues, revise them and bring forward further proposals.

Sir Michael Spicer

The Minister's point about independence was correct, and I am grateful to him for saying that he will consider ways of improving the Bill.

This clause is about the commission's functions and powers. I hope that the precedent established by the powers for designation in the clause will be borne in mind by the Minister when he considers the commission's powers and functions in other clauses.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 102 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

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