HC Deb 19 October 1999 vol 336 cc266-81 4.15 pm
The Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the Regions y>(Mr. John Prescott)

Madam Speaker, I wish, with permission, to make a statement about the horrific railway accident that happened at Ladbroke Grove junction on the approach to Paddington station on 5 October, when, at 8.11 am, the Great Western train from Cheltenham collided with the Thames train leaving Paddington. The House will be aware that, last week, my noble Friend the Minister for Transport made a statement in another place.

I am sure that the House will wish to join me in expressing deepest sympathy to the families and friends of those who lost their lives and hoping for the fullest possible recovery of those who were injured.

Immediately, we asked how such an accident could happen and how we could prevent such a thing from ever happening again. The latest casualty figures are 30 fatalities—including both drivers—and 245 injured. It was the worst rail accident in Britain since the Clapham Junction accident in 1988, when 35 people died.

Once again, the vigour, courage and professionalism demonstrated by our emergency services—fire, police, medical and health and safety staff—were outstanding. The emergency services' reaction was the product of constant training and planning, enabling them to perform in a manner of which I know that the whole nation wants to express its appreciation.

A striking feature of the appalling event was the remarkable reaction of ordinary people who were nearby at the time. Railway workers, staff from the local supermarket, others working nearby and, of course, survivors of the collision rushed to help those in distress without regard to their own safety. In the midst of horror, their selfless behaviour was a testament to human courage and willingness to reach out to others during a crisis. I am sure that the House will wish to join me in paying tribute to them all.

In addition to investigations by Railtrack and the railway inspectorate, there is to be a full public inquiry into the Paddington crash, under the chairmanship of Lord Cullen. I am pleased that Lord Cullen has agreed to take on the task and begun his work so promptly, visiting the site on the day of his appointment. He will, of course, soon have the benefit of the Southall inquiry, to which we attach the highest importance.

Lord Cullen will be examining the causes of the tragic accident, and also the wider issue of the overall safety regime in the railway industry. He will, inevitably, take some time to complete his work, but the Government will do all that we can to remove any obstacles to progress and ensure that we avoid the type of delay that the Southall inquiry experienced.

On Friday, 8 October, Her Majesty's chief inspector of railways issued interim findings on the causes of the crash. Subject to final confirmation, we now know that the Thames train passed a red signal before travelling a further 700 m into the path of the Great Western train. The automatic warning system on board would have applied the brakes if it had not been cancelled by the driver.

The chief inspector of railways has made it clear that, whatever the immediate causes of the tragedy, they should be considered as symptoms of a more general problem in the organisation of an effective railway safety regime.

I am determined to ensure that the industry takes firm and urgent action to reduce greatly the number of signals passed at danger—so-called SPADs. There has been considerable concern about SPAD incidents. Although the number of such incidents had been falling—from almost 1,000 in 1991, to just under 600 in 1997—last year it increased to 643. Consequently, last month, the railway inspectorate published a report detailing actions companies were required to take to strengthen safety systems. The chief inspector has my full support in that.

On 7 October, the railway inspectorate wrote to the train operating companies, instructing them to re-brief all drivers on the location of suspect signals and ways of avoiding passing signals at danger, and to review their driver training and arrangements for monitoring performance.

On 8 October, the inspectorate issued three enforcement notices. The first prohibits the use of signal SN109—the signal passed at danger by the Thames train—until Railtrack takes effective action to prevent further trains from passing it at danger. The second requires Railtrack to introduce by 6 November additional controls at 21 other signals passed at danger more than seven times in the past eight years. The third requires Railtrack by the same date to produce plans to reduce the risk at all other signals with a recent history of being passed at danger.

Meanwhile, I have asked for a weekly report to be sent to me on the number of SPADs. The chief inspector of railways has reported to me that, in the seven days after the accident, there were 16 SPAD incidents on the network. That is consistent with the average weekly numbers for October over the past three years. I have asked the railway inspectorate to produce a monthly analysis of SPADs which will be placed in the Library of the House.

The concern about SPADs has been increased by last night's incident at Lewes, where a Hastings passenger train collided with an empty train. There were 11 passengers plus driver and guard on the Hastings train, and all were safely evacuated. Fortunately, no one was hurt. Railtrack promptly informed the Health and Safety Executive, and an inspector from the railway inspectorate arrived on the scene.

The initial report from the HSE indicates that the train left Lewes station against a red stop light, and although the signaller at Lewes put out an emergency general stop call via the cab secure radio network, he was unable to prevent a collision. The likeliest explanation is that a number of errors by the platform staff at Lewes and the train crew combined resulted in a signal being passed at danger. The railway industry intends to carry out an internal inquiry. Meanwhile, the HSE is continuing to investigate, and we await its conclusions.

These incidents have led to a lot of discussion about train protection systems. Indeed, the inspectors consider that the Paddington accident would have been prevented had the train protection and warning system been installed. In 1989, the Hidden inquiry into the Clapham crash recommended the network-wide fitment of automatic train protection, although no workable system was available in Britain at that time. No decision to implement this recommendation was taken, except on a pilot basis.

When this Government came to office, the Health and Safety Commission—aware of my close interest in the area—expressed concern that the industry was not making sufficient progress on either of the two key rail safety issues of the day: namely, the development of train protection systems and the withdrawal of mark 1 slam-door rolling stock.

We made it clear to the HSC in January 1998 that it should bring forward whatever regulations it considered necessary to improve safety on the railways and to reduce the incidence of signals passed at danger. Those regulations—signed by me on 30 July—will introduce train protection across the network and will bring forward by two years the elimination of mark 1 rolling stock.

The regulations require the early introduction of the TPWS and the continued use of ATP where it is already operational. The regulations do not preclude the introduction of further ATP, especially on our high-speed rail network. In fact, ATP is already operational on the Great Western line, the Chiltern line and the Heathrow express. It is being introduced on the channel tunnel rail link and the west coast main line, together with the east coast main line and the midland main line when they are upgraded. There is a balance of systems on our railway network.

There has been much discussion in the media and elsewhere about different types of train protection systems, and a great deal of misinformed opinion and differing technical advice has added to the confusion. I want to identify the safest and most appropriate options for use on our railways. I have therefore asked Sir David Davies, president of the Royal Academy of Engineering, to assess and report back to me on the effectiveness, practicability and cost of train protection systems, and also on how best to reduce the present number of SPADs.

The Paddington incident has of course given rise to a large number of other questions not related to signals being passed at danger. They include the safety of the rolling stock and emergency equipment in case of fire; the behaviour of automatic central door locking; the type of diesel fuel; and the design of the track configuration and signalling.

We would all like instant answers on those issues. They will be examined thoroughly and properly in the investigations into the crash. I trust that the House agrees that it would be wrong to leap hastily to conclusions. Of course, should right hon. and hon. Members wish to raise any specific points, I shall ensure that they are drawn to the attention of those conducting the investigations and the public inquiry.

Concerns have been expressed since privatisation about fragmentation leading to a blame culture. Particular concern has been expressed about the wide range of responsibilities that reside in Railtrack's safety and standards directorate.

Last year, at my request and in line with a recommendation of the Transport Sub-Committee, the HSC began a review of the issue. Its interim report reached my office on the day of the Paddington crash. The report raises serious concerns about the rail industry, largely relating to priorities and decisions on safety standards, approval of the operators' safety cases, safety audit, incident investigation and the adequacy of strategic research. It states that those issues should be explored further.

As a consequence I acted immediately, and at my request the Health and Safety Commission has appointed a specialist team to investigate those concerns and advise on any action required. I am glad to say that Railtrack has publicly welcomed that initiative.

I am minded to transfer the main functions of Railtrack's safety and standards directorate out of Railtrack, but where those functions are best located requires careful consideration. The answer must be one that ensures greater coherence on safety and does not, through disrupting safety management, result in an increase in risk.

The chief inspector of railways is keeping me informed of the progress of his investigations into the Paddington crash. He hopes to have sufficient additional information from the various tests and examinations now under way to be able to make a second interim report shortly.

I asked for an early report on action undertaken by Railtrack to improve safety on the approach to Paddington station, both in the short and longer terms. Although the emergency services have completed their work and the track has been cleared, Railtrack will reopen Paddington station only when the railway inspectorate is satisfied that it is safe.

There will be some restrictions on services, in particular at peak times, notably because of the closure of the approach to signal SN109. The actions that I have taken since the Paddington crash have been designed to enable the fullest possible investigation of the causes of this appalling accident and the best ways of preventing it from happening again. They should ensure that the decisions that need to be taken will be properly informed, thoroughly considered and as prompt as possible. In the meantime, whenever it becomes clear that a measure needs to be taken, we shall take it. Neither shall we hesitate to introduce legislation to the House, should that be required.

I have summoned the managing directors of all the passenger and freight operators, the shadow Strategic Railway Authority, the Rail Regulator, Railtrack and the general secretaries of the rail unions to a meeting next Monday to thrash out any immediate and additional steps that can be taken to improve safety. In particular, we shall discuss the HSE reports on SPADs and Railtrack's safety and standards directorate.

The Ladbroke Grove junction rail crash touched the heart of the entire nation. It must be a watershed for railway safety. We must make it so. We must emphasise to everyone concerned that safety comes first, second and third on Britain's railways.

The lasting legacy and the outcome of all the urgent actions now in progress must surely be a more open, more responsive, more rigorous culture of safety across the rail industry. We owe the victims and their loved ones nothing less. I am sure that the House agrees.

Mr. John Redwood (Wokingham)

I thank the right hon. Gentleman for his statement. On behalf of the Opposition, I send my deepest sympathy to all the relatives of those who died near Paddington. The House is united in a feeling of shock and grief and we all send our best wishes for a full recovery to those who were injured. We shall all find it difficult to put behind us some of the scenes that we saw, particularly those of us, including me, who represent constituencies along that ill-fated railway line. We are all united in thanking the emergency services for all that they did after the crash to take care of those suffering.

Safety is above party. We all want safer railways. From the moment of the crash, the Opposition have stressed two points. First, we must have a full and speedy inquiry into both Southall and Paddington, and we welcome the news on that. Will the Secretary of State give us some firmer idea of the timetable that he has in mind? It is dangerous to leap to conclusions before knowing the full causes of the crashes, but we wish to press on with the issue because of the fear felt by the travelling public. Secondly, the Opposition will support any sensible measures that can make such dreadful crashes less likely in the future.

It is my unwelcome task today to ask some of the questions that the nation wants answered—that is the role of the Opposition—but I do so with a heavy heart. Many people have been shocked to learn of the number of red signals that have been ignored. When did the Secretary of State first become aware that the number of signals passed at danger has been increasing? He has demanded a weekly report of red signals passed, so is he telling us that he can do something as Secretary of State to ensure that it does not happen in the future? That would be most welcome. What action could he take following yesterday's collision, for example?

We all want swifter progress with the Paddington inquiry than took place with the Southall inquiry. Is the Secretary of State aware that the Opposition wish to co-operate with any reasonable change that may be necessary to allow public inquiries to proceed in parallel with other legal processes? We feel that that is most important.

Will the Secretary of State publish all the evidence and advice that has persuaded him to strip Railtrack of its safety responsibilities before seeing the inquiry findings? For example, does he intend that the same staff currently doing the job should perform the duties in a new body, or should they be dismissed and new people found and trained? Will the instructions to the new body be the same as the instructions to Railtrack, or does he now think those instructions were inadequate and part of the problem? Why does he wish to give Railtrack responsibility for a significant part of the London underground when he does not think that it can be trusted with safety responsibilities?

We wish to know what the Secretary of State has decided about the remit of the Southall inquiry. Will he meet the legal representatives of the families caught up in that tragedy, as the Leader of the Opposition, the shadow transport Minister and I did this morning, to ensure that their concerns about the scope of the inquiry are met? They are deeply felt concerns, and we were deeply moved by the requirements that their legal representatives put to us today.

Is it true that the HSE has said that Paddington is unsafe and that the station definitely cannot reopen tomorrow? The confusion surrounding the reopening of Paddington is doing nothing for the feelings of those affected by the tragedy or for the confidence of the travelling public. They all deserve better. I hope that the Secretary of State will return to the House soon with a plan of action, based on inquiry findings, for better technology and better train driving, so that travellers can be assured that he and the industry have done everything they can to learn from this series of tragedies. He will find the Opposition very willing to help.

Mr. Prescott

I am grateful for the remarks of support for the organisations involved in that terrible tragedy. We are united in wanting to improve safety, and I readily accept that questions raised by the right hon. Gentleman were not raised in a critical tone, but as a proper function of the Opposition in such situations. The House wishes to ensure that we have the best and safest railways, but I have made it clear from the beginning that I have avoided making political points, although it would be easy to do so. They do not help in such situations. People want us to get on with the job, because they are concerned that the railways are not as safe as they should be. They want the Government and the House to work together to improve matters, and that is our intention.

I met some of the relatives of victims of the Southall crash and discussed their concerns. As the right hon. Gentleman will know, I do not wish that inquiry to be delayed or held up while the Cullen inquiry takes place. It is important to get the conclusions of the investigation of the Southall crash before us as quickly as we can. Those conclusions will be relevant to consideration of the automatic train protection system and will have much to teach us about what went wrong that day. That is the purpose of inquiries. Indeed, I have asked Sir David Davies to make his engineering expertise on automatic train protection systems available to the inquiry. It is important that the Southall inquiry should not be delayed; I disagree with the lawyers who argue that it should be delayed until the Cullen inquiry starts. However, that is a difference of opinion. I think that the House would want that report to be concluded. It has been too long in preparation: people want to hear its conclusions, and they want to do so now.

The right hon. Member for Wokingham (Mr. Redwood) asked when I knew about the increase in SPAD incidents. Almost my first action, in the first month after I took office, was to call for a report on rail safety. Three or four months later, I called in the Health and Safety Executive to discuss precisely how we were to end the delay in the introduction of an automatic train protection system. The advice that I was given was that something like 70 or 80 per cent. of such incidents could be avoided. Naturally, I told the Health and Safety Executive, "Get on with providing the system—bring me the regulations." If the right hon. Gentleman looks at the dates of the relevant decisions in this matter, he will see that I acted promptly, within weeks of coming into office.

The reason why I acted so quickly is simple: I have always been concerned with safety, and have felt that not enough was being done in that regard. That attitude characterised my actions in my early days as Secretary of State with responsibility for rail safety.

The right hon. Gentleman asked what actions we have taken since the inquiries were instituted. Of course we will act on the inquiries' recommendations. The Southall inquiry is a very important matter for us. I am sure that the right hon. Gentleman will agree that the inquiries are crucial in allowing us to learn the truth. We must not try to guess what happened, and then act on emotion. The purpose of public inquiries is to allow reasoned consideration and a thorough examination of what needs to be done.

However, that is not to say that we can do nothing. Indeed, the country would not thank us if we were to say that we should do nothing while awaiting the inquiries' outcome. That is why I have called representatives from across the industry to a meeting on Monday, and why I have made it clear, through the Health and Safety Executive, that there is more that we can do.

I am not convinced that we cannot reduce the number of SPAD incidents, and I believe that more could be done about driver training. More responsibility should be borne by the industry and those who govern it, and there is more that they can do. That is what the public feel, and what I feel, and I intend to make that absolutely clear at the meeting on Monday. I believe that, by working together, we can improve matters. I hope that we can achieve that on Monday.

Everyone agrees that the Southall inquiry should report very quickly. I hope that it will be ready in December, and that we will be able to judge some recommendations then. That is relevant to my previous point: I believe that Sir David Davies can give us some good advice on the technical information that is available. There is a lot of confusion about such matters. Press reports maintain that people are not sure about automatic train protection, but I was asked—as I think were the previous Government—to adopt a system that was not proven to work 100 per cent. of the time. If we are to order safety systems, it is our responsibility to ensure that they work properly and well.

The right hon. Gentleman mentioned transferring the work of the safety and standards directorate, but the conclusions of the report from the Health and Safety Executive were clear. He knows that that report has been published, so he has had access to the evidence that I received. The report suggested that there should be further discussions on train and station operators' safety cases being accepted directly by the HSE. It also suggested the transfer of the oversight of railway standards development to an existing appropriate organisation such as the British Standards Institution, which is an independent body. Other suggestions included the relocation of some safety audit functions, and the development of new mechanisms for strategic research to achieve better incident investigations.

Those are serious charges to be made against a body with responsibility for safety such as the safety and standards directorate. Nevertheless, I have told the Health and Safety Executive to send in an independent body and find out what it has to say about the criticisms. We will report back at the appropriate time and make a proper judgment. I think that that is the proper way to proceed. I await the report, and all the measures that are taken will be presented to the House. That is evidence of our desire to achieve greater safety on the railway system.

Mr. Martin Salter (Reading, West)

Will my right hon. Friend pass on the appreciation of the people of Reading for the many messages of support and condolence that they received following the awful news of the Paddington train disaster, not least the messages from him, the Prime Minister and Her Majesty the Queen?

Does my right hon. Friend agree that my constituents are right to feel angry that such a disaster—I refuse to call it an accident—occurred so short a time after Southall? Does he agree that Railtrack does not have the confidence of the travelling public and that that problem has been compounded by what has occurred in Lewes? Does he agree that the shambles of the reopening of Paddington has compounded matters further, as have revelations that drivers' warnings about lack of visibility regarding signal 109 were ignored, and that drivers' warnings that the infrastructure for the Heathrow express was causing confusion and blocking sight lines were also ignored?

Will my right hon. Friend consider implementing one more recommendation, made by the Select Committee on the Environment, Transport and Regional Affairs in March last year? The Committee's report said: The Government would be well advised to consider whether it could better obtain its strategic objectives by taking an equity share in Railtrack. Would it not be of some comfort to the travelling public if they knew that someone on the board of Railtrack had wide responsibility for community safety rather than just a legal responsibility to a group of shareholders?

Mr. Prescott

I will certainly pass on my hon. Friend's remarks about the gratitude felt by many of his constituents. I understand the anger expressed by people in Reading and in other areas. I was pleased to meet hon. Members last week who told me of their concerns.

We must be careful not to jump to conclusions. My hon. Friend has apparently already concluded that the Lewes incident was due to Railtrack, but I am not sure that he can so readily jump to that conclusion. That is the whole purpose of inquiries. The inspectors have already told me that that incident possibly involved a driver passing a red light. I do not want to blame anyone, but we should not jump to conclusions.

I understand why my hon. Friend feels as he does, given all the other matters that he mentioned. However, I must be guided by proper investigation and inquiry that provides a thorough examination of the facts before I can come to conclusions about action needed to improve safety. That is what inquiries are for, and they have played a tremendous role in improving safety in Britain. I am quite a fan of inquiries; they have done an excellent job.

My hon. Friend's point about buying an equity share in Railtrack is interesting. In fact, the Government hold some shares in Railtrack for various reasons, but it amounts only to a small part of the company. I believe that that is not the way in which to control safety. We need properly to apportion the responsibility as between the companies that must implement safety measures and the public authorities that have the duty to interpret and impose safety standards on the industry. The balance of responsibility between those bodies provides the best safety operation.

I believe that there may be a conflict of interest in Railtrack over safety and operation, a point that has been strongly made. The point is not, I am bound to say, unique, as the inquiry conducted by Lord Robens concluded that we should make great efforts to ensure that there was no conflict of interest. Several departments had their safety functions removed on those grounds and there has been a massive safety improvement across the board as well as in the rail industry. I shall take care to ensure that we strike the proper balance between safety authorities and the industry.

Mr. Don Foster (Bath)

May I associate the Liberal Democrats with the sympathy expressed by the Secretary of State for all those affected by the tragedy of the Paddington rail disaster? In addition, may we associate ourselves with his comments on the courage and efficiency of the emergency services and, as he was right to point out, of the members of the public who also assisted?

I welcome the right hon. Gentleman's consideration of a separation of safety issues from Railtrack. Will he confirm that he accepts that Railtrack—a for-profit company—must not be judge and jury on rail safety issues? If the public are to regain confidence in our railways, Railtrack must not have the power to set and monitor its own safety standards.

I welcome the Secretary of State's desire to introduce measures intended to ensure the speedy introduction of effective systems to prevent trains from passing red signals. As the right hon. Gentleman knows, modern technology is more than capable of preventing trains from crashing into each other. The public will not understand it if that technology is not used to make our railways safe or not introduced as quickly as realistically possible.

Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that while contractors for the installation of the train protection and warning system—TPWS, to which he referred earlier—have been asked to speed up the time scale within which their bids are entered, Railtrack has not speeded up its process for letting the contract or allowing contractors on site? There must therefore be doubt as to whether the system will be in place within the agreed time. Will the Secretary of State agree to investigate that issue and report back to the House?

Finally, the Secretary of State said that cost is not to be the issue where safety is concerned. Will he therefore clarify who exactly is to foot the bill for safety improvements and assure us that other vital investment in the rail industry will not suffer as a result?

Mr. Prescott

I welcome the hon. Gentleman as the new spokesman for the Liberal Democrat party on transport and the environment, albeit on a sad occasion. I am certainly grateful for his warm words of support for all those involved in this terrible tragedy.

On Railtrack, I agree that there is a problem—it was expressed in the industry and it was certainly expressed in the HSE report to which I referred. Railtrack appears to have the role of both judge and jury with its standards department. That is why the Select Committee recommended that the functions should be separated. I think that when the relevant Bill was before the House both Opposition parties opposed the measure. I have therefore asked the HSE committee, which is an independent body, to study the accusations that have been made about that conflict. We expect a report shortly and I shall deal with it. However, I have a word of warning for the hon. Gentleman—I am not as yet sure to what single body the role should be transferred. No doubt we will debate that.

On the system itself, on contracts, the introduction of TPWS and concerns about automatic train protection systems, it is true that we should use the best technology. Perhaps we have not been as effective in using the best technology to improve safety on our railways by comparison with some European railways. At the end of the day, we want a technological system that works and is effective. It is not solely about money. Indeed, the various sums mentioned in connection with automatic train protection systems and TPWS could be financed, and properly so. In talks, Railtrack and other bodies have understood that it could be done in that way. Of course, it should become an essential requirement of the industry's charges that they should cover a safe railway system. People in this country are concerned that there should be some form of train protection system. I think that that is a minimum requirement if we are to restore confidence to the travelling public.

I will investigate the hon. Gentleman's concerns. Indeed, the Davies report should give us some good engineering advice, which might deal with some of the conflicting concerns that have arisen in relation to types of technology in automatic train protection systems. I will certainly look into the matter.

Mrs. Gwyneth Dunwoody (Crewe and Nantwich)

The whole House will welcome the focus and urgency of the actions of the Secretary of State on the matter. This is indeed a watershed in railway accidents. People will need to be reassured that the railway system is still among the safest means of transport in the United Kingdom.

My right hon. Friend mentioned moving the safety unit out of Railtrack. It is essential for it to be a free-standing body. The Select Committee on the Environment, Transport and Regional Affairs took evidence that made it clear that that could be part of a first step towards an independent safety authority. There is no criticism to be made of the railways inspectorate, or indeed of the Health and Safety Executive, but some worry exists about the HSE's enforcement powers. Will my right hon. Friend study how quickly it can get responses not only from Railtrack but from the train operating companies when they make recommendations?

Will my right hon. Friend also ensure that Railtrack introduces as soon as possible a confidential reporting unit—it could already have announced that—to enable train staff and drivers and anyone else connected with the railways to give confidential evidence about companies or incidents that break the law or safety rules? It is clear from my postbag that there is a nasty atmosphere in some of the companies, with bullying meaning that people are frightened to speak out. The public will be protected only when people are openly able to report on what is happening and on what is endangering lives.

Finally, the House expects not only Railtrack but all the train operating companies to produce new programmes for signalling, to respond by introducing new rolling stock and no longer to talk about bringing new installations into play only when they are given new franchises. That sort of tacky bargaining will not work any more.

Mr. Prescott

I thank my hon. Friend for her remarks. She is right to say that this is a watershed for safety in the railway industry. I congratulate her and her Committee on the good sense of their recommendations on these matters. I find myself constantly following them, whether in respect of the Strategic Railway Authority, the proposals for a separate, independent safety authority, or those for a hotline or confidential line where people can talk with the confidence that they will not be exposed about the pressures that they feel they are under—and then have them properly investigated. People tend to think of that arrangement only in respect of the air industry, but it has been working quite well in Scotland, where it is financed by the companies themselves. Introducing such a scheme to the English railway system is one of the issues that I will discuss with them at the meeting on Monday.

My hon. Friend's Committee is right to propose an independent safety authority. I want to see independence associated with safety and a reduction of the conflicts of interest that, I fear, exist in some areas. I have yet to make up my mind. I appear before my hon. Friend's Committee on Thursday and we may have further exchanges on that, but I certainly want independence; there is an argument only about the sort of body needed. The Committee is again leading the way on that.

I agree with my hon. Friend on whether the TOCs should be as concerned as others in the signalling system and railway safety. In the new franchise negotiations, we have always considered what safety standards and what kind of technology and signalling should apply. The industry is making some steps towards operating nationally rather than as a fragmented body, as we have seen in the past 12 months. Bringing the companies together on Monday will remind them of their national role and of the fact that acting nationally and co-operatively, not in the fragmented way of the past few years, is the way to achieve the best standards.

Mr. John MacGregor (South Norfolk)

I join the Secretary of State in expressing my deepest sympathy to the families of the bereaved and my admiration and gratitude for the work of the emergency services. I agree that the highest importance should be attached to safety, not only in the railway industry but in all transport sectors. It is in the interests of the industry itself that it should have that attitude, not least in attracting and retaining confidence with the increasing volume of passengers and freight on the railways.

The right hon. Gentleman is also right not to reach hasty, immediate conclusions on many such matters without the evidence and views of those conducting the inquiries. As he knows, these are never easy matters to resolve. I am grateful for his recognition that it was as much the technical and viability worries as anything else that led the previous Government not to adopt the automatic train protection system.

In the Secretary of State's consideration of what he might do about the safety and standards directorate, will he bear in mind the utmost importance of ensuring that nothing is done to undermine, reduce or take away Railtrack's management, operational and day-to-day responsibility for safety?

Mr. Prescott

I am grateful for the right hon. Gentleman's remarks. In looking up the history of this whole business, I had occasion to read several of his statements as Secretary of State for Transport dealing with these difficult issues of automatic train protection. It is right that we need to get the best system as soon as possible. Cost is not the only consideration; safety is our highest priority, as he has emphasised.

On whether there is a conflict of interests in respect of Railtrack and whether safety standards interfere with the operation of the railway system, we must always balance the best operation against the highest safety. I assure the right hon. Gentleman that even if we separate the safety and standards responsibility from Railtrack, which I am minded to do, Railtrack will still be left with the responsibility under present law to operate a safe railway system.

Ms Karen Buck (Regent's Park and Kensington, North)

As the Deputy Prime Minister is aware, this terrible crash took place within the borders of my constituency. I am grateful to him for his warm words to local residents for their part. Indeed, as he said, staff at the nearby supermarket and primary school and many local residents not only were among the first on the scene but provided vital support for the emergency services during the course of the day.

Will my right hon. Friend spare a word and a thought for the residents of a number of blocks of flats which directly overlook the site of the crash? Emergency workers have had the grisly task of taking part in the recovery for two weeks, but in addition hundreds of residents—many of them very vulnerable people—have had to confront that sight every day for a fortnight.

Will my right hon. Friend respond to this morning's news reports that an independent safety panel found that there were still severe visibility problems at 24 signals in the approach to Paddington? Can he reassure me that the Health and Safety Commission and the railway inspectorate will examine that evidence as well as all their other findings before Paddington is allowed to reopen?

Mr. Prescott

I am grateful for my hon. Friend's remarks. I hope that she will pass on the feelings that I, the Opposition and all Members of the House have expressed about the tremendous contribution made by the local residents. Anyone who visited the site was struck by the fact that it was narrow, and access for the emergency services was difficult and depended a great deal on the co-operation of local residents. We are all extremely grateful for the role that they played in this terrible tragedy. Their help ranged from helping to get people out of burning coaches to going around offering coffee to members of the emergency services. It was remarkable and I hope that my hon. Friend will pass on the feelings of the House.

As for the 24 signals at Paddington, the various reports are being studied by the HSC and the railway inspectorate. The Paddington line will not be reopened unless the HSC is satisfied that it is a safe operation.

Mr. Nigel Jones (Cheltenham)

I thank the Deputy Prime Minister for his courtesy in keeping me informed of developments since the tragic accident and especially for inviting all hon. Members with constituencies along the route of the 6.03 from Cheltenham to the briefing last Monday, which was very useful.

Will the right hon. Gentleman say something about speed limits in the area of the accident in view of the estimated combined impact speed of around 180 mph? Will he put pressure on Railtrack and the operating companies to upgrade the whole of the south-west region to replace single-track lines and introduce electrification so that never again will we see head-on accidents resulting in diesel fireballs such as that which occurred on this occasion?

Mr. Prescott

Yes, I can assure the hon. Gentleman that we, the Health and Safety Executive and the railway inspectorate are looking at how it is possible to achieve the best form of track layout for the railway system. The accident has obviously brought that very much more to mind and the matter is highlighted at Paddington, but there are other pinchpoints in the system that could perhaps be better designed. They are being studied, particularly with regard to signals, by the HSC and the railway inspectorate.

It is difficult to know exactly what speeds were being done at the time of the crash. The black box in the cab of the Thames train was recovered, but in a much damaged state. There was also one in the back of the train, from which some information has been obtained. The other one has been returned to its country of origin for investigation to see whether we can get anything more from it. Until the inquiry gives its judgments on the matter and the HSE completes the second interim inquiry, it is difficult to tell the exact speed of impact. Various estimates from 120 mph upwards have been made, but we must wait to see what the inquiry has to say.

Mr. George Stevenson (Stoke-on-Trent, South)

While I welcome the statement made by my right hon. Friend, does not a further profound question need to be addressed? Can the fragmented structure of the present railway system deliver the sort of railway that he has outlined? Does he share the widespread concern that, in spite of the dramatically increased profits of Railtrack, a recent report by the Rail Regulator suggests that the rail infrastructure is deteriorating?

Is it not time to look at whether, under the powers of the proposed new Strategic Rail Authority, enough emphasis is given to exactly how much responsibility it will have in the provision of rail infrastructure in this country?

Mr. Prescott

These matters are of concern; there has been much comment about them. The Booz-Allen report was critical about the amount of money going into rail infrastructure and about Railtrack. Indeed, Railtrack has since argued that it has accepted the criticism of the Booz-Allen report and has improved. An effective infrastructure is very important; we are looking into that at present. I have no doubt that these matters are all part and parcel of what we might call the safety culture or regime in the industry, and that Lord Cullen will address himself to them.

Miss Anne McIntosh (Vale of York)

The Deputy Prime Minister has placed great emphasis on the early use of a train protection and warning system. However, on 8 October, in the first interim report from the Health and Safety Executive, it clearly emerged that automatic train I protection equipment was part of the pilot scheme and was fitted to the Great Western train. However, the equipment has a great history of unreliability and in this instance, it was switched off. Could the Deputy Prime Minister please make it an early priority to ensure that that equipment and the train protection and warning system are tried and tested, and operational as early as possible?

Mr. Prescott

Since that terrible tragedy—which Professor Uff is investigating at the moment, and we must await his report—actions have been taken to ensure that those systems are properly implemented and not isolated in the way that was suggested. However, we must await the report, as it has also been suggested that the driver was not familiar with that kind of system and that it had been isolated for a good period. That is another example of the fact that the automatic train protection system is not necessarily 100 per cent. operative on what we call the bolt-on system.

If ATP is put on new track—as has been done in many parts of the continent, especially on the French railways, on our own new European rail link and on the Heathrow connection—where it is specifically designed, it works very well. The difficulties tend to come with the bolt-on systems that we have. That is a difficulty that all Secretaries of State for Transport have had to face—how to balance the high-speed automatic train protection that we want to see brought in against other factors. In some cases, even if there was a workable system and I tried to bring it in, it would take 10 years to do so, whereas the one that we are now dealing with—the TPWS—can be introduced by 2003 and will reduce 70 per cent. of these incidents. I think that is a good decision to take.

Fiona Mactaggart (Slough)

I represent a constituency in which five people who were killed in the incident worked, and the people of Slough are concerned to ensure that lessons are learned fast. They appreciate the message of sympathy and the speed with which the Deputy Prime Minister has acted in the matter.

However, we should not focus only on technology. I had a meeting with representatives of a local train operating company only two weeks before the episode, and learned that many drivers and signal operators had only quite recently been recruited, because of the difficulty of recruiting people to these posts in south-east England. Will my right hon. Friend examine the training of new appointees to the train operating companies to ensure first, that there is sufficient expertise and secondly, that sufficient attention is paid to the safety ethos of the railways?

Mr. Prescott

We should not be over-concerned with technology, although it does have a role to play. What we want is an effective rail system. Even with the best technology in the world, we require to take into account human error, caused either in servicing or working the system. Indeed, in a perfect world, the automatic warning system on a train would stop that train, because the warning has to be cancelled and if it is not cancelled within a few seconds, it will stop it. However, incidents still occur when drivers cancel it and there is a collision—for whatever reason. There are various systems that, if implemented, could actually stop the train itself—that is why we talk about automatic train protection systems.

However, my hon. Friend makes a very sound point about the training and recruitment of drivers. She will be aware that, when the industry was first privatised, an awful lot of drivers were taken out of the industry and there were considerable redundancies—largely because it was thought that there would be a decline in the rail system for one reason or another, but the opposite occurred. Now, there is a desperate need to increase the number of drivers—indeed, we came to an agreement with the industry on getting 800 new drivers this year.

The time it takes to train a driver is also an important question: under British Rail, there was a single training period, but now there are varying training periods and different systems used throughout the industry. Those factors cause me concern, although I make no judgment about their safety, and it is an issue that I shall take up with the industry on Monday.

Mr. Norman Baker (Lewes)

I am sure that the Deputy Prime Minister will join me in thanking the emergency services for their speed and efficiency in attending the incident in Lewes. I am relieved that, unlike the horrific accident at Paddington, no one was killed in last night's incident. However, the fact is that two trains crashed at Lewes, and my constituents will be horrified to learn that there have been 643 incidents of trains passing a red signal—almost two such incidents a day—in the past year. My constituents in Lewes and elsewhere expect a safe train system, but they do not believe that they have one.

When will measures be in place to ensure that no train anywhere on the British network will be able to pass a red light, as happened in Lewes last night and on many other occasions over the past year in this country? According to the press release issued this afternoon by Connex, the train operating company that runs trains through Lewes, not only did a driver pass a danger signal, but a safety device to remind the driver to check the signals was not used. What steps will the Deputy Prime Minister take to ensure that, once the necessary safety systems to make drivers aware of red signals have been implemented, drivers cannot override or cancel those systems and that the systems will be fail safe? We cannot have drivers cancelling signals that are there to protect them and the public at large.

Mr. Prescott

I am sure that the whole House identifies with the hon. Gentleman and his constituents in Lewes, and wishes to express great appreciation of the emergency services. From speaking to people involved in such accidents, I have learned that, terrible though the circumstances are, the one comfort is the knowledge that the emergency services will be there quickly to help. That does real credit to those services and I am delighted to have another opportunity to express our appreciation. The circumstances in Lewes were difficult, and we are all pleased that no one was injured there.

The 643 so-called SPAD incidents are a source of great concern, and it is no comfort to know that that total has come down from more than 900 incidents. We must do all we can to reduce that number. I shall place a report on the incidence of SPADs in the House of Commons Library, but it must be seen in perspective. Approximately 70 per cent. of incidents involve distances of less than 50 yd, and sometimes the train has gone over by only one, two or 10 yd, whereas the safety margin built into the system is something like 150 yd. I want to give the House a precise picture of the seriousness of the problem.

I want to prevent every such incident from occurring, and I am sure the House does as well. That is why we paid such close attention to the Health and Safety Commission's report, which contains 22 recommendations to Railtrack and the train operating companies on ways in which to improve the record. On Monday I shall discuss with the industry how those recommendations can be implemented and how we can get something done.

During my inquiries into automatic train systems, I have been told that if the signal has gone red—even if that is a failure of the signal—the train cannot be moved if the automatic train system is on; therefore, sometimes such systems have to be isolated to enable the train to be moved. There are circumstances when technology fails, but the train has to be moved. We have to avoid the easy option of simply cancelling a warning system and getting into the habit of thinking, "It's yellow, it's yellow, so it's bound to be green." Sometimes, the signal is yellow, yellow and then red, and that is when problems arise. We have to do all we can to avoid such difficulties.

Mr. Dale Campbell-Savours (Workington)

I have only a brief question, unlike many of those asked today. When will we stop the system of penalties and fines that operates between the train operating companies and Railtrack, which clearly has implications for safety?

Mr. Prescott

We are reviewing several penalties and fines, and the new franchise negotiations are seeking to find a better way of dealing with those kinds of problems. The shadow Strategic Rail Authority has been appointed to provide an overall system that meets the requirements of a better railway rather than simply talking about sanctions, fines and penalties. However, make no mistake, any breach of safety will be met with heavy fines for companies. If companies are not operating proper rail safety systems, they must face the possibility of losing their licences.

Mr. David Rendel (Newbury)

The Deputy Prime Minister said that drivers may occasionally override and pass through a series of yellow signals before coming to a red signal and overriding it also. Is that scenario not made more likely because the warning that the driver receives in his cab at a red signal is precisely the same, both audibly and visually, as the warning for a yellow signal? If the warning given to the driver for a red signal were made different from that for a yellow signal, it would surely make the sorts of accidents to which the Deputy Prime Minister refers much less likely.

Mr. Prescott

I thank the hon. Gentleman for repeating what he said to me a week ago. I promised then that I would report his comments to the authorities and I have discussed the matter with the Health and Safety Executive, which had considered it from time to time. There is a different warning sound for green, but the same warning for yellow and red signals. That can create a great deal of confusion in the cab, with all kinds of sounds and signals. The Health and Safety Executive has promised to consider the issue, which we shall certainly put before the Cullen inquiry.