Kosovo

HC Deb 26 May 1999 vol 332 cc355-72 3.31 pm

The Secretary of State for Defence (Mr. George Robertson)

Two months into NATO's campaign, I think that it is appropriate that I should report to the House, before it rises for the recess, on the Kosovo crisis.

Before I do so, I place on record the huge debt that we all owe the men and women of all three services and their civilian support, for their bravery, commitment and sheer hard work in support of NATO's efforts to help the refugees from Kosovo and to end the horror being inflicted by the Belgrade regime in Kosovo.

The men and women of our armed forces have seen with their own eyes the results of the horrific ethnic cleansing carried out by Milosevic's troops, the special police and the paramilitaries—the torture, the systematic rape, the murder and the eviction of more than 1 million people. They know that they are engaged in the pursuit of a just cause—the return of the evicted people of Kosovo to their homes in safety and security.

At the Washington summit at the end of April, NATO's political leaders took two important decisions on the future direction of the alliance's military strategy in Kosovo. First, they agreed to step up and intensify the air campaign. The results of that decision are daily becoming more evident, as NATO planes steadily weaken and progressively destroy the capability of Milosevic's forces and increase the pressure on him to accept a peace settlement based on NATO's conditions.

NATO's air campaign is working. During last week's debate, I gave some statistics about the amount of damage that we have already done to Yugoslav forces in Kosovo. Each day, we add more to the tally. Yesterday alone, NATO aircraft destroyed at least 15 artillery pieces, five tanks, a surface-to-air missile launcher and several artillery and mortar positions. On 22 May, the tally included at least 12 tanks and 11 armoured vehicles.

The overall losses inflicted on the Yugoslav forces are now estimated to include more than 110 combat aircraft. NATO estimates that that includes about 70 per cent. of the Mig-29s and about one quarter of the Mig-21s. These are the most combat-effective of the Yugoslav aircraft, and they represent a significant loss.

We have struck about 600 individual pieces of military equipment, more than half of them tanks, artillery and armoured personnel carriers. That constitutes about one third of the Serb heavy forces in Kosovo. We have destroyed 75 per cent. of Serbia's fixed surface-to-air missile sites and more than 12 per cent. of the mobile systems. We have struck more than a dozen command posts.

Those are the effects of the air campaign on the forces on the ground, which present the most challenging targets. The strategic targets include most of the primary road and rail bridges over which supplies must pass. We have attacked more than a third of all the fixed telecommunications sites, and we have repeatedly attacked airfields and hangars, and numerous ammunition and fuel storage sites and barracks.

All that represents a very effective air campaign, which is achieving the military objectives that we set at the outset of the campaign. The demonstrations, desertions and dissent that we have witnessed in recent days are evidence that ordinary Serbs are now questioning the policies of Milosevic and the damaging and unwinnable conflict with NATO into which he has led them.

The second Washington summit decision was to update NATO's plans for the deployment of ground forces. Air and ground options are sometimes described as though they are separate and different. That has never been the case. NATO has always planned for a ground force to ensure the safe return home of the refugees, once the air campaign has achieved its objective. We have already assembled a Kosovo Force of about 14,000 in Macedonia, including substantial contributions from France, Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom.

However, the massive destruction wrought by Milosevic's forces in Kosovo means that the originally planned total of 28,000 will no longer be adequate. On top of the task of creating a secure environment for the returning refugees, it is now necessary to plan on a much increased scale to assist with the re-establishment of the civil infrastructure, the provision of humanitarian aid and the clearance of land mines laid by Milosevic's forces. We are working with our partners to ensure that civil structures are in place to take on those tasks, but, inevitably, much of the early burden will fall to military forces.

The North Atlantic Council yesterday took note of a revised plan drawn up by NATO's military authorities, which, subject to more detailed planning, identifies a requirement for a force of about 45,000 to deal with the full range of tasks now envisaged. That figure excludes any additional forces that may be needed to provide essential national logistic support, which may raise the overall number to nearer 55,000 to 60,000. Further work to develop this military planning is going ahead within NATO.

The Kosovo Force plans will still need to be adapted as the situation on the ground changes and to take account of wider developments in the context of a political settlement. Discussions are taking place about the contributions that allies can make to such a force.

The British Government have made it clear that, as in Bosnia, we are keen to work with other nations that are prepared to provide military forces for KFOR. Given the need for NATO to be ready to react quickly to deploy into Kosovo in support of a peace settlement, the UK is today taking a number of steps on a national basis to ensure that we can move as soon as it is possible to get the refugees back home.

We have decided that the United Kingdom will make a substantial contribution to the planned force. That is consistent with the role that we have taken so far in the campaign and with our determination to see it brought to a quick and successful conclusion. We are determined that as many refugees as possible can return home before the winter closes in.

Because of the capability and deployability of our forces, the United Kingdom is well placed to contribute to that operation. Moreover, as the Framework Nation for the Allied Command Europe Rapid Reaction Corps—the ARRC—our initial contribution will inevitably be high. However, we envisage that the UK contribution to the force will reduce markedly after an initial deployment period of six months.

I am now reducing the notice to move of the three infantry battalion groups which, as previously announced, are undergoing training for possible operations in Kosovo. The units concerned are the 1st Battalion, the Royal Irish Rangers; the 1st Battalion, the Parachute Regiment; and the 1st Battalion, the Royal Gurkha Rifles.

In addition, we are reducing the notice of 3 Commando brigade and the amphibious ready group, of a number of combat support groups, of two brigade headquarters, of elements of a divisional headquarters and of a number of RAF support helicopters and support units. I am placing in the Library of the House a full list of the units involved.

Precisely how many of those earmarked forces will be needed by NATO will depend on a number of factors—most important, what forces other allies are able to provide in the time required. Given the importance that NATO attaches to the early identification, training, commitment and deployment of additional forces, we judge it prudent to take those steps now to keep options open and to be ready to respond once firm requests are received from NATO. The geographical distance of the United Kingdom from the theatre of operations means that deployment times are inevitably longer for us than for most other allies.

In all, we are reducing the notice to move of more than 12,000 personnel, in addition to the 5,400 already deployed in Macedonia as part of the Kosovo implementation force and the 1,600 others committed to Kosovo operations. We are also taking steps to provide the equipment and material needed to support a force of that size and are making preparations to deploy the heavy equipment of the three infantry battalion groups and some combat support to the region next month.

Those are serious steps, and they will place great demands on all three services and on individual service men and their families, but they measure up to the seriousness of the situation confronting us in Kosovo. Let us remember that 1.5 million people—more than three quarters of the population of Kosovo—have been driven from their homes in terror. Our objective is to allow them to return home and rebuild their shattered lives in secure and civilised conditions and, in doing so, to show that the cruelty and brutality that we have seen in Kosovo over the past year will simply not be tolerated.

That is a major and a momentous undertaking which, in the coming months and years, will require a major investment of diplomatic, financial, humanitarian and military effort. The measures that I have announced today are a further demonstration of the Government's determination to play a full part in that historic effort.

Mr. John Maples (Stratford-on-Avon)

I fully associate the Opposition with the support expressed by the Secretary of State for the work that our armed services are doing in the Balkans.

Last week in the Kosovo debate, my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Folkestone and Hythe (Mr. Howard) and I drew attention to what we saw as confusion at the heart of Government policy. Despite all the Foreign Secretary's travels and all the spinning during the past week, that confusion remains. Today's statement, although it announces the commitment of considerably more British troops to possible deployment in Macedonia, does nothing to clarify that confusion.

In the light of what he has said, can the Secretary of State confirm that the three battalion groups whose notice to move he has reduced are the same 2,000 soldiers who, he announced some weeks ago, were being assigned to KFOR in Macedonia? When does he expect them to be deployed? Is it true that the only way in which the 1st Battalion, the Parachute Regiment has been able to make up its numbers is by borrowing more than 150 people from the 3rd Battalion, the Parachute Regiment?

Last week, the Foreign Secretary went to Washington to remove the apparent split between the United Kingdom and the United States over ground troops. We were treated to a media double act by the Foreign Secretary and Mrs. Albright. We were told that they were at one, but, no sooner had the Foreign Secretary left, suggesting a new US willingness to use ground troops, than Mrs. Albright was denying any possibility of NATO entering Kosovo in anything other than a permissive environment.

All that has been agreed is a more realistically sized peacekeeping force at 48,000, although the Secretary of State has told us that that figure might rise to 60,000. The Government have been presenting that in the media as the basis of a possible invasion force, but, at yesterday's NATO force planning meeting, Ken Bacon, the Pentagon spokesman said: the force will be structured to provide plenty of non-military public security function to ensure the safe return of the refugees. Today, he said: this is not a shadow invasion force. Is it the basis of a possible invasion force or not?

The composition of the extra 20,000 troops apparently will take another full week to decide. Whatever happened to rapid reaction? It is now nine weeks since the bombing started. Only 14,000 of the 28,000 troops are actually in place in Macedonia. When does the Secretary of State expect the full 48,000—or now perhaps 60,000—to be available in theatre? Are the NATO forces in Albania included in the 48,000 total? How many of the 48,000 troops does he expect to be equipped and configured for war fighting, as opposed to peacekeeping?

The Government clearly still believe that we can achieve our aims only by the more aggressive use of ground troops, but none of our allies appears to share that view. The Foreign Secretary continues to talk of a "semi-permissive environment", to blur that division. However, I am advised that, in reality, there is no such thing. We either drive down the road into Kosovo as a peacekeeping force, or we enter configured for war fighting and prepared to meet resistance.

Javier Solana says that the alliance plans to bring the war to a close and return the refugees before the winter. We believe that that timetable is crucial. Two weeks ago, the Prime Minister agreed that the window of opportunity was very small, and that decisions would have to be made very soon. It seems to us that those decisions have not been made. The Government's preferred option of an early use of ground troops has probably been lost already through indecision over an issue that should have been resolved before we started.

Do we not appear now to be wholly reliant on the success of the bombing campaign? Of course, we must all hope that it will work, but I do not think that a single independent military expert believes that it will. Meanwhile, the flood of refugees continues, with all their evidence of Milosevic's revolting crimes. We want all those refugees to return to their homes. We want the Government to succeed in achieving that but, as I said last week, we cannot go on as we have for the past eight weeks. The Government must develop a credible strategy. I see no evidence that that is happening. I only hope that there is still time for them to do so.

Mr. Robertson

I take that as support.

Mr. Maples

It was.

Mr. Robertson

I suppose that that qualified support is better than no support, which is what has been offered by some other hon. Members on the Conservative Front Bench.

I shall answer the questions that have been raised soberly, because there should be maximum unity in the House at this time. Frankly, there are many questions to which enormously detailed answers would be of more advantage to the opponents of the alliance than to the House. However, my military commanders and I have given the maximum information that we believe is reasonable and possible. We have been attacked in many quarters for giving too much information—an accusation that I take on the chin.

The hon. Gentleman first asked whether the three battalion groups that I have talked about today were the same 2,000 troops that we sent to Kosovo as part of the second battle group. No, they are not, and that should have been reasonably obvious. We announced that those three battalion groups had been put into training, with the potential of being available if NATO were to decide that a bigger force was needed.

The hon. Gentleman asked when those troops will be deployed. That is a matter for NATO, not for individual countries. I wish that the Opposition, when they respond, both in the House and outside it, to statements such as today's, would remember that the operation is being conducted by NATO. There are 19 countries in NATO. The hon. Gentleman is perfectly entitled to attack this Government in this House, but this is an alliance effort, and all the stronger for being so.

The hon. Gentleman asked whether I was aware that, if required, I Para would be able to deploy only if it borrowed from 3 Para. Of course I am aware of that. The hon. Gentleman should be aware that, in practically every operational context, now and during the previous Government's period in office, battalions deployed for operations in theatre are all backfilled.

I thought that the hon. Gentleman made too much fun of my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary and the American Secretary of State, who last weekend showed the alliance solidarity that binds us together. On the very day that my right hon. Friend left Washington, the President of the United States wrote an article in The New York Times that made it clear that other military options existed and that no military option had been taken off the table. The hon. Gentleman may care to pick apart various phrases, but that is the reality of the alliance that we have today.

The shadow Defence Secretary claims that we suggested in the media that this is an invasion force, whereas we have said exactly the opposite. This is not an invasion force: it is a strengthened peace implementation force. That is a fact, and that is the reality of what we are doing. He asked when the troops would arrive in theatre. I have no intention of answering that question today, and anyway it depends on what the NATO military authorities ask us to provide from the earmarked troops.

The hon. Gentleman asked whether the total numbers include troops in Albania. Although the commander of the Albania force, General Reith, who is acting with enormous distinction and international praise, happens to be British, he is a NATO commander. He has some British support elements, but the vast majority of the troops in Albania, who are, after all, in the theatre, come from France, Italy and the United States.

The hon. Gentleman also asked about windows of opportunity. I should like to say to him and to anyone else who is listening, including people in Serbia, that there are plenty of windows of opportunity for us to act. We shall keep acting day on day until NATO's reasonable conditions have been satisfied.

The shadow Defence Secretary accused us of indecision, but I have come to the House of Commons today to show that NATO and this country's response can be decisive. This is a momentous day. We are strengthening the peace implementation force available to NATO to deploy when it is the right time for the refugees to go home. I should have thought that that measure deserved a more gracious welcome from Her Majesty's Opposition than it was given.

Mrs. Anne Campbell (Cambridge)

Many people will be heartened to hear my right hon. Friend's statement about the necessary support to help refugees to go back to their homes in Kosovo. Will he outline the measures that will be taken to clean up and rebuild the civilian infrastructure, which will be necessary for the refugees to live a normal life once they get back home?

Mr. Robertson

My hon. Friend is right. The damage that has been done by Milosevic's marauding troops is considerable. As the G8 declaration clearly lays out, the social reconstruction of Kosovo will be a big task for all of us. That is one of the reasons why NATO felt that it was right and proper to increase the size of the forces required. Although civilian authorities will have to be put in place, the early burden will inevitably fall on the military. We shall have to be ambitious in what we do inside Kosovo if those traumatised people are to have a semblance of normality.

Mr. Menzies Campbell (North-East Fife)

Following the Prime Minister's answer to the question put earlier by my right hon. Friend the Member for Yeovil (Mr. Ashdown), does the Secretary of State agree that it is not simply by numbers but by the composition of its forces that NATO will make clear to the Milosevic regime its determination that the refugees should be able to return and live in peace? Does he agree that the forces must be capable of sustained, high-intensity warfare and not only reconstruction, if NATO has to impose its will in a hostile environment to enable the return of the refugees before the onset of winter?

Does the right hon. Gentleman further agree that NATO's overall forces must be structured so as to be able to impose, and not just implement, peace, and must contain a preponderance of teeth arms? He told the House that he envisaged that the United Kingdom's contribution to the force would reduce markedly after an initial deployment period of six months. On what factors does he base that assessment, and from what date will that period run?

Mr. Robertson

The composition of whatever force is put in place will, of course, determine what that force can do. That is why we are being judicious in the troops that we send. Some of the troops who have been in the region since the beginning of the year are involved in high-intensity warfare, but such is the flexibility of our forces that, when the hundreds of thousands of human beings who have been evicted from their homes and from their homeland came across the border into Macedonia, those forces rose to the occasion and built the refugee camps. It is possible for troops trained for high-intensity warfare to move to a humanitarian role, and such skills will be necessary when we go into Kosovo to return people to their homes.

The picture that I have painted, and what I have said about the troops who have been earmarked, will have given the right hon. and learned Gentleman an idea of the problems that we expect our troops to face in Kosovo. Just one factor is the number of land mines that will have been sown by Milosevic, irresponsibly and illegally, during his occupation. They will pose a substantial risk to all incoming forces. The NATO structures will reflect the fact that, even in the most permissive circumstances, the environment will still be dangerous, and the fact that a wide range of capabilities will be required.

The deployment of the Allied Command Europe Rapid Reaction Corps in NATO doctrine is predicated on a deployment of six months, so that the corps can be available for other duties. The decision on when the clock starts to tick will be a matter for NATO, but the choice of a date for the corps to perform the task for which it was sent—returning the refugees—will be perfectly understandable.

Mr. Kevin McNamara (Hull, North)

Many people will welcome today's announcement, especially given the common view that it was a silly error to suggest at the start of the bombings that land forces would not be sent in. That was indeed a major error, and it probably encouraged Milosevic.

Nevertheless, there are real fears that the refugees will not return to Kosovo this year, and that many will spend their time in Macedonia, Albania and elsewhere. Will my right hon. Friend give an undertaking that those who are exposed to the terrible winter conditions of the area will be adequately housed and fed, and will not be left in tented encampments?

Mr. Robertson

Notwithstanding my hon. Friend's welcome, I disagree with him about whether it was right or wrong to rule out a wholesale land invasion in the face of organised resistance in Kosovo at the outset. NATO—all 19 of the allies—made a careful and considered decision at the time about what was the best military option to deal with the circumstances that existed at the time. It is easy for some, with hindsight, to criticise the decisions that were made then, but I think that history will show that the right decisions were made.

We will return as many refugees as is humanly possible to Kosovo and their own homes, in safe and secure circumstances. The earlier that that can be done, the better it will be; and the sooner Milosevic recognises that he cannot defeat NATO and should settle on the basis of NATO's conditions, the sooner things will be settled for those human beings.

Sir Geoffrey Johnson Smith (Wealden)

I welcome the statement, but does it not imply to some extent that we have—for the time being, at any rate—ruled out importing into the area troops capable of mounting an invasion? This is basically a force to implement peace when it has been established; it is nothing more or less than that.

Can the Secretary of State tell us who, apart from this country, is contributing to the force? Are the Americans or the Visegrad countries involved? To what extent is there an agreement in deed as well as in thought?

Mr. Robertson

This is a peace implementation force, but we—my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister, the President of the United States and NATO—have made it clear that all other options are on the table, and will be carefully considered. As for who will supplement and strengthen the implementation force, I believe that all the allies in NATO will be engaged. They are substantially involved in the present KFOR. There are clear indications that, at the force generation conference that will probably take place next week, most of the other countries in NATO will be substantially contributing, along with us.

Mr. Malcolm Wicks (Croydon, North)

Although homelessness is a feature of all wars, does the Secretary of State agree that a unique feature of the war in Kosovo is that the vast majority of Kosovan people are now homeless—they either have been excluded from their country, or are homeless in the mountains? Therefore, he has the support of many of us in saying that we will need ground troops if the people are to return home in great numbers.

Will my right hon. Friend disregard the mocking of the British-American alliance by Her Majesty's Loyal Opposition, which must replay very well in the Belgrade media? Will he instead listen to the voice of decent British public opinion, which cannot stomach genocide in Europe and will support all that the Government do to combat it?

Mr. Robertson

I agree with my hon. Friend that the decent majority in this country—indeed, the overwhelming majority of public opinion—support what the Government are doing. They support our humanitarian objectives—we need constantly to emphasise that. However, those are more than humanitarian. If Milosevic were to get away with the genocide and with ethnic cleansing on such a grand scale, does anyone imagine that he would stop at Kosovo? Vojvodina would be the next place, and it would be hoovered out of ethnic Hungarians. What would happen to Montenegro? What would he do about Macedonia, next door?

There are good strategic reasons why we have to draw a line before Milosevic's ambitions. Those go side by side with the common humanity that we engage when we say that ethnic cleansing is absolutely unacceptable.

Ground troops have always been part of NATO's strategy. Air attacks and the ground troops that would escort the refugees back to their homes have been part and parcel of the twin-track policy that we have had from the beginning.

Sir Peter Emery (East Devon)

After that last remark from the hon. Member for Croydon, North (Mr. Wicks), will the right hon. Gentleman understand that the Opposition are 100 per cent. behind our troops in the field and all the tasks that they have to achieve? Whatever questions may be asked of him, the support for what we have to do is complete and absolute, and he must know that.

Perhaps as an illustration of keeping up the morale of the troops in the Balkans, will the right hon. Gentleman show his support by doing everything possible to ensure that the anonymity of the military men who are called to give evidence to the new Bloody Sunday inquiry that has been instituted shall be maintained, and shall not be revealed to the IRA?

Mr. Robertson

I pay tribute to the right hon. Gentleman for the unwavering support that he has given to what the Government are doing in their present endeavour—part and parcel of a NATO alliance that is standing firm in the face of an enormous evil, the like of which we have not seen.

Madam Speaker

Order. I believe that the Secretary of State should not respond further. I was reading material relating to that matter at the time. It is sub judice.

Mr. Robertson

I was actually paying a compliment to the right hon. Member for East Devon (Sir P. Emery). I had not got to the element that involves sub judice. I am grateful for your prior warning, Madam Speaker.

Madam Speaker

The right hon. Gentleman can pay all the compliments that he likes to the right hon. Member for East Devon (Sir P. Emery), provided that he does not get on to the sub judice part of the question. I may have something to say about that later.

Mr. Robertson

I knew that I would be taking great risks if I got anywhere near the Bloody Sunday inquiry. I did not realise that I was treading in dangerous territory by daring to praise an Opposition Member, but he has always been robust in his support. I know that, contrary sometimes to the impressions that are given in the heat of the moment, the whole House supports those of our fighting forces who are out there risking life and limb for what they and we know to be a major national interest.

Mr. Harry Barnes (North-East Derbyshire)

I have never had any problems in supporting attacks on military targets in Yugoslavia, and the Secretary of State has just spelt out the success of that type of bombing. What I am concerned about is the impact of bombing on civilians, as it seems to have gone way beyond what one might attribute to collateral or accidental damage. What criteria are used in determining civilian targets? Obviously schools, hospitals and housing are being hit only by accident; but there seems to have been an awful lot of bombing of bridges, factories, bus stations and railway stations, going beyond the principle of proportionality. Many of us would feel much easier if bombing were restricted entirely to military targets, with only occasional non-military damage.

Mr. Robertson

Life would be much easier for all of us if, in a country such as Yugoslavia, we could easily draw a line between that which is military and that which is military-commercial. Milosevic set out to create a military machine in which there was an intimacy between his military and every other aspect of society. Nevertheless, the rule of proportionality is a very severe guide to us, as is appropriateness. Therefore, all the targets being hit are related—appropriately and proportionately—to degrading and weakening the military machine that has caused the genocidal violence in Kosovo.

Mr. Andrew Robathan (Blaby)

I also welcome the Secretary of State's presence in the House and his statement today. I can also assure him that, having seen the refugees in Albania and Macedonia, I wholeheartedly support the Government in their determination to get them back to Kosovo. I was tempted to ask why, if the air campaign is working so well, the volume of refugees being deported by Milosevic is increasing, rather than decreasing, but, my question is this: Before the bombing campaign began, did the Secretary of State receive advice from the Ministry of Defence that the bombing campaign on its own would not achieve the aims that he set out?

Mr. Robertson

I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for making clear his support. I do not believe that anyone who—like him and me—has met the refugees could reach any conclusion other than that we had to act, and to do so very robustly indeed. He also asked a question that the Government are occasionally asked, on the military advice that we have received. The buck stops here: I am at the Dispatch Box, in the House of Commons, as the Secretary of State for Defence. There is in the United Kingdom civilian control of the military. I cannot hide behind the decisions taken by the military or the advice that I am given, because I am answerable to the House for the decisions that I take.

The decision to go ahead with the strategy that was adopted was taken not by the United Kingdom Government or by the United Kingdom military, but by 19 Heads of Government and 19 military commanders, with 19 democratic Parliaments behind them. I think that the hon. Gentleman can take it that the military advice that we received was the advice that we executed.

Mrs. Alice Mahon (Halifax)

I join with every hon. Member in condemning ethnic cleansing, be it in Kosovo or the Krajina. However, does the Secretary of State accept that there are other victims of violence in this war? Is he aware that 30 per cent. of the 1,200 civilians killed in Yugoslavia by NATO bombs were children, and that 40 per cent. of the 5,000 injured were children? What would he say to the children of Nis who, before the war, attended the Playhouse—the English-teaching primary school? While I was on a brief visit to the school between bombing raids, those five and six-year-olds took down the Union flag—I have it here—from their school, and drew on it pictures of their experience of being bombed by NATO. Does he agree that they are just as much victims as the children in the camps? Is it not time to start concentrating on a political settlement, rather than talking up a ground war?

Mr. Robertson

I know that my hon. Friend holds her views with great sincerity and great passion, but she really has to see in her own mind who started this whole thing. Who was it who started to bombard villages in Kosovo? Who was it who drove ordinary people—civilians—from their homes and their villages into the hills and across the borders? Who has been involved in the murders and the rapes that have been a part of that systematic picture? We know who it was not only from the words of the victims themselves, but because we know what Milosevic's troops have done in other theatres of war.

I do not like any civilian casualties. I am sure that the statistics were given to my hon. Friend in good faith, but I do not believe that 30 per cent. of the civilian casualties in Yugoslavia have been children. I regret every civilian casualty. Every one was a mistake. None of them was targeted. Thousands upon thousands of innocent civilians—children, old people, men and women—have been brutalised directly and deliberately by Milosevic's troops and paramilitary thugs in Kosovo. When that stops and the refugees get back, we shall not have to carry out the bombing that has been necessary. We did not want to do it, but we had to.

Mr. Andrew Tyrie (Chichester)

The Government can have my full support for the aims of the military action, but I am worried that they are willing the end but not the means. It has always seemed clear to an enormous number of us that bombing alone is very unlikely to achieve the Government's objectives. Might the increased forces that the Government are putting in place be used in a non-permissive environment, as defined by the Foreign Secretary?

Mr. Robertson

The troops announced by NATO are not an invasion force. That is clear from the numbers. They are a peace implementation force to escort the refugees back to their homes. We willed the end—an end to the violence and a peaceful and secure return home for those who have been driven from their homes. All the military commanders believed that that was the right way to proceed. That was endorsed by the politicians, who make the ultimate decisions. We are confident that, after eight weeks, the air attacks have caused huge damage to the Serb military. Dissent is increasing in Serbia. Many brave people of real substance are speaking out and deserve the support of all decent people in Yugoslavia. People are beginning to realise what has been done in their name in Kosovo. That is a major pressure towards the settlement for which we all hope.

Mr. David Winnick (Walsall, North)

Should not the critics in the House and outside accept that the conflict can quickly come to an end once Belgrade signals its intention to accept an international military force that would allow all the refugees to return in safety and protect all the other civilians in Kosovo, including the Serb minority? Perhaps the critics could try to persuade Belgrade of that. Two months after the start of NATO's military intervention, the majority support in the country for what we are doing has been maintained because the people know, as we do, that to stand aside while such terrible crimes and atrocities were being committed in Kosovo would have brought lasting shame to this country and to our European allies.

Mr. Robertson

My hon. Friend speaks with authority and consistency. We are taking action only because of the genocidal violence practised by Milosevic and the Belgrade regime. When that ends and the conditions are accepted, the bombing can and will stop. The conditions are not onerous. They are simply that there should be an end to the violence, the withdrawal of the Serb troops and the acceptance of a political process and an international security force to allow the refugees to come home. Those were all component parts of United Nations Security Council resolution 1199, passed last September. That list of demands is endorsed by the vast majority of the international community. The demands make sense, they are humane and they would impose no more on Milosevic than his human obligation.

Sir Archie Hamilton (Epsom and Ewell)

Why do the Prime Minister and the Defence Secretary continue to talk about allowing Kosovans to go back to their homes when they know quite well that many of them have no homes to go to for the simple reason that they have been burnt or razed to the ground by the Serbs? Why should the Kosovans be so much keener on returning to Kosovo than the Bosnians were to return to Bosnia, where some 1 million people were displaced and only 78,000 have gone back? Would the Secretary of State not do better to assume that hundreds of thousands of refugees will be left in refugee camps this winter, and start providing the shelter that they will need to withstand the rigours of the Balkan winter, instead of adding to their agony by allowing hundreds of thousands to freeze to death?

Mr. Robertson

We have to make arrangements for refugees who may well have to spend the winter in the cold of the Balkans. That is sensible contingency planning and it has already started. However, the clear intention is to get refugees back to their homes and villages—despite the damage that has been done and the fact that some of their houses and villages no longer exist—because that is what they want. They say that they will rebuild their homes and keep their communities together and that they have no intention of leaving the land of their forefathers. We have no right to make assumptions about what should happen to them. Not all the analogies with Bosnia are correct; some are, especially in respect of the violence that Milosevic was willing to perpetrate there, which gives us an indication of what he did to human beings in Kosovo. However, 90 per cent. of the population of Kosovo were Albanian by extraction. They know how to go back and where to go back to, and their houses have not been occupied. It will be a difficult and painstaking process, but it will happen.

Ms Dari Taylor (Stockton, South)

I thank my right hon. Friend for his statement to the House today and warmly welcome the peace implementation plan. Will he take as an example the tremendous work of our Territorials and Reservists in Bosnia and consider the extensive value and use they could be to a reconstruction plan in Kosovo? Will he give them adequate warning so that they can put their lives in order before their call-up papers arrive?

Mr. Robertson

I congratulate my hon. Friend on the consistency of her message. We certainly have not forgotten our Reserve forces who continue to play a distinguished role in Bosnia. Many of them will be valuable and important in the potential implementation force that is being set up and strengthened for Kosovo. They will undoubtedly have a role there too.

Sir Peter Tapsell (Louth and Horncastle)

Is it intentional or unintentional that the Secretary of State always leaves the strategy of NATO—if it has one—very unclear? After 60 days and nights of bombing, the tragic truth is that not a single Kosovan Albanian has been saved. If the military capacity of Serbia has been so much reduced, as the right hon. Gentleman suggested in his opening remarks, it is difficult to believe that, in a permissive situation, it would be necessary to increase the number of troops from 28,000 to 60,000.

On the other hand, if, as I strongly suspect, we shall ultimately go into an opposed invasion, 60,000 troops will be wholly inadequate. On 23 March, the Prime Minister admitted in the House that if we had to take on the Serbian Army we would require at least 200,000 troops. So we are getting the worst of both worlds. As I said to the Prime Minister on 23 March, it is time for the Government to come clean with the British people and tell us what they really intend to do.

Mr. Robertson

When I hear such questions, I wonder whether some people are looking forward to failure. The strategy has been clear from the start. The intention is to stop the violence in Kosovo and to get the refugees back in safety and security to the land of their ancestors. That is the strategy to which the 19 NATO countries have subscribed. It has been clear, open and transparent—perhaps too transparent—from the word go. That is exactly our intention.

I have made it clear, in this House and outside, that this is not an invasion force but a peace implementation force, strengthened for the reasons that I have given. In the new circumstances following the eight weeks of the air campaign and the carnage wrought by Milosevic in Kosovo, it is the belief of the military authorities that we need more people to be ready to escort the refugees back.

The hon. Gentleman says that not a single Kosovar has been saved. Perhaps he should take the opportunity to go to some of the places in this country where there are Kosovar refugees—if he cannot make the journey to Macedonia or to Albania—and ask them how many lives have been saved and how many people were not put to the bayonet because of NATO forces. Perhaps he should hear the acclaim with which NATO has been greeted as the only saviours of the Kosovar people. We will get those evicted people back to their homes.

Mr. Tam Dalyell (Linlithgow)

Although it has taken place in a sparse House, in 37 years I have not heard a more momentous or far-reaching statement from a Minister. It must be about a land war of uncertain outcome in the Balkans on which we are embarking.

What is the port situation? Are we going to be guaranteed the use of the port of the Piraeus, because the mayor of Athens has said that not a finger would be lifted by the dockers? Are we going to have the facility at Salonika? If not, how is such a force to be supported?

On the question of cluster bombs, the Secretary of State justifiably can claim considerable credit for his work on land mines. Cluster bombs are not so very different from land mines. What is the justification for their use? The Secretary of State talked about the refugees returning to Kosovo. Could I ask a factual question? In the knocking-out of tanks, what has been the assessment of the use of depleted uranium?

The Secretary of State has referred to Hungarian ethnic minorities in Vojvodina. Is there a suggestion that they are subject to the possibility of ethnic cleansing? If so, what can we do about it, other than occupy Serbia? Is there on the agenda an option for the occupation of Serbia?

Finally—

Madam Speaker

Order. The hon. Gentleman must understand that others are seeking to ask questions. I realise the seriousness with which we all take this matter, but he must bring his questioning to a conclusion.

Mr. Dalyell

All right, Madam Speaker.

Mr. Robertson

I do not think that I shall persuade my hon. Friend the Member for Linlithgow (Mr. Dalyell), who has made up his mind that we should not be involved in this military action at all. If he is willing to stand back while people are massacred, that is a matter for him and his conscience.

The port situation and where any potentially enhanced force will be based are matters for the NATO authorities and the countries involved. I would like to pay tribute to the Government of Greece, who have allowed the use of the port of Thessaloniki for the troops that are at present in Macedonia. I pay tribute also to the Governments of Macedonia—a tiny and fragile country, which has hosted so many of our troops because it believes in the interests that we are promoting—and Albania, which has absorbed 400,000 refugees: that is equivalent of the whole population of the island of Ireland being absorbed into mainland Britain. Those are extraordinary achievements by those countries, which deserve our thanks and congratulations.

Our forces will be supported wherever they are. They have been up to now, and they will be in the future. My hon. Friend asked about cluster bombs. They have existed for some time, and they are the means that we have against the forces that are at present deployed inside Kosovo, who are deliberately targeting civilians and causing mayhem. Not only are people raped and tortured, and men beaten, as we saw so vividly on television at the weekend, but who knows what other horrors are going on.

Depleted uranium is not used in any of the munitions currently being used in Kosovo or in the Yugoslav theatre.

My hon. Friend asked about the Hungarian minority in Vojvodina. If he were listened to for military advice, all the ethnic Albanians would be swept out of Kosovo, and Milosevic would not stop there: the minority in Vojvodina would certainly be expelled and the last flickering elements of democracy in Montenegro snuffed out, after which Milosevic would be on the trail for other victims.

Mr. Douglas Hogg (Sleaford and North Hykeham)

The Secretary of State said that he had received military advice to the effect that it is now necessary to have more military forces to escort the refugees back into Kosovo. Does he accept that that implies that we are likely to meet greater resistance than was previously anticipated? Does it not follow that what he is doing in reality is to guard, and possibly provide, against the opposition of the Serbs? In short, we are talking about an invasion against resistance.

If that is right, or even likely to be right, should not the Secretary of State ask, on a substantive motion, for the authority of the House to underpin such an operation?

Mr. Robertson

The right hon. and learned Gentleman was Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office in the previous Government, and was specifically in charge of the Balkans. I was a shadow foreign affairs spokesman for about 11 years, and I do not remember substantive motions being tabled about the military action that NATO, rightly and properly, took in Bosnia, through IFOR, to ensure that the Serb violence was ended there.

We will leave that to one side, because according to the Leader of the Opposition we are not allowed to talk about history: apparently, the previous Government did not exist. The fact is, as I have said, that this is not an invasion force but a strengthened implementation force, designed by the NATO military authorities and endorsed by the North Atlantic Council for the good, sensible and practical reasons that they believed made it absolutely necessary to have a force in place that is relevant to the circumstances that our troops will face when they take the refugees back into Kosovo.

Mr. Nigel Griffiths (Edinburgh, South)

Will my right hon. Friend accept the congratulations of the House on the judicious leadership that the Government have shown in NATO? Will he ensure that ground troops are deployed as quickly as is practical and prudent, to secure the safe return of hundreds of thousands of Kosovar refugees?

Mr. Robertson

I am very pleased to accept my hon. Friend's congratulations, not only because there is no politician who does not like to be flattered but because he has been to the refugee camps in the region, met the people there and listened to the tales of horror, but also the tales of hope about what NATO has done and can do in the future. Their only hope is that NATO will—as it will—prevail.

Mr. Julian Brazier (Canterbury)

In the light of the Secretary of State's earlier answer, in which he referred to the need to backfill units deployed into action, and his answer to the hon. Member for Stockton, South (Ms Taylor) on the use of Territorials and Reservists in Bosnia, can he confirm that, throughout the country, units that are being reduced to a small fraction of their present size are receiving requests to send volunteers to the Balkans, including for example the Green Jackets Support Weapons Unit in Oxfordshire and 289 Commando Battery in the east end of London? Is he planning a compulsory call-out of Territorials?

Mr. Robertson

The purpose of restructuring and modernising the Territorial Army was to make it more usable, more deployable, and therefore much more useful in the sort of situation in which we find ourselves in Kosovo today. I hear no suggestions that we should reverse the reforms that we have put in place. On the contrary, I have heard from various parts of the country the clear message that what we set out to do, and what we are delivering in terms of strengthening the Territorial Army, is precisely what the Territorial Army will be good at in the future. I hope that the hon. Gentleman will take that message back to the country.

Mr. Jeremy Corbyn (Islington, North)

May I take the Defence Secretary back to the reply that he gave a few moments ago in response to a question from my hon. Friend the Member for Linlithgow (Mr. Dalyell) in which my right hon. Friend asserted that depleted uranium shells are not being used by British forces? Will he confirm that NATO forces are using them and that they have a long-term carcinogenic effect both on the victims at whom they are directed and on society as a whole? Will the Defence Secretary confirm also that it is part of NATO's strategy to bomb oil refineries, chemical factories and industrial plants, in the full knowledge that the resulting danger of pollution is enormous and horrendous and that that pollution will not stop at national boundaries but affect and destroy natural life and the health of people throughout the region? Will the Defence Secretary confirm that cluster bombs—about which my hon. Friend the Member for Linlithgow inquired—are, in effect, mines dropped from the sky and that they will be a curse on the people of that region for many decades to come?

Mr. Robertson

It will be nice—and, gosh, will I welcome it!—when my hon. Friend comes to the Chamber and denounces the violence perpetrated against women and children inside Kosovo.

Cluster bombs are not covered by the Ottawa treaty. They are not anti-personnel land mines and they are not covered even by the annexes to that treaty, which was negotiated with enormous care in order to take account of those munitions that might qualify under the original campaign.

I have made it clear that we are not using shells with depleted uranium in Kosovo or in the theatre of action at present. My hon. Friend made several assertions, none of which he can back up with peer-reviewed scientific research. We are undertaking considerable research into the allegations made about the effect of considerable amounts of depleted uranium that are alleged to have been used in the Gulf war. We believe the health risks are very small, but we will consider carefully any reliable medical or scientific data that may emerge concerning the incidence of ill-health that might have been caused by the use of depleted uranium in Iraq.

I remind the House that depleted uranium has many civilian uses and that several thousand tonnes of depleted uranium are in civil hands in this country. It is used for radiation shielding in hospital radiotherapy departments and in the manufacture of counterbalance weights for yacht keels and aircraft, among other things.

Mr. Crispin Blunt (Reigate)

The Defence Secretary's answer to the right hon. and learned Member for North-East Fife (Mr. Campbell) will come as a depressing surprise to the 5,000 men deployed with the ARRC and KFOR, who will be disappointed to learn that the clock is not ticking on their expected six-month deployment on an emergency operation. The Defence Secretary has acknowledged the horrendous problem of overstretch in the armed forces. Can he confirm that, despite the fact that training and the recruitment campaign have been a success, the Army is still suffering a net outflow of personnel? Can he confirm also that the day before the 6th Battalion and the Light Infantry were told of their amalgamation into the West of England Regiment, they were asked for 200 volunteers to reinforce the Army? The Defence Secretary has told us that 18,600 men and women are now dedicated to the operation in Kosovo. How long can the armed forces sustain that level of commitment, given that they have no idea when deployment to Kosovo will occur, as that decision remains in the hands of Mr. Milosevic?

Mr. Robertson

The members of the armed forces whom I have met are a lot more optimistic and determined than the hon. Gentleman. As I have travelled around the country and visited the theatre of operations, those personnel have delivered one message about the Conservative Member of Parliament who had the effrontery—the effrontery to them—to call, in the middle of a conflict, for the resignation of the Chief of the Defence Staff. They find that extraordinary and offensive. 1 hope that the hon. Gentleman feels properly shamed about even making that suggestion about such a distinguished soldier.

A number of the troops who were in Macedonia have returned, so that roulement is already taking place because we believe that it is right and proper. Those who will augment the troops in due course will have the same commitment and dedication to the cause.

There are on-going problems of retention in the armed forces—after all, we inherited serious problems from the previous Government—but recruitment to the armed forces has substantially increased. My hon. Friend the Minister for the Armed Forces must take credit for much of that. I assure the hon. Gentleman that the British Army, of which he was once a member, believes that it can sustain the operations that it is undertaking despite the strain, because it knows that what it is doing is right.

Mr. William Ross (East Londonderry)

Does the Minister understand the concern that some of us feel whenever he tells us that the number of British troops deployed will depend mainly on the forces made available by our allies? Is not the situation far too open-ended for this country to enter into, given the number of troops that we have available? We have a number of reinforcement troops for service in Northern Ireland and we have commitments in the Falklands and in the middle east—any one of those places could blow up at any time. Will the Minister keep that firmly in mind when he considers the commitments that the nation is making to the Balkans?

Will the Minister explain exactly what is the difference between a peace implementation force and an invasion force, because fighting is almost certain to begin as soon as those men cross the frontier?

Mr. Robertson

No, it is not, and a peace implementation force is exactly what it says it is: it is configured, and its numbers are designed, with that purpose in mind. The hon. Gentleman comes from Northern Ireland and knows how much the Province depends on the British Army's presence. That is a commitment that it has fulfilled well over the years, and it is an undiminished commitment that will not in any way be affected by what we have to do in the Balkans. Of course, as the Defence Secretary, I have to weigh up all the commitments that this country has and all the pressures on our armed forces before I make decisions about the deployment of our troops. That is why, when we make these announcements, we do so after very careful consideration.

Several hon. Members

rose—

Madam Speaker

Order. We now come to the business statement.

Sir Peter Emery (East Devon)

On a point of order, Madam Speaker.

Madam Speaker

Points of order come after statements. I call the Leader of the House to make the business statement.