Kosovo (Hansard, 19 July 1999)

§ 7. Mr. John Bercow (Buckingham)
What assessment he has made of the effectiveness of European defence co-operation during the Kosovo campaign. [90205]

§ 15. Mr. Tim Loughton (East Worthing and Shoreham)
What assessment he has made of the effectiveness of European defence co-operation during the Kosovo campaign. [90214]

§ The Secretary of State for Defence (Mr. George Robertson)
Throughout the campaign, European defence co-operation was excellent and Europeans are now providing 85 per cent. of KFOR personnel. However, Kosovo has highlighted areas where European collective capabilities can and should be improved. The European defence initiative that we launched last autumn foresaw those requirements and is intended to address them.

§ Mr. Bercow
I am grateful to the Secretary of State for his answer: the lessons of Kosovo are clearly crucial to the future of European defence co-operation. Does he agree with Jamie Shea that NATO knew about the nuclear bunkers and deception tactics used by the Serbian army, the effect of which was to protect much of its equipment from the effects of the NATO air strikes? Given that the battle damage assessments that were made public at the time were widely regarded as over-optimistic, and in light of the knowledge that Jamie Shea claims NATO possessed, what effect did NATO's private assessment have on its judgment of the situation on the ground?

§ Mr. Robertson
It was not only Jamie Shea who knew about the bunkers and the deceptions practised by the Yugoslav troops: it had been known for many years that they were part and parcel of Tito's tactics against any potential Warsaw pact invasion, so it was hardly news 780 that they were in use. However, the fact is that, if the tanks were hidden and only decoys were on the surface, there would be much less violence against civilians and property. The relentlessness of the attacks by allied air forces increasingly drove the Serb troops into the bunkers where they could cause far less damage than if they had remained on the surface.
As for battle damage assessment, we divulged at the time what we knew—what was apparent to us from the distance at which we had to operate. There is currently a NATO team in the area evaluating the damage, and it would be wiser to wait and see what it produces than to jump to any conclusions now. The answer to the question of how much damage we caused to Milosevic's military machine can be summed up in one simple word: enough.

§ Mr. Loughton
From a rather intriguing document, "Preliminary Thoughts on Kosovo", which represents a recent speech by the Secretary of State, we learn much about history: we learn about what NATO did not do and how NATO came through the Kosovo conflict strengthened, despite public opinion in Greece and Italy; and we learn how wonderful the Germans were. However, we skim over the fact that more than 80 per cent. of the air power was provided by the United States.
What sort of operation does the right hon. Gentleman think that Europe could have carried out without the United States, given that he says in the document how far Europe has come in responding to conflicts on its doorstep? Secondly, what exactly is he looking for when he mentions that we have some way to go before we have as robust a European defence policy as he would like?

§ Mr. Robertson
The answer to the second question is the answer to the first one. I hope that we would not need the Americans to supply more than 80 per cent. of our air power in such a situation. They were generous and we should give them appropriate credit for their presence and willingness to take on the expense and risks. That is clearly one of the lessons that we must learn in considering how Europe might build its capabilities for the future.
Collectively in Europe, we have far too few air systems that can deliver precision-guided weapons, which are the weapons for the future. The European defence initiative must clearly address itself to that.
I did not skim over what Europe needs to do. It is one of the fundamental planks of the European defence initiative, on which we feel very strongly but which, it appears, the Opposition think is simply part and parcel of a European crusade.

§ Ann Clwyd (Cynon Valley)
Amnesty International claims in a letter to me that the United Kingdom Government are planning to deploy 17-year-olds as part of the international peacekeeping force in Kosovo. I do not know whether that is so, but the United Nations guidelines are very clear. They say that the minimum age for peacekeepers should be 18, and preferably 21. Is this really the policy of the Ministry of Defence?

§ Mr. Robertson
The UN guidelines make it clear that they apply only to conscripts and not volunteers. We seek parental permission for those under the age of 18 who might be deployed as peacekeepers. The British armed 781 forces recruit at that age because we hope to train the youngsters and give them the professionalism and skills for which our troops are known, although we are very sensitive to possible deployments. I repeat that the UN guidelines, to which my hon. Friend draws attention, apply to conscripts and not volunteers.

§ Mr. Dale Campbell-Savours (Workington)
Have all the offers of troops for KFOR been fulfilled?

§ Mr. Robertson
Increasingly, they are being fulfilled. Not all of them are in place, but very large numbers of troops are moving into position and, as times goes on, I have no doubt that they will replace British troops. A wide range of countries, inside and outside NATO, are offering troops. We will gradually build the force to 50,000 by autumn, which was the KFOR-plus target established by NATO.

§ Mr. Gerald Howarth (Aldershot)
Given that this is the last Defence questions before the likely disbandment of the 5th Airborne Brigade, may I take this opportunity to invite the Secretary of State to pay tribute to it, its leader, Brigadier Adrian Freer, and the 1st Battalion Parachute Regiment, which has done a very effective job in Kosovo?
Will the Secretary of State recognise the grave outrage in Aldershot at the idea that young paratroopers who are trying to enforce peace in Kosovo may be charged with murder? Finally, is he really convinced that the new 16th Air Assault Brigade will be able to do the job that the 5th Airborne Brigade would have been called on to do had it been required to fight in Kosovo?

§ Mr. Robertson
Yes, of course. The component parts believe that they will be able to do so, and with renewed strength. Of course I pay tribute to the 5th Airborne Brigade and the headquarters, which were present for the initial search inside Kosovo, but are now back home. I pay tribute particularly to Brigadier Adrian Freer, who attracted international attention with his discussion with Russian troops at Pristina airport. No one who saw the pictures of the Paras, the Gurkhas and the Irish guards going into Kosovo on 12 June, on the day of the Queen's official birthday parade in Horse Guards, will ever forget that moment. No one who has flown by helicopter across that route and seen the dangerous circumstances into which they went will doubt their courage and professionalism. No one who met them in Pristina performing a range of duties will question in any way the versatility of the paratroopers, or of any of those who are serving with KFOR in the British sector.

§ Mr. Tam Dalyell (Linlithgow)
Are we wrong to suppose that NATO went to war, and a mighty army was deployed, all in the cause of combating ethnic cleansing? Therefore, what can be done about the brutal ethnic cleansing currently going on of Serbs and gypsy people? What on earth is to be done about that?

§ Mr. Robertson
The 19 countries of NATO took military action because there was no other alternative in stopping the systemic genocidal killing being perpetrated by the Serb military inside Kosovo—which had led to the expulsion of almost 1 million people of Kosovar extraction from Kosovo itself. I regret it if some of the 782 Kosovar Serbs are being intimidated into leaving their country. I understand that the number of Kosovar Serbs leaving their country has declined, and that some people of Serb extraction are now going back to Kosovo—as they are encouraged to do.
As distinct from the killers among the Serb battalions who drove the Albanians out, the forces of NATO—KFOR, under General Jackson—have made it absolutely clear that they are evenhanded and will treat alike those who are intimidating the Serbs and those who are intimidating the Albanians. That is the standard that we have established, and I hope that it is a standard that will survive for a long time to come.

§ Mr. lain Duncan Smith (Chingford and Woodford Green)
The Secretary of State seems to be in danger of contradicting himself. During the campaign, he said quite clearly that a part of its purpose was to debilitate or even to destroy Milosevic's war machine in Kosovo and elsewhere. However, just now, in answer to my hon. Friend the Member for Buckingham (Mr. Bercow), the Secretary of State said that everyone in NATO, including himself, had known about the Serbs' nuclear bunkers and various techniques to hide their equipment and create decoys, so that NATO aircraft would strike the wrong targets. If they knew all that, why did NATO—with the Secretary of State's approval—raise expectations during the conflict of success in destroying Serb army targets, such as tanks and artillery?

§ Mr. Robertson
We were aware of possible techniques that might be used by Serb forces inside Kosovo. However, from the very beginning, we spoke about NATO's objectives being very precisely to disrupt the violence going on inside Kosovo and to weaken the military machine that was causing that violence. From day one of the conflict, and throughout it, that is what we sought to do. Ultimately, as a consequence of the action that we took, Milosevic capitulated. All of the Serb troops—over 40,000 of them—and all of the armour that they had in Kosovo was taken outside Kosovo. The refugees are back home; NATO is in there. That is a success by any standard that one might care to mention. I wish that all those—the dismal Jimmies—who are determined to drag defeat from the jaws of victory would recognise that.
There may well be lessons to be learned—there will be lessons learned—but there has been a huge success, as any person of Albanian extraction inside Kosovo will be happy to tell the hon. Member for Chingford and Woodford Green (Mr. Duncan Smith).

§ Mr. Duncan Smith
The Secretary of State is very quick to refer to anyone who asks questions as a dismal Jimmy, but surely the point is that the Government seem incapable of accepting that there are questions legitimately requiring an answer. The Government behave as though they are utterly infallible and incapable of any difficulties or problems. However, the Secretary of State will have to answer those questions.
A report, for example, states that NATO's ramped-up target and achievement levels appeared at about the time that the No. 10 Downing street press secretary and other political spokesmen arrived at NATO. Will the Secretary 783 of State say, once and for all, whether there was any connection between the upping of achievement levels and the need to win a propaganda war?

§ Mr. Robertson
The hon. Gentleman takes the conspiracy theory to a ludicrous extent if he suggests that Mr. Alastair Campbell was single-handedly in charge of the achievement levels inside Kosovo. We shall see in due course what damage was done to the Serb army. I can only tell the hon. Gentleman, as General Jackson would tell him, that we did sufficient damage, whether inside Kosovo or inside Yugoslavia generally, to cause Milosevic to capitulate and to take out all of his troops.
I do not deny the hon. Gentleman the right to ask questions. Indeed, he has every right to do so. There are questions that we shall ask and lessons that we shall learn from events in Kosovo. Some of them will be in the defence White Paper that will be published in the autumn. Some of them will emerge from the reviews that will take place by the Select Committees on Defence and on Foreign Affairs. I am not afraid about that.
However, instead of nit-picking over how many tanks we killed, we should reflect on the fact that if tanks were being hidden or substituted by decoys that were blown up, they were not causing the violence which, in the early days of the conflict, led to thousands of people being killed and even larger numbers being expelled.