Kosovo

HC Deb 01 February 1999 vol 324 cc597-608 3.32 pm

The Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (Mr. Robin Cook)

With permission, I should like to make a statement about recent developments in regard to Kosovo.

The situation on the ground remains tense. On Friday, more than 20 Kosovo Albanians were shot in Rugovo. On Saturday, a hand grenade was lobbed into a cafe in Pristina frequented by Serbs, injuring eight people, including one Albanian. Yesterday, two Serb policemen were injured when a grenade was fired into their van while they were returning from the funeral of a casualty of earlier conflict. More than 200 people have been killed since the Holbrooke agreement last October provided for a ceasefire.

At its meeting in London last Friday, the Contact Group called on both sides to end hostilities now. It insisted on full compliance by Belgrade with its undertakings of last October, and on real co-operation with both the verification mission and the International War Crimes Tribunal.

The main focus of the meeting was on the urgent need to put momentum into the political process. Since last October, Ambassadors Hill and Petritsch have developed the Contact Group's framework document for a political settlement, which reflects extensive consultation with both sides. The detailed document provides for an interim accord for three years. That period would provide an opportunity for the creation of democratic self-government in Kosovo, through free and fair elections supervised by the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe. The new institutions of Kosovo would enjoy a wide range of self-government, including control of Kosovo' s own police and internal security. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia would retain competence only for foreign policy, external defence, monetary policy, the single market, customs and federal taxation. Both Serb and Albanian communities would be fully protected, with the right to elected institutions preserving their national cultures, language and education. The framework document also provides that, at the end of three years, the future status of Kosovo would be reviewed under international auspices.

Despite the extensive consultation and the detailed work that has gone into the framework document by representatives of the Contact Group, in three months there has not been one negotiating meeting on it between Belgrade and the Kosovo Albanians. On Friday, the Contact Group resolved on a programme of action to break that stalemate.

We agreed to summon both sides to negotiations on the basis of the framework document. We set a tight timetable that requires both sides to attend talks by this Saturday and to conclude negotiations within less than two further weeks. France has offered to provide a venue for the talks, which will take place under the joint chairmanship of me and Hubert Vedrine, the French Foreign Minister. Also on Friday, the United Nations Security Council welcomed the Contact Group's strategy and demanded that both parties should comply with it.

On Saturday, the North Atlantic Council gave its full support to the Contact Group's strategy and warned that NATO is ready to take whatever measures are necessary to avert the humanitarian catastrophe by compelling compliance with the demands of the international community. In the meantime, the North Atlantic Council delegated to its Secretary-General, Javier Solana, authority to order military action in the light of the responses of both parties.

My right hon. Friend the Prime Minister discussed Kosovo with President Chirac during his visit last Thursday. They agreed that both Britain and France would be willing to consider the deployment, with their allies, of ground troops in Kosovo to provide a period of stability and peace during which a political settlement could take root.

I was instructed by the Contact Group to convey our demands to both parties and, on Saturday, I visited Belgrade and Skopje. I was accompanied throughout by Bill Walker, chief of the verification mission. The visit increased my respect for its valuable work. It has provided instant and reliable information on atrocities, which invariably occur in places where it is absent, and has undoubtedly deterred further atrocities where it is present.

In Belgrade, I met jointly with President Milosevic of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and President Milutinovic of the Republic of Serbia. I stressed to them that I came with the mandate of the united Contact Group, and backed by the authority of the North Atlantic Council. Our requirement on them to take part in negotiations under international chairmanship is the best opportunity that Belgrade will get to extricate itself from a conflict that it cannot win. President Milosevic undertook to study the Contact Group proposals and to reply within a few days.

In Skopje, I met Dr. Rugova, Mr. Demaqi and Mr. Qosja, who between them represent a broad spectrum of Kosovar opinion. I stressed in all my conversations with the Kosovo Albanians that the proposals of the Contact Group offered a democratic, self-governing Kosovo free from the bloodshed of recent months.

Dr. Rugova, who was elected overwhelmingly last year as leader of the Kosovo Albanians, welcomed the opportunity for talks and committed his party to participate fully in them. I also spoke by telephone to Mr. Surroi, an independent publisher and a leading political figure in Pristina, who gave his full support to the proposals and expressed his willingness to participate. Mr. Demaqi, who acts as political spokesman for the Kosovo Liberation Army, and Mr. Qosja, leader of the third largest Kosovo Albanian party, both undertook to consult their colleagues and to let me have their responses within days.

I cannot confirm that the talks that we seek will take place. Nor can I guarantee that, if they take place, they will succeed. Serious issues of difference remain between the two sides, which it will take hard negotiation to resolve, such as the nature of the review to take place in three years' time and the relationship between a self-governing Kosovo and Serbia, but I can confirm that the meeting of the Contact Group showed real unity and a common determination to provide for progress towards a political settlement of the conflict.

It is now for both parties to show the same commitment to finding a political solution. Neither of them can win the conflict by military means. Both of them would benefit from a political settlement. The offer of those talks, brokered by the Contact Group and backed by the Security Council and NATO, provides the best opportunity that they will ever get to achieve a political settlement through dialogue. I urge both of them now to seize that opportunity and to give the people of Kosovo hope for their future in place of fear of the present bloodshed.

Mr. Michael Howard (Folkestone and Hythe)

I thank the Foreign Secretary for his statement.

It has been clear for some considerable time that a clear ultimatum is required to halt the violence in Kosovo and to bring the two sides to the negotiating table. As the Foreign Secretary said on Friday, the international community cannot simply allow the current stalemate to continue while the ceasefire crumbles and people continue to be killed. In truth, the ceasefire crumbled some time ago; the October agreement is in tatters; and, as the Foreign Secretary has just said, more than 200 people have been killed since that agreement was entered into.

In the light of those dire facts, the Opposition fully support the summonsing of both sides to talks, by 6 February, and the setting of a clear deadline for conclusion of the negotiations. We also support the decision by the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation to authorise the possible use of force, provided that it is based on clearly defined objectives.

NATO forces are reported to be on 48 hours' notice. Will the Foreign Secretary say more about British preparations for the possible use of force? Should military strikes be authorised, what plans exist for extraction of the OSCE verifiers—I join the Foreign Secretary in paying tribute to them, and to what they are doing in Kosovo—before any such action?

The Foreign Secretary also mentioned the possible deployment of ground troops to enforce any settlement. Would all leading NATO nations take part in such a deployment? Is the United States, in particular, now showing greater willingness to deploy such troops?

The whole House will wish to condemn unreservedly the killings that continue to take place in Kosovo. The Foreign Secretary referred to the discovery, on Friday, of the bodies of 24 Kosovo Albanians in the village of Rugovo. Will he tell the House what progress has been made by the verifiers and others in investigating who was responsible for those deaths? Does he accept a role for international war crimes investigators in that work, as he did after the massacre of 49 Kosovo Albanians at Racak?

The head of the OSCE has reaffirmed his belief that he has "absolutely no doubt" that Serbs were behind the Racak outrage. What discussions did the Foreign Secretary have with President Milosevic on access for war crimes investigators to that area? What response did he receive? Will he comment on weekend reports that United States surveillance teams uncovered evidence of direct involvement by senior Serb politicians and military representatives, both in the massacre itself and in the attempted cover-up that followed? Will he comment also on claims by United Nations human rights monitors that Serbian authorities have launched a new campaign of arresting and torturing Albanian political activists?

Does the Foreign Secretary recall that it is now almost eight months since he issued what he called a last warning to the Yugoslav President? Threats have been made repeatedly since, but they were not followed through. The response of the international community, led—as he constantly reminded us—by him, was described by the Prime Minister's press secretary as "dithering and disunited". Will the Foreign Secretary now give an assurance that those days are over and that, if the current ultimatum does not succeed, resolute action will be taken?

Mr. Cook

I shall respond to the right hon. and learned Gentleman's concluding remarks before I sit down, but, meanwhile, I shall respond to his questions.

Britain will take full part in any action that is taken by NATO. For that reason, we have already made appropriate arrangements for our airplanes to be ready in Italy.

If military action were in contemplation, the verification mission would of course have to be withdrawn. While I was in Skopje, I had the opportunity of meeting some of those who are deployed to the extraction force, which would assist in that task if it were necessary. Of course, the requirement to remove that verification mission, which is doing valuable work in Kosovo, must also be a factor in our decision on whether to take military action.

There is discussion in the United States Administration on ground troops. No conclusion has been reached, but there is growing recognition among many NATO members that a political settlement would have a better chance of success if it were backed by ground troops.

I have presented President Milosevic with the full conclusions of the Contact Group, which include the demand that the International War Crimes Tribunal be given access to Racak to carry out an investigation. I am well aware of the reports of what happened at Racak. I made my position on that plain when I spoke in the House two weeks ago. It is clear that the prime responsibility appears to lie with the Serb security forces, who were in the vicinity.

On Friday, the Contact Group of the United States, Russia and the major European nations was united without reservation behind the strategy that I have outlined to the House. Since then, the strategy has been backed without reservation by the 15 members of the Security Council and the 16 members of NATO. I regret that the right hon. and learned Gentleman could not give the same full support without indulging in party politics.

The right hon. and learned Gentleman talks about a period of eight months. I remind him that President Milosevic suspended the autonomy of Kosovo in 1990. Today's storm has been gathering in the eight years since then. For seven of those years, the right hon. and learned Gentleman's party was in power. Having done nothing throughout those long years to avert the crisis, it is a bit rich to complain that we have not solved the mess that we inherited from the Conservatives in eight months.

Mr. Donald Anderson (Swansea, East)

With the exception of the right hon. and learned Member for Folkestone and Hythe (Mr. Howard), there must surely be admiration and congratulation from all parties for the leading role that my right hon. Friend has played in the flurry of international conferences and initiatives in recent days. Although there are clearly loopholes and problems, including the extent to which we can rely on the promises of President Milosevic and uncertainty about who can speak properly on behalf of the Kosovo Liberation Army, surely we must all recognise that the initiative is the only serious way out of the crisis. Those who reject it will bring a heavy burden on those whom they purport to represent—a burden that will be borne through greater bloodshed and destruction of property.

Mr. Cook

I entirely agree that the situation is very complex, and the best way to resolve those complications is for both sides to get around the table and thrash the issues out together. I am sad to endorse my hon. Friend's last remark, having had first-hand contact. I sometimes feel that the deaths on both sides are not necessarily the prime consideration of those involved with whom I discuss the matter. Undoubtedly the best prospect of peace and stability for the people of Kosovo lies in the process. I urge their leaders to take that step. The best way to halt casualties on the Serb side and to protect the rights of the Serb community in Kosovo also lies in the process.

Mr. David Heath (Somerton and Frome)

I thank the right hon. Gentleman for his statement. Does he accept that the proposed talks at Rambouillet will be widely welcomed, providing a renewed momentum to the political process, firm proposals for discussion and a clear political objective should force be required—the three prerequisites that the Liberal Democrats have long advocated? I welcome his personal contribution to an overdue process still fraught with military and political risks.

I should like three assurances. First, will every effort be maintained to ensure common purpose with our European partners, particularly France and Germany? Secondly, if Dr. Rugova and President Milosevic are prepared to come to the table, will it be made clear to Dr. Demaqi and the KLA that they have no veto to prevent effective talks from proceeding? Lastly, will the Foreign Secretary confirm that the jurisdiction of the International War Crimes Tribunal and the eventual indictment of individuals in Kosovo guilty of crimes against humanity are not negotiable?

Mr. Cook

I thank the hon. Gentleman for his welcome for the initiative. On his first point, we will work hard to maintain the common purpose with our European allies, and as the event is jointly chaired by me and by the Foreign Minister of France, that is essential to the success of the enterprise. Germany will be represented throughout at Rambouillet at a high official level, and it is important that the President of the EU remains engaged in the process.

Secondly, there can be no veto by any specific party on whether the talks take place. We would be willing to conduct talks in the event of Dr. Rugova, Mr. Surroi and Mr. Qosja attending Rambouillet. However, we are anxious to make sure that we receive an Albanian team that is as representative as possible, and therefore we very much hope that Mr. Demaqi and the KLA will give us a positive answer. It is in the KLA' s interests to be represented in the discussions.

Finally, the hon. Gentleman is of course correct to say that the demand for access for the International War Crimes Tribunal to Kosovo has been made by the UN Security Council and is in no way open to negotiation at Rambouillet.

Mr. Dale Campbell-Savours (Workington)

The assumption that many people are making is that NATO action would be against Serbian military assets. However, if this is an argument—as has been said at the Dispatch Box before—between Greater Serbia and, to some extent, Greater Albania, are there not circumstances in which NATO military action might have to be taken against forces other than those of Serbia?

Mr. Cook

If that assumption exists, it has no validity in terms of the text approved by the North Atlantic Council on Saturday, which is even-handed and has authorised Javier Solana to take action, depending on the response of both parties—not just one party. At the same time, we must be realistic. Military action in Kosovo against the KLA is not a readily feasible military option because there is no concentration of targets, and they are mostly among civilian areas that we would not wish to target. However, I hope that those questions will not arise. Quite apart from any prospect of military action, it is plainly in the interests of both sides to come together and make a success of the talks. I hope that they will draw that conclusion themselves.

Mr. John Wilkinson (Ruislip-Northwood)

In the somewhat dire eventuality of Britain having to inject a military force on the ground, will the Foreign Secretary explain on whose side that force would be and its precise objectives? Would the force be interposed between two belligerents in what could prove to be an extremely long and costly engagement in an area ideally suited for guerrilla warfare? Does the right hon. Gentleman agree that self-determination for Kosovo, sooner rather than later, may prove to be the most realistic political option?

Mr. Cook

The hon. Gentleman has raised the prospect of self-determination for an independent Kosovo several times; therefore, I find it surprising that he should warn that those who argue for that in Kosovo would choose to shoot at troops who were there to police a political settlement. There can be no question of any external force being interposed, because there is no such thing as a front line in Kosovo in which it could be interposed. The objective of any such deployment would not be in support of either side, but would be in support of a political settlement. Such a deployment would be realistically likely only if both sides were committed to that political settlement.

Mr. David Winnick (Walsall, North)

In view of the remarks of the shadow Foreign Secretary, is my right hon. Friend aware that those of us who were in previous Parliaments remember only too well how the then Conservative Foreign Secretary, now Lord Hurd, treated with derision those of us who called for action to protect the lives of Muslims in Bosnia, and we are not likely to forget it? Does my right hon. Friend accept that all the evidence that has come to light in the past few days demonstrates that the mass murders have been orchestrated by Belgrade, and it would be naive to think otherwise? I hope that the plan that my right hon. Friend has announced today will succeed, but we should remember that, like Baghdad, unfortunately Belgrade understands only force.

Mr. Cook

If my hon. Friend is right on that last point, there is a clear possibility of that force being applied if Belgrade does not respond to the diplomatic invitation that we have made. I share my hon. Friend's concern about the atrocities and I also understand the point that he makes about the tight discipline and communications in the Serb security forces. I stress to the House that the important issue, and the strategic objective, must be to find a political settlement. As long as there is no political process regarding Kosovo, the ceasefire will continue to crumble. We will persuade both sides to look for a solution other than through conflict only if we can show that there is another way to achieve a much better solution.

Mr. William Cash (Stone)

Does the Foreign Secretary accept that many in this country welcome the move that he has made and wish to encourage the settlement along the lines that he has suggested? However, in the light of his rather cautious remarks about the other members of the European Union, will he indicate the extent of differences between the member states? He was careful not to mention the extent of unanimity between the member states.

Mr. Cook

I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for his support for what we are doing. We discussed the issue at the European Union meeting of Foreign Ministers only a week ago today, and there was total unanimity in condemning the atrocities and stressing the importance of the political process. Four of the largest members of the European Union were present at the Contact Group on Friday—Britain, France, Germany and Italy—and all fully supported the conclusions that I have presented to the House. At present, I am not aware of any substantial disagreement in the European Union and I am sure that, should NATO decide that ground troops are an appropriate way to ensure that the political settlement can take root, many other members of the European Union will participate as members of NATO.

Mr. Robert N. Wareing (Liverpool, West Derby)

As one who, as long as 14 years ago, argued while in Yugoslavia that Kosovo should get full republic status, I congratulate my right hon. Friend and his colleagues in the Contact Group on coming up with a framework document that is a basis for negotiation. I agree with him that military activity will never solve the problem. Has he taken cognisance of the words of Colonel Edward Cowan, our former military attaché in Belgrade, on BBC Radio 5 on 22 January that military action would be a disaster? I ask my right hon. Friend to consider the possible consequences of re-igniting the conflict in Bosnia if Serbia is bombed.

Mr. Cook

There is no one in the Contact Group or in NATO who actively wants to initiate military action. Any such decision would be taken with great reluctance and only if Belgrade refused to respond to the fair offer that we have made. I hope that Belgrade will recognise that it is in its interests to give a positive response and to share the view expressed by my hon. Friend that the way forward is to negotiate on the remaining difficult areas. Equally, Belgrade should have no doubt about our resolve if it refuses to end the conflict and fails to take this opportunity to engage in a political process. We are clear in our determination that that cannot happen without a response from NATO and we have set out clearly what that response might be.

Mr. Crispin Blunt (Reigate)

I congratulate the Foreign Secretary on the level of diplomatic unity that he has achieved on the objectives that he has laid out to the House this afternoon. However, he should bear it in mind, when he upbraids my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Folkestone and Hythe (Mr. Howard), that it was the Prime Minister's press secretary who described the results of the Foreign Secretary's previous efforts as dithering and disunited. Will he explain to the House what authority has been delegated to the Secretary-General of NATO to do what and with what military forces in the light of the response of both parties? How much authority over the control of its armed forces has the United Kingdom given away in response to the military events of the next few days?

Will the Foreign Secretary explain from where the troops who will be used in the long-term control and protection of the settlement will come? It is rumoured in the newspapers today that 8,000 British soldiers may be involved in the initial stages but, as the strategic defence review made clear, we have the capacity to deploy a formation only for one six-month spell.

Mr. Cook

I thank the hon. Gentleman for his congratulations, and I assure him that I come to the House with the full backing of the Contact Group of the North Atlantic Council, of the Security Council—and also of the press spokesman for the Prime Minister.

The hon. Gentleman asked whether we had given away control of British forces. Of course we have done no such thing: what we have done is participate as full members of an alliance that has a procedure for joint decision making. Part of our procedure has always been that, towards the end of the political decision making, we hand over authority for action to the military membership.

In this case, we have handed over the authority for action to Javier Solana, the NATO Secretary-General, but we would, of course, expect consultation before any further step is taken. Indeed, the conclusions of the North Atlantic Council explicitly state that he will take into account the Contact Group's assessment of the responses. I can therefore tell the hon. Gentleman that I am totally confident that there will be further consultation with Britain before any action that involves our forces takes place.

Dr. Norman A. Godman (Greenock and Inverclyde)

May I offer my compliments to my right hon. Friend? In terms of political developments, should the Kosovo Albanians not be urged to play the long game? From their point of view, it makes good sense that there should be an autonomous administration long before there can be any talk of self-determination. However, does not military force or action have to be legitimised by international law and by the support of the United Nations Security Council? If there are not to be American troops on the ground there, what role will the American Administration play in what is, essentially, a European problem?

Mr. Cook

First, I strongly endorse my hon. Friend's point about the interim character of the Contact Group proposals. The Kosovo Liberation Army does not give up any issue of principle in coming to negotiate on the three-year interim period; nor, for that matter, does Belgrade, by taking part in those negotiations, compromise on any issue of principle about the long-term future of Kosovo. My hon. Friend is right to say that those who want there to be an independent Kosovo—and that does not embrace the Contact Group—would be well advised to take this opportunity to create the democratic structures that would establish a political community within Kosovo which, if independence were to be the outcome at some future date, could be ready to take that extra step. However, for the time being, we propose a democratic, self-governing Kosovo within the Federal Republic but with extensive control over its own affairs.

My hon. Friend asked also about the legal base for any action. We are clear that we have legal authority for action to prevent humanitarian catastrophe and we are all deeply worried that we shall be looking at just such a catastrophe unless we are able to get a political settlement under way. I stress to my hon. Friend and to the House that the proposal that I have outlined this afternoon was welcomed unanimously by the Security Council and that no permanent member disagreed with it.

Dr. Julian Lewis (New Forest, East)

As a relative newcomer to the sponsorship of the concept of military deterrence, does the Foreign Secretary appreciate that the best chance of deterring an aggressor is to be as specific as possible in stating what military action will follow if that aggressor fails to comply with requirements? Therefore, when the right hon. Gentleman talks about the possibility of military action against Serbia, will he spell out clearly whether he means that it will be simply air action, unsupported by anything else? Does he mean that such action will take place only in the disputed area of Kosovo, or will it extend to Serbia itself?

Mr. Cook

As for late converts, the hon. Gentleman may like to remember that many people on the Labour Benches condemned Saddam Hussein while the hon. Gentlemen of the Conservative party were arming him.

On the hon. Gentleman's question about military intervention, I frankly believe that there is a lot of merit in keeping President Milosevic guessing about exactly what we would do. The hon. Gentleman is, however, quite correct to say that, if there were military action, it is unlikely that it could be confined to the province of Kosovo.

Mr. John Austin (Erith and Thamesmead)

May I join my hon. Friend the Member for Swansea, East (Mr. Anderson) and others in congratulating the Foreign Secretary on his determination and perseverance in bringing about a viable political settlement that all sides to the dispute should adopt? However, will my right hon. Friend tell the parties involved that the agreement is for the interim, that there will be final status negotiations in three years' time, and that there is no possibility of the international community's countenancing any change in the internationally recognised borders of Macedonia or Albania? Will he also tell them categorically that nothing is ruled out of the final options, including the possibility of an independent Kosovo?

Mr. Cook

I took an opportunity during my visit to Skopje to see the Foreign Minister of Macedonia and to ensure him of our continuing commitment to the territorial integrity of Macedonia. We have set out a number of principles for the negotiations. We regard them not as matters for negotiation, but as points to guide the parties in their negotiation of the framework document. One of the principles is respect for the territorial integrity of the Federal Republic and of neighbouring countries. Another is that there should be no unilateral change to the territorial integrity of any party in the area from which the parties to the talks come.

My hon. Friend is right to say that we are discussing an interim period, and that a review clause will provide for a review under international auspices and with international mediation. At present, no particular outcome is ruled out, but I hope that all sides will come to the talks ready to make a serious effort to achieve stability during the three-year period. If Belgrade wishes Kosovo to remain in the Federal Republic at the end of the three-year period, the best way to achieve that is to demonstrate that the Kosovo Albanians can have a future of peace, stability and freedom from repression within the Federal Republic.

Dr. Jenny Tonge (Richmond Park)

In the unwelcome event of military action by NATO, can the Foreign Secretary make any plans to protect the civilian population, and to deliver humanitarian aid to the people of Kosovo?

Mr. Cook

We are already extensively involved in humanitarian aid in Kosovo, and Britain is one of the major donors to the efforts of the International Committee of the Red Cross and the United Nations. Plainly, if military action were to be taken, I would certainly seek to avoid an impact on the civilian population. I cannot guarantee that there will be no such impact, but that will be a heavy factor in our consideration of whether to proceed with military action.

Mr. Michael Clapham (Barnsley, West and Penistone)

I congratulate my right hon. Friend on the part that he played in putting together the peace package. Does he agree that, if troops are to be used to build confidence between the two sides, they must be introduced speedily to become part of the negotiations? Does he further agree that military action by NATO would make almost impossible both the use of ground troops and peace in the foreseeable future?

Mr. Cook

My hon. Friend is right to say that the reason for deployment of ground troops would be to provide the confidence and reassurance on the ground in which we can start the process of reconstructing a democratic, self-governing Kosovo. His argument also has force when he says that progress in the political settlement would be more difficult to achieve in the wake of military action. However, if no progress can be made, we would not be losing progress by taking military action.

Belgrade must reckon carefully on the options available. One option is to take part in the talks, and to secure a future not only for itself but for the Serb community in Kosovo. If Belgrade fails to take that option, it should not doubt our resolve and willingness to press home with what we have committed ourselves to do in the North Atlantic Council. I hope that it will not come to that, but it is very much in the hands of Belgrade to respond positively to an offer that is in its own interests.

Mr. John Randall (Uxbridge)

I thank the Foreign Secretary for his balanced statement. Does he agree that, if in these grave circumstances NATO were to use force against the belligerents, although Yugoslav targets might be readily identifiable, the nature of the KLA guerrilla force means that it might shelter among the civilian population and it would be almost impossible to take action against it? If that were tried, there would be grave consequences for the civilian population.

Mr. Cook

I thank the hon. Gentleman for his comment on my balanced statement, which I take as a compliment. His assessment of the KLA is right. I cannot add or detract from what he said because it was fair comment. The KLA should not ignore the fact that its behaviour will be a factor in whether military action is taken against Belgrade. There could be no question of the North Atlantic Council authorising action against Belgrade for failing to take part in talks if the KLA fails to take part in them. We are keen to ensure that we use all the levers to try to achieve progress towards peace and stability, but we are not going to be conscripted as the KLA' s air force.

Mr. Tony Benn (Chesterfield)

In considering the composition of the ground troops who may be sent in, has the Foreign Secretary taken account of the fact that, within living memory, tens of thousands, if not hundreds of thousands, of Serbs were killed by German troops? The survivors of those massacres are still there. Might that factor influence the composition of ground forces?

Mr. Cook

German troops are already present in Macedonia, where they are welcome and ready to take part in any extraction force necessary in relation to the verification mission. I hope that it will not be necessary to provide a military expedition to secure the verifiers because we have a clear commitment from Belgrade to look after their safety. Any ground troops would be committed in support of a political settlement. One therefore hopes that, as both sides would have supported such a settlement, they would welcome the ground troops who would give it an opportunity to work. My principal frustration in trying to achieve progress in the western Balkans is the readiness of all sides to disappear into the period of history in which their grievances began. If we are to make progress at Rambouillet, I hope that both sides come to look to the future, not the past.

Mr. John Bercow (Buckingham)

The Foreign Secretary has said several times, in this statement and elsewhere, that British ground troops might be deployed to police a settlement. Has he absolutely ruled out the possibility that they will be deployed not in Kosovo but in Serbia in the event of the failure of such a settlement?

Mr. Cook

The hon. Gentleman invites me to contemplate a military action that we have not considered and do not have in contemplation. I therefore do not intend to rule it out or in, but I would want to think long and hard before embracing the proposal that he made.

Mr. Cash

On a point of order, Mr. Deputy Speaker. We have had an important statement this afternoon, but many hon. Members and the public might have expected another on the public sector pay settlement. It is outrageous that we have not been given an opportunity to question Ministers, given today's Downing street statement that the Government will use the House of Commons as a proper forum in which to air the nation's grievances.

Mr. Deputy Speaker (Sir Alan Haselhurst)

As the hon. Gentleman knows, that is not a matter for the Chair. However, Ministers will have heard what he had to say.