HC Deb 04 March 1998 vol 307 cc1150-60
Mr. Menzies Campbell

I beg to move amendment No. 266, in clause 89, page 40, line 35, after '(1)', insert 'Subject to subsection (3)'.

The First Deputy Chairman

With this, it will be convenient to discuss the following: Amendment No. 26, in page 40, line 35, leave out 'continue to'.

Amendment No. 27, in page 40, line 36, after 'appointment', insert 'or removal'.

Amendment No. 267, in page 40, leave out from beginning of line 38 to end of line 1 on page 41 and insert— '(2) Subject to subsection (3) below, the First Minister shall recommend to Her Majesty the appointment of a person as—

  1. (a) a judge of the Court of Session (other than the Lord President or the Lord Justice Clerk); or
  2. (b) a sheriff principal or sheriff.
(3) The Prime Minister shall not make any recommendation to Her Majesty under subsection (1) nor shall the First Minister make any recommendation to Her Majesty under subsection (2), unless the nominee has been recommended to the Prime Minister or First Minister by the Judicial Services Commission for Scotland. (4) The Judicial Services Commission for Scotland shall be constituted and have the powers and functions set out in Schedule (The Judicial Services Commission for Scotland.)'. Amendment No. 429, in page 40, line 39, leave out from 'been' to end of line 40 and insert 'included in a list, submitted by the First Minister to the Prime Minister, of persons suitably qualified and experienced to hold either of the offices specified in subsection (1) above. (2A) Before submitting the list specified in subsection (2) above, the First Minister shall consult the Lord President of the Court of Session, the Lord Justice Clerk, the Secretary of State for Scotland, the Lord Advocate and the Advocate General for Scotland'. Amendment No. 28, in page 40, line 40, at end insert— '(2A) The Prime Minister shall not recommend to Her Majesty the removal of any person from the office of Lord President of the Court of Session or Lord Justice Clerk unless the First Minister advises that such a recommendation should be made. (2B) The First Minister shall not give such advice unless the Parliament has resolved that the Lord President or Lord Justice Clerk should be removed from office and the number of members voting in favour of the resolution is not less than three—quarters of the total number of seats for members of the Parliament.'. Amendment No. 29, in page 40, line 44, leave out 'or'. Amendment No. 30, in page 41, line 1, at end insert ',or (c) the Chairman of the Scottish Land Court.'. Amendment No. 430, in page 41, line 1, at end insert:— '(3A) Before making any recommendation to Her Majesty in relation to an appointment specified in subsection (3), the First Minister shall consult the Lord President of the Court of Session, the Lord Justice Clerk, the Secretary of State for Scotland, the Lord Advocate and the Advocate General for Scotland. (3B) Before making any recommendation to Her Majesty in relation to the appointment of a sheriff the First Minister shall also consult the Sheriffs Principal'. Amendment No. 31, in page 41, line 2, after 'Session' insert 'other than the Lord President or Lord Justice Clerk.'. Amendment No. 431, in page 41, line 2, after 'Session', insert 'Sheriff Principal or Sheriff'.

Amendment No. 432, in page 41, line 3, at end insert— '(4A) The First Minister shall make such a recommendation if, and only if, the Lord President of the Court of Session and the Lord Justice Clerk have undertaken, of their own accord or at the request of the First Minister, an investigation in the fitness for the office of the judge, sheriff principal or sheriff, as the case may be, and have reported in writing to the First Minister, together with a statement of their reasons, that the judge, sheriff principal or sheriff is unfit for office by reason of inability, neglect of duty or misbehaviour. (4B) When an investigation under subsection (4B) above is into the fitness for the office of either the Lord President of the Court of Session or the Lord Justice Clerk, such investigation shall be carried out by the other and by two additional judges of the Court of Session nominated by the First Minister. (4C) The First Minister shall make such a recommendation if, and only if, a Resolution approving of the proposed removal of the judge, sheriff principal or sheriff, as the case may be, has been approved by both Houses of Parliament.'. Amendment No. 32, in page 41, line 4, at end insert— '(a) he receives a report from the Lord President and the Lord Justice Clerk that the judge is unfit for office by reason of inability, neglect of duty or misbehaviour, and (b)'. Amendment No. 33, in page 41, line 7, leave out 'two—thirds' and insert 'three quarters.'.

New schedule 1—'The Judicial Services Commission for Scotland— —(1) There shall be a Judicial Services Commission for Scotland consisting of—

  1. (i) a lay President;
  2. (ii) three judges, including at least one from an intermediate court, elected by the judges by such method as a Scottish Act of Parliament shall prescribe;
  3. (iii) two persons who have regularly exercised rights of audience in the superior courts for not less than 15 years; and
  4. (iv) five lay members, who are broadly representative of the community;
(2) The Judicial Services Commission may act notwithstanding any vacancy in its membership; (3) the members of the Judicial Services Commission (other than judicial members) shall be appointed by the First Minister after consultation with the Lord President and the Lord Justice Clerk; (4) The lay members shall be selected by the First Minister from a list of names submitted by the Commissioner for Public Appointments; (5) If either the Lord President or the Lord Justice Clerk expresses dissent from a proposed appointment, the fact of the dissent shall be published if the Prime Minister or First Minister proceeds to make a recommendation to Her Majesty; (6) The members of the Judicial Services Commission shall be appointed for such terms (being not less than 5 years) as a Scottish Act of Parliament may prescribe; (7) No person may be appointed for a term which would expire after that person has attained the age of 70 years; (8) A member of the Judicial Services Commission shall cease to hold office—
  1. (i) upon the expiry of the term of appointment (which, subject to sub—paragraph (7), may be renewed); or
  2. (ii) if the member ceases to have the qualifications necessary for appointment; or
  3. (iii) on receipt by the First Minister of a letter of resignation from the member; or
  4. (iv) in the case of a judicial member, if the member is removed from office; or
  5. (v) in the case of a non-judicial member, if the member is removed from office by the Commissioner for Public Appointments.
 (9) The Judicial Services Commission shall, in nominating persons for appointment to judicial office, adopt procedures for the identification of candidates so as to ensure, so far as practicable, that adequate numbers of candidates of both sexes and from diverse racial, religious and social backgrounds are considered for appointment; and (10) The Commission may do anything which is calculated to facilitate or is conducive or incidental to the discharge of any of its functions.'

Mr. Campbell

It will be clear to hon. Members who have examined this group of amendments that to understand fully the effect of what is proposed, one must read amendment No. 266 together with amendment No. 267 and new schedule 1. As will be obvious, amendment No. 266 is a paving amendment.

Perhaps I should begin by declaring an interest, as I am a member of the Faculty of Advocates from which, by convention, appointments to the Court of Session bench are made. I still practise rather sporadically, but it is right that I should declare an interest.

The amendments and the new schedule are designed to institute a judicial services commission for Scotland to appoint judges. It may be worth having regard for a moment or two to the precise terms of clause 89. Subsection (1) provides for the United Kingdom Prime Minister to recommend to Her Majesty the appointment of a person as Lord President of the Court of Session or Lord Justice Clerk. Those are the two most senior appointments in Scotland. The holders of those appointments occupy the chair of the first division, in the case of the Lord President, and the chair of the second division, in the case of the Lord Justice Clerk, in the Court of Session.

Clause 89(2) provides that The Prime Minister shall not recommend to Her Majesty the appointment of any person who has not been nominated by the First Minister for such appointment. Of course, the First Minister is the First Minister in the Scottish Parliament. Subsection (3) provides: It is for the First Minister to recommend to Her Majesty the appointment of a person as … a judge of the Court of Session (other than the Lord President or the Lord Justice Clerk) or … a sheriff principal or a sheriff. Subsection (4) provides for the removal from office of any judge, whether the Lord President, the Lord Justice Clerk or a judge appointed to the Court of Session, on the recommendation of the First Minister.

Subsection (5) provides that The First Minister shall make such a recommendation if (and only if) the Parliament resolves that the judge in question should be removed from office and the number of members voting in favour of the resolution is not less than two-thirds of the total number of seats for members of the Parliament. As I pointed out, the purpose of the amendments and the new schedule is to provide a judicial services commission for Scotland. I claim consistency, if that be a merit in these matters, as a private Member's Bill that I introduced in February 1992 contained similar provisions. As was inevitable, that Bill made no further progress, but it embodied provisions that were substantially the same as those that I urge the Minister to accept this evening.

Why do I seek to establish a judicial services commission for Scotland through these amendments? It is right that some of the mystique that attaches itself to the appointment of judges should be removed. As matters stand, I understand that the Lord Advocate of the day determines a suitable candidate for appointment to the Court of Session and makes a nomination to the Secretary of State for Scotland, who makes a recommendation to her Majesty, who ultimately makes the appointment. None of that takes place in public and none of it is subject to the scrutiny of the public or anyone other than the Lord Advocate and the Secretary of State for Scotland.

The mystique ought to be removed. There is more than a hint of the white smoke emerging—I think that it is from the Sistine chapel, although I cannot claim any great expertise in such matters—from the chimneys of Parliament house in the High street in Edinburgh, behind St. Giles. Therefore, it is right and proper that those matters should be subject to greater public scrutiny. There should be public accountability, because in accountability and scrutiny lies greater public confidence. The effect would be that all professional Scottish judges would be appointed only after consideration and nomination by the judicial services commission. Only stipendiary magistrates, who are professional judges but sit in the district courts, would be exempt from such consideration.

These provisions do not come before the Committee with only the rather slight benefit of consistency that I have demonstrated in this matter. For the last 10—certainly for the last five—years of the Labour party's time in opposition, they enjoyed substantial support in the Labour party in Scotland. I know that he is now subject to the Trappist vow of silence that accompanies being a Whip, but I have often heard the hon. Member for Dumbarton (Mr. McFall) eloquently argue the case that I am making. If the Government seek consistency, they need look no further than him.

The background is that it was believed that the Lord Chancellor was of a mind to make similar provision in England and Wales, but keen students of these matters noted that what was expected to appear to that effect in the manifesto of the Labour party did not ultimately feature in it. There has been some speculation about why, but it is clear that the Lord Chancellor has determined that there should be no such judicial commission for England and Wales. I do not think that that is a good argument for saying that we should not have one for Scotland. We are creating a different sort of Parliament, with a different sort of scrutiny and different roles and responsibilities. It would be correct and consistent with the Parliament's spirit to have a judicial services commission as proposed in the amendments.

9.15 pm

I do not need to say much to amplify the case for such a commission. Its make-up is set out in some detail in new schedule 1, of which paragraph 9 is the only element to which I wish to draw attention. It provides that the commission shall, in nominating persons for appointment to judicial office, adopt procedures for the identification of candidates so as to ensure, so far as practicable, that adequate numbers of candidates of both sexes and from diverse racial, religious and social backgrounds are considered for appointment". That is a sensible provision. It does not seek to impose a quota or suggest that people without the requisite qualifications should be promoted to achieve a balance, but it lays on the commission a duty to seek to identify, so far as practicable, people of both sexes and from diverse racial, religious and social backgrounds. The judiciary in Scotland could be strengthened only if that approach were part of the mechanism by which professional judges in Scotland were appointed. I therefore have no hesitation in recommending the scheme contained in amendments Nos. 266 and 277 and new schedule 1 and inviting the Committee to accept it.

Mr. Dalyell

Every constitutional theorist acknowledges that individual freedom is threatened when the balance between the judiciary, the legislature and the Executive is not equal. Clause 89 tips the balance against the judiciary and therefore against a bulwark of the rule of law. Is it the Government's view that clause 89(5) protects the judiciary from parliamentary or Executive interference? I hope for and expect a positive reply.

The reason why the Prime Minister has the power to recommend the appointment. of the Lord President of the Court of Session and Lord Justice Clerk under clause 89(1) and not the other judges of the Court of Session requires clarification. Clause 89(3) fails to refer to the chairman of the Scottish land court and honorary sheriffs. Should not those offices be included?

As for removals, the First Minister should be required to give reasons for the removal of a judge and to hold an independent parliamentary inquiry. Should there not be a statutory role in the process for the Lord President and the Lord Justice Clerk? Clause 89(4) apparently means that the Lord President and the Lord Justice Clerk can be removed through a truncated procedure. Is that appropriate in the context of judicial independence?

The Judicial Pensions and Retirement Act 1993 provides a compulsory retirement age of 70 for judges of the Court of Session. No statutory provision exists for the removal from office of a judge of the Court of Session, but Lord Fraser of Tullybelton, writing in "The Laws of Scotland", suggests that such a removal would require an Act of Parliament. Sheriffs principal and sheriffs are required to retire at the age of 70 and can be removed from office only by an order from the Secretary of State following a report by the Lord President of the Court of Session and the Lord Justice Clerk.

A number of points arise from my amendments, but I have the impression that the Committee is more interested in hearing the Government's response before the guillotine falls at 9.45 pm. Let me just say that the amendments were born out of a passionate concern that, in the media society in which we live, it is all too easy—[Interruption.] The Whip says that I must finish my speech quickly, so I shall put what I want to say succinctly. In this media society, it is all too easy for the tabloids, or indeed the broadsheets, to whip up hysteria against a supposedly fuddy-duddy judge who, perhaps, is too soft, in the public's estimation, on an unpopular category such as paedophiles. In certain cases, that judge may know a great deal more than the press, but could all too easily be the target of press campaigns for his removal.

Against that background, it is extremely precious to our democracy and whole future that judges who make unpalatable decisions on the basis of knowledge should be given the benefit of the doubt. I, for one, am generally alarmed by the proposal for a two-thirds majority, which could be fairly easily stitched together in rather unpleasant circumstances.

I hope that the Minister will give a positive reply, because this is a desperately important subject.

Mr. Ancram

I, too, should declare an interest, as a member of the Faculty of Advocates, although I have not practised since 1979 and the chances of my doing so again in my current position are—I hope—reasonably remote.

I rise with some diffidence because every time Conservative Members rise to speak, the Minister tells us that we are trying to make things more difficult. I assure him that we are not on this occasion and, indeed, that we do not normally do so.

This is an important matter which arises from the change in the role of the judiciary resulting from this and other legislation. I think we all appreciate that the role of the judiciary will be changed by this Bill and by the Human Rights Bill, which the House is currently considering. The judiciary in Scotland and further afield will be required to take on new roles of a rather more constitutional nature. Their role in adjudicating on devolution issues will make new demands of judges in Scotland and beyond. Their role in determining the legality of Acts of the Scottish Parliament will obviously involve them in certain sensitive areas. In cases arising from the European convention on human rights, they may have to determine matters that raise profound questions of social policy, morality or religion. That obviously increases the scope for conflict between the courts and the Executive; it may introduce the prospect of disagreement at times between the courts and the Scottish Parliament.

I sketch that background not because I envisage such conflict taking place but because it emphasises the need to ensure that the authority and independence of the judiciary are preserved. We are all trying to ensure public confidence in the independence and quality of the judiciary, and the confidence of the judiciary that they can operate independently.

My concern about the way in which clause 89 is drafted is that it leaves the appointment of judges in the hands of a few people who may have a political motivation. I am not saying that they necessarily would, but the very fact that that could be the case may undermine the credibility of, and the confidence that the public might have in the independence of, the judiciary.

I do not seek to follow the path taken by the hon. and learned Member for North-East Fife (Mr. Campbell). I have heard his views before and his idea is interesting, but I consider that it goes too far in trying to achieve the quality and independence that we are all seeking.

However, on judicial appointments, we have tried in our amendments to broaden the consultation that will be required to achieve nominations. We believe that, by broadening it beyond the First Minister and the Lord Advocate to include the Lord President of the Court of Session, the Lord Justice Clerk, the Secretary of State for Scotland and the Lord Advocate and the Advocate General for Scotland, we are proposing a broader and more professional basis on which nominations can be made. Essentially, the amendments replicate that basis for the appointment of all judges in Scotland.

We are also worried—I know that the judiciary would be, too—about the procedure for removing judges. As the hon. Member for Linlithgow (Mr. Dalyell) said, this is currently a matter of some uncertainty. There is a view that it would take an Act of Parliament to remove a judge. The Bill provides for such a removal to be brought about by a vote of two thirds of the total number of seats for Members of the Parliament. I share some reservations that, on occasions, such a vote could be stitched up.

Therefore, in amendment No. 432, we seek to provide a broader system to operate before a removal can take place. The amendment says: The First Minister shall make such a recommendation"— for removal— if, and only if, the Lord President of the Court of Session and the Lord Justice Clerk have undertaken, of their own accord or at the request of the First Minister, an investigation in the fitness for the office of the judge, sheriff principal or sheriff, as the case may be, and have reported in writing to the First Minister, together with a statement of their reasons". That is important, as is the second part of that amendment, which sets out the need for a proper investigation.

These amendments are tabled, in a very constructive spirit, to try to ensure that the judiciary, of which we are rightly proud in Scotland—I say that as a Scottish lawyer—maintain the integrity and the quality that have always been their hallmark. I believe that the amendments would improve the Bill and, although it is not for me to move them at the moment, I hope that the Government will give them due consideration.

Mr. McLeish

I want to participate in the debate in the spirit in which the amendments have been tabled, because I share the concerns of the right hon. Member for Devizes (Mr. Ancram) about public confidence in, and the credibility of, the system. I should also like to reflect the comments of my hon. Friend the Member for Linlithgow (Mr. Dalyell) about balance and the need to ensure that there is no interference of the Executive with the judiciary. That is a very important point and I hope that some of my comments will reflect that concern.

This is not the end of the journey for clause 89. I hope that, after I have finished speaking, the Committee will see that we shall return to this matter on Report. These are very important issues. We want to get these matters right and I give the Committee an assurance that we are listening and are keen to consult to ensure that we get them right when the Parliament is established.

First, I shall speak to amendments Nos. 26, 27, 28 and 31. I am most grateful to my hon. Friend the Member for Linlithgow for raising many points covered by the amendments. I listened carefully to what he said about them. Several most important issues underlie his proposals.

I shall say a word about clause 89(1) as it stands. The role of the Prime Minister in recommending the appointment of the Lord President and the Lord Justice Clerk is of very long standing. Until now, the role has been non-statutory and we felt it appropriate to use the opportunity that is presented by the Bill to give formal recognition to a practice that Governments of all parties have operated since the beginning of the century.

Amendments Nos. 26, 27, 28 and 31 would give the Prime Minister a new role in recommending the removal of a judge. The Prime Minister has no such role in the context of English judges, and in principle we see no case for such a role to be exercised solely in Scotland.

9.30 pm

In England, a judge may be removed from office on the address of both Houses of Parliament, although, as some hon. Members have said, the position is not crystal clear. The responsibility for recommending the removal of a judge should rest primarily with the First Minister who would have to seek the authority of the Scottish Parliament before making any recommendation to Her Majesty the Queen. Clause 89(5) means that a recommendation by the First Minister for the removal of a judge requires the support of two thirds of the Members of the Scottish Parliament. That is a weighty mechanism for determining whether a judge should be removed, and that is appropriate.

Mr. Dalyell

Could not it be at least three quarters or, given the possibility of a coalition Government, more?

Mr. McLeish

At this stage, we are happy with the two-thirds majority because it is a formidable obstacle, but I shall refer to my hon. Friend's question later.

It is right that the decision should be taken by the Scottish Parliament. I would expect it to take a close and measured interest in such matters, consistent with the responsibility that we propose to place on it. We must provide a mechanism for dismissal, but we are debating a situation that we hope is unlikely to arise.

Amendments Nos. 29 and 30 are unnecessary because section 1(2) of the Scottish Land Court Act 1993 already provides for the appointment of members of the land court, including the chairman, by Her Majesty the Queen on the recommendation of the Secretary of State for Scotland, whose function in that respect will be transferred to Scottish Ministers by clause 49.

I shall now deal with amendment No. 32. It should be borne in mind that we are establishing a set of principles and a hurdle that the First Minister and the Parliament will have to overcome if a judge is to be dismissed. We are not writing the procedures because that will be a matter for the Scottish Parliament. Any statement about the grounds of removal must be carefully crafted in the light of precedent and case law, to strike the appropriate balance between ensuring provision for the removal of judges who are unfit for office—however rare and unlikely that eventuality—and protecting members of the judiciary from removal on anything other than the ground of unfitness.

The Bill safeguards judicial independence by the very fact that a two-thirds majority of Members of the Parliament will be required for a resolution to remove a judge. That will inevitably require a consensus on the reason for removing the judge. In view of the comments of my hon. Friend the Member for Linlithgow, I am prepared to consider making it clear that the ground on which the First Minister should make his recommendation should be unfitness for office. I should like to consider an amendment that is designed to achieve that and table it on Report.

Mr. Dalyell

I thank my hon. Friend. That seems an excellent solution.

Mr. McLeish

I accept that my hon. Friend appreciates that the Government take this matter seriously. I support the spirit of his amendment, but I ask him not to press it.

Mr. Salmond

May I tempt the Minister to consider the nature of traditional appointments to the Privy Council? Is he aware that only two of the 109 members of its Judicial Commitee are women and that one of them is there because she is the Leader of the House? In the light of questions about traditional appointments, does the Minister think that that is satisfactory?

Mr. McLeish

I should like to respond to the hon. Gentleman, but I fear that if I do I shall stray into another group of amendments.

Amendment No. 33 requires that three quarters of Members of the Parliament would be required to vote in favour of a resolution to remove a judge. The proportion of two thirds that is suggested in the clause is a high threshold, and, in proposing that proportion, the Government recognise the seriousness of removing one of Her Majesty's judges from office. That is why we have not proposed a simple majority in the normal way but require a significant number of Members of the Parliament to be satisfied that the Executive's actions are justified and appropriate. In the circumstances, I invite my hon. Friend the Member for Linlithgow to agree that the point has been well made in the Government's proposals and that there is therefore no need for him to press his amendment.

Amendments Nos. 266 and 267 and new schedule 1 would represent a fundamental change in our traditional arrangements. At this stage, we do not consider it appropriate to impose a scheme of this sort on the Scottish Parliament. The arguments in favour of some form of judicial appointments board have been advanced from time to time, but we do not believe that such ideas have yet been sufficiently discussed or that the Scotland Bill is the right vehicle to implement any such changes.

I agree that it should be open to the Scottish Parliament to establish some form of Committee on judicial appointments, which could put forward names to the First Minister, but, again, I come back to the point that we should not seek to impose such a procedure by means of this Bill.

I have made my comments in the spirit of understanding the hon. and learned Member for North-East Fife (Mr. Campbell) suggested, but, in view of the points that I made about consultation and discussion, about this Bill not being the most appropriate vehicle, about the Scottish Parliament being able to consider the matter and about nothing being ruled out, I hope that he will not press the amendment.

Mr. Menzies Campbell

If the Minister is considering unfitness for office, I hope that he will take account of a recent case in another place, where the unfitness for office of a Scottish judge who had been removed from office arose in fairly sharp focus. There were questions about precisely what meaning should be ascribed to the words. I hope that the Minister will take note of their lordships' decision.

From what the Minister has said, I feel that he is more open minded about my proposals than his original outright opposition would suggest. I have only one question—is it his view that a Committee of the sort to which he referred would be within the general competence of the Scottish Parliament, or would it require statutory provision? If the hon. Gentleman is able to give me a satisfactory answer to that, I may not feel compelled to press my amendment.

Mr. McLeish

I am willing to give the assurance that the matter will be within the general competence of the Scottish Parliament. I take the hon. and learned Gentleman's point about unfitness within the context of the discussions we have had. We will be looking closely at the considerations that surround the unfitness issue. We want to get it right and there will be further consideration of the matter.

I come finally to the amendments tabled by the right hon. Member for Devizes and his colleagues and will begin with amendments Nos. 429 and 430. Although there may very well be arguments for non-statutory consultation of the nature suggested, I do not feel that writing into the Bill such a complex series of exchanges will improve the quality of the final decisions. However, I am prepared to consider further whether there should be any additional provision for consultation by the First Minister before he makes recommendations for appointments. If any amendments are required, the Government will table them in time for Report.

On amendment No. 431, there are already powers for removing a sheriff or sheriff principal in section 12 of the Sheriff Courts (Scotland) Act 1971. Under the general provisions of the Bill, those powers will pass to Scottish Ministers and the Scottish Parliament. I have no doubt that they will be exercised with appropriate care and I see no need to include anything in the Bill that would make any specific additional provision.

I have dealt with the principles underlying amendment No. 432 in my response to the amendments tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Linlithgow. In short, I do not consider that the Bill needs to set out the detailed procedures that may relate to the removal of a Court of Session judge. Neither could I accept any suggestion that Westminster should be involved in this process. It should be a matter for the Scottish Administration and it is not something which should be second guessed by Westminster. The amendment would be a quite inappropriate provision and it should be rejected. I have made it clear that I am prepared to consider an amendment that specifies the grounds on which any recommendation for removal of a Court of Session judge should be made.

Mr. Dalyell

Will the Government draft an amendment along those lines?

Mr. McLeish

I have assured right hon. and hon. Members that we will want to revisit on Report the points that have been raised in this debate. I have more than entered into the spirit of the occasion—there is substance in my response to some excellent and considered comments by hon. Members. I therefore hope that amendment No. 266 will be withdrawn in the sure knowledge that we will revisit the issue. That should go some way to satisfy the concerns that have been expressed.

Mr. Menzies Campbell

In light of the Minister's comments about returning on Report to the removal issue, and on the Parliament's competence being adequate to allow it to create a committee to give advice on judicial appointments, I do not think that it would appropriate to press the amendment to a Division. On that basis, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 89 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 90 and 91 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

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