- '(1) No party may submit a list of candidates to be Assembly members for an Assembly electoral region unless there is a candidate of that party in at least one—half of the Assembly constituencies included in that Assembly electoral region.
- (2) Where a party has candidates in at least one half of the Assembly constituencies included in an Assembly electoral region they shall submit a list of candidates to be Assembly members for that Assembly electoral region.'.—[Mr. Ancram]
§ Brought up, and read the First time.
§ Mr. AncramI beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
802 This is a somewhat unusual new clause that deals with an important point. As I have only a short time to deploy the argument, I hope that hon. Members will forgive me if I do not take interventions. I hope that the Government will be able to respond.
To understand the argument, it is necessary to revisit the proposed system of elections to the assembly, which we discussed earlier in Committee—the two-vote additional member system known as AMS, with the distribution of list seats contingent on the outcome of the constituency contests in the individual constituencies in each region.
For various reasons, largely in relation to the Scotland Bill, it has become clear that the AMS as at present provided could be open to legal but undesirable manipulation, which would effectively go far towards negating the purpose of achieving a more proportional result.
As hon. Members will recall, I made clear my dislike of the AMS at an earlier stage. I want to make it clear at the outset that the new clause does not seek to wreck the proposed system. In reluctantly accepting the system, I am trying to mitigate the effects of the damaging manipulation which, it appears, could currently arise and which, without some adjustment to the Bill, is quite likely to arise.
The potential for manipulation arises from what could loosely be called ticket splitting. In a region where one party is likely to score heavily on the first-past-the-post constituency contests, the AMS by way of the d'Hondt divisor, which is the one built into the Bill, applied under clause 6(1)(b), would on straight party tickets militate strongly against that party on the electoral region lists. Indeed, the required proportionality is achieved through the so-called adjustment seats, which is the purpose of the d'Hondt system that the Government have adopted and by which they set great store, as they have told us repeatedly.
The potential, however, arises for the party in question to decide not to contest the list seats at all, but instead to throw its weight behind another party in order to deny other parties additional members through the adjustment seats. This other party could be, as is happening increasingly in Germany, a potential coalition partner that would then owe loyalty in return for the benefit of the split ticket. Although that is undesirable and undermines proportionality, I fear that that is probably unavoidable within the system.
The most unacceptable manipulation can occur in a slightly different way. The dominant party in terms of the constituency elections could decide not to contest the list seats, and could instead form an understanding with another party, probably one that might be termed an alter ego party, which had been registered for that purpose—a party that either had not stood in the constituency seats, or had received no votes there.
§ Mr. Ron DaviesOr presumably that could be done with independent candidates.
§ Mr. AncramIndeed, but the mathematics become more fierce when they involve a registered party on the list system. The alter ego party could stand in the regional lists, and if there was an effective straight replication of votes across from the constituency to the regional lists, the effect would be dramatic in the overall increase of 803 seats that those combined parties could achieve. The alter ego party would avoid the constituency strike-rate element of the divisor, and would be subjected to the divisor only under the list system itself.
A party could stand, for example, as Plaid Cymru in the constituencies and register its alter ego as the Party of Wales for the regional list. Conservatives could become Unionists for the same purpose. Labour could become Co-operative, as has been mooted in the west of Scotland, or resurrect the Independent Labour party.
§ Mr. WigleyOr become socialist.
§ Mr. AncramOr even become socialist. Liberal Democrats, as we know, would probably become whatever suited them at the time.
It all sounds complicated, but in essence it is not. A split-ticket campaign would not be difficult where the split between the two parts of the system was total. If, however, there is any cross-over, split-ticket voting is by no means impossible, but it becomes much harder to manage. I shall return to that.
I shall try to exemplify. I am sorry that I have not been able to produce any figures for Wales, but some work has been done in Scotland. I refer with appreciation to the initial work of Dr. Michael Dyer of the department of politics and international relations at Aberdeen university. On the basis of the electoral results of I May last year applied equally to both ballots within the AMS in Scotland, it is calculated that Labour would have returned 64 out of 129 Members of the Scottish Parliament—which is only one short of an overall majority. However, if there had been a clear split-ticket arrangement in place using an alter ego party, the combined total would have been 91—a clear majority and an increase from just under 50 per cent. to just over 70 per cent. of the seats. While that might be attractive in political terms, it would comprehensively defeat the purpose of the AMS system: proportionality would be side-stepped and the basis of the new political arrangements would be undermined. On that basis, I hope that the Secretary of State will share my concern about that problem.
That brings me to the solution. Clearly the key will be the provisions for the registration of parties. The worst of the effects that I have mentioned would be avoided if there were provisions to prevent the registration of what I have termed alter ego parties. However, at present, we do not know what the provisions will be. It is quite extraordinary, if not unacceptable, that we have reached this stage in considering the legislation—alongside the Scotland Bill and the European Parliamentary Elections Bill, which are also affected—without sight of the terms of the enactment referred to in clause 4(8) and having achieved nothing more than the earliest stages of inter-party consultation about what they might be.
So central is the question of registration to the proper working of the electoral system that it is unconscionable that the legislation could complete its passage through this place without full sight of, and discussion about, the statutory criteria by which registration will operate and clear indications that alter ego parties will not be permitted. I make that point very seriously at this stage in the hope that the right hon. Gentleman will take steps to 804 ensure that, when we return to the Bill on Report on the Floor of the House in due course, we shall be fully apprised of the details of the forthcoming legislation regarding registration. It cannot be right that important democratic systems are created in legislation with a vital component such as this left unrevealed. We need to see the registration Bill—and soon.
In the meantime, our new clause—which does not and cannot deal with registration—seeks to mitigate the worst effects of such manipulation. It seeks to prevent the optimum split-ticket arrangement where the split between the two parts of the system is total. It is in two connected parts: the first requires a party to put up candidates in one half of the constituencies in an electoral region if it wants to nominate a list; and the second requires a party to nominate a list if it has candidates in one half of the constituencies in an electoral region. I must admit that that does not resolve the problem, but it makes the potential abuse more difficult to achieve. It is certainly better than nothing—which I fear is what the Bill at present provides.
I hope that this suggestion will appeal to anyone who genuinely wants a fair and balanced system of elections to the assembly—and I hope that that includes the Government Front Bench. In any event, I commend new clause 35 to the House.
§ Mr. Win GriffithsI thank the right hon. Member for Devizes (Mr. Ancram) for advancing new clause 35 and the reasoning behind it. We acknowledge the points that he has made and I concede that there may be scope for collusion between and within parties to exploit the two-ballot structure of the additional member system in the manner that he described. Such cynical manipulation of the system would be an affront to the electorate and would undermine the democratic credibility of the elected body.
However, it is not easy to deal with this problem as a matter of law—the proposed new clause would have some undesirable consequences, as I shall explain in a moment. I am not aware that there is any provision in existing electoral law that would provide the answer. A rather similar circumstance prevails in certain parts of Wales that has a different effect. Known members of political parties often stand in local government elections as independents, even though they are nothing of the kind. They do not wear their political colours because they fear that that might reduce their chances of election. Nothing in the law prevents that practice, and it is left to the good sense of electors to figure out who is who.
One of the unfortunate side effects of the new clause is that it could—without going into all the details—have a severe effect on many of the smaller parties in the electoral regions. It would sometimes be difficult for them to offer a sufficiently large number of candidates for the list. The new clause could damage the interests of smaller parties. We want to be inclusive in the assembly. We want to try to take account of the fears of people throughout Wales. That is why we are a bit hesitant.
9.45 pm
I return to the issue of collusion. The collusion mentioned by the right hon. Gentleman will require the vigilance of other political parties and the media to expose it. There is evidence to show that, in New Zealand and 805 Germany, where efforts have been made to use collusion, it has been exposed and it has not done the parties involved any good. If that were to happen in Wales, it would not reflect well on the guilty parties. That would be a real deterrent. That said, we take on board the serious concerns the right hon. Gentleman has raised.
I am not in a position to give a guarantee about when the details on registration will emerge. I can assure Opposition Members that we want to see whether it will deal with these issues. I am not entirely sure that it will. We do not want to dismiss the matter as of no importance. We shall examine it with our colleagues in Scotland and the Home Office to try to prevent collusion in the additional member system in Wales.
I hope that, with those assurances, the right hon. Gentleman will be prepared to withdraw the motion.
§ Mr. AncramI am grateful to the Minister for the concern that he has shown towards the new clause and, indeed, for the way in which he responded to it. He, like me, realises that whatever our views on a particular electoral system, it is important that it is seen to work fairly if it is not to undermine the democratic institution at which it is directed.
I am worried not just about collusion, which might be regarded as underhand and when exposed cause a public reaction, but about the open manipulation of the system, as happens in certain parallel systems where having an alter ego party is a purely political manoeuvre to allow the d'Hondt divisor to be avoided in the second list, which means that in the first calculation no account is taken of the constituencies that are won on the direct list. The system can be abused not just in an underhand way but in a legitimate and legal way, which would avoid the intentions behind the system. I hope that that can be looked at.
I am a little cautious about using Germany as a parallel. The areas there are much bigger and there is not the tendency, except in a few areas, towards a preponderance of one-party votes that could create the problems in an area such as this.
Finally, I return to the registration of political parties. Important issues arise and I stress that I shall be making the same point in relation to the Scotland Bill. I think that my right hon. Friend the Member for North-West Cambridgeshire (Sir B. Mawhinney), the shadow Home Secretary, made the same point when the House of Commons was discussing the European Parliamentary Elections Bill last Thursday. If we are to have confidence in going along with what is proposed, we must know the criterion on which legislation is to be based. I understand that consultation has begun, but it is at an early stage and fairly vague.
As for the propensity for alter ego parties to get through the system, I should be grateful for detailed information, if that is possible, on Report. Indeed, it would be difficult for us to take a sanguine attitude to these matters if that information was not available. I realise that that is not entirely in the hands of the Minister or the Secretary of State, but is a matter for the Home Secretary. However, I hope that my views and representations will be made known strongly and clearly.
806 In the light of what the Minister has said, and given his undertaking to take the new clause away and consider it carefully, I am prepared to withdraw the new clause. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.
§ Motion and clause, by leave, withdrawn.