§ Mr. Gerald Howarth (Aldershot)I thank the Economic Secretary to the Treasury for concluding her remarks so swiftly, thereby enabling me to have a little more time.
I am grateful to have the opportunity to raise the issue of the Parachute Regiment, which is based at Aldershot. I am delighted to see my hon. Friend the Member for Mid-Norfolk (Mr. Simpson) sitting on the Opposition Front Bench. I believe that it will be in order for my hon. Friend the Member for Canterbury (Mr. Brazier) to catch your eye later in the debate, Mr. Deputy Speaker, as the Minister is perfectly happy for him to do so. I should also mention that the hon. Member for Torridge and West Devon (Mr. Burnett), a former marine commando, is greatly concerned about the issues I am about to raise, although he is unable to be in the Chamber at the moment.
Last Friday, His Royal Highness the Prince of Wales presented new colours to the Parachute Regiment on the green open space of the Queen's Parade at Aldershot. It was a truly memorable event, as a glorious English summer's day combined with a splendid military pageant, which itself bore a spiritual dimension. The Paras were indeed
Furnish'd and burnish'd by Aldershot sun",as John Betjeman might have put it, but there was one cloud casting its shadow over those marvellous proceedings. If rumours now rife in the camp are true, last Friday's could turn out to be the last parade of the Parachute Regiment in Aldershot. Those rumours have it that, under proposals in the strategic defence review, the regiment, which has been based in Aldershot for most of its 56-year history, will move to Colchester.I shall address two issues: first, the role of the Parachute Regiment and, secondly, its location. In discussing the first, let me make it absolutely clear that I do not seek to be the mouthpiece for the regiment; that would be to claim an authority that I neither possess nor seek. However, I do speak for the town of Aldershot and its citizens, who include both regular and territorial soldiers.
The Paras are an unashamedly elite regiment. Like their counterparts elsewhere, in the words of Max Hastings and Simon Jenkins:
They possess a glamour, an aggressive self-confidence and toughness that earn some suspicion and jealousy from other units.In the British Army, the Parachute Regiment has never been universally popular, but it carries before it an awesome reputation. As Hastings and Jenkins continue:Even in peacetime soldiering, most senior officers are conscious of the value of a unit which, when it is needed, is needed very badly indeed: to attempt the impossible.Nowhere was that more dramatically and heroically demonstrated than in the Falkland Islands, where the Paras walked across inhospitable terrain to attack the enemy from behind, which had never been expected by the enemy and which no one thought ordinary soldiers could do. The Parachute Regiment did it.The Parachute Regiment forms the key element in 5 Airborne Brigade, one of the two core brigades of the United Kingdom's joint rapid reaction force, which was established just two years ago. Along with their support 1014 units, which include 7 Parachute Regiment Royal Horse Artillery, 9 Parachute Squadron Royal Engineers, the Parachute Logistics Battalion and the Parachute Field Ambulance, the Paras provide the main element in a light brigade that is maintained at a high state of readiness and able to move at 24 hours' notice.
Although all three battalions are trained to drop by parachute, that training merely provides one option for delivering the force, as they demonstrated at Goose Green and Mount Longden. The fitness of the Paras and the culture of the regiment combine to make them a fearsome force, regardless of the means by which they arrive at the battle zone. Those attributes apply not only to the infantry, but, in equal measure, to the airborne support units that keep the regiment going.
The rumours suggest that the Government want to amalgamate 5 Airborne Brigade and 24 Air Mobile Brigade, with the new brigade to be based at Colchester where 24 Air Mobile is currently located. I see that the hon. Member for Colchester (Mr. Russell) is now in his place.
The rationale, as I understand it, for consolidation at Colchester is that the troops need to be located close to their new attack helicopter, which I understand is intended to be based at Royal Air Force Wattisham. There can be no doubt that the introduction of the Apache attack helicopter, with its unique Longbow radar, will constitute a formidable addition to our armoury and a significant boost to our rapid reaction force, providing that the Royal Air Force has the heavy lift capability to move it into theatre.
The amalgamation of the two existing brigades must not be undertaken as a cost-cutting measure if it means that existing capability is in any way to be impaired. It will not be enough for the new formation to have one battalion group with parachute capability. It must continue to have a full, rounded capability, including its airborne headquarters and its current joint capability to direct the force and to operate fully integrated with the Royal Air Force. It must also be assured of the endless practice that makes for its immediate deployability. One of the things that make the Parachute Regiment and the airborne forces so important to the Government is that they can rely on them because they are such a highly trained organisation. They have plenty of time to ensure that they are up to speed and ready to move at a moment's notice.
Critics of the Parachute Regiment argue that, because the last time it dropped into a battle zone was at Suez in 1956, parachuting into battle is somehow out of date. It was that scepticism which led to the disbanding of the 16 Independent Parachute Brigade in 1977. The following year, the French sought our support for the deployment of a parachute force in the Kolwezi operation in the Congo. To Britain's embarrassment, we were unable to deliver. As a result, the policy was reversed and the United Kingdom's parachute force was reinstated.
The new parachute enables troops to be dropped from as low as 250 ft. We are not talking about exposing troops necessarily to the risk of dropping from 1,000 or 1,500 ft. We have the technology to deliver them from a height of 250 ft.
Many other nations have parachute regiments, but only a handful—the United Kingdom, the United States of America, France and Israel in the west—hav00e a genuine airborne capability. For example, the United States 1015 employed its parachute regiment in Grenada and Panama. It is vital that we should not make the same mistake as was made by a previous Labour Government in 1977.
It is because airborne forces attract the adventurous and the determined that they, together with their brothers in the Royal Marines 3 Commando Brigade, are elite forces. Their availability for rapid deployment provides the Government of the day with a powerful weapon. As they are a force to be feared, even the threat of their deployment can enable the Government to make a tough political statement.
Currently, there are two parachute battalions in role. My understanding is that they will be reduced to one battalion. More seriously, I understand that the Government plan to axe the airborne support capability—the ability to launch an airborne force, whether delivered by parachute or by tactical air-land out of the back of a C130 Hercules, comprising not only infantry but the other airborne units that I have mentioned, such as medical, logistics and artillery support, which make up 5 Airborne Brigade. I hope that the Minister will be able to assure me that the rumour is unfounded.
Can the Minister assure the House that, in reducing from two brigades to one, the new brigade will be properly resourced to enable it to do the same job as is currently undertaken by the two existing brigades? Can the Minister also assure me that the close integration with the RAF will continue? At present, three RAF officers are committed to 5 Airborne Brigade, demonstrating effective use of "jointery"—an extremely ugly word but one which the Minister has come to understand, as we all have.
Can the Minister also assure the House that airborne forces will retain a strong Territorial Army element? For example, are the TA Parachute Battalion, which is part of the Regular 7 Parachute Battalion Royal Horse Artillery, and the Parachute Medical Squadron, which is part of the Regular Parachute Field Ambulance, to be retained? The House will know that 4 and 10 TA Battalions are able to reinforce the regulars in time of need. I understand that 40 TA Paras are currently on operational service and that, in the past year alone, 25 have joined the regulars. The TA airborne forces are providing a tremendous resource for the Government in the reinforcement of the regulars and providing a source for new recruits for the Regular Army. I understand that the regular force could not operate without TA surgeons and anaesthetists.
I turn to the location of the new formation. As the Member for Aldershot, I wish on behalf of the town to protect its reputation as the home of the British Army. Those who have travelled in the area will know that one cannot approach the town without seeing signs that proclaim the identity of the town and its proud heritage as the home of the British Army.
I entirely acknowledge that those who join Her Majesty's forces accept that they are likely to be moved around. However, as I am sure the Minister will accept, because the Parachute Regiment and airborne forces have been located at Aldershot for many years, many soldiers have settled in and around the town, which has become the home base for the Paras. The town and the garrison have worked together to achieve a harmonious relationship. Indeed, I can give the hon. Member for Colchester some advice should disgraceful rumours 1016 become fact. I can tell the hon. Gentleman that the publicans of Aldershot have developed a fine art in servicing the needs of the Paras without putting the civilian population at risk. I am not sure what training the publicans of Colchester might need to achieve the same success.
As the Aldershot News has declared, Aldershot is the spiritual home of the Paras. They have become an integral part of the local military and civilian scene. I know that the Minister will understand that, because I know that he has good connections with some of my colleagues, although not of my political persuasion, in the town. I think that the Minister knows also that, in speaking for the town, I not only speak for the Conservative interest but represent those of other political persuasions who share my concerns.
If I am to make a case for the Parachute Regiment and the airborne forces maintaining their presence and their base in Aldershot, it is incumbent on me to advance reasons. Clearly, I am not a military man; I am a politician. However, I believe that there are some clear practical issues that militate in favour of retaining the presence in Aldershot. I shall list my reasons for the Minister.
First and foremost, we have a long tradition and history of the Parachute Regiment being based in Aldershot. Although it is true that the accommodation for 2 Para has been condemned by health and safety and other authorities, and ought to be removed at the earliest possible opportunity, we have the facilities to contain a light brigade at Aldershot. With all the work that is being done to invest in new facilities in the military town, there is no good reason why the infantry should be moved out of Aldershot.
Secondly, we have close at hand—within a mile of the town–7,500 ft of first-class, usable runway at Farnborough aerodrome. Although the operation of the aerodrome has been handed over to TAG, that facility would be available in a national emergency. That is an important and valuable facility to have located so close to the troops.
Thirdly, moving a few miles west from Farnborough, the support helicopters are based at Odiham. The Chinooks could be used for carrying the troops into theatre. That would be a splendid place for attack helicopters to be located. If there is no room at Odiham, a few miles further north there is Royal Air Force Benson in Oxfordshire, which could be available for the same facility.
Moving west again, the fourth reason is that all the helicopter training of the Army Air Corps is based at Middle Wallop. That is another facility which fits into the integrated package of a new kind of air cavalry that the Government want to create and to which my hon. Friends and I have no objection in principle. That facility is within close striking distance of Aldershot.
Fifthly, as we move further across the map, Boscombe Down has a huge runway and airfield facility which could be available in time of need. Currently, the Empire test pilots training school is there, and much flying evaluation is carried out. Moving west, we also have RAF Lyneham and Brize Norton, which are the trooping stations for deploying our troops out of the United Kingdom to the theatre of operation. Yet further west lies Salisbury plain, with all its extensive training facilities. 1017 I understand that the present arrangements are that the airborne forces assemble at the South Cerney mounting base in Gloucestershire before deploying from Lyneham in Wiltshire. If they were to be located in East Anglia, that would greatly increase the journey time west to the mounting base at South Cerney and thence to the airfield at RAF Lyneham. As the Minister will know, it would mean negotiating the M25, so I hope that the deployment would not take place in rush hour, because our intervention force might be delayed outside the 24 hours in which it claims to be able to respond.
That is a practical consideration which needs to be taken into account. In that connection, I suggest to the Government that, as they retain some ownership of land at the Farnborough site, they should organise a mounting base there, perhaps by means of a private finance initiative proposal to build a facility there, close to the Aldershot base.
As we know, the Government's policy is to reorganise Britain's defence forces at no extra cost, although none of us knows when the review will see the light of day—not even, I suspect, the Minister, although he may enlighten us today. By moving 5 Airborne Brigade from Aldershot, the Government will incur substantial additional costs. I have advanced clear operational grounds for retaining the new formation west of London.
If Ministers can advance incontrovertible reasons for basing our airborne forces elsewhere, the people of Aldershot will want to know what alternative proposals Ministers have to ensure the continued role of the garrison town. Rumour has it that an armament brigade is to move to Aldershot. That would present certain problems that I shall not go into today. However, I say to the Minister that, if another brigade is to replace 5 Airborne, it will, of course, receive a warm welcome. My case today has been to advance the cause of retaining 5 Airborne and our airborne forces in Aldershot.
I am immensely proud to be associated with Britain's airborne forces. They are among the very best in the world. They are truly elite forces, excelling at what they do best. They do so because they are driven not by the commercial ethos of an ICI, but by loyalty to the Crown and a commitment to defend our country and our interests world wide and, ultimately, they are prepared to lay down their lives for those causes. The fact that they provide half the recruits to the SAS is testimony to what the Prince of Wales described last Friday as
the professionalism, toughness and courageof the men of the Parachute Regiment. In their short history, they have brought enormous credit to our country. They represent a powerful weapon on which any Government can rely. I should like them to remain in Aldershot.
§ Mr. Julian Brazier (Canterbury)I congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Aldershot (Mr. Howarth) on his excellent speech. I have an interest to declare as a former airborne soldier whose father jumped at Suez.
We all recognise that there is merit in bringing together the airborne ethos with the striking power of the Apache helicopter. The challenge will be to maintain the ability to strike anywhere in the world in a matter of days. In 1978, not only did the French Paras jump into Kolwezi, as my hon. Friend said, but Israeli Paras struck at Entebbe 1018 by air landing. Both were highly successful, lightning operations. Retaining that strategic speed will be a considerable challenge, because transporting the logistic tail of the Apache is a colossal undertaking.
There are three tests for a successful marriage. First, will the new headquarters be based around 5 Brigade, the hard-won centre of excellence, with its ability to mount air moves by a variety of means in a matter of days? In the Gulf war, within only a week, the 81st US Airborne had established a substantial footprint in Saudi Arabia. Our own much-vaunted 24 Air Mobile Brigade took several months just to get to Bosnia. This is not an issue about the tactical use of parachutes versus helicopters; it is about the incredible complexity of planning and executing rapid strategic air moves, which only 5 Brigade can do.
Secondly, will the new brigade include the excellent supporting units that my hon. Friend mentioned—the 9 Parachute Squadron Royal Engineers, the 7 Parachute Regiment Royal Horse Artillery and the Parachute Logistics Battalion, in which every soldier is hardened by P Company training? It is a measure of their excellence that one brigade should provide half the successful applicants to the 22 SAS Regiment.
Finally, to maintain enough RAF Hercules crews in trim to move a battalion group, it is necessary to have three or four times as many soldiers who parachute regularly. Will the final order of battle of airborne units, both Regular and TA, be sufficiently large to guarantee the regular practice needed to maintain the RAF's very complicated formation air-dropping skill? That lapsed in the 1970s, when, to our shame, Britain was unable to strike at Kolwezi with the French and Belgians. I am sure that no British Government want to see that again.
§ The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Defence (Mr. John Spellar)I congratulate the hon. Member for Aldershot (Mr. Howarth) on securing this debate, and on his thoughtful and wide-ranging speech. It is always good to hear that an ardent Thatcherite recognises the ethos of public service in comparison with a solely commercial ethos. I congratulate the hon. Member for Canterbury (Mr. Brazier) on his brief, but equally well-thought-out, speech. It is good to hear how much the regiments of the British Army are valued by the communities in which they reside.
I hope, in the time available, to respond to most of the points that were made, but I will be pleased to write to the hon. Members to deal with any remaining points.
I partly congratulate the hon. Member for Aldershot on his timing. The Minister for the Armed Forces, who could not be present today, attended last week's presentation of new colours to the regiment—which the hon. Gentleman rightly drew attention to—and, with them, its most recent battle honours; in that sense, it is appropriate that we debate the regiment's future.
As the hon. Member said, the battalions of the Parachute Regiment are famous for their commitment, their skills and their high training standards. The regiment is among the youngest regiments of the British Army, but, if its history is short by the standards of other regiments, its battle record certainly stands comparison with any. Its history is very much a history of our times, especially the desperate nature of many of the actions in which the regiment has been involved—a feature, perhaps, of parachute operations, to which I shall return. 1019 However, it is also relevant and of interest that the regiment was born as the result of a political initiative—a direct instruction from Winston Churchill in June 1940, which gave life to War Office plans which were, at best, in embryo. We are often told that politicians should not interfere in matters that are best left to generals, but the success of the regiment over the years shows that that is not necessarily so. Perhaps we may take that as a good omen for the defence review.
I began by partly congratulating the hon. Member on his timing. However, if his timing had been slightly better, I might have been able to say more than I can today. The future of the Parachute Regiment, as of all the armed forces, has been examined in the strategic defence review. I emphasise, as we have done many times from the Dispatch Box, that, in the review, we have gone back to the very basics. With very few exceptions, declared at the outset, we have taken no aspect of our force structure for granted. We started from scratch. Our conclusions on the full range of defence issues have been submitted by the Secretary of State to the Prime Minister and Cabinet for collective decisions, which we expect very soon.
I am sure that the House recognises, therefore, that, at this stage, it is very difficult for me to go into great detail on the future of any elements of Britain's defence capability. I can say that the defence review has recognised the importance of mobility and of our ability to deploy forces rapidly to areas of crisis, and that we have thought carefully about how we might tackle situations in which no friendly port or airfield is immediately available. In fact, few areas in the defence review have received closer study.
The ability to deploy force quickly in the early stages of an international crisis can be crucial. Such forces can have a military and political impact well beyond the size of the units deployed. There is no faster way of deploying units to a combat zone than by air—especially if there are long distances to travel. In such circumstances, where there is no suitable airfield in friendly hands, the best way to land may be by parachute. Obviously, therefore, we need to retain a parachute capability. The question that confronts us, which the hon. Member for Aldershot rightly identified, is how big that capability should be.
By definition, airborne forces must be lightly equipped. Lightly equipped means potentially vulnerable. History is full of examples of airborne forces suffering heavy casualties in the face of determined opposition. Therefore, the circumstances in which we would be prepared to risk deploying forces by parachute will inevitably be constrained.
Aircraft are an expensive way of moving troops, and even light troops demand a lot of aircraft. Whatever strategic-lift assets we have will be in heavy demand at the outset of a major operation. To dedicate enough resources to allow an airborne landing for a full brigade would almost certainly have significant penalties for our military capability elsewhere.
However, the picture that I am painting is not a bleak one for the Parachute Regiment. Undoubtedly, as we all recognise, warfare and circumstances are changing, and our forces must change with them. New equipment offers new opportunities, and could profoundly affect our tactics and battle plan. For example, as the hon. Member said, 1020 the attack helicopter is due to enter service in 2003, promising to bring unparalleled flexibility and firepower to the battlefield. It is a formidable enhancement of power and the ability to project that power.
I mentioned the vulnerability of light forces. Two ways of reducing that vulnerability are to increase their mobility and to increase firepower. That is one reason why we have been developing the concept of a formation that combines the advantages of our airborne forces—which were rightly identified by hon. Members—and the attack helicopter. Such a formation could be a key part of our plans for rapid but effective deployment of force in future. It would offer an exciting, challenging role at the cutting edge of military technology. It would demand all the very best qualities of the best of our forces.
I cannot yet say that we shall do that, but I can say that, if we were to take that route, the Parachute Regiment could play a major role, drawing on its historic strengths and ethos. Whatever the outcome of the review, it is clear that the requirements for rapidly deployable air-minded forces will continue.
The second question that the hon. Member rightly raised was whether the parachute battalions based in Aldershot could be located elsewhere as a result of the review. Obviously, that is a matter of keen and legitimate interest for him and for the town—as it is for us—because it touches on the relationship between his constituency and the Regular Army. It is Aldershot's proud boast to be the home of the British Army. The hon. Gentleman was right to point out that I have also received representations from the Labour group on Rushmoor borough council; I congratulate the hon. Gentleman and the group on working together to advance the interests of their constituency.
I hope that the hon. Member will understand, once again, that I cannot give a full answer to his question. There is a limit to what I can say at this stage about the detailed consequences for the location of individual units. The review has been primarily about the size and shape of the armed forces in all services. On that, as I have said, we hope to announce soon the decisions that have been taken.
Even if those decisions affect the Parachute Regiment, it will be some time before we can say with certainty whether the two battalions in the hon. Member's constituency will be affected in the way that he describes. I do not expect that we shall be able to take decisions about the possible location of units before the autumn.
However, it is normal practice to ensure that units are located with, or within a reasonable distance of, others with which they are linked for operational purposes. That is especially important for elements of the Army that must be at relatively high readiness. That means, for example, that units within a single deployable brigade will generally be located in the same area. If they are not, it becomes difficult to exercise effective command of the brigade, as I am sure the hon. Member recognises. We try where we can to ensure that units are placed close to where they can train. For those reasons, we would expect those who plan these matters to want to locate the two parachute battalions with, or near to, other units within whichever brigade they are part of after the review.
It is important not to see the issue as one of the Parachute Regiment in isolation. There are likely to be a number of moves as a consequence of the strategic 1021 defence review. I can assure the hon. Member that it is highly unlikely that there will be a significant diminution overall of the Army's presence in Aldershot. Units may come and go, but Aldershot will remain among the most important of the Army's garrisons. The Army will need the infrastructure and access to training areas that the garrison affords. Not least, it will enjoy and value the long-standing good will of the community. I can reassure the House that the relationship between Aldershot and the Regular Army will continue for many, many years—the hon. Gentleman gave many of the reasons why that should be so.
The hon. Member for Canterbury mentioned the Territorial Army parachute battalions. We have great respect for their qualities, but I am sure that the hon. 1022 Gentleman realises that it is not possible to make pronouncements about one of the elements of the Territorial Army while the future shape of the Territorial Army as a whole is being considered.
The history of the armed forces is one of evolutionary change while building on the best of our traditions. We no longer deploy the cavalry on horseback, but the ethos and traditions of the cavalry regiments remain. There is no doubt that the Parachute Regiment will remain as a potent element of our armed forces, but to ignore the need to modernise and to adapt to the demands of the battlefield of the next century would be to risk undermining the regiment's effectiveness and, ultimately, its future.