§ Ms Tess Kingham (Gloucester)I am grateful for this opportunity to draw the attention of the House to Western Sahara, which is under Moroccan occupation. I should be interested to hear the views of my hon. Friend the Minister on that sadly neglected country.
I first became aware of the situation in Western Sahara in 1985, when I was an aid worker with the charity War on Want, the first United Kingdom organisation to provide assistance to Saharawi refugees from Western Sahara. Since then, I have followed events in the area with interest and, since I was elected to Parliament, I have had the honour to serve as chair of the all-party group on Western Sahara.
I hope the House will forgive me if I indulge in a short history lesson and give the background to the situation, as I am sure that many people, even many hon. Members, are not fully aware of the plight of Western Sahara and the Saharawi people. That is itself a scandal, as the Moroccan invasion of Western Sahara closely mirrored the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. The Iraqi invasion attracted worldwide condemnation and swift international intervention, whereas the Moroccan invasion was swept under the international carpet—there was no international uproar or military force to liberate Western Sahara, although cynics may say that that was because there are no working oilfields in Western Sahara.
Western Sahara lies on the Atlantic coast of Africa, between Mauritania and Morocco. Historically, the people who lived there—the Saharawi—were nomadic and had a life style similar to that of their Tuareg neighbours. The area was colonised by the Spanish in the 19th century and named Spanish Sahara. The indigenous people, as in most other African countries that were colonies, set up an independence movement to resist colonisation, the Polisario Front. In 1966, the United Nations General Assembly called on Spain to organise a referendum of self-determination for the people of Western Sahara. Spain organised a census in 1974, which revealed that 74,000 Saharawi people were living in the territory—that figure was supposed to serve as the basis for an electorate for the referendum, which, it was planned, would happen speedily. The road to independence seemed to be laid out.
Morocco did not like that one bit, and laid claim to the territory. The International Court of Justice was asked to deliver an opinion on whether Morocco or Mauritania had any claim to the area; it found that there were no historic ties that could debar Spanish Sahara from decolonisation or from self-determination. Again, the way seemed clear for the Saharawi people to move forward to independence.
In response, Morocco almost immediately invaded Western Sahara. Tens of thousands of Saharawi people fled. Women and children were bombed by Moroccan forces and napalm was used against them—it was an international scandal, but, sadly, the international community turned its face away. Around 180,000 refugees fled to southern Algeria, where they have lived in enormous camps—huge tented cities—for the past 23 years.
The Saharawi refugees are mostly dependent on food aid administered by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. Despite the dire conditions 334 in which they live, however, they have created a society in their camps whose rates of literacy are unparalleled in Africa. They have created a good health system and a democratic structure that ensures that women play a full part in running and managing the camps. The fact that the Saharawi people have survived those conditions for 23 years demonstrates their deep desire to secure their right to self-determination—many other groups would have packed their bags and gone home.
For more than 20 years, the Polisario Front waged a guerrilla war against the occupying forces. It had steadfast support from the Organisation of African Unity. When, in 1985, the Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic—the state in exile—was admitted to OAU membership, Morocco promptly walked out of the organisation.
In 1990, the United Nations—freed from the shackles of the cold war—turned its attention to Western Sahara. A peace plan was drawn up, calling for a referendum based on the 1974 Spanish census to be organised and supervised by the UN. A ceasefire between the warring parties was agreed, and, yet again, all looked set for the Saharawi people to decide whether they wanted their territory to become independent or to be part of Morocco. Sadly, eight years later, the UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara—MINURSO—is still in the area and the Saharawi people are still waiting for their referendum.
In the intervening years, the UN has failed to enforce its peace plan for Western Sahara. I believe that the main problems have been Morocco's refusal to accept the 1974 census as the basis for the referendum, and its continual disruption of the peace process. The UN mission has faced criticism from its own members. In 1995, Ambassador Frank Ruddy, the former deputy chair of the MINURSO voter identification commission, said that, during his time in Western Sahara,
Morocco conducted, without a raised eyebrow from Boutros Ghali's hand picked representative who ran the referendum, a campaign of terror against the Saharan people. I had not seen anything like it since I observed the apartheid government in South Africa.In October 1996, Douglas Dryden, the former United States military representative to the special liaison office of MINURSO, said:the atmosphere at the MINURSO force HQ in L'Ayoun is practically a siege mentality. The mission is not allowed to function independently, but as a creature of the Moroccans. It is the only UN mission that I am aware of where the flag of one of the parties"—he means the Moroccan flag—is required to fly alongside that of the UN.Thankfully, the appointment of Kofi Annan seems to have galvanised the UN into action, giving it a new willingness to make a reality the Saharawi referendum for self-determination. In March 1997, Kofi Annan appointed James Baker, the former US Secretary of State, as his personal envoy to Western Sahara. James Baker moved quickly and, following meetings in London—which were facilitated, I am pleased to say, by the new Labour Government—Lisbon and Houston, Morocco and the Polisario Front agreed to a proposal on voter identification and a code of conduct guaranteeing the UN authority to oversee a fair and free referendum for the Saharawi people.That agreement, known as the Houston agreement, was endorsed by the UN, and, in December 1997, voter identification was under way. Once again, 335 the referendum seemed to be back on track. Unfortunately, however, things are not progressing smoothly—in his recent report to the UN Security Council, Kofi Annan admitted that the referendum was unlikely to take place in 1998 as planned. I believe that much of the delay is caused by the Moroccan Government's stalling tactics.
Morocco has, for many years, been engaged in a sustained campaign of intimidation against the Saharawi people in the occupied territory. Saharawi people who call for independence have been systematically detained, tortured and subjected to extra-judicial killings. Amnesty International continues to receive reports of disappearances and torture. Morocco is also pushing for the registration of 12,000 extra voters from specific tribal groups, all of whom live in Morocco; none of them appeared in the 1974 Spanish census, which was, as I said, the agreed basis for the electorate for the referendum.
Like many other organisations, the Labour party has long supported the right of the Saharawi people to self-determination. I welcome the role that the Government played in helping James Baker to put the peace plan back on track, and I strongly welcome the part that they have played as president of the Friends of Western Sahara Group at the UN Security Council. I now welcome the chance to ask my hon. Friend the Minister for his response to some questions, whose resolution would, I believe, strongly help the peace process to move forward fairly and speedily. I believe that the British Government can play a dynamic role in moving the peace process to a free and fair referendum and in ensuring that both parties in the dispute keep to the spirit of the Houston agreement.
I understand that the Minister recently visited Morocco, and I should be interested to hear how his discussions with Moroccan Ministers went. In line with our ethical foreign policy, I should particularly like to know whether he has raised the issue of Morocco's continued human rights abuses against the Saharawi people—the arbitrary detentions and torture—with the Moroccan Government. I understand that our Government's position is one of positive engagement with countries with poor human rights records such as China and Indonesia, and I hope that we have been consistent with that in respect of Morocco's poor human rights record. I should also like to know what plans my hon. Friend has to meet representatives of the Polisario Front in order to obtain a balanced view of the current situation in Western Sahara.
My hon. Friend is also aware that, at the beginning of the UN peace plan, the United Kingdom provided personnel to MINURSO, but, for some time now, we have had no presence. We are the only one of the permanent five countries on the UN Security Council not to be providing military or civilian personnel. I feel quite ashamed, given our long-term support for the peace process, that we are not providing that support. I hope that the Minister will be able to give me some encouraging news on that.
I also hope that we shall send a United Kingdom delegation of election monitors to cover the run-up to the referendum and the referendum in Western Sahara. As a former election monitor in Albania for the United Kingdom Government, I know how important that is.
336 Finally, I should like my hon. Friend's assurance that we shall continue to do all we can to ensure that a free and fair referendum happens speedily for the Saharawi people. They have waited long enough. I am sure that the British Government will never allow strategic interests and EU trade negotiations to muddy our view of the justice of the issue. The parallels between the invasion of Western Sahara by Morocco and the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq are indisputable. I sincerely hope that the Government will be as tough in their dealings with Morocco, in persuading her to abide by UN resolutions and international law, as they were with the Iraqi regime. The Saharawi people deserve nothing less from a Labour Government.
§ The Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office (Mr. Derek Fatchett)I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Gloucester (Ms Kingham) for the way in which she introduced the debate. We all know of her long-term interest in and keen commitment to the issue, and I am grateful for her opening comments.
My hon. Friend asked a number of questions, and I shall try to answer them fully. She gave us a useful background to the current situation. I shall repeat some of the points she made in the context of my response, but not in any sense to deny the historical background that she set out.
My hon. Friend asked about the Government's policy towards Western Sahara. It is very simple: we seek a just and lasting settlement and we support the United Nations' efforts to bring one about. We want to see a clean, fair and transparent referendum that will give the people of the territory the opportunity to decide whether their future lies with Morocco or as an independent state.
Our commitment to do all that we can to help underlies our support for the United Nations Secretary-General, his personal envoy James Baker and his special representative Charles Dunbar. We have also used our presidency of the European Union to bring the on-going developments in Western Sahara into sharper focus. I hope that my hon. Friend recognises that we have played and will continue to play a positive role.
My hon. Friend rightly said that the dispute in Western Sahara has lasted too long and needs to be brought to a swift, mutually acceptable conclusion. We welcomed the United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan' s appointment just over a year ago of James Baker as his personal envoy to Western Sahara. That was an important step forward. As hon. Members will know, James Baker was charged with the task of assessing the situation and considering whether the United Nations' settlement plan for Western Sahara, which at the time had been stalled for more than a year, could be fully implemented.
James Baker visited the region and decided that, if he was to make any progress, he would have to bring together the parties to the dispute—Morocco and the Polisario—for talks. When he asked the British Government whether we would be able to assist him in his first steps towards achieving that, we were, of course, pleased to help. We provided a suitable venue and logistical support for meetings that he wanted to hold with Morocco, the Polisario, Algeria and Mauritania. I am delighted that we were able to assist in that way, and I can tell my hon. Friend that James Baker was delighted with the support he received from the United Kingdom Labour Government.
337 The two days of talks that followed, in summer 1997, concluded with Morocco and the Polisario taking the landmark decision to meet face to face, under United Nations auspices, in an attempt to iron out their differences. I hope that, along with James Baker, we can take some credit for that progress. There followed a series of meetings to which my hon. Friend referred—some in London and some in Lisbon—which made valuable progress. In particular, the talks quickly established that both Morocco and the Polisario had no interest in pursuing any political solution other than implementation of the settlement plan. Neither party showed any enthusiasm for any kind of autonomy for the people of the territory within the kingdom of Morocco.
Differences over how the eligibility of individuals to vote might be assessed remained—and remains—the key issue. When they were resolved at the final session of talks in Houston, the Moroccan authorities and the Polisario signed what is now termed the Houston agreement, to which my hon. Friend referred. It included a code of conduct for the referendum. The Secretary-General's report of 13 November 1997 set out the plan and timetable for the referendum, which is scheduled for 7 December 1998.
I hope that I have been able to persuade the House that the Government have been active in respect of Western Sahara. Let me set out some further initiatives and responsibilities that we have pursued. Whenever Western Sahara is discussed at the United Nations, we firmly support the United Nations Secretary-General and his personal envoy. We are also responsible for co-ordinating the Friends of Western Sahara Group at the United Nations. We therefore have played, and will continue to play, a central role in New York and elsewhere.
Although we are conscious that Western Sahara is inevitably an agenda item on which the United Nations has the lead, we have sought to raise its standing within the European Union. During our presidency of the European Union, we have ensured that Western Sahara regularly features on the agenda at the monthly Maghreb-Mashreq working group meetings in Brussels. I am delighted that my hon. Friend is pleased about that. I am sure that many others will be, too.
As a result of one United Kingdom initiative, the European Union heads of mission in Rabat are now permitted to visit Western Sahara to see things for themselves, whereas previously visiting was restricted to junior members of embassy staff. We believe that not only visits but the level of those visits is important. Additionally, we know that many of our European partners do not enjoy the range of information on events in Western Sahara that we possess, so we have circulated comprehensive reports from our ambassador in Rabat.
We were pleased that the United Nations Secretary-General was able to put together a timetable for the run-up to the referendum so quickly, and that MINURSO in Western Sahara was able to recommence the voter identification process at the beginning of December last year. That has continued, with few interruptions.
It is very encouraging to note—I shall come to my hon. Friend's points—that the United Nations Secretary-General's report of 13 April 1998 included the 60,112 applicants identified during the first phase of the identification process, which ran from August 1994 to 338 December 1995. More than 100,000 have been identified as potential voters, and fewer than 60,000 remain to be convoked.
Since the identification process resumed, British Government officials have made three separate visits to Laayoune in Western Sahara, where MINURSO is based. We also try to visit Tindouf, the Algerian town around which the Polisario camps lie, as often as possible. Unfortunately, the logistical difficulties are such that our last visit to Western Sahara, outside Laayoune, was in September 1997, when officials visited Tindouf, the MINURSO team site at Mehaires and Smara. They travelled from Mehaires through minefields and across the Berm to Smara, and saw for themselves the terrain and conditions that have hindered the work of the United Nations for so long. That is an indication of many of the problems and difficulties resulting from the fighting in the region.
I am pleased to be able to tell my hon. Friend that British officials are undertaking another visit to Western Sahara at this very moment. I should like to take this opportunity to reiterate our gratitude to the United Nations for its assistance with these visits. I hope that my hon. Friend will appreciate that on the ground, through our embassy and other staff, we are active in finding out what the conditions are within Western Sahara.
I also believe that practical demonstrations of support, such as visits, are vital for MINURSO. They not only provide a visible and much appreciated sign of our support, but help us to understand the conditions that it has to work under and the difficulties that it has to face. We are also keen to take every possible opportunity to improve our knowledge and understanding of developments in the territory itself. I know from the many letters we receive in the Foreign Office that there is great interest in the United Kingdom in what is going on in Western Sahara. Indeed, I am delighted to see so many of my hon. Friends in the Chamber for the debate. Yet again, there is not one Opposition Back Bencher here—but we are becoming accustomed to that.
We are told of allegations of human rights abuses, the manipulation of the press, demonstrations and disturbances. The United Nations independent jurist, Professor Rocounas, is engaged in those issues, and we support him in his work. Our regular visits offer us the ideal opportunity to find out from those on the spot what is really happening. I know that those visits are important for MINURSO morale, and they underline, in a practical way, our continuing commitment to the successful resolution of the dispute.
It has been said by some that, if the UN process stalls again, for whatever reason, Morocco would not be too bothered—it would continue to inhabit the towns west of the Berm, much as it has done since the Spanish, and latterly the Mauritanians, withdrew from the territory. I do not believe that that is what the Moroccans want. Nor is it in Morocco's interests for the sovereignty of Western Sahara to remain unresolved. My hon. Friend asked about my recent visit to Morocco. I reassure her that the issue of Western Sahara was a key element in my discussions with the king, the Prime Minister and other Ministers. Our commitment to a resolution of the issue and to the United Nations position was stressed during all those meetings.
339 There are also some who argue that MINURSO is biased; that it is somehow pro the Polisario and anti-Moroccan. We believe otherwise. MINURSO has proved its value and its integrity, and we shall continue to hold that view unless there is any available evidence to the contrary. At the moment, there is none.
My hon. Friend asked me about the possibility of UK Government contacts with the Polisario. As she knows, I was due to meet the Secretary General of the Polisario, Mohamed Abdelaziz, this morning. I understand that Mr. Abdelaziz is in London for this week. Unfortunately, because of other diary commitments, it was not possible for me to have that meeting. I assure my hon. Friend that it is important that Britain, as a key player in Europe, in the region, at the Security Council and in the Friends of Western Sahara Group in New York, should know what is really happening at this crucial time for Western Sahara. We shall seek that information from all possible sources.
There seems to be some difficulty in arranging meetings with Mohamed Abdelaziz. I understand that my predecessor, Jeremy Hanley, arranged to meet him in north Africa early in 1997, but Mr. Abdelaziz had to pull out of that meeting. We may be fated not to meet. However, I again assure my hon. Friend that we shall seek information from all the key players in the process.
I reiterate to the House our continued determination to see the Western Sahara dispute resolved through the referendum. Britain takes no position on the outcome, and we will not alter that stance. We neither support the Moroccan claim to sovereignty over the territory, nor recognise the Polisario's self-proclaimed Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic. Indeed, my hon. Friend would not wish me to take any other position. Her argument is that the matter is one for self-determination by the people. We support the United Nations, and we want to see the dispute resolved peacefully. Morocco and the Polisario have agreed to put the matter to a free vote. We shall do all we can to make sure that there is a vote and that it is free and fair. We shall do all we can to help implement whatever decision the people make.
In February this year, I was pleased to be able to meet the United Nations Secretary-General's newly appointed special representative to Western Sahara, Mr. Charles Dunbar. Mr. Dunbar is a former US ambassador who has worked extensively in the region. I know from reports received that he has been extremely active in his efforts.
340 He has been admirably and effectively supported by Mr. Robin Kinloch, the British UN staff member who heads the identification commission. My hon. Friend asked about the British role. Robin Kinloch is a key element in the resources that we make available.
I pointed out earlier the progress made on the identification of the non-contested applicants who wish to be assessed as to their qualification as voters in the referendum. As my hon. Friend and others will be aware, there are about 65,000 individuals whose eligibility to submit themselves to MINURSO for interview remains to be confirmed. That is a key issue, to which my hon. Friend referred. Now is not the time or the opportunity for me to go into the problem of the contested tribes in depth. However, in brief, Morocco believes that the members of those tribes should all have the opportunity to submit themselves for identification as voters. The Polisario believes that to do so would be contrary to the Houston agreement. It is clear that both parties see the issue as of paramount importance. We agree that a successful resolution in regard to Western Sahara requires the settlement of the dispute over those tribal groups. If there is any way in which we can assist in that process, we shall be happy to do so.
All applicants in Western Sahara, including those from the contested tribal groups, have been convoked to attend one of the UN identification centres. Those who attend are interviewed by MINURSO staff and representatives of the Polisario and Morocco. Their eligibility for registration is assessed under UN criteria. On the dates on which the 65,000 members of the contested tribes were invited to attend for identification, only 4,000 came forward. Only 1,500 have been interviewed. I regret that the Moroccans have refused to participate in interviewing the remaining 2,500 until they have received satisfactory assurances from the United Nations about how remaining members of those tribes will be dealt with. Charles Dunbar is working hard on that issue, which is crucial to the resolution of the problem, and we shall continue to assist in whatever way we can.
I hope that I have been able to answer the points raised by my hon. Friend, and to assure her that we are active on this matter and are looking for a peaceful solution through the referendum process. If the United Kingdom can assist the UN in any way to resolve this long-standing issue, we will be keen to do so. I congratulate my hon. Friend on raising an issue of such importance, and we look forward to the existence of a map of north Africa without this dispute.