Strategic Defence Review

HC Deb 25 February 1998 vol 307 cc301-23

11 am

Mr. Keith Simpson (Mid-Norfolk)

Mr. Deputy Speaker, I thank you and the House for the opportunity to have an Adjournment debate on this important subject. I applied for an Adjournment debate on the strategic defence review before Christmas, as I thought it unlikely that we would have an opportunity to have a major debate on it before it was published some time in the spring or summer. It is coincidental that the debate has been selected this week, against the background of the Iraq crisis. There is no conspiracy in the Speaker's Office; this also happens to be the week in which the Defence Committee visits Washington, but this is not a method by which we can debate defence in the absence of the distinguished members of the Select Committee.

This is an opportunity for hon. Members to question the Minister about the strategic defence review and for him to provide an interim report on where we are. There is a rumour that the Secretary of State for Defence, apart from official appearances in the House, is now in purdah and will no longer accept outside speaking engagements for fear of lifting the veil on the strategic defence review.

We last debated defence in the two-day defence debate in October. Since then, we have had a good Adjournment debate in November, introduced by the hon. Member for Chorley (Mr. Hoyle), on the defence industry. I compliment the hon. Gentleman on his assiduity and his great interest in defence. In December, we had an Adjournment debate, introduced by my right hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Haltemprice and Howden (Mr. Davis), on the important subject—given the Iraq crisis—of anti-missile defence.

It is usual at this time of the year, as more experienced hon. Members know, to have single-service defence debates. Perhaps at the end of the debate the Minister will confirm whether the Ministry of Defence intends to go ahead with the single-service debates, or whether we will have a further hiatus.

The strategic defence review is as much about continuity as change. One thing we should establish this morning is how much is continuity and how much is change and what that change means for the United Kingdom and for defence. I do not have to tell the House that defence is still important. I would like to believe that there is a consensus among the majority of hon. Members that the defence of the United Kingdom, our people and our interests is of paramount importance and cannot be taken lightly. It cannot be cut back, nor can the capability be given up lightly as we may be forced to readopt it in the event of a major crisis. Ultimately, the defence capability of our country is a war-fighting capability. The defence of our country gives us the political leverage that is important in the new world disorder in which we live.

The defence budget, of nearly £22 billion, is by no means the largest in Whitehall; it comes well below social services, health and education. I do not need to remind the House that the MOD has 210,000 regular service personnel and employs 109,000 civilians. It is UK industry's largest customer—11,000 UK companies have a defence interest. Defence affects virtually every Member of the UK Parliament. Some 10 per cent. of all UK industrial employment and 11 per cent. of all industrial output is connected with defence. Defence exports are probably worth in excess of £4 billion a year. It is a major earner for UK plc.

During the Prime Minister's statement to the House yesterday on the Iraq crisis, my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition asked whether the Prime Minister agreed that the strategic defence review, which is now approaching completion, could not reasonably conclude that there is scope for reducing the defence budget? The Prime Minister replied: I have always thought and said that this country's defence forces are vital to our foreign policy and Britain's standing in the world. That is precisely why the strategic defence review will ensure that our armed forces have a secure and certain future."—[Official Report, 24 February 1998; Vol. 307, c. 177.] On that, we would all agree, and that is the litmus test for the review. I sincerely hope that those words of the Prime Minister will not come back to haunt him in six months' time.

I want to take the Government at their word. They claim, not only on defence but across the board, that they are into greater openness and public accountability. The Government have continued, and indeed expanded, the policy of previous Conservative Secretaries of State by providing more information about defence. It is exceptionally good that the wide range of expertise in our universities and establishments of higher education on defence and security matters has been consulted. The defence industries have been brought in, as have non-governmental organisations, which have much to offer. The public have also been consulted. We can all agree on that and the Government have undertaken a major programme.

That is the easy bit. The hard bit is making decisions. How do we assess the progress of the Government's strategic defence review? How do we judge the strategic defence review when it is published? I suggest five tests. First, does it provide effective security and defence for the United Kingdom? Secondly, does it succeed in meeting the United Kingdom's national and international obligations? Thirdly, will our armed forces be organised, manned and equipped to meet those obligations? Fourthly, has the strategic defence review taken into account the twin revolutions in political and military affairs? Finally, will the financial resources be allocated to meet this remit? That final point is the crunch in terms of the strategic defence review.

There are two ironies connected with the Iraq crisis. One is a question of national identity, the other a question of defence direction and capability. Certain elements of the new Labour Government—the Minister does not fall into this category—have been keen to rebrand Britain as cool Britannia, whatever that means, yet there is a certain irony that the reality of sending a task force to the Gulf in the Iraq crisis has been more traditional and—without jingoism—more rule Britannia than cool Britannia.

Secondly, despite all the Government's allegations of how weak the defence capability was after 18 years of Conservative government, the reality is that the command and control system set up as a consequence of the experience of the Falklands and the Gulf war—the Cabinet, the MOD and the permanent joint headquarters—was established by the Conservatives. The remit to send a task force was established and tested by the Conservative Government, as were the doctrine, weapons, equipment, manpower and resources.

Here is a great irony. If the Government think that our forces were in such an appalling state, how did they successfully command, control and organise a task force of the type that was sent to the Gulf, and which has made such an important contribution to maintaining international security? There is a certain bijou irony there.

Some observers might argue that fulfilling major deployments such as Bosnia and the Gulf while undertaking the strategic defence review places great strain on our services. Thirty years ago, another Labour Government were—surprise, surprise—carrying out one of their many defence reviews. Later, the then Secretary of State for Defence, now Lord Healey, observed the contradictory nature of simultaneously deploying and trying to review defence. Later he wrote: I did not think it made sense to carry out an appendix operation on a man while he was lifting a grand piano". I suggest that many members of our armed forces feel just like that man or woman attempting to lift a grand piano.

In opposition, new Labour faced reality. It moved away from unilateralism and argued that there was a need for a strategic defence review that would stop the decline in Britain's defences. The Labour Opposition said that they would properly assess Britain's strategic priorities and that the process would be foreign policy led. Every question asked by hon. Members—Conservative and Liberal, at least—to ascertain more detail was met with what appeared to be the reasonable holding answer that Labour Members could not commit themselves until they had looked at the Ministry of Defence books.

Nevertheless, in the lead-up to the general election, the Labour Opposition felt able, without looking at the books, to commit themselves to maintaining our strategic nuclear deterrent and to honour the Conservative commitment to Eurofighter—a commitment, at that time, of about £16 billion. That blew a hole through the carefully constructed arguments for a strategic defence review. On what basis did the then Labour Opposition decide to maintain Trident and Eurofighter when the strategic defence review was supposed to be foreign policy led? Why did they not commit themselves to order Challenger tanks or purchase carriers? Where did the information come from that they said in other areas was so vital that they would have to wait until they had looked at the books?

Our military friends have a saying; a bad commander—for that read politician—does not appreciate the situation, he situates the appreciation. That is exactly what Labour did before the general election.

Let us move on from the flawed logic behind the strategic defence review and see how an assessment of British foreign policy could provide the driver for the strategic defence review.

The Minister for the Armed Forces (Dr. John Reid)

Will the hon. Gentleman give way?

Mr. Simpson

I gladly give way to the Minister.

Dr. Reid

The hon. Gentleman has finally tempted me to the Dispatch Box with his phrase, "flawed logic". Will he explain why the Conservatives spent the period leading to the general election complaining, "You can't trust Labour; they won't keep Trident or the Eurofighter" and have spent the time since then complaining, "Labour can't be trusted because they are going to keep Trident and the Eurofighter"?

Mr. Simpson

I think the Minister should allow me to continue my point. He should not have allowed himself to be tempted.

If, in opposition, people argue a perfectly acceptable case—that they cannot commit themselves before looking at the books—and maintain that they will carry out a strategic defence review because they lack information, where does the information come from to cause them to say that they will keep Trident and Eurofighter but that they cannot commit themselves to other important areas? By making that declaration, they largely determined the outcome of the strategic defence review, which was supposed to be foreign policy led. I thank the Minister for his intervention.

I shall now examine the flawed logic behind the strategic defence review and see how an assessment of British foreign policy could provide the driver for it. We know, in general terms, from what the Foreign Secretary said when he launched his Foreign Office mission statement on 12 May 1997, that UK security will remain based on the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and that the Government want to be an active member of the United Nations.

However, we still do not know the foreign policy baseline for the strategic defence review. Both the Foreign Secretary and Secretary of State for Defence have refused to publish it. Several times, the Secretary of State has replied to any question about the foreign policy baseline by saying, "Nudge nudge, wink wink, you will find bits of it in the defence debate in October 1997 and in some of the speeches that I have made to outside bodies."

Why the coyness? Why not publish the foreign policy baseline? This is open government. It is crucial that we establish what, if any, foreign policy commitments have changed and how they will impact on defence capabilities and—even more significant—resources. In default of a foreign policy baseline, Opposition Members—and I suspect that there is a nagging doubt among Labour Members—are forced to conclude that the Treasury is unwilling for the foreign policy baseline to be published before the tough negotiations that are about to start between it and the MOD. If the foreign policy baseline is not published here, on the official record, it can always be massaged to fit the budgetary restraints.

I challenge the Minister: prove me wrong. Stand up today and tell us what the foreign policy baseline is or give us a commitment. If he fails to do that, the strategic defence review is fatally flawed.

On 12 May 1997, the Foreign Secretary made great play of launching a Foreign Office mission statement, saying: Every modem business starts from a mission statement that sets clear objectives". Quite so. This is now the requirement for most business and industry and, indeed, the military. By any definition, the Ministry of Defence is a very large modern business, worth £22 billion, so where is the Ministry of Defence mission statement?

I asked the Secretary of State that question in June 1997. On 16 June 1997, the Minister for the Armed Forces replied: We intend to issue shortly revised aims and objectives for my Department in the form of a mission statement."—[Official Report, 16 June 1997; Vol. 296, c. 15.] Since then, despite repeated requests by several hon. Members, there has been no MOD mission statement.

Ironically, 50 or 100 years ago, if someone had asked an old-fashioned and politically incorrect Minister, either Labour or Conservative—or, if we go back far enough, a Liberal—he would probably have said that the mission of the Ministry of Defence was killing the Queen's enemies. That is not so today; it is a politically incorrect statement. Therefore, as the MOD moves forward the complex process of the strategic defence review, it lacks, according to the Foreign Secretary, who is laying down the foreign policy baseline, those clear objectives so essential to any modern business—or perhaps they form part of that foreign policy baseline, which remains unavailable to parliamentary scrutiny.

My second challenge to the Minister this morning is, can he either tell us the Ministry of Defence mission statement or tell us a date in the near future when it will be published?

That logically brings me to the central issue of resources. Across the board in Whitehall, the Government face the dilemma of keeping their election pledge not to raise taxes while maintaining the Conservative Government's public expenditure plans for the first two years and at the same time delivering on Labour's priorities of education, health and employment. We know that, although the Prime Minister has pledged to maintain strong defences, the defence budget will remain static at best—and at worst it will probably be reduced.

A real strategic defence review, which genuinely examines our foreign policy, our capabilities, and our possible commitments—a real one, such as the Australians had—might broadly reflect Conservative foreign policy commitments, the need to be proactive in the United Nations and to undertake the wider requirements of defence diplomacy, the need to purchase new weapons and equipment that are required and the need at least to maintain the pay and conditions of service personnel. Such a review might conclude that the defence budget should be increased—but we know that that has been ruled out, so this is not an objective strategic defence review.

The political and financial realities confronting the Secretary of State for Defence are almost insoluble. First, his constituency, the parliamentary Labour party, backs defence cuts. In a survey of Labour Members published on 11 May 1997 in The Observer, a ratio of 6:1 favoured defence cuts; the ratio rose among the 1997 intake to 12:1. Not only are many Labour Members sceptical about the need to maintain the present defence budget, many of them believe that that budget provides a milch cow for education and health.

Secondly, despite Labour denials that the strategic defence review would not be Treasury led, the evidence proves the contrary. In October 1997, the Ministry of Defence was forced to make savings of £168 million after the Treasury claimed that there had been overspending and that the savings would help to avert a winter shortage of national health service beds.

There is continual pressure—I know that the Minister is affected by it—from the Treasury to offload the cost of British peacekeeping operations in Bosnia from the contingency reserve on to the Defence vote. However, I suggest that the real financial squeeze will come from the Treasury's comprehensive spending review, which was announced in June last year and should be completed this summer. We know from the answer to a question asked in this place on 3 November 1997 that the strategic defence review is the Ministry of Defence's contribution to the comprehensive spending review. That review is tasking Departments to look for savings—it does not require them to come up with ideas for obtaining new money from the central reserve.

Thanks to the delay in completing the strategic defence review—I remind hon. Members that its publication was promised in December last year, but the completion date has now slipped and we expect it in the first half, perhaps May or June, of 1998—the Ministry of Defence's ideal solution of a quick bilateral deal with the Treasury appears to be receding into the distance. The strategic defence review is being dragged further and further into the orbit of the comprehensive spending review.

Whitehall rumours—who am I to gainsay them—have suggested that the Treasury is seeking long-term cuts of £2 billion, or 10 per cent. of the current budget, or even £4 billion, or 20 per cent. of the budget. If that is not bad enough, the MOD—like other Departments—will have to introduce resource accounting by the financial year 1999–2000.

Dr. Reid

The Tories introduced it.

Mr. Simpson

I assure any hon. Members who have not come across them that resource accounts will have a major impact on Government Departments. They will involve valuations of the MOD's assets, inflate the size of the MOD budget and make the MOD appear to other Departments even more of a Whitehall milch cow. The Ministry of Defence will be seen as a soft touch.

Mr. James Gray (North Wiltshire)

Did my hon. Friend hear the seated intervention from the Minister a moment ago? In response to my hon. Friend's comments about resource accounting, the Minister said the Conservative Government introduced it. Does my hon. Friend agree that it sounds as though the Government are planning to abolish it?

Mr. Simpson

I thank my hon. Friend. I am not certain that the Government know what they are doing in this area. However, they intend to go ahead with resource accounting, which will have a major impact on the Ministry of Defence.

In the short term, the MOD budget will be under considerable strain and, in the medium term, it will be very vulnerable. That will seriously constrain the Secretary of State's strategy of paying for the MOD's one "big idea". A young officer who works at the Ministry of Defence told me recently that the staff are thinking about putting up a series of signs around the Ministry—rather like in "Alice's Adventures in Wonderland"—that will point to "The Big Idea". Ministers and their special advisers might find it one day—but it will be in the boiler room.

The Ministry of Defence's one big idea—which is largely a product of MOD studies; it has nothing to do with Ministers—is an expeditionary force capability. There is a certain irony here because, if we had been sitting in the Chamber 90 years ago, we would have been discussing the formation of an expeditionary force capability under a Liberal Secretary of State for War, Richard Burdon Haldane. We have turned a full circle in 90 years.

Even if savings are found elsewhere in the MOD budget, an expeditionary force capability will require new weapons, equipment and information technology that will not be compensated by internal savings. Even if assumptions are made that our allies will provide many of those capabilities, the United Kingdom will still require a minimum stand-alone capability, which I do not at present envisage the Government's being able to fund.

Quite correctly, the Government have emphasised the quality of our armed forces personnel and the need to sustain their morale and that of their families. We all agree about that, but how do service personnel judge the strategic defence review? We know the answer to that question because a leaked Ministry of Defence report provides the damning evidence. At the end of last year, the MOD conducted a three-week assessment of 1,500 personnel from all three services at 14 different establishments, covering all ranks from private to two-star general. In a damning phrase, the strategic defence review liaison team assessors found almost unanimous suspicion that the review is a cost-cutting exercise dressed up in policy rhetoric". In the spirit of openness, I ask the Minister whether he will place that report, and any other studies of service morale that he has commissioned, in the Library.

Furthermore, as the publication of the strategic defence review has slipped and slipped, many service personnel and local communities have experienced a great period of unease about their future. In my constituency, the 9th/12th Lancers—an armoured regiment based at Swanton Morley that is currently deployed in Bosnia—are concerned about their future. My constituents at Coltishall and the surrounding villages are concerned about press reports regarding the future of the Jaguar force at RAF Coltishall based in the constituency of my hon. Friend the Member for North Norfolk (Mr. Prior).

Despite all the promises and good intentions of Ministers, we are forced to conclude that the strategic defence review lacks a purpose. To paraphrase Winston Churchill, this strategic defence review lacks a theme. We are unable to determine the foreign policy baseline that is supposed to form the basis of the MOD's defence review. Ministers have been unable to produce a departmental mission statement with a clarity of purpose. The defence budget is vulnerable to pressure both from within the parliamentary Labour party and from the Government's own comprehensive spending review—and that is reflected in the mood of our service personnel. Sadly, the strategic defence review will probably come up with a requirement to do even more with even less.

Finally, I remind the House of the five tests by which I believe hon. Members should judge the strategic defence review when it is published: does it provide effective security and defence for the United Kingdom; does it succeed in meeting the United Kingdom's national and international obligations; will our armed forces be organised, manned and equipped to meet those obligations; has the strategic defence review taken into account the twin revolutions in political and military affairs; and will the financial resources be allocated to meet that remit?

11.26 am

Mr. John Wilkinson (Ruislip-Northwood)

We are extremely indebted to my hon. Friend the Member for Mid-Norfolk (Mr. Simpson), who, in a wide-ranging speech, covered all the main areas of concern regarding the strategic defence review. I shall concentrate on two or three narrow issues.

I whole-heartedly welcome the strategic defence review: it will do the Ministry of Defence no harm to re-examine its fundamental practices. I also believe that it is worth while for the Ministry of Defence to make sure that it is operating cost-effectively at every stage. As for the principles which should underlie the review, I turn to the views enunciated by the former French chief of staff, General Ailleret, a few years ago. He enjoined France to embrace "défense à tous azimuts"—which I interpret to mean "multi-polar defence".

British defence has been largely Eurocentric since the beginning of the cold war—and understandably so. With the dissolution of the Warsaw pact and the multiplicity of risks and potential threats to our security and our interests around the world, that Eurocentric approach must change. We must also eliminate the old shibboleths which went with it. In a sense, those shibboleths were understandable and comprehensible.

Following world war two, we were committed to the Brussels treaty requirement to maintain a standing army of 55,000 men and a tactical air force in Germany. That requirement has been overtaken by events, and we now have only two main air bases and an armoured division in the federal republic. I urge Her Majesty's Government to re-examine our contribution in Germany. Our clear purpose should be to ensure that our armed forces possess mobility, flexibility and fire power to meet those wide-ranging threats and future potential commitments. I do not see that maintaining an armoured division and two air bases on German soil accords with those wider objectives.

The RAF is to withdraw its Harrier squadrons from RAF Laarbruch this year. I hope that they come back as soon as possible. The Tornado wing at RAF Brüggen is due to stay until 2002. For the life of me, I do not see why it cannot be returned to the United Kingdom forthwith. The headquarters has already gone back. We need to concentrate our forces in the most appropriate manner. It will be necessary to make space for those units and personnel in the United Kingdom, and this must be done.

The armoured division is a more difficult problem, especially as regards training areas, but increasingly the training facilities in Poland and Canada are being used. It is too high a price to pay for the maintenance of a three-star position as commander of the Allied Command Europe Rapid Reaction Corps that we should be committed for ever and aye to keeping an armoured division in Germany.

The French have withdrawn from the federal republic. The argument that we must be in the federal republic to maintain a United States commitment to western Europe does not stand up. There is defence in depth now in central Europe. Were Russia ever to become a military threat again, and the countries of eastern Europe joined NATO, we would have a collective security apparatus on the continent which did not require the maintenance of extremely costly British forces on German soil.

To pursue the three objectives of mobility, flexibility and fire power, I endorse also the efforts towards more joint operations. The idea of a joint helicopter support force seems entirely sensible. I can see no inhibition or fundamental problem. Likewise, the precedent has been well established and proved in the Gulf for joint Royal Air Force-Royal Navy air groups on Her Majesty's ships. This, too, is eminently sensible. I am sure that we will see more such developments in the defence review, and rightly so.

I hope that we will recognise the United Kingdom's special contribution to European defence in the maritime and air elements, and in air mobility and amphibiosity, rather more than in highly inflexible, static armoured forces. If there must be a balance, that is the way that we must go. It can only be good for the Royal Navy. I am pleased that HMS Ocean is shortly to enter service—an appropriate decision by the previous Conservative Administration to provide a landing platform for helicopters for Her Majesty's fleet.

Beyond that, we will need to replace the Invincible class. We have seen the benefits of maritime air power in the Gulf crisis. A force can be deployed relatively rapidly. It can be poised offshore. The political inhibitions to maritime air operations are minimal.

The difficult decision will be whether to replace the three Invincible class carriers with two 40,000-ton fleet carriers, or whether we go for smaller carriers of 20,000 tons or thereabouts. I would argue that it is better to have three smaller carriers than two big carriers. One will always be in refit, and we must be able to rotate the vessels, as we are doing now between Invincible and Illustrious, knowing that it is always possible to keep one on station.

I tend to favour the smaller carriers for the United Kingdom, but I question whether it will be necessary to have quite as many Horizon 2000 anti-aircraft frigates or destroyers as was previously envisaged. The best air defence of the fleet is, of course, the aircraft carrier. I imagine that the naval staff will examine closely whether Horizon 2000 makes as much sense now as it used to do in the days when the Soviet naval air arm and the Soviet air forces posed a real threat to the NATO navies in the north Atlantic.

As for the Royal Air Force and the need for power projection and the ability to intervene—whether to preserve peace, to fight wars, or to extricate our nationals or friendly nationals—central to this capability must be an integral heavy lift capacity, particularly if it will be necessary to deploy armoured forces rapidly. We need a spectrum of capabilities to meet every contingency.

If we were unable to provide the heavy lift, we would be dependent on the United States, whose political objectives and priorities might conceivably be different in some instances, and we would be too dependent on civil carriers. The C17 has all the characteristics required for the role—the ability to operate forward, the ability to be both a freighter and a troop transport, and more significantly, a tanker for air-to-air refuelling.

I recognise that the Ministry will have difficult decisions to make about the nature of future air power. We have seen in the Gulf that air power is decisive not just to win wars, as was the case in the Gulf war, but to prevent war, by an early application of political pressure. Therefore, for the front line of the Royal Air Force to be cut at this time would be a step backwards. The Jaguars are extremely cost-effective until the Eurofighter comes into service. They are just undergoing an update at relatively low cost which will enable them to maintain an effective capability well into the next century.

A joint strike fighter will be needed. As the House knows, we have seen how the FRS2s of the Royal Navy and the GR7s of the Royal Air Force are working well together aboard Her Majesty's ships. If we had a joint strike fighter—essentially a common air frame—for both roles, it would be a sensible procurement. It could be beneficial for British industry not only because the Americans are buying it, but because a host of European allies are likely to buy it—perhaps the northern four, which have the F16, and possibly also the Italians, the Portuguese and other air forces.

Sir Geoffrey Johnson Smith (Wealden)

My hon. Friend knows a great deal about the Royal Air Force. Does he have in mind the American version of the joint strike fighter, in which British money has already been invested?

Mr. Wilkinson

That is indeed the aircraft which I have in mind. My right hon. Friend speaks wisely about the funding that the Ministry of Defence has already put in. British contractors could benefit considerably from the programme.

I offer two concluding thoughts, as I promised to be brief. The first is the importance of sustainability, for which reserve forces are crucial. The Government must not make the mistake of allowing the reserves to be cut further as a consequence of the review. The reverse should be the case.

If regular manpower must be drawn down, we must use reserve manpower much more. That makes sense if we are using our own resources as a community in the most cost-effective way. It makes sense if we no longer have to deploy so many people to Germany. With the legislation now in place, it is a great step forward that the various categories of reservists, not least the reserves who operate as contractors for companies already working for the Ministry of Defence, can be subject to military discipline. I hope that the Government will take advantage of it.

Finally, we should not forget the importance of the control of space for future military operations, both for reconnaissance and signals intelligence, and for ensuring the defence of these islands against potential ballistic missile attack. We will have to intensify our efforts to provide a ballistic missile defence system for this country and for our allies on the continent, and I hope that efforts in this direction will not be nullified as a consequence of the review.

11.40 am

Mr. Lindsay Hoyle (Chorley)

I congratulate the hon. Member for Mid-Norfolk (Mr. Simpson) on securing the debate. It is important that defence is discussed in the House. The debate has presented us with an ideal opportunity to discuss many of the issues about which we all have questions. I am pleased that my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State is with us.

I am worried slightly about the hon. Member for Mid-Norfolk, whose knowledge about defence matters is second to none in the House. The hon. Gentleman goes on about defence reviews and expresses views on virtues and values along with other points of view on all matters of defence. The problem is that the hon. Gentleman did that also for the previous Government.

We are having to have a strategic defence review because of that Government's mistakes, and that is the problem. Major mistakes were made and they must be rectified. It is no use pretending that the hon. Gentleman was not involved when those mistakes were made. Certain Members were involved then; we are all involved now for the future. That is why we all wish to ensure that the strategic defence review works, and ensures that we have the right forces with the right capability to take us through the next 30 years. That is what we are talking about.

We must get things right because we cannot afford to make any more mistakes. I think that we can all agree that mistakes were made previously and that they were Treasury led. This time, we want the review to be led by the defence team. Smart procurement by a smart defence team will leave us with a smart defence force that is capable of moving around the world to ensure that a peace capability is implemented. That is why we are all here and that is what we all wish to see.

The previous Government lost out. There was no confidence on the part of the forces or among the defence industries. That is why so many Conservative Members lost their seats at the general election. As I said, we must ensure that we get things right this time.

As for the Eurofighter, the House was rightly united on what we believe will be the right aircraft for the Royal Air Force. [Interruption.] That is right. The initial decision was taken by the Conservatives and then they fudged it. The final decision was left to the Labour Government. We had to show commitment and place the orders with British Aerospace.

We all watched the "Panorama" programme. It was tragic to see ex-Members, who were members of the previous Government, questioning whether the right decision had been made or whether money had been wasted. I thought that the programme was obscene and scandalous. It did not fairly reflect the merits of an aircraft that we believe will be right.

Dr. Julian Lewis (New Forest, East)

The hon. Gentleman says that many Conservative candidates lost their seats at the election because of mistakes made in defence. Only on a few issues did the polls show the Conservatives to be leading Labour in the run-up to the general election. Well, there was just one issue, and that was defence.

Mr. Hoyle

I remind the hon. Gentleman of my constituency, Chorley, and of South Ribble and the Portsmouth and Blackpool seats. How many more constituencies does the hon. Gentleman want to be reminded of? It is easy to have a memory of convenience, but let us have a memory of fact in future.

I shall move on to talk about aircraft carriers. I do not believe that it would be right to have 20,000-ton vessels. They should be of 40,000 tons plus, because such vessels will present us with greater options. The issue involves options and costs. I see the re-emergence of the Royal Navy and the corps—the Royal Marines and the Royal Navy together will be the spearhead of any defence capability. I want to see vessels that are capable of taking a fixed-wing, one-strike aircraft. What better aircraft would be available than the Eurofighter? Let us have a Fleet Air Arm version of the Eurofighter, and let us ensure that we get the right carrier for the future.

We are talking of a mass in the form of an aircraft carrier that sits, as it were, near trouble spots. The carrier can sit beyond the horizon. We are not talking about aircraft that fly out and must return to a land base; the carrier can sit near the trouble spot. There are despots around the world and we must ensure that we have the right capability.

As for Iraq, we have deployed one carrier. What better solution would there be than to have a larger carrier to ensure that we have the right back-up with aeroplanes of the right capability. Those who voted for the Government on the Iraq issue can feel that they played their part in securing the peace that may emerge. That outcome did not derive from talks alone. The threat of defence that backed up the talks ensured peace for the time being. We do not know how long that peace will last, but those Members who supported the Government will be able to hold up their heads with pride at the end of the day. That is important.

The strategic defence review will be all-embracing. I have already touched on aircraft carriers, the Navy's ships generally and the re-emergence of the Royal Navy. There has been talk of HMS Ocean, and I accept that it is the result of a decision made by the previous Government. I am pleased that I shall be seeing HMS Ocean when it is commissioned. I am pleased to be with the Royal Marines, who have a major part to play. They have been on an exercise in Norway that was bigger than those held in previous years. That proves that the Government are willing to invest in the right troops—the right people generally—to ensure that a strong capability will continue.

We must consider British defence needs and United Kingdom manufacture. The C 17 is a wonderful aircraft that is capable of specific actions where needed. However, it does not have a true capability, and that is the difficulty. A future large aircraft really can provide the options required by UK defence needs. The FLA is a variant aircraft—it can be a tanker and it can take and lift everything except the battle tank. We know, of course, that we need a mixed fleet of aircraft. I believe that the FLA can back up what is already in place.

I should like to see us investing in UK defence, thereby creating UK jobs and ensuring that UK technology, which will be delivered in the form of defence contracts, will be transferred to the civil sector. Defence is extremely important and we cannot introduce advanced technology into the civil sector unless we have a strong defence manufacturing base. I believe that we can retain that capability, and that is why British Aerospace is important, along with Royal Ordnance plc, Vickers and many other companies that can still build aircraft, arms and ships. Our shipbuilding capability was virtually lost when the previous Government were in office. I believe, however, that we can rebuild that capability.

We are present in the Chamber because we believe in strong defence. I did not think it fair to take potshots at the Government, who are ensuring that they can rectify the mistakes made by the previous Government. That is why I am proud to speak in this debate.

11.46 am

Mr. Alan Clark (Kensington and Chelsea)

In a safe at the Ministry of Defence there will probably be found a copy of the first defence review of the past decade, which I wrote. Without wishing to emulate my right hon. Friend the Member for Henley (Mr. Heseltine), who takes every opportunity to claim authorship for, and enthusiasm concerning, the millennium dome, I wish to tell the House that, were I to place a copy of my review in the Library—which I probably could do because I do not think it is classified, as I wrote it—it would be shown that all the conclusions set out in it have been validated by what has happened since.

Seven years ago, I based the review on three assumptions. The first was that the cold war was over and that our defence policy need no longer be, to use the expression of my hon. Friend the Member for Ruislip-Northwood (Mr. Wilkinson), Eurocentric. There is no longer any direct threat to the security of these islands and to the people who dwell therein. Secondly, the world remains a dangerous, deceitful and disagreeable environment in which nothing can be predicted with certainty. Thirdly, if the United Kingdom is to assert its influence and strength and reinforce its foreign policy, its strategy must be maritime.

There will be many hon. Members who are not present this morning, especially Labour Members, who will ask, "Why should the United Kingdom bother any longer? Its security is no longer threatened. We are a nation of only about 50 million people. We have perpetual constraints and bothers with our public spending. Surely this is a sector that we can abandon."

That would be an extremely dangerous decision, and one difficult to reverse. It would involve the final derogation of the United Kingdom from its role as a member of the United Nations Security Council. The UK would no longer be able to justify its seat in the G7 and on other international bodies that determine what will happen in an increasingly close and interdependent world. There would be certain circumstances—one cannot predict what they are—when United Kingdom citizens would be at the mercy of despots, just as we as a nation would be at the mercy of the super-powers in policy decisions. Our input into what is happening—so well illustrated by the way in which the Prime Minister and the present Government instantaneously reacted and deployed strength in the recent crisis—will no longer be feasible.

I fully accept that there are colossal budget restraints on the Department—my hon. Friend the Member for Mid-Norfolk (Mr. Simpson) illustrated these and reinforced them with excerpts from the rumour mill in Whitehall. If the Department is to have a serious shot at attaining the change in emphasis that is necessary for the United Kingdom to sustain its international position over the next 20 or 30 years into the millennium, there will have to be a drastic shift in resources in service allocations. We will have to revert to the pattern of 100 years ago, when the Army was little more than a colonial gendarmerie, and our security and instrument of foreign policy was the Royal Navy. There will be immense resistance to this in the Department, as the Minister has probably already experienced. For far too long, soldiers had too prominent a say in what happened and in the decisions that were taken by the Ministry of Defence. The need to deploy and maintain a large force of infantry and armour on the continent of Europe was a hangover from the second world war, and it continued into the cold war. That is no longer the case. We can reduce to a small, elite force.

We listen with interest to the rumours about the air cavalry and to those about subsuming the Parachute Regiment into this new force. I spoke earlier about soldiers and their prejudices, and their malign influence in certain sectors of the Ministry of Defence. We all know that, for the past 40 years, the Army establishment has been determined to get even with the Parachute Regiment, to cut it down to size and, preferably, out altogether if it can. Although the idea of an air cavalry is attractive, let us hope that it is not simply used as a device to get rid of the Parachute Regiment and to subsume it into the mass infantry career structure. We do not know, but we watch.

Soldiers have to be few in number, well trained, well equipped, mobile, but should not take anything like as large a proportion of the defence budget as they do at present.

We must move towards—several hon. Members mentioned this—the certainty that a fixed-wing carrier will be the central weapons system of our armed forces over the next 50 years. It must be; there is no other way to project force and carry out the operation—illustrated so effectively, but, fortunately, not carried to the extreme—that we have seen in recent weeks.

A fixed-wing carrier or two—three would be excessive—can be bought for a relatively small sum, if one compares it with the colossal sum that is allocated to Eurofighter. I always listen to the hon. Member for Chorley (Mr. Hoyle) with great attention, but we are not of totally the same mind on Eurofighter. If the sum devoted to Eurofighter were cut in half, it would buy a couple of respectable fixed-wing carriers.

Carriers do not come on their own. There are immense ancillary costs: software, electronic counter-measures, and the support vessels that have to defend the carrier. My hon. Friend the Member for Ruislip-Northwood said that a carrier's best defence is the carrier itself, but it is a vulnerable target. The Americans have found that, to support a carrier, one needs a considerable flotilla of ancillary vessels that carry missiles and have a counter-measure capability to ensure that it is not hit. If a carrier is lost—the House will recall that that was a primary apprehension during the Falklands conflict—the expedition is cut off at the knees.

There is one other factor of which the House should be aware when considering the strategic defence review: defence policy should be considered only as part of a geostrategic review, which has to have input from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office when considering our foreign policy. It should not be Foreign and Commonwealth Office led, but that Department must have input. The Ministry of Defence is the largest client of the manufacturing industry in this country. We must be clear about the industrial implications, not just in isolation but as they interact with the geostrategic considerations; the extent to which we shall be dependent on other suppliers, particularly foreign suppliers, or the United States; the extent to which we can take the risk of making things on our own; and the extent to which we can reassert our industrial independence, which we have neglected. All those things have to feed into a proper and round consideration of what the review should include. Only then can one start to calculate minimum force levels.

With the greatest respect to the Secretary of State, who, unfortunately, is not able to attend this interesting debate, there is scope for a commission, which the Prime Minister must chair, because only a Prime Minister can overrule the predatory, insatiable demands of the Treasury, as they will be arrayed. The Prime Minister has, as we have seen, acquired a taste for strutting the international stage and posturing as an international statesman and arbiter of the way in which our affairs are ordered—

The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Defence (Mr. John Spellar)

Look what he has just done.

Mr. Clark

Indeed; I have already applauded him, but perhaps that was before the Under-Secretary came into the Chamber. Unless the Prime Minister exercises his authority over the decisions and the counter-pressures that the Treasury will apply to our defence policy, the time will come—perhaps sooner than is comfortable for him—when he no longer has the muscle when he needs it to back up the posture that he is adopting.

11.57 am

Mr. Mike Hancock (Portsmouth, South)

I congratulate the hon. Member for Mid-Norfolk (Mr. Simpson) on being successful in securing the debate and on his speech this morning, but he was a little idle in his research. He failed to mention the miserable existence that service personnel and civilian employees have endured over the past 18 years, facing the consequences of successive Tory defence reviews that were misplaced, mishandled and disappointing, and dispiriting to the personnel involved. I represented my constituency in the 1980s, so I know from first-hand experience how demoralising were the successive reviews, which were never transparent in their conception and were pretty damning in their delivery. However, he gives us an opportunity—the importance of which is shown by the number of hon. Members who are present—to address once again the difficult questions of defence and the strategic review.

Mr. Gerald Howarth (Aldershot)

The hon. Gentleman attacks the Conservative Government, despite our belief in strong defence, but is it not true that the Liberal Democrats were in favour of cutting defence by a third just before the deployment of our forces in the Gulf, so he is not really in a strong position to criticise the Conservative party?

Mr. Hancock

The hon. Gentleman makes his point, but those who were around at the time will consider the historical facts and discover that what the hon. Gentleman is saying is not only misplaced but downright mischievous because it is inaccurate.

I share hon. Members' concern that we have failed miserably to put before the House or, for that matter, the wider community, the rationale behind the foreign policy initiatives on which this defence review is based. It cannot be right for that to persist even now. Like other hon. Members, I had hoped for some appreciation in the House of the priorities. I am disappointed that that has not happened.

As considerable numbers of my constituents are serving in the Gulf, it would be wrong not to appreciate and applaud their work, and to ask the Minister to pass on good wishes and hopes for a speedy return to all the crews and personnel, men and women, serving in our fleet and on land in the Gulf. It would also be wrong to miss this opportunity to say that many families of the crew of the Invincible would be interested to know when she will return to the United Kingdom. I hope that there will be good news on the near horizon for them. I also thank my local newspaper The News for its work in pushing the story of the efforts of those people and keeping the crews and personnel down there informed of the good wishes of the people back here.

The Iraqi crisis has shown us two things. First, it has shown us that the United Nations still has a vital role to play. As a nation which took such an active part in the recent Iraqi crisis, we must use the strength that we now have to insist that the UN strengthens its position on such topics. Secondly, it raises the question of joint European defence. During the past few weeks, we have seen how difficult it is to get our European partners to agree on something as important as Iraq. We should seriously question on what they would agree.

Some of us were present at a recent North Atlantic Assembly briefing in Brussels when it was interesting to see the frustration on the faces of our American colleagues when all sorts of allegations were made about why they were in Iraq. More worrying, from a European point of view, was their riposte that they should not be pushed too hard or they would sort out the Bosnia situation by seriously considering whether Congress and the Senate wanted American forces to remain there. That was an ill-tempered threat, but it was directed at those European partners who were less than enthusiastic about why we were even considering taking action against Iraq. Once again, we missed the opportunity as a nation to use our leadership in Europe to bring our European colleagues on board. We set an example, but we were unable to lead our European colleagues to back us more enthusiastically. That is a disappointment that many share.

Like other hon. Members, I had hoped that we would have got to the bottom of where foreign policy issues were taking the defence review. Many of us who would be accused of being cynical would say that, because the Foreign Office initiatives have not been published, they have moved up the road from the Foreign Office to the Treasury. Before they come here, the Chancellor and his colleagues are running their beady eyes over them. As a result, the House is being denied the opportunity properly to evaluate the defence review in its true light.

We have been told time and again that the review would be an exercise in transparency which would involve people. Hon. Members have had the opportunity to be involved and I am sure that the Minister will tell us how many members of the public have joined in enthusiastically in one form or another, but the Government have failed to be straight and honest about what was driving it. Was it the Treasury's insistence on substantial cuts or a genuine attempt to allow foreign policy, for the first time, to be open enough to drive a defence review that would realistically address the defence ambitions of the British Government and the British people?

I support the views that have been expressed about the fixed-deck carriers. The country cannot afford three, but we shall need two. HMS Ocean is a major addition to Britain's fighting capabilities. However, I also agree with the points made by the hon. Member for Chorley (Mr. Hoyle) about the role of the Royal Navy and a strengthened Royal Marine corps, and their strategic responsibility in defending the foreign policy issues that Britain holds dear.

If we lose this opportunity, we shall fail miserably. People will not forgive the Government for denying them the real opportunity to bring together our defence and foreign policy objectives. It is unfair and unforgivable to insist that men and women in our armed forces should take on more and more tasks without the proper resources. It would be unforgivable if the Government were to repeat the awful mistakes that many experienced during the 1980s and the early part of this decade.

12.5 pm

Mr. Robert Key (Salisbury)

I congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Mid-Norfolk (Mr. Simpson) on his tenacity in securing the debate. He is right to have persisted since before Christmas. The Ministry of Defence currently has other things on its mind, but Ministers have repeatedly made it clear to the House that, with regard to the strategic defence review, the show must go on.

I thank my hon. Friends for their contributions. My hon. Friend the Member for Ruislip-Northwood (Mr. Wilkinson) shared with us his deep knowledge and my right hon. Friend the Member for Kensington and Chelsea (Mr. Clark) showed us his particular insight and his important vision of the way forward. It is always a pleasure to listen to the hon. Member for Chorley (Mr. Hoyle)—whose heart is in the right place, even if he does have a tendency to rewrite history—and the hon. Member for Portsmouth, South (Mr. Hancock), with his particular responsibilities as a Member of Parliament representing Portsmouth.

Recent events in the middle east have given the Royal Navy a providential opportunity to demonstrate its strength in force projection. Not since the first world war has chemical and biological defence assumed such importance for British forces. All three services have reacted swiftly and efficiently at a time of international crisis, and we congratulate and thank them.

What lessons have the Government learnt, what conclusions will they draw and how will they inform the strategic defence review?

Defence is rarely the subject of political knockabout. It rarely attracts large numbers of hon. Members to Question Time and debates. However, today it is important to note that the Secretary of State has been here for part of the debate, the Minister for the Armed Forces is here and the Under-Secretary was here. No doubt, the Minister for Defence Procurement is watching on his television in another place.

I emphasise that Her Majesty's forces know that a comparatively small number of Members of both Houses have a deep knowledge of, and commitment to, Britain's defence, and that they can be relied upon to be persistent and tenacious in pursuing military matters. They also know that, at times of tension, both Houses of Parliament can be relied upon to swing behind them with generous cross-party support. Most service men and women would wish that defence was not a party political issue. Defence should stand astride the common ground between the parties.

After 18 years in opposition, Labour's understanding of defence issues was incomplete. It reformed its party's defence stance and the Labour Government's policy is now on trial. They pledged that they would have a defence review, but they did not know what to expect, and that is clear 10 months on. Labour chose the big bang approach, rejecting our philosophy of continuous review with occasional necessary reforms. They have not said, and we do not know—I doubt whether they know either—whether they will revert to the continuous review process or adopt the Australian and American pattern of a review every three or four years.

We were told that the SDR would be over in six months and that the uncertainty in the armed forces and the defence procurement industry would be worth putting up with. Apart from the Secretary of State, no one believes that the review is now foreign policy led. Clear as he was about the downward ratchet in defence spending—I hope that he took note of the wise words of the Chairman of the Defence Select Committee in last week's debate on Iraq—the Secretary of State has been consistently unclear about the nature of Foreign Office and Treasury involvement.

My hon. Friend the Member for Mid-Norfolk has already drawn attention to the lack of a clear statement on foreign policy baselines, as has the hon. Member for Portsmouth, South. The Secretary of State continues to expect us to believe that his speech at the Royal United Services Institute on 18 September last said it all. It said virtually nothing new—I read it again this morning. It will not do for him to pretend that we know about those baselines. They remain secret and out of date.

Both the early consultations and the establishment of the foreign policy baselines last August have receded so far into the past, and world events have moved forward so quickly, that serious doubt must be cast on the validity of both. We have also had a long period of silence from the Secretary of State. According to the Ministry of Defence, since he was appointed last year, he has made just four speeches on defence policy, only one of which was on the strategic defence review. He made two speeches on NATO and one on defence diplomacy, a concept originally introduced by the Conservative Government in their 1981 defence review White Paper. Will there be no more speeches from the Secretary of State until the SDR is safely out of the way?

Ministers now appear like rabbits caught in the Treasury's headlights. The military input will be complete by the end of March as promised. Defence Ministers will no doubt reach conclusions by the end of April. Then all that work will disappear into the black hole of the Treasury and the Cabinet Office. The comprehensive expenditure review will take time to resolve. We might be lucky and have a statement on the SDR by June, or it might slip to the last week of July—perhaps to the last day that Parliament sits before the recess. All that will give the Treasury an opportunity to push the whole exercise into the next public spending round, implying no real movement on the SDR until April 1999. Two years after the Government's election pledge, with the world a different place, the Government will hope that the Opposition will support the results of the review.

Defence Ministers should be aware that they are putting at risk cross-party support by their failure to listen and to answer the concerns expressed not just by Opposition Members but by Labour Members. I absolve the Minister for the Armed Forces from that accusation. We recognise that he is a tireless worker for the armed forces and that he can be relied on, with his grasp of detail and his patience and courtesy, which are much appreciated. However, I wish that he would have a word with the Secretary of State and the Under-Secretary because routinely in debates, questions have been asked and points raised, which are apparently not heard and certainly not answered. Even in last week's debate on Iraq, my right hon. Friend the Member for North-West Hampshire (Sir G. Young) made some good points and asked some straightforward questions but received no answers.

I mentioned the new significance of chemical and biological defence. The proliferation of chemical and biological weapons is a major threat to the peace and security of the global community. The previous Government recognised that and invested in substantial facilities to combat the threat. The time has come for further appraisal of active and passive defence against chemical and biological attack, both military and civilian.

It is our choice to stand by the United States. We must be as good as the United States. The 1999 US defence budget will add $1 billion to counter chemical and biological threats. How much new investment will the strategic defence review suggest for us? How much will the Treasury then allow us?

Similarly, we cannot afford to be left behind, following the revolution in military affairs that now informs so much defence planning. Since last May, the world has become less stable and more dangerous. British military forces are under increasing pressure and peace in Northern Ireland is more fragile. Abroad, Bosnia remains the top priority for Britain's and NATO's long-term commitment. In Bosnia, we must consider the need for a smaller but more permanent and established presence, and we need to overcome the current lack of a corporate memory. Escalating ethnic tensions in Kosovo could provide the next flashpoint in the Balkans.

Will the SDR require cuts in our contribution to NATO, material and financial? The "Partnership for Peace" process absorbs substantial resources, mostly to good effect, but there is little Mediterranean dialogue. NATO's troubled southern flank poses threats to Europe's political, economic and military stability. Further afield, we cannot ignore the potential for trouble over the Spratly Islands in the South China sea, nor events involving our dependencies in Commonwealth countries. More immediately, tensions in the middle east will require our constant vigilance and continuing military presence. Our military relationship with Turkey should have a higher priority.

Back home, the Green Papers on the Defence Diversification Agency and the future of the Defence Evaluation and Research Agency are now three months late. Unclear of their priorities and befuddled by their vision of Europe, the Government want to maintain their special relationship with the USA while demanding that our defence industry merges our efficient world-class companies with some of the nationalised, subsidised, dinosaur industries elsewhere in Europe—answers by 31 March please, on one side of a postcard.

Above all, the performance of our forces depends on our people and their training, equipment and morale. If we are to recruit and retain good people, we must spend what it takes to achieve that. If we want their families to follow the flag, we must not skimp on housing, education, medical services and the quality of their lives.

Last July in Coventry, I attended a consultation seminar on the strategic defence review. The Secretary of State said that there should be no expectation of an increase in defence expenditure. He asked me whether I thought that there was a case for an increase and I am glad that I said yes. I say it again today. If we are to relate this nation's defence policy to the real world rather than to some diplomatic utopia, this is no time to contemplate further cuts. We should not rule out the case for increased defence spending, review or no review.

12.16 pm

The Minister for the Armed Forces (Dr. John Reid)

So many questions have been asked and there is so little time to answer.

I doubly congratulate the hon. Member for Mid-Norfolk (Mr. Simpson): first, on obtaining this debate and on the wisdom that he brings to it; and, secondly, on having discovered a new smelting process for brass necks, which produces those of a quality, strength and thickness that have never previously been invented. He combined that with modesty: in his own modest way he failed to declare an interest, in all humility, as an architect of the Conservative Government's policy of the past 10 years.

Had the hon. Gentleman declared an interest as a special adviser to a previous Secretary of State for Defence, he would have had more difficulty convincing us that we must not cut defence spending, when he advised cutting defence expenditure by 30 per cent.; that we must not reduce personnel numbers, when he advised reducing them by 32 per cent.; or that we must produce a mission statement within six months, when he failed to do so in 18 years. I understand the hon. Gentleman's modesty. In a consensual fashion, I had not intended even to refer to the Conservative Government's record, but I thought that we should place in context some of the remarks that have been made.

Let me say from the outset that our commitment in opposition to conducting a strategic defence review, rather than a cost-driven exercise, was central to our determination to provide Britain with strong, capable and modern armed forces. That was our analysis of the need then, and it remains our goal now. Events have proved how right we were to make that decision, for three reasons. First, a policy-led review is the only way comprehensively to assess how our forces should be structured, equipped, trained and deployed to meet the challenges of the 21st century. Only that approach has the potential to afford the armed forces and the Government the coherence and clarity of purpose that they deserve.

Secondly, inherited shortfalls have led to inadequacies, some of which were identified during the strategic defence review. We were unable fully to appreciate them: as the hon. Member for Mid-Norfolk correctly pointed out, the information was not at our disposal until we came into power.

Headline issues arising from the strategic defence review bear repetition. I allocate no blame, but we must face up to the fact that we cannot transport forces quickly enough or provide the necessary logistic support once they have deployed. Our medical services are thoroughly inadequate. Some parts of the forces cannot communicate effectively with other parts. We face a vicious circle of undermanning and overstretch, which feed on, and exacerbate, each other.

I am not being party political, but we have to admit that there are real problems before we can begin to solve them. It is the easiest thing in the world for politicians at the Dispatch Box to use rhetoric that gets more robust the weaker their arguments become, rather like the Jesuit who comes to the part of his sermon about which he has doubts and writes in the margin, "Shout louder." Surely the days are gone when the services are burdened with increasing inadequacies so that political leaders do not have to find the moral courage to face up to the hard choices. Those problems must be tackled to ensure that our armed forces can be deployed rapidly, flexibly and effectively.

Thirdly, undertaking the strategic defence review was the right decision. We owe it to the brave men and women who risk their lives on our behalf day in, day out—not only when they are in the headlines—to ensure that we have a coherent vision of the future use and structure of our armed forces. Paying further tribute to the men and women of our armed forces is timely. Last night, Kofi Annan, the United Nations Secretary-General, congratulated the Prime Minister on being "the perfect UN peacekeeper". That was not only a justification of the Prime Minister and of the House, and of our commitment to the UN; the accolade was also for the men and women who serve in our armed forces. I cannot convey how proud I am to be associated with them and their efforts day in, day out. It is the Government's duty to give them a coherent vision of the future that recognises their vital contribution. We owe it to them to ensure, through regular scrutiny, that the means at their disposal match their commitment to the tasks set for them by the Government. Only a truly strategic defence review will allow us to address those issues.

I shall quickly cover the main points arising from the debate. First, despite the banter that goes on in the House, our approach has, from the start, been to try to achieve consensus. To use an old cliché, I believe that Britain works best when we work together. Defence is too important to be a political football. I agree with the hon. Member for Salisbury (Mr. Key) that, where possible, national security should be above party politics, which does not mean that there will not be any criticism and that the Opposition should not oppose. Our desire to achieve such a framework arises as much from the acknowledgement of our past mistakes as from our commitment to try to avoid them in future.

Whatever the criticisms, there has been unprecedented consultation during the review. Hon. Members have been involved, and more invitations are going out to members of all parties; seminars have been held; we have involved journalists, academic institutions and ex-military people as well as the Foreign Office and the Ministry of Defence; and industry and trade unions have also played a part. We have spent a great deal of time on the review: the message that comes back from the forces is that it is better to get it right than to rush it.

We have been particularly keen to listen to the troops. For the first time, a strategic defence review liaison team was established. The team has met thousands of service men and women outside the chain of command. As requested, it responded robustly and frankly, and told us exactly what has been said. There is good will among the troops and morale is high, but there is concern that our review may be the same as those undertaken by the previous Government, which were perceived to be Treasury led.

The hon. Gentleman would have given a fuller picture if he had said that concerns arise not because people are suspicious of what we are doing, but because of their experience under the previous Government. Therefore, we are making every attempt to show that the review is foreign policy led: it is based on a fundamental reassessment of our essential security policy and defence needs and was conducted in its early stages jointly by the Ministry of Defence and the Foreign Office.

We have outlined the conclusions that are emerging, but there is dispute over the extent to which the work should have been done earlier. First, our armed forces have inescapable national commitments. Military aid must be provided to the civil power in Northern Ireland: we hope for a lasting political settlement in the Province, but will not count our chickens before they have hatched. We are responsible for the internal and external security of our dependent territories.

In Europe, we must ensure European and British security by making a commensurate contribution to the maintenance of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, which was a manifesto pledge. The collapse of the Soviet Union has radically reduced the threat of all-out war in Europe, but it has given rise to a plethora of risks—nationalism, border disputes and ethnic tensions—that were suppressed by communism. We have wider global interests, but they do not extend equally and we are most likely to be involved in such problems in Europe, the Gulf and the Mediterranean, where our economic and security interests are most closely engaged.

Other global threats form part of our policy baseline. Recent events in the Gulf have brought home to us the risks from nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. Just as the citizen has rights and responsibilities, this country, as a national citizen in the global community, has rights. Our armed forces will defend them, our territories and interests, abroad and at home. We have responsibilities commensurate with our position at the United Nations and in NATO, and as a leading country in Europe, and we shall discharge them.

Mr. Keith Simpson

Will the Minister give way?

Dr. Reid

No. I have only 14 minutes in which to respond to the debate.

Additionally, we have embarked on a defence diplomacy initiative, which means using the military assets necessary for the defence of our country in such a way as to lessen the likelihood of their being deployed in anger in war. My right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Defence co-operated on that sensible, relevant and modern policy framework with the Foreign Office. As is the case in every Department, the Treasury has been consulted. That is the normal business of government—but it does not mean that this review, like the rest, has been led by the Treasury, or by any arbitrary dictates of the Treasury. The starting point has been foreign policy.

Of course resources matter. We live in the real world. I have tried to deal with the main points in the limited time available, but let me make one final point. The cliché that people are our most precious resource is no less true because it is often uttered. People are at the centre of our strategic defence review. We are looking at a range of policies—not only because that is morally good, but because the third element of fighting power, morale, is the most underestimated. All the equipment and all the doctrine in the world mean nothing if we do not ensure that our people are properly protected and resourced. We are proud of what we have done in the Gulf, and will justify that—

Mr. Deputy Speaker (Mr. Michael J. Martin)

Order. We must move to the next debate.