HC Deb 25 February 1998 vol 307 cc341-8 1.30 pm
Dr. Julian Lewis (New Forest, East)

I am grateful for the opportunity to discuss this subject in the House. I am especially grateful to see the Home Secretary preparing to answer personally on this topic, which is increasingly close to his heart. I have written to the Labour Members in this House and to those in another place whom I propose to mention if time allows, and I am gratified to see that that is one way in which to ensure that the House is not too poorly attended for my oration.

I suggest that we take a trip back in our imaginations to 1945. Let us imagine that the outcome of the 1945 general election had been different and that, as widely expected, the Conservatives had won. Let us imagine that, shortly after that victory, one of their fairly senior figures—a Minister with perhaps not the most spotless reputation—had announced that he was determined that the Security Service, MI5, should destroy all the files on fellow-travellers with Oswald Mosley and the British Union of Fascists. There would have been an outcry—and rightly so—because it is not right for future historians to be denied the opportunity to see what the records say about what people in public life did before—and, I would contend, after—the war, in collusion with or in support of totalitarian, fascist or communist regimes.

How does that relate to today's debate? The answer is, quite simply, that on 22 September 1997, The Guardian published a story about the Minister without Portfolio, headed: Mandelson wants MI5 files pulped". The article began: Peter Mandelson, Minister without Portfolio, yesterday called on MI5 to destroy all files on 'subversives' created during the cold war after receiving an apology from the head of the Security Service over the leaking of details from his own file. It continued with Mr. Mandelson saying: 'I was not a subversive or a threat to national security—I was a teenager holding ordinary leftwing views'. He said MI5 should find the resources to 'weed out and destroy' such files, collected during the cold war, 'which are now entirely redundant'. I was interested in his explanation of his period in the Young Communist League, because it had already been challenged in The Daily Telegraph of 27 August 1997. That article said: Mr. Mandelson conceded that, 'disgusted' with the Labour Government's support for the Vietnam war, he had briefly been a member of the Young Communist League in the early 1970s. 'It is true that, for a very short period between three and six months, I was a member of the Young Communist League.' But former political associates of Mr. Mandelson who knew him at the time said he and some friends had actually set up a branch of the Young Communist League after falling out with the Young Socialists. They also poured scorn on his reason for leaving the Labour Party, pointing out that Harold Wilson's support for the Vietnam war had come in the 1960s and that, by the early 1970s, the party was no longer in power. I first raised this matter at the tail end of a speech in the defence debate on 28 October, when I pointed out that it smacked of George Orwell's "Nineteen Eighty-Four" in that the past was being airbrushed. It will be remembered that Orwell's Big Brother state used the slogan: Who controls the past controls the future: who controls the present controls the past. I began once again to think that power had gone to Labour Ministers' heads. I therefore wrote to Stephen Lander, Director General of the Security Service, on 16 October—shortly before the defence debate—saying: I intend to raise this matter in the House of Commons as soon as Parliament returns later this month. So far as I can see, there is no question of inaccuracy in any of the information that was held on Mr. Mandelson's political activities as a member of the Young Communist League in the early 1970s. It is therefore quite deplorable and unacceptable that he should have made his reported demands. I should be much obliged if you will take the trouble to reassure me that there is no intention on the part of your service to destroy files containing accurate information about Communists and their allies who were active in this country at the height of the Cold War—particularly at the behest of one of these formerly misguided individuals. The Home Secretary replied on behalf of Mr. Lander in a letter dated 28 October—the same date as the defence debate, but received afterwards. He wrote: The policy of the Security Service is to retain only those records which it needs to carry out its statutory functions, or which are of historical importance. Files held by the Service are therefore reviewed against those criteria periodically as resources permit. There is no question of consigning whole categories of files for destruction without proper review.

Mr. Alan Clark (Kensington and Chelsea)

The key question is the judgment of what is "of historical importance". The problem is that, almost invariably, that judgment is made by civil servants—although, laughably, Ministers may occasionally try to get something taken out to protect their political reputation. For a historian, the really obstructive thing is when civil servants, to defend their reputation as administrators or having made colossal errors of judgment, weed out or repress things that will reflect badly on them.

Dr. Lewis

My right hon. Friend is an extremely distinguished historian; I am a far less distinguished former military historian and it is precisely from the historian's point of view that I am approaching this matter.

The Home Secretary's letter to me finished: On the other hand, given the need to ensure that files are not retained unnecessarily the Service will not retain files which do not seem to merit retention on any of the grounds I have mentioned. On 30 October 1997, 20 Members of Parliament tabled early-day motion 377, which notes the recent admission by the Minister without Portfolio, that he was active in the Young Communist League when MI5 opened a file on him in the early 1970s; regards as unacceptable his excuse that this amounted to the holding of ordinary left-wing views; deplores his reported demand that MI5 files on Cold War subversives should be destroyed; and urges the Director-General of the Security Service to resist partisan and self-serving political pressure from the Minister without Portfolio.

Mr. Dennis Skinner (Bolsover)

As the hon. Gentleman is one of the Opposition's conspiracy theorists, would it not be a good idea to tell us the full story? He is well versed in this matter. He was a spy in Newham Labour party; he was a fellow-traveller; he infiltrated deliberately to try to expose people in the Labour party; and then the Labour Member of Parliament, Reginald Prentice, crossed the Floor of the House and joined the Tory party. To be honest, the hon. Gentleman should tell us the full unvarnished truth about his own activities.

Dr. Lewis

The hon. Gentleman makes my point for me. If I have my way, my MI5 file—if one exists—will be there so that people can see whether or not what he says is true. That is the irony. Twenty years after my engaging in controversial political activities, my political opponents see fit to bring them up, but, less than that time after controversial political activities in which they engaged, they want to airbrush the record and destroy the evidence of what they did. I thank the hon. Gentleman for supporting my case.

I wrote on 4 November to the Home Secretary to say: I quite agree with the criteria set out in your letter. It is certainly of historical interest for future historians to know the extent to which people in British public life co-operated with, or espoused the cause of totalitarian, fascist or communist ideologies before or after the Second World War. I asked the Home Secretary to be more specific about the assurances he was giving me and, on 8 December, he replied. He said: Files which are destroyed are those which are either no longer required by the Service to carry out its statutory functions or are judged not to be of historical importance or both. There can therefore be no danger of the indiscriminate destruction of files by the Security Service. As an innocent and virginal Back Bencher, I was taken in by this. On 10 December, I wrote to the Home Secretary and said: I am grateful for your further letter about the danger of Cold War files being indiscriminately destroyed. I regard your response to my concern as being entirely satisfactory and I thank you for writing back in such a straightforward way. As far as I was concerned, that was the end of the matter—poor fool that I am.

On 11 January, the front page of The Sunday Times said: MI5 orders end to spying on political activists. The report said: The security service MI5 is to announce an end to spying on activists, radicals and insurgents. In a decisive break with its cold war past, it will destroy tens of thousands of files naming anti-nuclear campaigners, trade unionists and others whose organisations were once considered a threat to national security. The Guardian, on 12 January, said: MI5 is speeding up the destruction of thousands of files on individuals it once considered subversive as part of an attempt to modernise". Evidently, it is now the people's Security Service.

On 15 January, I tabled 12 written questions to ask about the criteria that would be adopted in retaining or disposing of files. Some of the questions were technical and some even went back to criteria used in 1945. I was extremely impressed by the fact that, within five days, I had my answers—although not quite all of my questions were answered. Ten were answered within five days, but a week went by and then another week, and I still received no answers to my remaining two questions.

In the short amount of time I have available—I wish to allow the hon. Member for Lewes (Mr. Baker) to intervene—I shall refer to the two questions. I fear that I shall disappoint Labour Members whom I warned I might be naming, as I will not have time to do so. [HON. MEMBERS: "Shame!"] I will be happy to do so after the debate. The two missing questions were these—one would not have thought that it would take three weeks to answer them. The first was: To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department how many representations he has received in favour of the destruction of Security Service files from (a) Labour hon. Members, (b) Labour peers, (c) Ministers, (d) trade union officers and (e) journalists. The second question was even easier. To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department, what representations he has received from the Minister without Portfolio for his MI5 file to be destroyed; and if it is to be destroyed. One would have thought that these were easy questions to answer. However, it took almost three weeks before the Home Secretary came up with a reply—after I had telephoned his office to remind him I was still waiting. He said: If I receive any representations from individuals about the possible existence of Security Service files, my practice is to explain the approach of the Security Service to destroying files. It is not my practice to give information about any representations from hon. Members or Ministers or from the other sources listed any more than it would be for me to disclose whether the Service holds or has held files on any individuals."—[Official Report, 3 February 1998; Vol. 305, c. 589.] I would have thought that, if that were the Home Secretary's position, he could have told me so straight away.

I conclude with three questions. Does the Home Secretary accept that it is of legitimate interest to future historians to know which public figures in politics, trade unionism, business or the media consorted with fascists or communists before or after the second world war? Does he accept that it is important that, if files were improperly held, they should be kept so that the Security Service can be called to account in the future? Above all, does he accept that it is especially important for a Labour Government not to preside over the destruction of files that are likely to show some of their Ministers, hon. Members or supporters in a discreditable light?

1.43 pm
Mr. Norman Baker (Lewes)

I shall be brief, and I am grateful to the hon. Member for New Forest, East (Dr. Lewis) and to the Home Secretary for allowing me to intervene. This is a serious matter which I approach from a freedom of information point of view. MI5 is important and necessary, but I would suggest to the Home Secretary that a number of steps could be taken, in line with the Government's commitment to freedom of information, which would enable the matter to be progressed in a manner consistent with Government policy.

First, we do not know whether there is a file on the Home Secretary himself—an allegation that has been made. In a written answer on 4 December, he said: I have not asked to see, nor have I seen, any file which the Security Service may hold on me."—[Official Report, 4 December 1997; Vol. 302, c. 297.] In response to a later question, he indicated that there were circumstances in which MI5 was permitted to determine that files were not suitable for ministerial eyes—although the Home Secretary is responsible for MI5. There is a democratic deficit there. It is up to Parliament to ensure that procedures are put in place to ensure that MI5 is properly accountable.

There are a number of points that the Home Secretary could usefully pursue which will not endanger national security in any way, but which are consistent with the Government's approach to freedom of information. First, why are non-security matters dealt with by MI5 not subject to the Data Protection Act 1988—particularly matters in support of the police? Why is MI5 excluded from freedom of information legislation, when the test of substantial harm could be applied to its activities in the same way as it is applied to anything else? That may well mean that most of what is dealt with by MI5 does not come out, but some might—instead, we have a proposed blanket exemption. Why are the budgets for MI5, MI6 and GCHQ—the Government communications headquarters—shown not separately, but as one figure in the vote?

Why is the number of individuals on whom files are held not published? The Home Secretary has said that he is looking at that matter, and that no security problem is involved in publishing the number of files held on individuals. Why are telephone tap warrants not given out one per line, so we have an understanding of the number of telephone lines being tapped? At the moment, one warrant can cover an organisation such as the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, which may involve hundreds of people.

What steps have been taken to improve parliamentary scrutiny of MI5 and the security services? At the moment, insufficient information comes to Members of Parliament, and it is in the interests of the Government and the country that MI5 should be accountable and should be seen to be accountable. That will give more confidence in the Security Service than at present exists.

1.47 pm
The Secretary of State for the Home Department (Mr. Jack Straw)

The debate presents the House with a useful opportunity to discuss aspects of the accountability of the Security Service, and of myself as Home Secretary for that service.

Security Service investigations usually involve the painstaking collection of information about suspects—whether individuals or organisations—whom the service has reason to believe might present a threat to national security. The information must be recorded carefully and systematically if it is to be of any use in investigations. Consequently, the management of records is bound to be a natural consequence of the service's work.

Since 1989, the Security Service has operated under powers granted by Parliament contained in the Security Service Act. The service's practice of collecting information about people is not one that Parliament has treated lightly. The director general is under a statutory obligation to ensure that the service collects only information that it needs for the purposes laid down in the Security Service Acts of 1989 and 1996—to protect national security; to safeguard the economic well-being of the UK against threats posed from abroad; and, since 1996, to act in support of the law enforcement agencies in the prevention and detection of serious crime.

The hon. Member for Lewes (Mr. Baker) refers to our commitment to freedom of information and to our commitment to greater openness. I am grateful to him for doing so, because we are indeed committed to that. That is reflected in the publication of the freedom of information White Paper, and will be reflected in the publication of the freedom of information Bill.

The hon. Member for Lewes asked me why the freedom of information Act will exclude the operation of the intelligence agencies. We all recognise, as have successive Administrations, that it is not possible to be open about everything. If we removed the ability of the Security Service to operate in secrecy, we would fatally undermine its capacity to defeat terrorists and spies, who themselves exploit the cover of secrecy. However, as I have told the hon. Gentleman, I believe that we should be prepared to be open about the things that we can reveal without harming the service's capabilities. The service shares that view, and in recent years a great deal of information that would previously have been kept secret has been revealed.

Early on, the hon. Member for Lewes asked me what was the oldest file still kept secret in the Home Office relating to the activities of the Security Service or its predecessors. It turned out that it was a file that dated from 1874. I had that file seriously examined and I agreed that it should be placed in the Public Record Office, following representations. I am grateful to him for that.

However, interestingly, I agreed that, as the file related to the Irish Secret Service, pre-dating the current Security Service, the names of the informants, which were on the file, should be kept secret. Although it is now well over 120 years since the events to which the file relates, given the folk memory in Northern Ireland, if those files were made available, some living individuals could be placed at risk. I am grateful to the hon. Member for Lewes for recognising that.

I believe, as does the service, that the idea of making more information available is right, and I commend the previous Prime Minister and my predecessors as Home Secretary for doing so following the 1989 Act. I am examining, therefore, whether and to what extent it is possible to give details of the number and categories of files held by the Security Service. That answers another question raised by the hon. Member for Lewes. I hope to be able to make an announcement on that subject before the summer recess.

I shall make some general points about the Security Service's file holdings as a whole—

Sir Raymond Whitney (Wycombe)

Answer the question.

Mr. Straw

I am answering the question directly. The way in which the service manages its files is described in some detail in the Security Service commissioner's annual report for 1991. The commissioner observed that the procedure for opening a file was strictly controlled. Once a file is open, it is subject to a regime known as "traffic lighting". The reason for that description becomes apparent when I explain that all permanent files are initially given a "green" coding. While a file keeps its green coding, inquiries may be made about the subject of the file.

At the end of the green period, the coding changes to "amber". During the amber period, inquiries about the subject are prohibited, but any relevant information that the service receives about the subject may be added to the file. At the end of the designated amber period, the file is coded "red". During that period, the service may neither carry out inquiries into the subject nor add substantive information to the file.

Finally, after a period of red coding, the file is microfilmed, the hard copy is destroyed and the entry for the file in the service's central index is transferred from the live index to the research index. Access to the research index is limited, and I understand that it is seldom consulted. For example, it is not consulted in vetting checks.

It will be apparent from what I have said that only a proportion of the service's files are current, in the sense that inquiries may be made about the subject of the files. A substantial proportion of the files are closed. Inevitably, over the years, especially during the long, 40-year period of the cold war, many files were opened and, later, closed. It is worth repeating that no inquiries may be made on the service's closed files unless new intelligence justifies reopening the relevant files within the criteria that I described earlier.

I shall say a few words about one target of the Security Service investigations, which featured in some of the closed files and which was mentioned by the hon. Member for New Forest, East (Dr. Lewis)—those involved in subversion. One of the Security Service's statutory functions is to protect national security from actions intended to overthrow or undermine democracy by political, industrial or violent means. That is what we mean by subversion today, and it is what we have always meant by it.

It happens that our parliamentary democracy is not currently threatened by the activities of subversive groups, but that was not always the case, and it was especially not the case during the cold war. It was concern about subversive activities which led the then Prime Minister, Clement Attlee, to announce the introduction of new vetting processes, designed to deny members of those groups access to sensitive information. That policy was endorsed by all subsequent Governments, and was most recently set out by the then Prime Minister, in a statement in December 1994.

The threat from subversion declined rapidly following the collapse of Soviet communism, and so did the service's work against that threat. The limited resources that the service currently devotes to its counter-subversion function are now focused on monitoring the position, so that it will be able to respond, should the threat resurface.

I shall deal with the central issue raised by the hon. Member for New Forest, East—the policy on the destruction of Security Service files. The Security Service has no wish to retain piles of records that no longer serve any useful purpose. On the contrary, it is the service's policy to keep only those records that it needs to keep, either to carry out its functions or to comply with its statutory obligations. Those include the obligation, which I accept fully, to retain records that are likely to be of historical interest.

As the hon. Member for New Forest, East mentioned, I set out in detail the criteria for keeping records that are regarded as of historical interest in a written answer that I gave him on 20 January 1998. Each file is examined individually and then considered on its merits as a whole as a file, but no collective decision is taken about categories of files.

The examination includes asking whether the file relates to a major investigation; whether questions were raised concerning important subversive figures, terrorists and spies; whether the file concerns individuals involved in important historical events or causes celebres in a security context; whether the file contains original papers of historical interest; whether the file documents major changes of Security Service policy, organisation and procedures; and whether the file is in some way a period piece, illustrating clearly Security Service attitudes or techniques of the time, and milestones in the service's history.

In 1992, following the end of the cold war, the service launched a review of its file holdings, and started to destroy documents that were no longer relevant to its requirements and did not need to be retained for statutory or historical reasons. As individual judgments are made about each file, the process is resource-intensive and has had to compete with the service's other pressing priorities, such as its work against terrorism. More recently, the work has been accelerated, and I hope to be able to inform Parliament before the summer recess of the progress that has been made.

It has to be for the professional judgment of the service itself to decide which files it can safely destroy and which must be retained for operational, statutory or historical reasons. I make it absolutely clear that the service does not, and will not, take decisions about which files to retain or destroy on the basis of representations from outside the service. It would be wrong to do so in respect of private individuals; it would be even more wrong to do so at the behest of hon. Members or, in particular, of Ministers.

Parliament deliberately inserted into the Security Service Act 1989 the safeguard that the service must take no action to further the interests of any political party. Therefore, I make it clear to the hon. Member for New Forest, East that there can be no question of the service retaining or destroying any of its records with a view to securing a party political advantage for any party or any individual, including the Government of the day.

I pay tribute to the men and women of the Security Service, who spend their lives working to protect the citizens of this country from the type of threat that emerged, for example, last year, during the trials of two ruthless terrorist gangs. That work by Security Service staff, whom I have been privileged, in my time as Home Secretary, to meet and get to know, goes on, by and large, out of the public eye. Every one of us has reason to be grateful for what they do on our behalf.

I shall continue to seek opportunities to shed a little more light on the work of the service, but I shall also continue to draw a clear distinction between information that may be disclosed and that which must be withheld in the interests of the effectiveness of the service. We would be failing in our duty to the public if we forced the service to operate—ineffectively—in the full glare of publicity.

It being Two o'clock, the motion for the Adjournment of the House lapsed, without Question put.

Sitting suspended, pursuant to Standing Order No. 10 (Wednesday sittings), till half-past Two o'clock.