HC Deb 23 February 1998 vol 307 cc110-24
Dr. Fox

I beg to move amendment No. 381, in page 31, line 31, leave out from 'Board,' to 'and' in line 33.

The Second Deputy Chairman

With this, it will be convenient to discuss the following amendments: No. 382, in page 31, line 34, leave out 'have a significant effect on the practical extent' and insert 'increase or decrease the revenue available to the Parliament by more than 5 per cent. of the amount available had the maximum tax power been used in the 1997–98 tax year,'. No. 384, in page 31, line 37, leave out 'as soon as reasonably practical' and insert 'within one calendar month'.

No. 409, in page 31, line 38, leave out from 'proposal' to second 'to' in line 40'.

No. 385, in page 31, line 38, leave out 'as soon as reasonably practical' and insert 'within one calendar month'.

No. 387, in page 32, line 3, after 'to,' insert 'basic rate'.

No. 388, in page 32, line 4, leave out 'conditions' and insert 'condition'.

No. 389, in page 32, line 5, leave out 'subsections (4) and (5)' and insert 'subsection (5)'.

No. 390, in page 32, leave out lines 9 to 17.

No. 392, in page 32, line 14, leave out from 'would' to end of line 17 and insert 'be to raise or forego £450 million in 1997–98 prices, increased in line with the general government implied deflator.'. No. 393, in page 32, line 15, leave out 'broadly the same from year to year as' and insert 'within 5 per cent. of the amount'. No. 396, in page 32, line 21, leave out 'generally'.

No. 397, in page 32, line 21, leave out 'significantly different from' and insert 'within 5 per cent. of.

Dr. Fox

It will take me about as long to deliver this speech as it took you, Mr. Lord, to read out that long list of amendments.

Clause 72 is one of the most important in the Bill and, as anyone who has read the Bill will know, one of the most complex. It was an essential part of the referendum that the Parliament should be able to raise, in the words of the White Paper, £450 million or an index-linked equivalent sum, but that is not in the Bill; it is couched in different terms. Why is there no reference in the Bill to the £450 million? Why was it left out? The clause is more loosely drafted, imprecise and unclear than most in the Bill. Indeed, it is contradictory. We therefore need to ask two questions at the outset: what did the electorate believe they were voting for in the referendum; and what are they getting in the Bill as a result?

I shall begin with the clause's imprecise nature. Subsection (1)(b) is a clear example of the problem. It says: that proposal is one made and published by the Treasury or the Board, or (without having been so made and publicised) appears to the Treasury to be a proposal to which effect is likely to be given by Act of Parliament. That would hardly get a plain English award.

More important, we are concerned about some of the terms in the clause. What are we to make of terms such as "significant effect", as soon as reasonably practicable", and "likely"? Amendment No. 382 would define "significant effect" as varying revenue by 5 per cent. As the Bill stands, the Treasury alone will decide what is significant. What if the Scottish Parliament decides that changes to income tax Acts are significant? Will that count? Even if there were some sort of arbitration, "significant" is ill defined. It would be far better to stipulate it in the Bill, so that there was no question of friction as a result of imprecision. I readily confess that the figure of 5 per cent. is arbitrary, but I hope that the Minister will think about the matter again and table an amendment at a later stage so that we shall be rid of such extremely unhelpful imprecision.

9 pm

The main issue in clause 72 is whether and how the Scottish Parliament's extra revenue would be maintained in the light of changing economic circumstances. We must consider the clause in conjunction with clause 69, which leads Scottish voters—as did the referendum campaign—to believe that 3p would be the limit of the Scottish Parliament's tax-raising power, but, in two potential situations, major changes may occur. Either a United Kingdom Chancellor of the Exchequer raises thresholds and, as a result, produces a decreased number of basic rate taxpayers, or, as a result of a recession or adverse economic circumstances, the number of taxpayers falls. How, then, would revenue be maintained? It would not, as the hon. Member for North Tayside (Mr. Swinney) said in an earlier debate, just be tough for a Scottish Parliament, because the Bill appears to make provision for just such circumstances.

Under clause 72(2)(a), if in the Treasury's opinion, an amendment of the Parliament's tax-varying powers is required as a consequence of the proposal", the Treasury would act to make up the amount of money that might be lost. It must take account of subsection (4)(b), which says: after making due allowance for annual changes in the retail prices index, that the practical extent of the Parliament's tax-varying powers would remain broadly the same from year to year as it would be if … the law relating to income tax were the same from year to year as it was in relation to the year 1997–98. As I understand it, that part of the Bill is to protect the Parliament's revenue-raising powers and ensure that it works with a consistently similar sum of money. I can draw only two conclusions from the two paragraphs when they are taken together. First, the Treasury could produce a situation that might result in the need to raise more money from fewer income tax payers, as it is committed to making the "practical extent" of tax-raising powers consistent. Secondly, that could require a rise in income tax of more than 3p.

It is only common sense that, if the Parliament has to raise the same amount of money—index-linked—and the number of taxpayers who are paying it shrinks, the amount that has to be raised from each taxpayer must rise. Unless there is something fundamentally amiss with my arithmetic, every hon. Member should accept that. That means that what voters thought they were voting for in the referendum—a 3p ceiling on tax-raising powers—is not in fact a ceiling. Especially as the Minister has consistently said today that the changes must be confined to income tax, I can see no way of maintaining income other than a rise of more than 3p.

The Opposition tabled amendment No. 387 to provide protection for taxpayers and to clarify the Government's intentions. Making the basic rate explicit will stop exactly what the hon. Member for North Tayside seemed to want: to be able look at other areas of income tax, such as raising the top rate, moving other income taxes around or even introducing new income taxes in Scotland. All that would be allowed if the words "basic rate" were not stipulated in clause 72(3)(a).

Mr. Dalyell

Is not that what the hon. Member for North Tayside (Mr. Swinney) and his colleagues are quite legitimately and honourably all about? They do want that.

Dr. Fox

It might be legitimate, but I am not sure whether it is particularly honourable to campaign in favour of one economic change in a referendum but knowingly to want to introduce quite a different one.

As we have said from the outset, we want to minimise potential points of friction. It is far better to include such stipulations in the Bill than to leave it open to vague interpretation. I whole-heartedly entreat the Minister to consider amendment No. 387. If the Government intend any changes to be limited to the basic rate, they must say so. Otherwise, various income taxes may be changed.

If clause 72(4) is to protect against loss of revenue, subsection (5) is clearly designed to reassure taxpayers. It states that the effect on the levels of the after-tax income of Scottish taxpayers generally will be much the same as in previous years of assessment. That is quite different from the notes on clauses. The question is how we interpret subsection (5). If basic rate taxpayers are to be protected, how could subsections (2) or (4) be put into effect? They would become contradictory. Do the Government not intend "taxpayers" to mean "basic rate taxpayers"?

The Opposition's suspicion begins to rise given that the notes on clauses say: the proposed revised powers must, if exercised, have broadly the same impact on the after-tax income levels of individual tax payers as the existing powers". Which taxpayers are we talking about? Are we talking about all taxpayers, basic rate taxpayers, or could the word "generally" in subsection (5) mean average, across-the-board Scottish taxpayers? Therefore, if some taxpayers are taken out of the tax bands, others' taxes will have to rise to keep the general level of income the same.

That would be open season on basic rate taxpayers. It is what we have warned of all along. We have always said that the danger would be that the Bill was not watertight; that it would be so loosely drafted that it would open the door to those who wanted to set higher basic rates for those in the middle bracket in Scotland than elsewhere in the United Kingdom. That means that if the Chancellor of the Exchequer reduced taxation by raising thresholds, the burden would immediately fall on Scottish basic rate taxpayers, by virtue of this clause.

Mr. Alasdair Morgan (Galloway and Upper Nithsdale)

Does the hon. Gentleman agree with my interpretation of the clause, which is that it gives the power to change these arrangements in future to the Westminster Parliament, not the Scottish Parliament? Given his views, the hon. Gentleman should be happy to see the Scottish Parliament's powers of taxation being regulated by this House.

Dr. Fox

A neat try—but we want any changes made explicit in the Bill. The hon. Member for Linlithgow (Mr. Dalyell) rightly pointed out just now that this is exactly the sort of friction that the nationalists want in the Scottish Parliament. They want the Bill left vague, because that maximises the possibilities of future trouble-making. They want nothing fixed in statute. The hon. Member for Galloway and Upper Nithsdale (Mr. Morgan) said during the referendum campaign that he wanted £450 million to be the limit; now, he does not want it to be the limit. He wants the clause to be unamended, because that maximises the chances of making trouble once the Parliament is set up.

We believe that the clause is dangerously drafted, confusing and contradictory. Many of our amendments are designed to probe, but amendment No. 390 is extremely important in its own right. If we get no satisfactory answer on it from the Minister, we shall push it to a Division to show that we understand the dangers that basic rate taxpayers could be up against if these plans come to fruition. We warned about an open season on Scottish taxpayers; unfortunately, that is what the Bill provides for.

Mr. Dalyell

Clause 72 presents real problems. First, I should like to ask a technical question posed by Martin Jones of Maclay, Murray and Spens, Glasgow tax experts. I talked to him at some length this morning about subsection (1)(b). He wants to know about the cumulative effect of modifications as distinct, first, from each modification separately; or secondly, the modifications of each year taken separately. What happens about three years of changes to the lower band, or about capital allowance changes? Serious lawyers would like an answer to that question.

My true concern has to do with the delineation of devolved functions. The delineation of functions is always a challenging task. There are, of course, many existing federations which, by definition, have such delineations in place; but most of them—at least the developed states with a political and public culture broadly comparable with ours—have been federations for a century or more. Their basic delineations were accordingly established at times when governmental functions were usually much less dense, extensive and interactive than they are now. The dividing lines have, by and large, evolved gradually and pragmatically within cultures familiar with acceptance of the federal concept.

Here, however, we are not talking about a federal concept; we are talking about a unique kind of semi-federal concept. Leading examples of the genre such as Australia, Canada and the United States stretch across large territories, so cheek-by-jowl comparison is less intense. It is without parallel anywhere else in the world to try to draw an entirely new legislative and financial boundary through a complex governmental scene, in a relatively small and densely populated island, with a powerful culture and an unusually strong nationwide media structure, giving rise to expectations of consistent treatment right across the UK.

Two basic questions arise in consideration of the crucial problem of delineation. Should the line be drawn by describing what is devolved and what is not devolved? In 1974–77, the former route was taken. Furthermore, should the line be drawn by broad description of subject or by detailed mapping according to current statutes? In 1974–77, the latter route again was taken. The 1974–77 approach produced long, complex Bills and was accordingly much criticised at the time and afterwards. The White Paper and the Bill indicate the opposite approach, but it should be recognised that there are considerable practical difficulties in regard to both approaches, whichever course is preferred. There is no logical reason why the difficulties would be removed simply by reversing the approach adopted in the 1998 Bill.

The problem is policing the delineation. The choice of approach to delineation on financial and legal matters interacts with the question of how the delineation is to be policed. Who is to decide whether the Scottish Parliament has overstepped its powers? During the 1974–77 saga, that was a matter of considerable argument in the Government, centring on the issue of judicial review.

That bring us to the question of judicial review and who is to decide when the Scottish Parliament asks whether it is to have more taxation. It is absolutely certain that that will come up soon after Holyrood is established. The expectations have been raised out of all recognition. All sorts of problems—lone parents, tuition fees; you name it—will be solved when there is a Scottish Parliament. It is not laws, let alone speeches in that Parliament, that will deal with those matters, but resources. The demand for resources will be huge. That is why delineation is crucial. This is the point in the Bill at which to ask questions about it.

9.15 pm

One argument, advanced virtually as a matter of basic legal and constitutional principle, is that it would be wrong to deny citizens the right to argue in the courts that a Scottish Parliament Act disadvantaging them exceeded the powers granted by Westminster in a devolution statute. The other argument, arising partly from an awareness of the boundary complexity problem, is that it would be unreasonable in practice and politically objectionable in Scotland that primary legislation and financial regulations of the Parliament should be liable at any time, perhaps long after enactment, to be struck down by the courts as ultra vires. The more broadly drawn the delineation, the greater the risks.

If this argument prevails, the question still arises as to who is to police the boundary. At some point, somebody must. If there is no general right of post-enactment judicial review of the vires of primary legislation or financial legislation, there must be some procedure—legal or Westminster parliamentary—for providing a nihil obstat at the time of enactment. We come back to the lawyers. The procedure for considering vires and resolving disputes must be clarified before the Bill passes into law.

No course is free from difficulty. It is fair to acknowledge that in the past 20 years public opinion has become more accustomed—because of the operation of the European Court—to the idea that the legal system might be able to overrule statute passed by a democratically elected body. That does not make the experience politically comfortable. The scale and weight of those incidents might—depending on the quality and style of the devolutionary delineation, the political climate, and how widely any right of challenge to vires extends—be a good deal more onerous than in the European dimension, as it would be additional to that dimension.

Dr. Fox

Does the hon. Gentleman accept that with the spectre of judicial review looming at any time, it would be far better for terms in the clause such as "significant effect", "likely" or "reasonably practicable" to be defined much more closely? Are we not asking for trouble with judicial review later by leaving the Bill so loosely phrased?

Mr. Dalyell

I shall reply to that by asking the Minister a question. What is the legal advice on all this? I agree with the views expressed from the Opposition Front Bench on this matter. The terms are very loose. That is also the view of the Law Society and other lawyers who have studied the Bill. Are the Government saying that, according to their legal advice, the Bill is sufficiently watertight to avoid a challenge in the courts such as Jarndyce v. Jarndyce?

Incidentally, that would lead to tremendous political discontent on the part of all Members of the Holyrood Parliament, including Conservative Members. Let us not assume that the Conservatives would avoid those pressures. They would face the same problems because of the expectations that have been raised in Scotland. The entire Parliament would create those pressures.

I conclude with this question: what legal advice have the Government received about these very delicate and important matters?

Mr. Laurence Robertson (Tewkesbury)

I support what my hon. Friend the Member for Woodspring (Dr. Fox) said about the possibility of the Treasury's changing the rules so that the Scottish Parliament could levy a higher taxation rate than 3p in the pound. My hon. Friend has covered that point, but it is extremely important as regards democracy.

Mr. Alasdair Morgan

The Bill does not give the Treasury the power to change any rule: the Treasury is given the power to suggest changes to the House.

Mr. Robertson

The Scottish people were asked to vote on whether they wanted the Scottish Parliament to have tax-varying powers. They understood that the rate would be no more than 3p in the pound, but it could well be more than that.

I refer to the constraints that might be placed on the Treasury. The Chancellor of the Exchequer has said—I believe very reasonably—that he might want to introduce a taxation rate of 10p in the pound. What effect will that have on the Scottish Parliament's ability to raise £450 million? Will it not place the most enormous constraints on the Treasury's ability to act for the whole United Kingdom? I ask the Minister to reply to those two points.

Mrs. Laing

Once again, I agree with the remarks of the hon. Member for Linlithgow (Mr. Dalyell). He has made some serious points tonight that are often overlooked in the public debate about the Bill. He referred, in particular, to the difficulties of delineation and the problems arising from it. It is an understatement to say that the confusion and conflict that the problems will create are a lawyer's paradise. I know many lawyers, both north and south of the border, who must be rubbing their hands with glee at the thought of the business that will come their way in the next few years.

We begin to suspect that the Government have no wish to clear up the confusion in the Bill. We offer clarity through our amendments. The Bill would become clearer if the Government accepted the amendments. However, they will not, so we must assume that they wish to preserve the conflicts and the uncertainties that we have pointed out time and again.

This warning has been issued many times: if the conflicts that exist on the face of the Bill are not resolved, the Scottish people will not get what they voted for in September. They voted for a limited amount of devolution and a little variance on tax. If the conflicts are not solved now and the Bill is not clarified, devolution will not work. If devolution does not work, the Scottish people will get what Scottish National party Members want them to have: a separate Parliament and a separate Scotland. The Government have been warned about that time and again, but they constantly ignore our warnings.

Mr. Prior

It is likely that, in the not-too-distant future, a Budget will raise thresholds for paying basic rate income tax, so that the tax base in Scotland will fall. If it falls from £450 million to £350 million, for example, the Westminster Parliament will have to decide whether to extend the tax base in Scotland—that will be a clear example of the problem of delineation that the hon. Member for Linlithgow (Mr. Dalyell) mentioned. Until delineation between the two Parliaments is sorted out, problems over taxation will continue each year.

Mr. McLeish

It would be helpful to remind Conservative Members in particular of the intention behind the clause—to provide protection from the erosion of the tax base. Conservative Members have claimed that the clause is imprecise, but it is important to be flexible in these matters. We cannot be precise, as the future shape of the United Kingdom tax structure, in the context of which any change to present arrangements would be made, is not known. Any changes would be to the income tax system, not to any other form of taxation; they would maintain, as far as possible, the tax's current distributional effects—the same people will pay roughly the same amount of tax as they will under the proposals in clause 72.

It may also help if I briefly outline how what I regard as the fall-back power in clause 72 will work. The clause falls into two parts. Subsections (1) and (2) set out the process whereby any fall-back power would be introduced. In effect, what will happen in most foreseeable circumstances is that, first, the Treasury would internally develop a proposal to change UK tax arrangements. Secondly, if the Treasury assessed that that would significantly reduce or increase the Scottish tax take, it would, if it thought it necessary, again draw up internally proposals for changing the Bill's powers.

Thirdly, when the UK tax changes became public on Budget day or possibly in a Green Budget, the Treasury would be obliged, as soon as reasonably practicable, to lay before the House in a statement whether it believed that the Scottish power needed to be changed and what the changes, if any, should be.

In practice, the Treasury would be expected to consult the Scottish Executive before laying revised proposals before the House as soon as was reasonably practicable. Once a proposal had been laid before the House, it would be incorporated into the Finance Bill as an amendment to the Scotland Bill's powers.

Subsections (3) to (7) set parameters to any revised power—in effect, that roughly the same people should pay roughly the same amount of income tax as they would under the power that is currently proposed. Once any new power had been implemented, the Scottish Parliament would either stick with any tax resolution that it had already made under its formal powers or make a new in-year resolution under the new power.

Of course, we should note that the new power would need to include provision allowing an in-year resolution to be made in these circumstances. Under clause 70, such an in-year resolution would be considered.

I understand from the Conservative party's hostility to the referendum result in favour of a Scottish Parliament that it will exaggerate and distort; it can never regard an issue such as the one covered by the clause as simple and straightforward.

Mr. John Hayes (South Holland and The Deepings)

Will the Minister give way?

Mr. McLeish

I shall not give way just now.

I respect what my hon. Friend the Member for Linlithgow (Mr. Dalyell) said; it was principled, and he, at least, has been consistent in his opposition over many years. However, on this and other clauses, the Opposition have tried to hide behind a smokescreen of distortions and exaggerated claims about a lawyer's paradise; in fact, their basic hostility creeps through on every possible occasion.

The Committee's objective is to scrutinise the Bill and it is, of course, acceptable for hon. Members to make political points. However, let us not pretend that those are the same things.

Dr. Fox

Under the Bill, as drafted, would it be possible for the Treasury to increase Scottish tax-raising powers by more than 3p in the pound?

9.30 pm
Mr. McLeish

I repeat that the key purpose of the provision is to protect the tax take. It does not need a great deal of imagination or intellect to appreciate what that is. The Bill, which will become an Act, will have the ability to raise or lower the basic rate of income tax by 3p. In future, however, changes made by any Government or any Treasury could have an impact on the tax take. The clause provides an important fall-back mechanism for the Westminster-based Parliament and the Treasury to ensure that the level of tax take that we try to build into the Bill is taken forward in subsequent years. That is straightforward and common sense.

There must be flexibility, and that is provided by a fall-back power. Where would flexibility lie if the Chancellor of the Exchequer, in this place, changed the basic tax system? A fall-back power is essential because it will protect the Parliament, the tax take and the integrity of the tax-varying power. In addition, it will protect the taxpayer.

Mr. Gerald Howarth

Does not the clause and everything that the Minister has said confirm that we are talking about tax-raising powers? We are not talking about tax-varying powers. The clause, and the Bill in general, is geared towards increasing the tax burden on the Scottish people. Will the Minister not come clean about that?

It is not only the hon. Member for Linlithgow (Mr. Dalyell) who has principles about these issues. It is the duty of the Committee to point out to the Minister the practical consequences of what could arise for the Scottish people, as drawn from a detailed study of the Bill.

Mr. McLeish

With great respect, that is complete and utter nonsense. The situation has been well discussed in Scotland, in the publication of the White Paper, in the referendum and in the publication of the Bill. It is interesting that the Conservative party used to help the business community through some of its difficulties. Nowadays, however, only the Conservative Opposition see the perceived dangers—they make them up as they go along—as we consider the Bill in Committee.

Mr. Hayes

Will the Minister give way?

Mr. McLeish

No. I am not giving way at this stage.

No self-respecting Parliament with a working tax-varying power could avoid a fall-back position. That having been said, I shall deal with the specific amendments.

Mr. Dalyell

Neither my hon. Friend the Minister nor I is a tax lawyer. Rather than asking my hon. Friend to answer the question that I posed on cumulative accumulation of tax, may I suggest that a tax expert from the Scottish Office gets together with Martin Jones of Maclay Murray and Spens and the Law Society's tax committee to sort out this issue? I suggest that my hon. Friend writes to us or returns to the House with a closer definition on Report.

Mr. McLeish

Inland Revenue and Scottish Office officials are in consultation with many groups about the rules and duties that will be taken on board through the tax-varying power. I take my hon. Friend's suggestion on board, but consultation is taking place.

The group of amendments is concerned with what, for convenience, I shall term the fall-back power. Amendments Nos. 381 and 409 would remove from the Treasury the duty to start taking steps to consider a replacement tax-varying power in circumstances where it was obvious that it should be doing so. The circumstances in question would be where it looked likely that a major change to the UK tax structure was likely to be enacted, but, for some reason, that had not been formally proposed or published by the Treasury or Inland Revenue. Thus, for example, the Treasury would not be under an obligation to act when, as has happened, the Government accepted an amendment to income tax provisions during the passage of a Finance Bill, but had not formally proposed or published the policy enshrined in that amendment. That would plainly be absurd, and I hope that the amendments will be withdrawn.

The purpose behind amendment No. 382 is to put a figure on the trigger for clause 72 coming into play. The Bill as drafted leaves that undefined; this is deliberate. If we were to determine a particular figure, whether a 5 per cent. increase or decrease in potential tax take, or some other figure, that could easily trigger the clause when it was in the interests of nobody to trigger it. Alternatively, it could deprive the Scottish Parliament of an important opportunity to enter negotiations with the UK Government.

I simply do not accept arguments that a lack of definition will lead to conflict. Of course, there may have to be negotiation in particular circumstances, and I have no doubt that those negotiations may sometimes be tough, but I would argue that is a much more stable and mature arrangement than sticking an arbitrary, non-negotiable statutory marker in the ground. Therefore, I do not accept the need for the amendment.

Amendments Nos. 384 and 385 bring those of us who are accustomed to the work of Standing Committees on to familiar territory—the respective merits of a requirement to do something as soon as "reasonably practicable" or within a particular, specified time frame. Amendment No. 384 at least has the merit of making sense, although I do not accept that, in all circumstances, it would be desirable to require the Treasury to lay material before the House within a month of publishing or proposing a tax change. Amendment No. 385 should be rejected.

Amendments Nos. 387 and 390 are an attempt to provide that any replacement power should apply only to the basic rate of income tax. The deletion by amendment No. 390 of one of the particular conditions that any replacement tax would have to meet is, I assume, intended as being consequential, but that requirement is itself potentially completely unworkable. It is precisely for that reason that we have not limited the replacement power, but nevertheless have included the detailed provisions at clause 72(4) and (5) to ensure that, under any future power, broadly the same people would end up having broadly the same liability for the Scottish variable tax.

Amendments Nos. 392 and 393 are not acceptable. Amendment No. 392 seeks to put a precise figure on the tax that any replacement tax power should be capable of raising.

Amendment No. 393 attempts to provide relative precision in an area where a more broad-brush approach is the only practical way forward. The design of any replacement tax system will inevitably have to take into account a whole range of factors.

Amendment No. 396 strives for too great a degree of precision. The clause makes it quite clear that Parliament expects the effect of any new tax power generally to be broadly similar, as it affects individuals, to the power currently in the Bill. Again, precision is the enemy of the setting of sensible, workable parameters. The amendment should not be accepted.

Amendment No. 397 attempts to establish 5 per cent. parameters—this time on the effect of any replacement tax power on individuals' income after tax. Because of the way in which it has been drafted, it would prevent any new after-tax income level coming within 5 per cent. of previous levels. I suspect that that is not something any of us want.

This has proved to be a wide-ranging group of amendments, testing the fall-back power provisions. The Government's approach in relation to that power has been to put into statute the general framework of how any replacement power would be designed, in accordance with the undertakings that we gave in the White Paper. I am convinced that that is the right approach, given that we cannot begin to predict the specific circumstances in which the power will operate. Therefore, I ask the Committee not to accept the amendments.

Dr. Fox

Anyone who has read the clause or heard the Minister's response to the debate will realise why we had a pre-legislative and not a post-legislative referendum: people might have recognised what recipe the Government had for them. The Minister's inability to accept any amendment, or even the arguments made in good faith by Opposition Members, is sad. The Government's ability to speak with a forked tongue on these matters is extraordinary, and their condescension staggering. The Bill is loosely drafted.

The Minister paid tribute to the integrity of the hon. Member for Linlithgow (Mr. Dalyell) and then proceeded to disregard all his arguments about the potential for judicial review, and the terms in which the Bill is drafted. The Secretary of State urged us on Second Reading to look at everything on a worst case scenario. Now the Government ask us to welcome a situation in which Westminster will decide any changes to Scotland's taxes, which will be different from the position in England. That is what they used to complain about when the poll tax came into operation. They now suggest that it will be all right; that it will not be exploited by the nationalists; that we have nothing to fear from this process, and that we are scaremongering by bringing up these subjects.

This is a recipe for friction. That is one of the many reasons why we cannot accept the Minister's arguments, which are contradictory. Clause 72(4) seeks to protect the Parliament's income. Clause 72(5) seeks to protect the taxpayer's income. In the Minister's words, roughly the same people should pay roughly the same tax-how precise for a financial measure. We simply cannot accept that, but I guess that we should not be upset about contradictions from a Government who are introducing a tax-raising power, with a Prime Minister who says when he goes overseas that raising tax is a threat to jobs but thinks that it is all right to introduce it in Scotland, where, apparently, the laws of economics will be suspended. I shall seek to withdraw amendment No. 381, but press amendment No. 390 to the vote.

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Amendment proposed: No. 390, in page 32, leave out lines 9 to 17.—[Dr. Fox.]

Question put, That the amendment be made:—

The Committee divided: Ayes 126, Noes 328.

Division No. 177] [9.39 pm
AYES
Ainsworth, Peter (E Surrey) Gorman, Mrs Teresa
Amess, David Gray, James
Ancram, Rt Hon Michael Grieve, Dominic
Arbuthnot, James Hamilton, Rt Hon Sir Archie
Atkinson, Peter (Hexham) Hawkins, Nick
Baldry, Tony Hayes, John
Bercow, John Heald, Oliver
Beresford, Sir Paul Heathcoat-Amory, Rt Hon David
Body, Sir Richard Hogg, Rt Hon Douglas
Boswell, Tim Horam, John
Bottomley, Peter (Worthing W) Howarth, Gerald (Aldershot)
Bottomley, Rt Hon Mrs Virginia Hunter, Andrew
Brooke, Rt Hon Peter Jack, Rt Hon Michael
Browning, Mrs Angela Jenkin, Bernard
Bruce, Ian (S Dorset) Johnson Smith, Rt Hon Sir Geoffrey
Butterfill, John
Cash, William Key, Robert
Chapman, Sir Sydney (Chipping Barnet) Kirkbride, Miss Julie
Laing, Mrs Eleanor
Chope, Christopher Lait, Mrs Jacqui
Clappison, James Lansley, Andrew
Clark, Rt Hon Alan (Kensington) Leigh, Edward
Clark, Dr Michael (Rayleigh) Letwin, Oliver
Clarke, Rt Hon Kenneth (Rushcliffe) Lidington, David
Lilley, Rt Hon Peter
Clifton—Brown, Geoffrey Lloyd, Rt Hon Sir Peter (Fareham)
Collins, Tim Loughton, Tim
Cormack, Sir Patrick Luff, Peter
Curry, Rt Hon David Lyell, Rt Hon Sir Nicholas
Davis, Rt Hon David (Haltemprice) McIntosh, Miss Anne
Duncan, Alan Maclean, Rt Hon David
Duncan Smith, Iain McLoughlin, Patrick
Emery, Rt Hon Sir Peter Madel, Sir David
Evans, Nigel Malins, Humfrey
Faber, David Maples, John
Fabricant, Michael Mates, Michael
Fallon, Michael Maude, Rt Hon Francis
Flight, Howard Mawhinney, Rt Hon Sir Brian
Forth, Rt Hon Eric May, Mrs Theresa
Fowler, Rt Hon Sir Norman Moss, Malcolm
Fox, Dr Liam Nicholls, Patrick
Fraser, Christopher Ottaway, Richard
Garnier, Edward Page, Richard
Gibb, Nick Paice, James
Gill, Christopher Paterson, Owen
Gillan, Mrs Cheryl Pickles, Eric
Prior, David Taylor, John M (Solihull)
Randall, John Taylor, Sir Teddy
Redwood, Rt Hon John Tredinnick, David
Robertson, Laurence (Tewk'b'ry) Trend, Michael
Roe, Mrs Marion (Broxbourne) Tyrie, Andrew
St Aubyn, Nick Viggers, Peter
Sayeed, Jonathan Wardle, Charles
Shephard, Rt Hon Mrs Gillian Waterson, Nigel
Shepherd, Richard Whittingdale, John
Simpson, Keith (Mid—Norfolk) Widdecombe, Rt Hon Miss Ann
Soames, Nicholas Wilkinson, John
Spelman, Mrs Caroline Willetts, David
Winterton, Mrs Ann (Congleton)
Spicer, Sir Michael Winterton, Nicholas (Macclesfield)
Spring, Richard Woodward, Shaun
Stanley, Rt Hon Sir John Yeo, Tim
Steen, Anthony Young, Rt Hon Sir George
Streeter, Gary
Swayne, Desmond Tellers for the Ayes:
Syms, Robert Mr. James Cran and
Taylor, Ian (Esher & Walton) Mr. Stephen Day.
NOES
Adams, Mrs Irene (Paisley N) Coaker, Vernon
Ainger, Nick Coffey, Ms Ann
Alexander, Douglas Coleman, Iain
Allan, Richard Colman, Tony
Anderson, Donald (Swansea E) Connarty, Michael
Anderson, Janet (Rossendale) Cook, Frank (Stockton N)
Armstrong, Ms Hilary Cooper, Yvette
Ashton, Joe Corbett, Robin
Atkins, Charlotte Corbyn, Jeremy
Barnes, Harry Corston, Ms Jean
Barron, Kevin Cousins, Jim
Bayley, Hugh Crausby, David
Beard, Nigel Cryer, Mrs Ann (Keighley)
Beckett, Rt Hon Mrs Margaret Cryer, John (Hornchurch)
Bell, Stuart (Middlesbrough) Cummings, John
Benn, Rt Hon Tony Cunningham, Rt Hon Dr John (Copeland)
Bennett, Andrew F
Benton, Joe Cunningham, Jim (Cov'try S)
Bermingham, Gerald Cunningham, Ms Roseanna (Perth)
Berry, Roger
Betts, Clive Dafis, Cynog
Blizzard, Bob Dalyell, Tam
Blunkett, Rt Hon David Darling, Rt Hon Alistair
Boateng, Paul Darvill, Keith
Borrow, David Davey, Valerie (Bristol W)
Bradshaw, Ben Davidson, Ian
Brown, Rt Hon Nick (Newcastle E) Davies, Rt Hon Denzil (Llanelli)
Brown, Russell (Dumfries) Dawson, Hilton
Browne, Desmond Dean, Mrs Janet
Buck, Ms Karen Denham, John
Burden, Richard Dewar, Rt Hon Donald
Burgon, Colin Dobbin, Jim
Burnett, John Donohoe, Brian H
Butler, Mrs Christine Doran, Frank
Byers, Stephen Dowd, Jim
Campbell, Alan (Tynemouth) Drew, David
Campbell, Mrs Anne (C'bridge) Drown, Ms Julia
Campbell, Menzies (NE Fife) Eagle, Maria (L'pool Garston)
Campbell—Savours, Dale Edwards, Huw
Caplin, Ivor Efford, Clive
Caton, Martin Ennis, Jeff
Cawsey, Ian Etherington, Bill
Chapman, Ben (Wirral S) Ewing, Mrs Margaret
Chaytor, David Fatchett, Derek
Chidgey, David Feam, Ronnie
Chisholm, Malcolm Field, Rt Hon Frank
Clapham, Michael Fisher, Mark
Clark, Rt Hon Dr David (S Shields) Fitzsimons, Lorna
Clark, Paul (Gillingham) Flint, Caroline
Clarke, Eric (Midlothian) Flynn, Paul
Clarke, Rt Hon Tom (Coatbridge) Follett, Barbara
Clarke, Tony (Northampton S) Foster, Rt Hon Derek
Clelland, David Foster, Michael Jabez (Hastings)
Foster, Michael J (Worcester) Lewis, Terry (Worsley)
Foulkes, George Liddell, Mrs Helen
Fyfe, Maria Linton, Martin
Galbraith, Sam Livingstone, Ken
Galloway, George Lloyd, Tony (Manchester C)
Gapes, Mike Lock, David
Gardiner, Barry Love, Andrew
Gerrard, Neil McAllion, John
Gibson, Dr Ian McAvoy, Thomas
Gilroy, Mrs Linda McCabe, Steve
Godsiff, Roger McCafferty, Ms Chris
Goggins, Paul McCartney, Ian (Makerfield)
Gordon, Mrs Eileen McDonnell, John
Gorrie, Donald McFall, John
Griffiths, Nigel (Edinburgh S) McGuire, Mrs Anne
Griffiths, Win (Bridgend) Mackinlay, Andrew
Grocott, Bruce McLeish, Henry
Grogan, John McNamara, Kevin
Hall, Mike (Weaver Vale) McNulty, Tony
Hall, Patrick (Bedford) McWalter, Tony
Hamilton, Fabian (Leeds NE) Mahon, Mrs Alice
Hancock, Mike Mandelson, Peter
Hanson, David Marsden, Gordon (Blackpool S)
Harris, Dr Evan Marsden, Paul (Shrewsbury)
Harvey, Nick Marshall, Jim (Leicester S)
Heal, Mrs Sylvia Martlew, Eric
Healey, John Meacher, Rt Hon Michael
Heath, David (Somerton & Frome) Meale, Alan
Henderson, Ivan (Harwich) Merron, Gillian
Hepburn, Stephen Michael, Alun
Heppell, John Michie, Bill (Shef'ld Heeley)
Hesford, Stephen Michie, Mrs Ray (Argyll & Bute)
Hill, Keith Milburn, Alan
Hinchliffe, David Miller, Andrew
Hodge, Ms Margaret Mitchell, Austin
Home Robertson, John Moonie, Dr Lewis
Hoon, Geoffrey Moran, Ms Margaret
Hope, Phil Morgan, Alasdair (Galloway)
Hopkins, Kelvin Morgan, Ms Julie (Cardiff N)
Howarth, Alan (Newport E) Morris, Ms Estelle (B'ham Yardley)
Howarth, George (Knowsley N) Morris, Rt Hon John (Aberavon)
Howells, Dr Kim Mountford, Kali
Hughes, Ms Beverley (Stretford) Mudie, George
Hughes, Kevin (Doncaster N) Mullin, Chris
Hughes, Simon (Southwark N) Naysmith, Dr Doug
Humble, Mrs Joan O'Hara, Eddie
Hurst, Alan Olner, Bill
Hutton, John O'Neill, Martin
Iddon, Dr Brian Öpik; Lembit
Ingram, Adam Palmer, Dr Nick
Jackson, Ms Glenda (Hampstead) Pearson, Ian
Jackson, Helen (Hillsborough) Pendry, Tom
Jenkins, Brian Pike, Peter L
Johnson, Alan (Hull W & Hessle) Plaskitt, James
Jones, Barry (Alyn & Deeside) Pollard, Kerry
Jones, Helen (Warrington N) Pond, Chris
Jones, Ms Jenny (Wolverh'ton SW) Pope, Greg
Pound, Stephen
Jones, Jon Owen (Cardiff C) Powell, Sir Raymond
Jones, Dr Lynne (Selly Oak) Prentice, Ms Bridget (Lewisham E)
Jones, Martyn (Clwyd S) Prentice, Gordon (Pendle)
Keeble, Ms Sally Primarolo, Dawn
Keen, Alan (Feltham & Heston) Prosser, Gwyn
Keen, Ann (Brentford & Isleworth) Purchase, Ken
Keetch, Paul Quin, Ms Joyce
Kelly, Ms Ruth Quinn, Lawrie
Kennedy, Jane (Wavertree) Radice, Giles
Kidney, David Rammell, Bill
Kilfoyle, Peter Raynsford, Nick
King, Andy (Rugby & Kenilworth) Reed, Andrew (Loughborough)
Kirkwood, Archy Rendel, David
Kumar, Dr Ashok Robertson, Rt Hon George (Hamilton S)
Laxton, Bob
Lepper, David Roche, Mrs Barbara
Leslie, Christopher Rogers, Allan
Lewis, Ivan (Bury S) Rooker, Jeff
Rooney, Terry Stringer, Graham
Rowlands, Ted Stuart, Ms Gisela
Roy, Frank Stunell, Andrew
Ruane, Chris Sutcliffe, Gerry
Ruddock, Ms Joan Swinney, John
Russell, Ms Christine (Chester) Taylor, Rt Hon Mrs Ann (Dewsbury)
Ryan, Ms Joan
Salmond, Alex Taylor, David (NW Leics)
Salter, Martin Thomas, Gareth R (Harrow W)
Sanders, Adrian Timms, Stephen
Sarwar, Mohammad Tipping, Paddy
Savidge, Malcolm Todd, Mark
Sawford, Phil Touhig, Don
Sedgemore, Brian Trickett, Jon
Shaw, Jonathan Turner, Dr Desmond (Kemptown)
Sheerman, Barry Turner, Dr George (NW Norfolk)
Sheldon, Rt Hon Robert Twigg, Derek (Halton)
Shipley, Ms Debra Twigg, Stephen (Enfield)
Simpson, Alan (Nottingham S) Vis, Dr Rudi
Singh, Marsha Wallace, James
Skinner, Dennis Ward, Ms Claire
Smith, Rt Hon Andrew (Oxford E) Wareing, Robert N
Watts, David
Smith, Angela (Basildon) Welsh, Andrew
Smith, Rt Hon Chris (Islington S) White, Brian
Smith, Miss Geraldine (Morecambe & Lunesdale)
Whitehead, Dr Alan
Williams, Rt Hon Alan (Swansea W)
Smith, Jacqui (Redditch)
Smith, John (Glamorgan) Williams, Alan W (E Carmarthen)
Smith, Llew (Blaenau Gwent) Willis, Phil
Smith, Sir Robert (W Ab'd'ns) Wills, Michael
Snape, Peter Winnick, David
Soley, Clive Winterton, Ms Rosie (Doncaster C)
Southworth, Ms Helen Wood, Mike
Squire, Ms Rachel Wray, James
Steinberg, Gerry Wright, Anthony D (Gt Yarmouth)
Stewart, David (Inverness E) Wyatt, Derek
Stewart, Ian (Eccles)
Stinchcombe, Paul Tellers for the Noes:
Stoate, Dr Howard Mr. David Jamieson and
Stott, Roger Mr. Robert Ainsworth.

Question accordingly negatived.

Clause 72 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Forward to