§ Motion made, and Question proposed, That this House do now adjourn.—[Mr. Betts.]
8.48 pm§ Mr. David Davis (Haltemprice and Howden)John Maynard Keynes was once quoted as saying:
Practical men, who believe themselves to be quite exempt from any intellectual influences, are usually the slaves of some defunct economist.In a similar way, whole generations of politicians can be captivated by a beguiling phrase. Today's Governments—not just the British Government—are captivated by the beguiling phrase "peace dividend". It is a phrase that carries within it the idea that we have somehow finished our investment in peace, and that all we have to do is to sit back and enjoy and spend the rewards. That is a fallacious idea. The only proper dividend of peace is peace itself. By seeking to "spend" this dividend by cutting defence spending, the Government run the risk of bankrupting their own defence strategy.I secured this debate to seek clarification from the Government about their policy on ballistic missile defence systems. Stories have recently been circulating in the press that the Government plan to abandon research on the development of ballistic missile defences.The Sunday Telegraph of 23 November quotes senior defence sources as saying:
Even if this has not been abandoned completely, it has been kicked into the long grass.My fears were reinforced by the Institute of International Strategic Studies, whose journalStrategic Comments said last month:The MoD and Foreign and Commonwealth Office officials agree that the Review will not recommend any significant new expenditure on…ballistic missile defence systems.As a former security command Minister in the Foreign Office, I do not always believe everything I read in the newspapers. I have a great deal of respect for the Minister for the Armed Forces, and I want clear guidance from him on the Government's policy. If those stories are true, it could have disastrous consequences for the United Kingdom and our NATO allies.The collapse of the Soviet Union and the relaxation of its global grip set loose the ambitions of a number of states in a world in which borders are no longer defined by the spheres of influence of east and west. The result has paradoxically been a rush to arms, and most particularly a rush to acquire weapons of mass destruction—a rush which, if we are not careful, may render NATO's whole new policy obsolete.
Many nations—most obviously Iraq, Syria, Libya, Iran and North Korea—are developing weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear, biological, chemical and radiological weapons and their delivery systems. At least 38 states possess ballistic missiles, and more than 70 have cruise missiles. For the moment, the range of systems is limited, but it will not be long before Iranian systems can hit Israel, and not much longer before the whole of Europe is within the missile range of a number of middle eastern countries.
571 As is well known, the North Koreans are currently developing the Taepo Dong 2 missile. As it stands, we can only guess at the maximum range, but the third report of the Select Committee on Defence published in 1995–96 says that it is
planned to have a range of around 5,000 km.Libya and Iran already have an interest in buying that system. If they manage to get their hands on missiles with that range, it could put Britain at risk. Even if they do not, the Russians and Chinese might be alternative sources.So much we know, because it is in the public record; but we should not overestimate our knowledge. The single biggest lesson to be learnt from the United Nations special commission's investigations in Iraq, and from the various issues that have been in the public domain in the past couple of months, is that our ignorance is massive.
Iraq has been a problem state for some time; yet we knew next to nothing about its programmes. In the Gulf conflict, we targeted eight out of 56 nuclear facilities. We were unable to find or destroy some 28,000 chemical munitions, and we knew little of the biological weaponry: 30,000 litres of botulin, anthrax and aflatoxin.
It is not as though we were not warned. In 1980, the Israeli air force bombed and destroyed Saddam Hussein's Osirak nuclear reactor outside Baghdad. The Israeli Government were widely condemned by the international community for that action. The Gulf war showed that we were wrong and they were right. Had they not taken that action, there is no telling whether Iraq would have had a nuclear weapon by the start of the war over Kuwait.
That ignorance is repeated elsewhere. We now know that the Soviet Union's stocks of chemical and biological warfare weaponry were 10 times that estimated by American analysts at the time of the cold war. That ignorance is endemic. Soviet nuclear accounting was primitive in the extreme—the Government have recently given assistance with that. General Lebed has said that nuclear warheads have gone missing, but no one can tell whether he is right or wrong. We know that a number of rogue states are seeking to acquire such weapons, and many experts believe that they are likely to succeed some time in the next 10 years.
Those rogue states want weapons of mass destruction and the associated missile delivery systems for two reasons. The most important reason is regional dominance. They have learnt that lesson from recent experience. The carnage of the Iran-Iraq war ended with the missile exchanges called the "war of the cities". The population fled the cities, terrified that Iraqi Scuds would be armed with chemical or biological weapons. As a result, Iran sued for peace. Both Iran and Iraq learned lessons from that.
The second reason for acquiring weapons of mass destruction is as an equaliser against western technological military dominance. If anything, the Gulf war will have sharpened that desire. Shortly after the Gulf war, a former Indian chief of staff said that
the next conflict with the United States would involve weapons of mass destruction.We can deduce from that that lessons will also be learned by so-called third world countries.572 Europe's position is acute, because so many of the proliferators of weapons of mass destruction are around the Mediterranean and on Europe's southern border. Within 10 years at most—probably much less—every European capital could be within missile range of north Africa and the middle east, and will certainly be within the range of Libya and Algeria. If the Taepo Dong 2 achieves only the 3,500 km range, its limit from Iran or Iraq is probably Paris. If it achieves much more, let alone its intended 5,000 km range, the whole of Britain is within range of all the countries in the middle east. We should not forget that fuel technology is advancing all the time and can change the range of an extant missile system.
European exposure to that threat is likely to change the attitude of at least some countries to military operations beyond the borders of Europe. The fashionable interest in NATO out-of-area operations is likely to fade rather quickly under that threat. If we do not deal with this problem, they could become an obsolete concept in less than a decade. History shows that only too well. When the Americans staged their raid on Tripoli, other European countries refused to allow American warplanes overflight rights. That may have cost the lives of American service men. It showed that European countries will not always rush to support another NATO partner state, even when dealing with some of the dubious regimes of the middle east.
Many interests may motivate such reluctance: political and commercial interests, fear of the consequences, or national amour propre. As we saw with Belgium, which was an ammunition supplier during the Gulf war, international solidarity can be very delicate. The Gulf coalition was always a fragile entity.
Let us imagine the Gulf war occurring in 10 years' time against an opponent with missile systems able to hit any European capital. That opponent would almost certainly have chemical or biological weapons capable of killing hundreds of thousands. They might have 10 or 20 nuclear warheads capable of destroying cities. In such circumstances, how easy would it have been to hold together the alliance that won the Gulf war?
This is no fantasy. Recent history shows all too clearly that missiles are now being used to intimidate and break up coalitions. I have spoken about the war of the cities, and we know that Saddam used his Scud missiles to rain terror on Israel in the hope of provoking retaliation that would break up the alliance. More recently, China used missiles to intimidate the Taiwanese during their elections. That is the tactic of the future.
The effect of such proliferation will be to shut down the ability of the major powers to intervene. The new missile empires will be free to crush democratic states, indulge in genocide or hold the west to ransom over the control of critical resources or trade routes. That means that we have a 10-year or less window for action. If we do not act now, we shall face a geopolitical, tectonic shift, an irreversible fragmentation of the world into regional hegemonies, some of which could easily become no-go areas for western states.
There are four stages in any process that western Governments could use to deal with the danger. First, we could attempt to deny the rogue states the technology and, of course, we try to do that. For example, we can try to ensure that the missile technology control regime is adhered to. We became chairman of that regime while 573 I was at the Foreign Office. It is an agreement between 28 states to curb exports of vital components. China is not a signatory, nor are any of the rogue states. However, the regime has no means of enforcement, so it has not been able to prevent advances in missile technology. All the associated regimes relating to dual technology, weapons of mass destruction and the components thereof are equally porous.
Secondly, we can attempt to deter missile attacks by retaliation. That is a necessary aspect of the policy, but it is not certain. Deterring such attacks will work only if the offending states make a rational calculation of their self-interest. The rationality of leaders such as Saddam Hussein is a dangerous plank on which to base a policy.
Thirdly, western states can attack missile launch sites and other facilities. However, the Gulf war showed how difficult that can be. The United States air force failed to destroy the Iraqi mobile missile launchers.
The fourth and final way to deal with hostile missiles and the one about which I am concerned in this debate is to develop missile defence systems. Such systems cannot be created or completed overnight. They take time to develop, and if we delay now it may be too late 10 years down the line if we discover that Iran, to take one example, has nuclear missiles.
Some of the information that has come out of Russia in the past week or two shows that if we start to develop anti-missile system when we discover that a prospective opponent has nuclear missiles, that could cause destabilisation and provoke an attack. If we develop a defence system now, it could cause rogue states to re-evaluate their priorities. I am speaking not just about Britain but about all the European NATO states, any one of which could face any of these problems. Nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles are expensive. If the west is adequately defended, the calculations may show that the costs outweigh the gains.
It is vital for all of NATO to be defended against the missile threat, but if anything it is even more important that Britain be defended. Throughout the world we are rightly seen as particularly good allies of the Americans. I hope that that is as true today as it was under the Government of which I was a member. It attracts plaudits such as "special relationship", but it also attracts words such as "running dogs". However it is described, we are seen as close allies. The strength of that alliance means that any conflict involving the United States would make us a prime target. We may currently be at the edge of the missile range, but the political situation means that we are a prime target, and that distance edge may not last long.
Britain has a proud tradition of standing by her allies and upholding world freedom. One of my reasons for respecting the Minister of State is that I believe that he shares my belief in that. It is a source of strength, but it also makes us a target for despotic regimes. If we were unable to defend ourselves, it could have grave consequences elsewhere. The proliferation of missiles threatens to snuff out the resurgence of democracy, free trade and individual freedom that is serving the world so well today. Under any Government, this country has always been at the forefront of defending those civilised values in the past. An apparently small decision now, which may save a small amount of money, may eliminate our ability to defend those civilised values in the future.
§ 9.3 pm
§ The Minister for the Armed Forces (Dr. John Reid)The right hon. Member for Haltemprice and Howden (Mr. Davis) illustrated in a number of ways the wisdom that he brings to the matter—first, in his choice of subject; secondly, by his recognition at the outset that peace is the real dividend; and thirdly, by his caution to Members, including myself, not to believe what we read in the papers. That was a somewhat superfluous caution, but I agree with him.
The right hon. Gentleman is wise enough to know that, if the premise of an argument is wrong, the conclusion will probably also be wrong. Part of his argument was based on the premise that a newspaper report was accurate. Let me make it plain that the report was not accurate.
Like every other aspect of defence, ballistic missile defence is being examined in the context of the strategic defence review, but no decisions have yet been taken. Far from sudden or dramatic decisions or significant shifts having been made, no decisions have been taken. Press speculation suggesting that the issue has been decided is premature and misleading.
Despite the flaw in the premise of the right hon. Gentleman's argument, I congratulate him on securing the debate on such an important subject. Anyone who listens to or reads the debate will recognise that the timing is apposite. We have recently seen renewed Iraqi efforts to obstruct the investigations of United Nations officials into its weapons programmes. It is as well to remind ourselves of the risks to not only regional but global security posed by the proliferation of missiles and the development of weapons of mass destruction.
The right hon. Gentleman's article inThe Daily Telegraph of 20 November set out many of the issues facing us in the complex and difficult area to which he has devoted his debate. Some 14 third-world nations now possess operational ballistic missiles, and many other countries have cruise missiles of some sort.
Of course, some nations give greater cause for concern than others. Iraq is the obvious and topical example, but it is not by any means the only one. Several nations have not only missile programmes, but programmes for nuclear, biological or chemical weapons. When those capabilities, or attempts to develop those capabilities, are linked with a track record of aggressive and irresponsible behaviour, the cause for concern is manifest.
Attempts to develop nuclear, biological or chemical weapons—weapons of mass destruction—not only multiply concerns about missile proliferation, but present a more complex security challenge. That is partly because such weapons can be delivered by means other than missiles, and also because programmes to develop them are much harder to detect. Chemical and biological weapons activity can often be concealed within programmes with legitimate civil applications.
Biological agents are particularly problematical: a small quantity can have a widespread and potentially catastrophic effect. The production of such small quantities may require facilities that are extremely basic and easy to disguise or hide. We cannot assume that the activities that we know about represent the full extent of the problem. That very uncertainty, which is greater in this area than in many others, is itself a weapon in the hands of regimes that cause concern to the right hon. Gentleman and me.
575 In considering the missile threats faced by the United Kingdom, it is probably helpful to distinguish between three areas: the United Kingdom itself, the territory of our NATO allies, and the territory outside the NATO area, to which the right hon. Gentleman alluded.
At present, the missile capabilities of states such as Iraq, Iran, Syria, Libya and North Korea do not have the range to pose a direct threat to the United Kingdom or to the bulk of NATO territory, except for the south-eastern fringes. In saying that, I do not mean to diminish that threat, but merely to explain that the United Kingdom and its close geographical allies and colleagues are not in imminent danger from that threat. In the immediate future, the risks lie mainly in regions outside the NATO area, particularly the middle east, the near east and north Africa.
However, the picture is not static, and concerns remain about attempts by some of those countries to develop ballistic missiles with greater range—the right hon. Gentleman referred to that. How long it might take to develop the range to threaten western Europe and the United Kingdom itself is difficult to assess, but it can certainly be measured in years. However, that is a relatively short time in security estimates and in the development of security operations. Although it can be measured in years, that is of limited comfort because that is a relatively short period in military planning and because British forces may be deployed on operations where they face missile threats outside the United Kingdom, even with the limited ranges currently available to potential aggressors. In terms of time scales, the protection of deployed forces is a more immediate concern than the protection of the United Kingdom itself.
We could spend a great deal of time talking about the threat and speculating about how it might evolve in the years ahead. The very uncertainty should alert us to the imminence of the danger. In the short time available, I shall refer to responses to that threat, some of which were covered by the right hon. Gentleman. I must make it plain that, as I am sure the right hon. Gentleman agrees, there is no single, all-encompassing answer to these issues, but there are several mutually reinforcing approaches available to us.
First, there are preventive measures of various kinds. Diplomacy has a role to play in discouraging the development and proliferation of missiles and weapons of mass destruction. There may be some regimes that are impervious to the moral condemnation of the international community, even given the most stringent methods of implementation. However, just because some regimes are impervious to that, we should not underestimate the importance of such diplomatic factors in dissuading others from following their example.
Of course, diplomatic efforts will not always be able to solve the problem, but they may play a role in containing it, as long as the international community has the determination to sustain the pressure. There are mixed views about the effectiveness of diplomatic and economic sanctions, but there is no doubt that they can constrain a pariah regime's freedom of action and constitute a constant reminder that its behaviour is under scrutiny. It is crucial that such regimes are not given any 576 encouragement to believe that responsible nations have lost interest or lack the political will to respond to their transgressions.
On a more specific level, arms control agreements clearly have an important contribution in making proliferation both harder to achieve and harder to conceal. We welcome the agreement this year of increased powers for the International Atomic Energy Agency—the so-called "93 plus 2" programme. That will effectively fill the holes in which Saddam Hussein was able to hide his nuclear programme and make it more difficult for him or any successor to do so again. We are working for early implementation of that agreement.
The missile technology control regime—to which the right hon. Member referred—the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, the chemical weapons convention and the biological weapons convention all have a part to play. It is in our interests to encourage the widest possible support for those agreements, and to do what we can to strengthen the means available for monitoring, verifying and enforcing compliance.
Next year, we will be using our presidency of the European Union to press for early progress, particularly on verification arrangements for the biological weapons convention. It would be optimistic to imagine that arms control will completely eradicate the problem, but it will add to the obstacles faced by the would-be proliferator.
The right hon. Member will know that intelligence on such weapons has a critical part to play. The House will not expect me to go into details on the matter, but—on the basis that forewarned is forearmed—it is vital that we gather as much information as possible on proliferation activities, and particularly on the intentions and capabilities of potential adversaries. If there is the slightest chance that British armed forces might have to deploy to a particular region in future, in defence of British national interests or maintenance of international peace and security, we want and need to know as much as possible about the threats that they may have to face.
We must, however, accept that we will never be able to be sure that we know all that there is to know. Our approach to the issue must take account of that inevitable uncertainty.
When we do have good intelligence of capabilities and intentions, an additional element in our response may be the use of counter-force measures, to strike at the aggressor's capabilities before he can use them. Developments in precision guided and stand-off weapons may make that an increasingly viable option. We also have an exceptional asset in our special forces. However, the applicability of counter-force measures obviously depends on warning of the aggressor's intentions and the availability of good information for targeting purposes.
The role of deterrence, to which the right hon. Member referred, must not be overlooked. Even if a potential aggressor has developed missiles with the range to strike at the United Kingdom, and nuclear, biological or chemical warheads to be delivered by those means, he would have to consider—he would do well to consider—the possible consequences of such an attack.
There is sometimes a tendency to suppose that the concept of deterrence is relevant only in a transatlantic context, and that dictatorial regimes outside Europe are somehow incapable of thinking in such terms. We would be wise not to make such suppositions. Although such 577 despots often appear indifferent to the suffering of their own peoples, I see no sign that they are indifferent to the survival of their regimes and the preservation of their personal positions. Deterrence has a bearing on both those matters.
It seems unlikely that a dictator who was willing to strike another country with weapons of mass destruction would be so trusting as to feel entirely sure that that country would not respond with the power at its disposal. Any state contemplating such an assault on a NATO member would have to consider the implications very carefully.
We must realise, however, that deterrence in that sense might not carry the same weight in all circumstances. Therefore, we need to be able to provide our forces with adequate protection for deployed operations, in case neither deterrence nor counter-force measures could be relied on to nullify the threat. Such protection could include both active and passive defensive measures. Active defence, as the right hon. Gentleman well knows, is generally used to refer to anti-missile defence systems, such as the Patriot system and various other systems being developed by the United States, together with the necessary early warning and command, control and communications capabilities.
We maintain close links with our American allies on this subject—very close, in fact. The right hon. Gentleman perhaps has no idea quite how close. Were I not addressing the Chamber on this important subject, I would be at a dinner with our Secretary of State and the United States Defence Secretary. The British Government will continue close links with our American allies; we have also played a full part in discussions in NATO, and will keep doing so.
At the national level, a consortium led by British Aerospace has conducted a pre-feasibility study investigating the various technical options that may become available in the years ahead. While the study remains classified, I am glad to tell the right hon. Gentleman that my officials are working to produce a declassified version of a report on the methodology and findings of the wider pre-feasibility programme, of which the study formed the larger part. That work has been part of the background to consideration of the issue under the strategic defence review.
There is a continuity of contemplation and purpose on this issue which does not square with the inaccurate reporting that formed part of the basis of the right hon. Gentleman's speech. I cannot yet tell the House 578 what the outcome of that consideration may be, or whether we shall identify a requirement at this stage for the UK to take steps, on a national or multinational basis, towards procurement of ballistic missile defence systems, but a range of options will be examined by Ministers in due course, as with every other issue in the review.
Whatever the conclusion of that work, it is certain that we will continue to require passive defence measures, including capabilities to detect chemical and biological agents, protective equipment, decontamination facilities and medical counter-measures. Such capabilities will always be necessary because no system of active defence, however sophisticated, could counter every possible means of delivering weapons of mass destruction—which may include artillery shells or aerosol sprays, as well as missiles.
No single issue that I have discussed should be taken in isolation; nor does any one of them supply us with exclusive protection against the threat of ballistic missiles. They must all be considered together, as an interlocking network of means by which we can begin to consider how to defend ourselves against a grave potential threat.
Even sophisticated missile defence systems may face considerable technical challenges in dealing comprehensively with missiles armed with nuclear, biological or chemical warheads.
I am grateful to the right hon. Gentleman for raising the issue and putting his concerns on the record, to alert us all to the dangers of ballistic missiles and the development of weapons of mass destruction. Such matters can remain quiescent for long periods, thereby encouraging complacency in some quarters. Then we can suddenly find ourselves facing the grave and disastrous consequences of the development of weapons of mass destruction. Over the past few weeks, we have faced up to a grave problem of that nature.
The Government have continually reiterated that our stance has been based on the international community's determination that such weapons shall not be available to those who might use them against the rest of the world.
I hope that this brief overview has illustrated the nature of the problem, the seriousness with which the Government view it and the diverse combination of responses that may be available to us. I thank the right hon. Gentleman again for bringing this complex and important subject to the attention of the House.
§ Question put and agreed to.
§ Adjourned accordingly at twenty-four minutes past Nine o'clock.