New clause 5

HC Deb 14 February 1996 vol 271 cc1036-45

INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY COMMITTEE AND THE PREVENTION AND DETECTION OF SERIOUS CRIME

`.At the end of section 10 of the Intelligence Services Act 1994 (The Intelligence and Security Committee) there shall be added—

"(8) The power of the Prime Minister referred to in subsection (7) above shall not apply to any matter in the report of the Committee that relates directly to the function of the Security Service as established in section 1(4) of the Security Service Act 1989.".'.—[Mr. Straw.]

Brought up, and read the First time.

Mr. Straw

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

I do not doubt that the new clause is technically defective. In any event, we tabled it not to secure a vote, but as a vehicle for debate. It raises the issue of the accountability of the Security Service to the Intelligence and Security Committee and then to the House. In the debate on new clause 1, there was discussion about whether the Bill ought to proceed, given the appalling outrage committed by the IRA when it let off its terrorist bomb last Friday. On that issue, I agree entirely with my hon. Friend the Member for Cardiff, South and Penarth (Mr. Michael) and the Minister of State: it would be wholly wrong for us to suspend the passage of the Bill as a response to that terrorist outrage.

Part of the public's reaction to that bomb reveals their ambivalence towards the work of the Security Service. In the aftermath of the bomb outrage, some of the newspapers raised the legitimate question of how much the Security Service knew about the possibility of a terrorist bombing. I do not expect the Home Secretary to give an answer to that question; I am making a separate point. Implicit in that question is a demand by the public that the Security Service should be ever vigilant. The public also recognise that, for that vigilance to be maintained, the Security Service has to work secretively and confidentially. There was a demand from both sides of the House, as well as from newspapers of different persuasions, for greater intelligence-gathering and more surveillance to prevent terrorist outrages. That is one instinct of the public.

At the same time, precisely because of the inherently secretive nature of the work of the security services—their work can be of no other nature—there is a natural anxiety that the power that we invest in them should not be abused. The occasions on which it has been abused have been few. The arrangements discussed when we debated the Security Service Act 1989, which have been put in place in recent years, ensure that the possibility of abuse is far smaller than it was before.

Mr. Allason

I remind the hon. Gentleman that, on Second Reading, the Minister said that there was excess capacity in the Security Service and that that was part of the reason why the Bill had been introduced. The hon. Gentleman is now demanding extra vigilance and asking for more officers to be deployed in the task of counter-terrorism. Does he think it appropriate that, within a few days of a bomb going off at Canary wharf, the public are told that the Security Service has excess capacity? Surely the events of the past few days demonstrate that, if there are people in Thames house who are twiddling their thumbs, there is an obvious job for them to do.

Mr. Straw

I cannot recall every last word that the Secretary of State uttered on Second Reading on 10 January. I do not recall his using the phrase "excess capacity"—

Mr. Allason

It was the Minister of State.

5.15 pm

Mr. Straw

I do not recall the Minister of State using the phrase. The record will prove which of our recollections is correct. In any event, there is no argument between us on the next point. As a result not only of the ceasefire—temporary as it has turned out—by the Provisional IRA, but of more profound, long-term changes that have occurred in eastern Europe, it seemed that there might be some resources within the Security Service that could be available for the pursuit of organised crime and in support of the police and other law enforcement agencies.

The Bill is, of course, founded on the fact that, contingent on the work of the Provisional IRA, in the medium term there is the prospect of stability in Northern Ireland and thus a serious judgment can be made about winding down some of the anti-terrorist work of the Security Service. Palpably, that judgment cannot be made today. If the hon. Member for Torbay (Mr. Allason) reads the debates of 10 January, he will see that Ministers and Opposition Front-Bench spokesmen made the point that we did not know whether the ceasefire was temporary or permanent. It was always anticipated that the attitude of the Provisional IRA would be crucial.

In the debate on new clause 1, my hon. Friend the Member for Greenock and Port Glasgow (Dr. Godman) spoke about three prisoners who are in Edinburgh prison for running arms and with whom he has had dealings. It was not clear from what he said whether the men had been convicted of a terrorist offence; they had certainly been convicted of a weapons offence. As my hon. Friend implied, and as my hon. Friend the Member for Cardiff, South and Penarth made clear, in the real world, the dividing line between organised crime and terrorism is difficult to define. We have supported the principle behind the Bill. If there is—this is the phrase used by the hon. Member for Torbay, not mine—excess capacity in the Security Service, it is sensible for it to be deployed in the pursuit of organised crime.

Time is short, given that there is another debate on a separate issue that has to be taken before 10 pm. The Second Reading debate reflected concern across the Chamber that, as the Security Service is to move into a new area of activity, there should be robust arrangements for its accountability. We were assisted in that debate by the report of the Intelligence and Security Committee, which was important in flagging up some of the issues.

We have tabled the new clause to provide an opportunity for the Secretary of State to recognise that it is important that, as the Security Service moves into a new area, the public should be reassured that the service is working as Ministers and Parliament intend. I hope that the Intelligence and Security Committee will produce an early report, once the new work is under way, in which it will discuss its views about how the work has been undertaken.

The new clause also concerns the power of the Prime Minister essentially to censor parts of a report that is produced by the Committee and intended for the eyes of Members of Parliament. All of us understand that there has to be some such mechanism when a scrutiny Committee deals with the work of the intelligence and security services, but I should be glad if the Secretary of State would give an assurance that, although it may sometimes be necessary for operational details that have somehow crept into the draft of the Committee's report to be excised from the public record, Ministers or the Prime Minister do not intend that the Committee's views and judgments about the Security Service's overall work should be the subject of amendment or deletion by Prime Minister.

Mr. Tam Dalyell (Linlithgow)

I regret that Scottish business made it impossible for me to participate, as I might have wished, in the Committee that considered the Bill. Hon. Members who did not go through the heat of the day in Committee have an obligation to be succinct, so I should simply like to ask the Home Secretary the following.

It is not clear to me—perhaps it should be—what the arrangements would be, if the Security Service were used to combat organised crime, in relation to its personnel appearing in court. It is unfair to ask the Secretary of State whether there are any differences between Scotland and England, but perhaps he could ask his Scottish Office colleagues to write to me if any differences exist in the procedures of Scottish courts.

There is a problem, with which I am sure he is all too familiar, of people operating for the service being unable, by the very nature of their role in the service, to be cross-examined in court, as would happen to other witnesses. I leave it at that.

Mr. Winnick

It would be strange if, when debating the Bill, we did not refer, as we have for obvious reasons, to the tragedy that occurred last Friday. I do not recall precisely what the Home Secretary said on Second Reading about MI5's position as a result of the lack— fortunately—of terrorist activity since the ceasefire started, but clearly the position is different now. The House does not know whether there will be more terrorist attacks. We are in the dark, and that is all the more reason why the Security Service should be using all its skills and resources—I am sure that it is—to analyse intelligence and, as far as possible, to give the necessary warnings to the Government about the possibility of future terrorist attacks. That is bound to be MI5's main role.

New clause 5, also, touches on a subject that is sensitive for Parliament. We are dealing with accountability which, inevitably, we discussed on Second Reading and in Committee. I have long taken the view that, for all the Security Service's importance and sensitivity, we should try as far as possible, as happens in other western democracies, to make its work accountable to parliamentary scrutiny. That does not of course include on-going operations—no one suggests that, certainly not me—but there should be a degree of accountability.

To the people who say that some progress has been made by setting up the Intelligence and Security Committee that reports to the Prime Minister, I would say that it is progress, but limited. The situation is different from that in which I and other hon. Members raised the subject in the early 1980s. The Committee consists of parliamentarians who are able to consider various aspects of the intelligence service. It would be wrong of me—however much I believe that parliamentary scrutiny to be limited—simply to write it off. When the Bill was before us, I accepted that it was a form of progress and that it was better than nothing. I said that before the Minister of State was involved.

The Intelligence and Security Committee is not in any sense a Select Committee. It does not report directly to Parliament. It reports only to the Prime Minister, who decides whether certain parts of its report should be deleted before being presented to Parliament. The Committee meets not in a parliamentary building, but in the Cabinet Office. It is officered not by any of the Clerks, but by an official from the Cabinet Office. Undoubtedly, a difference therefore exists between the accountability that we have under the Select Committee system and that under this Committee.

I apologise for missing the first few minutes of the remarks of my hon. Friend the Member for Blackburn (Mr. Straw). We are saying that the added powers that the Bill gives to MI5—those on crime prevention—should be subject to the same parliamentary scrutiny as the police's work.

As I reminded the Committee that considered the Bill, when I served on the Select Committee on Home Affairs from 1979 to 1983, I suggested, and the Conservative majority agreed, which was surprising, that the Select Committee should consider the special branch's work. There was uproar at the time. People outside the Committee, including the then Home Secretary, said that we were undermining the Security Service, which worked closely with special branch, but lo and behold, we considered special branch's work, heard evidence from the police, the Home Secretary and some critics and published a majority-minority report. Special branch continues and, to the best of my knowledge, the Security Service was in no way undermined.

That illustrates the panic that occurs when it is suggested that the work of, for example, special branch or the Security Service should be subject to some degree of parliamentary scrutiny. The accusation is immediately made that we are all against the Security Service and that we are trying to undermine it in every conceivable way. That is nonsense. The Select Committee's consideration of special branch's work illustrates and proves my point.

Labour's proposal makes sense. If we cannot obtain the parliamentary scrutiny that we want of the intelligence and security services—obviously, we will not obtain it now—why not allow the appropriate Select Committee, which outside Scotland would presumably be the Select Committee on Home Affairs, to consider at least the added powers given to MI5 to deal with ordinary crime? After all, it would be a contradiction if the police's work were subject to parliamentary scrutiny by a Select Committee—no Conservative Member, whether on the Front or Back Benches, argues against that, and no one is likely to do so today—and that added aspect of MI5's work, not relating to the main thrust of its work, were not. That is a far more sensible way of going about matters. As the hon. Member for Aldridge-Brownhills (Mr. Shepherd) said so eloquently, we in Britain seem to be obsessed with secrecy, which does not help the Security Service.

Mr. Beith

Am I misunderstanding the new clause or am I right in thinking that it does not have the effect that the hon. Gentleman describes—of giving Select Committees the opportunity to consider the Security Service's work in this area? Is not its effect rather to preclude the Prime Minister from excluding from the published Intelligence and Security Committee report any item that he thinks would be prejudicial to the Security Service's continued effective operation?

Mr. Winnick

Technically, the right hon. Gentleman is right. I have extended the argument. I suggest simply that, after implementing the new clause—I hope that I am in order. I am just concluding my remarks, Mr. Deputy Speaker. I simply suggest that we set up the appropriate Committee to do precisely what I have described. The new clause goes some way towards that. The Prime Minister would not be in a position to delete any relevant references, but that would not apply to the rest of the work undertaken by MI5.

In Committee, I suggested that the appropriate parliamentary Committee should be able to look at the additional work undertaken by MI5 as a result of the Bill. In the past, I and others have put forward arguments that have been dismissed out of hand. Nevertheless, a parliamentary Committee with limited powers was eventually set up, and I am sure that the time will come when what I am now urging will be realised—it is just a question of when.

This country has an unfortunate obsession with secrecy—unlike other western democracies that are no less serious about wanting to combat terrorism. The United States, Canada and other countries loathe terrorism just as much as we do, but they adopt a far more mature approach to the work of their security and intelligence services.

5.30 pm

Mr. Allason

New clause 5 assumes a degree of external independence and oversight of the work of the security and intelligence services. Looking at the record to date, I cannot say that I am hugely encouraged. The report directly relevant to this Bill was delayed for six weeks so that it could be published on precisely the same day as the Bill was published—the beginning of the Christmas recess. There was therefore only very limited time for right hon. and hon. Members to examine both documents. If the Committee was truly exercising its independence, perhaps it should have published its document when it was ready, instead of deliberately delaying it so as to be able to publish it on the same day as the Bill.

It is important that there be external scrutiny, because we have heard the Minister of State say today that the objective of the Bill is to allow the Security Service to operate far behind the front line. The "analytical skills" that are apparently to be deployed by the Security Service are, to my mind, a euphemism for running agents. The Security Service has a limited number of powers, skills and technologies. I submit that running agents and handling agents are not far behind the front line: they are right to the fore. This is precisely the interface between the public and the clandestine world which causes so many problems.

Anyone who doubts that there have been problems should take a look at the problem that the Government face tomorrow afternoon. A Security Service informant was supplying information to a handler who may or may not have asked the right questions. That is how the Matrix Churchill affair arose in the first place.

If there is to be agent handling—one of the prime functions of the Security Service and apparently one of its successes—there will have to be external scrutiny of it if the Committee is to have any meaning at all. The Littlejohn brothers believed that they could rob banks because they had the telephone number of a case officer who would get them out of trouble if they were arrested. They went to prison, and rightly so.

Stephen Ward believed that he would be let off the criminal charge that he faced because he had been an agent of the Security Service. Instead, he was left to dangle, and committed suicide. The biggest marijuana dealer in the world managed to wriggle off a charge in this country because he claimed that he had been in touch with the secret intelligence service to supply information about the Provisional IRA.

My point is that the most sensitive and difficult area of Security Service operations is to be found in the very human environment of the relationship between an agent and his handler. This area has created considerable problems in the past. If Paul Henderson is anything to go by, it looks to me as though there may be one or two problems in the future, too. If agent handling is one of the principal occupations and skills of the Security Service, euphemistically referred to as an analytical skill, I repeat: it is not far behind the front line.

I therefore urge the House not just to agree to the new clause but to ensure that the external body which—uniquely—this House has taken the trouble to create, so as to arrange for parliamentary oversight of the Security Service, is encouraged to exercise a little independence, not to mention the proper powers that this House has, again uniquely, conferred on it.

The Secretary of State for the Home Department (Mr. Michael Howard)

I begin by responding to the references to last Friday night's tragedy and its relationship to the provisions before the House. The House was at its most impressive on Monday when, in a spirit of unity, it expressed its outrage at Friday's events. Since then, the right hon. Member for Berwick-upon-Tweed (Mr. Beith) and the hon. Member for Walsall, North (Mr. Winnick) have suggested that the Bill should be delayed or not proceeded with as a result of what happened on Friday night.

In common with the Minister of State and the Labour spokesman, I believe that that would be the worst possible signal we could give the Provisional IRA. We have said all along that the work of the Security Service against organised crime would depend on the competing demands and resources of the service. Clearly the service will need to reappraise its position in the light of Friday's bomb, but that is no reason to deny ourselves the opportunity to use its capability against the menace of organised crime, as circumstances permit.

The recollection by my hon. Friend the Member for Torbay (Mr. Allason) of what was said on this matter on Second Reading is seriously mistaken. Neither I nor the Minister of State said that there was excess capacity in the Security Service. Indeed, in answer to the hon. Member for Sunderland, South (Mr. Mullin), I stated: if it proves to be the case that some spare resources are available in the Security Service, we should avail ourselves of its particular skills and expertise in the fight against organised crime, which is one of the greatest threats we face. Towards the end of my speech I added: Initially, the number of officers that the service will be able to deploy in pursuit of the new function will be small. The resources that it will be able to devote to that area of its work in future will depend on external circumstances and on the competing demands on its resources. In particular, much will depend on the continuance of the ceasefires in Northern Ireland."—[Official Report, 10 January 1996; Vol.269, c.218–25.] In his wind-up speech, my right hon. Friend made similar observations, but not in the sense wrongly recollected by my hon. Friend the Member for Torbay.

I can assure the House that there will be no question of insufficient resources being devoted to the battle against terrorism because of the new function that this legislation will confer on the Security Service. Every effort is being made by the police, with the support of the Security Service and others, to bring to justice those responsible for last Friday night's outrage, and to seek to prevent any repetition. It is important to be crystal clear about that. Dealing with the terrorist threat must, and will, remain the top priority of the service.

Mr. Winnick

There may be disagreement about whether, as a result of Friday's tragedy, MI5's resources should be utilised as they presumably are now, before the Bill has become law, but does the Home Secretary accept that those of us who have expressed reservations have not the slightest desire to give in to the IRA and are not panicking because of the IRA attack? We do not know what will happen or whether there will be renewed terrorist threats. Prior to this measure, it was generally assumed that MI5, over the past 25 years, with other security services, had been directing most of its energies to fighting terrorism. I hope that he will not misunderstand the position.

Mr. Howard

I have not sought, and do not seek, to impugn the motives of those who have expressed that view—neither the hon. Gentleman's motives nor those of the right hon. Member for Berwick-upon-Tweed. I differ in my assessment of the nature of the signal that would be sent. It would be the wrong signal, a dangerous one and not that which the House would wish to send.

I have some sympathy with the new clause moved by the hon. Member for Blackburn (Mr. Straw) and especially with the desire that lies behind it that as much information as possible should be made available to Parliament and to the public. The Government have pursued a policy of much greater openness in regard to the work of the intelligence agencies. Avowing their existence and putting them on a statutory footing was an example of that, as was the creation of the very committed Intelligence and Security Committee to which the new clause refers.

Mr. Dalyell

On the question of openness, could I go back to the question that I asked earlier, or is the Home Secretary is coming to that?

Mr. Howard

indicated assent.

Mr. Dalyell

If he is coming to it, I shall wait.

Mr. Howard

The Committee reports to the Prime Minister. It is then for the Prime Minister, after consultation with the Committee, to decide whether there are any parts of an ISC report that should, for reasons of sensitivity, not be laid before Parliament. As a matter of policy, my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister will always seek to publish as much as possible of any ISC report and only withhold information that is genuinely sensitive.

We would certainly expect that it would almost always be possible to publish in full any ISC report, or part of an ISC report, dealing with the new function that the Bill confers on the Security Service. We recognise, as do the movers of the new clause, that such work could be less sensitive than other areas of the work of the service. It follows from what I have said that I can without any difficulty give the hon. Member for Blackburn the assurance that he sought that the sense of any recommendations of the Committee and any observations contained in its report would, of course, be taken extremely seriously.

Nevertheless, it is possible that, in carrying out its function of examining the expenditure, administration and policy of the Security Service in relation to its new function, the ISC may want to deal with sensitive information. It may want to report to the Prime Minister on the implications for the other functions of the service arising from its work against serious crime. It may want to comment on issues of policy arising from on-going investigations or completed cases that had become sub judice. It would be wrong to place the Committee in the position where it was required either to leave important points out of its annual report or to run the risk of putting sensitive information into the public domain.

5.45 pm

The force of those reasons was recognised in the decision of Parliament not to qualify the exactly analogous power given to the Prime Minister in respect of 1SC reports on the role of the Secret Intelligence Service and GCHQ in relation to serious crime. It is equally important that the Prime Minister should retain the discretion, after consultation with the ISC, not to publish parts of its reports that deal with the serious crime work of the Security Service.

Before I sit down, I shall deal briefly with the question raised by the hon. Member for Linlithgow (Mr. Dalyell), remote though it is from the subject matter of the new clause. He asked about the circumstances in which evidence is given by members of the Security Service in court. As he rightly surmised, I would be foolish to trespass into the province of the practices of the Scottish courts.

In England and Wales, it is not the case, as the hon. Gentleman suggested, that members of the Security Service are immune from cross-examination; their evidence is subject to it. It has been the practice for them to give evidence in such a way that the identity of the officer is not disclosed. It is given from behind a screen or something like that. But members of the Security Service are not the only people in sensitive occupations for whom similar arrangements have been made. Those arrangements are made by decision of the court on the basis of the particular circumstances of the case. I expect that to continue. I hope that that answers the hon. Gentleman's question, at least in respect of England and Wales.

Mr. Dalyell

Does that answer coincide with the advice that the Home Secretary has had from senior police officers? Without trespassing on the Scottish situation, there is unease about the matter among senior members of the Scottish police.

Mr. Howard

I do not want to follow the hon. Gentleman along that line. I have acted on the basis of close consultation with the police service generally. I do not believe that his point is a matter of continuing concern.

Mr. Beith

Perhaps for the purposes of shorthand, the Home Secretary used words such as "sensitive" to describe the things that the Prime Minister might seek to exclude from the Intelligence and Security Committee report before it came before Parliament. He did not use the words of the Intelligence Services Act 1994, which refers to a matter which would be prejudicial to the continued discharge of the functions of the service. I hope that he will put that point on record, because it is not intended that that power should allow the Prime Minister to exclude matters that are merely inconvenient or embarrassing.

Mr. Howard

My right hon. Friend the Prime Minister always acts in accordance with the language of statute, and will do so in the context of this statute as in all others.

I hope that the hon. Member for Blackburn will accept that the power to withhold from publication part of an ISC report would never be used lightly but that it is important to retain it for all elements of the work of the Security Service because all of them may involve sensitive operations and methods or information prejudicial to its operations.

Mr. Allason

May I take my right hon. and learned Friend back to my mistaken use of the words "excess capacity" for which he rightly corrected me? I refer him to the Official Report of 10 January, when my right hon. Friend the Minister of State, the right hon. Member for Penrith and The Border (Mr. Maclean), was asked what was the catalyst for the legislation. He replied: The answer is that we have identified that in the Security Service there are some skills, especially analytical skills, and it has some resources and, God willing, if Northern Ireland continues in its present course, it may have some capacity to contribute to the battle. I simply say to the House, if there are those skills, if there is that capacity, we should all be pretty daft to look that gift horse in the mouth."—[Official Report, 10 January 1996; Vol. 269, c. 300.] It seems to me that my shorthand of "excess capacity" reflects precisely what my right hon. Friend the Minister of State said, and that that remains the catalyst for the legislation.

Mr. Howard

I am afraid that my hon. Friend and I will have to differ on that. He has been good enough to read from Hansard the precise words of my right hon. Friend the Minister of State. It will be possible for everyone to make an easy and straightforward comparison between those words and the characterisation of them that my hon. Friend gave earlier. I am perfectly satisfied that there is a wide gap between the characterisation that he previously gave and the words used by my right hon. Friend the Minister of State on Second Reading.

In the light of everything that I have said, I hope that the hon. Member for Blackburn will feel able to withdraw the amendment.

Mr. Straw

I am grateful for the assurances that the Home Secretary has given. In the light of what he has said, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Motion and clause, by leave, withdrawn.