HC Deb 17 December 1996 vol 287 cc855-62

Motion made, and Question proposed, That this House do now adjourn.—[Mr. Brandreth.]

10.1 pm

Mr. Peter Kilfoyle (Liverpool, Walton)

It is with a very heavy heart that I speak in this Adjournment debate. I am grateful, however, that my hon. Friends and Conservative Members are in the Chamber. Families of the bereaved of Hillsborough have travelled down to London and are in the Strangers Gallery to provide their support during the debate. I particularly note that the Home Secretary has chosen to reply to this debate, because I think that he realises the significance and sensitivity of the issue.

On 15 April 1989, on a glorious spring afternoon, 96 people went to a football match never to return again to their families. They were men and women of all ages—from 10 to 67—and 28 of them were 18 years old or less. They came from all parts of the country, although mainly from Merseyside, and all of them had one thing in common—a love of football, particularly of Liverpool football club.

It would serve no useful purpose to repeat all the events of that day, or to attempt to rehearse the many legal arguments that have been made in the intervening seven and a half years, but it is important to establish, in general terms, what happened on that fateful day.

Although the Liverpool supporters outnumbered the opposing team's supporters, they were allocated tickets for the smaller Leppings lane end. The allocation was made on the direction of the police, to facilitate their plans for incoming traffic carrying rival supporters. Roadworks on the trans-Pennine route slowed down the traffic carrying Liverpool fans. As they approached the ground, it was noted that match day arrangements had been changed from those for a similar game in the previous season.

It has been pointed out that the standard practice at Sheffield and elsewhere was for police to channel supporters to the appropriate turnstiles by using crash barriers. Tragically, such action was not taken on that day, and it set in motion a train of events that led to the tragedy.

The crowd built up outside the turnstiles in such a way that the police officer in charge there, Superintendent Murray, was concerned that fans were in grave danger of being crushed. He sought, and was given, permission from the officer in overall charge, Chief Superintendent Duckenfield, to open gate C to alleviate the crush outside. That resolved the immediate crisis, but gave rise to a much greater danger because the natural path for the fans to follow, unless directed otherwise, was through the tunnel facing them. There were no stewards or police to funnel fans into comparatively empty pens. Pressure built up in pens 3 and 4 and in the tunnel. These were the killing fields for 96 innocent men, women and children.

In the immediate aftermath of the horror, there was a breakdown in official reaction to the tragedy, which unfolded live on television around the country. It was the fans who pleaded for the gates in the perimeter fence to be opened; it was the fans who requisitioned hoardings as makeshift stretchers; it was the fans who began mouth-to-mouth resuscitation. Individual police officers and first aiders did what they could, but there was paralysis at the top of the command.

As the Attorney-General observed in the House on 26 October 1994: It was a painstaking and thorough inquiry. … The Taylor report placed the blame for the tragedy fairly and squarely on police handling of crowd control at the event."—[Official Report, 24 October 1994; Vol. 248, c. 981.] Lord Justice Taylor noted in paragraphs 311 and 278 of his interim report that the real cause of the Hillsborough disaster was overcrowding and that the main reason for the disaster was the failure of police control. There was an agreed understanding in the Taylor report and beyond on what happened and who, in general, was responsible, but the inquiry did not take place in a vacuum. As the tragedy unfolded, misinformation was being spread. We were told that fans had broken down gate C, that hordes of drunken fans charged the rear of the Leppings lane entrance, and that the Liverpool fans had been the authors of the terrible misfortune of the day. Those who uttered such charges and wrote such lies should still hang their heads in shame, given the eventual findings of the Taylor inquiry.

The low point must have been the infamous report of that terrible day in The Sun. Even by its Grub street standards it reached an abysmal low, but it was not alone. Newspaper after newspaper, tabloid and broadsheet, fed the line that fans were responsible for the deaths. The world is full of gullible people. Perhaps that is why, as late as 1993, the hon. Member for Welwyn Hatfield (Mr. Evans) was still peddling the line that it was all the fault of Liverpool fans. As late as 1995, Mr. Brian Clough continued to point the finger at the fans in his autobiography. There is no fool like an old fool, in politics or in football.

At the same time, a steady stream of wholly partial versions of events emanated from police sources, blaming the fans and fuelling a climate of cynical disregard for the facts, dwelling instead on the exoneration of those who some might argue were culpable for the events of that day.

We are here tonight because of a recent docudrama on Hillsborough which demythologised the Hillsborough tragedy and provided catharsis for the survivors and the families of the dead. It was plain to anyone who saw that harrowing account—I note that the Home Secretary has commented that it was a harrowing account—that there was a presumption by the authorities that drunken loutish behaviour was responsible for the deaths. That was illustrated by the tone and content of the police questioning in the docudrama. I do not accuse individual junior police officers of acting unprofessionally; they were following a line set out for them by senior officers and the press.

If showing that a wholly erroneous version of events had been portrayed by the press had been the only achievement of the docudrama, it would have been worth while, but it also raised the issue of the allegedly faulty video camera and the missing video tape. In my research, I noticed that, in questions to the Home Secretary in the House following his statement of 17 April 1989, my hon. Friend the Member for St. Helens, South (Mr. Bermingham) urged that all film of the tragedy be made available to the proposed inquiry. He presciently said: Unless we move quickly, that footage may be lost and it contains evidence that may be of great value to the inquiry."—[Official Report, 17 April 1989; Vol. 151, c. 38.] How right he was.

We now have the testimony of Mr. Roger Houldsworth—a video technician on duty at Hillsborough on that fateful day—who apparently contradicts the police version of the state of the video cameras. He had the same view as the police of the build-up of fans in the pens. His analysis of the impending disaster is as at odds with the view of the police.

Of course, the police take contradictory positions on Mr. Houldsworth's testimony. First, they say that there is no new evidence in it, yet it was not put before the inquiry or the inquest. Only the police version of the video evidence was put to the inquest jury. Apparently, the South Yorkshire police, the coroner, and the investigating force—the West Midlands police—have hitherto declined to co-operate in determining how much of Mr. Houldsworth's evidence was known and to whom. Nor has there been, as far as I am aware, any attempt to clarify how, and by whom, it was decided not to call him. Some would describe that as a conspiracy of silence.

However, the Yorkshire Post has ascribed to the police the view that Mr. Houldsworth has changed what he said at the time, which contradicts the "nothing new" argument. The police cannot have it both ways. Without doubt there are serious grounds either way for reviewing that vital evidence. That must be added to the other outstanding questions that have never yet been answered.

The South Yorkshire police, in particular, must still answer the following questions. Why was Chief Superintendent Duckenfield put in charge of a major semi-final only 21 days before the game, when he was relatively inexperienced at policing football matches? Why, unlike in 1988, were there no barriers or cordons to filter the crowd outside the Leppings lane end? As the danger unfolded, why was the kick-off not delayed? Why did police not recognise the build-up in pens 3 and 4 when television commentator John Motson and the video technician, Roger Houldsworth, clearly saw what was happening?

Why was the lethal tunnel not sealed off as it had been in 1988? Why did Chief Superintendent Duckenfield tell the Football Association that fans had forced gate C when he had ordered it to be opened? Why did it take until 3.30 pm to make an announcement on the public address system to inform or instruct fans or to seek medical personnel to help the dying and the injured? Given that 42 ambulances reached the ground, why did not more of them get on to the pitch to provide expert medical help? Why did only 14 of those who died get to hospital? Why was the city's major medical disaster plan never put into effect?

Those and many more questions need to be answered. The House cannot raise the dead, but I hope that we can raise the burden on the survivors and on the families of the victims, who wish only to see that justice is done. The dead, their families and survivors cry out in the name of natural justice to be answered. It is incumbent on us to seek a reopening of the inquiry into the events of that dreadful day.

10.12 pm
The Secretary of State for the Home Department (Mr. Michael Howard)

I would like to join the hon. Member for Liverpool, Walton (Mr. Kilfoyle) in expressing my deepest sympathy to the families involved in the tragic event which took place at Hillsborough. I know that I speak for the whole House when I say that our thoughts will remain with them this Christmas, which I know that they must find a particularly difficult time of year.

Anybody who saw the news reports on that dreadful Saturday, 15 April 1989, will have been overwhelmed by the terrible, distressing pictures. I know that the loss of the families that suffered that appalling tragedy was made all the worse by the fact that it arose from an event that should have been a normal family outing.

I have watched the programme "Hillsborough" and I indeed found it harrowing, but the hon. Gentleman will appreciate that any decisions that I am called upon to make have to be made on the basis of a consideration of all the relevant facts, not simply on the basis of one television programme, however powerful and moving. As the hon. Gentleman knows, there have been four independent investigations and reviews of the Hillsborough tragedy: Lord Taylor's inquiry; the inquest into each of the deaths; the investigation into police behaviour supervised by the Police Complaints Authority; and the judicial review of the inquest. Each of those inquiries served a different purpose, and it might be helpful if I said a little about each of them and their outcomes.

First, the formal inquiry by Lord Taylor was commissioned by the then Home Secretary on the second day after the disaster. Its terms of reference were not only to inquire into the events but to make recommendations about crowd control and safety at sports events. Over 31 days, between 15 May and 29 June 1989, Lord Taylor heard oral evidence from 174 witnesses at a public hearing in Sheffield. He also received evidence in the form of submissions and letters. The inquiry considered video film from three separate sources, providing in all about 71 hours of further evidence.

Lord Taylor published an interim report in August 1989, setting out the causes of the disaster and making immediate recommendations. He found that there were a number of causes of that disaster. The immediate cause of the gross overcrowding was the failure to cut off access to the central pens, which were already over-full. They were already over-full because no safe maximum capacities had been laid down, because no attempt was made to control entry to individual pens numerically, and because there was no effective visual monitoring of crowd density.

Lord Taylor found that, when the influx from gate C entered pen 3, the layout of the barriers afforded less protection than it should have done, and the barrier collapsed. He found that the need to open gate C was due to dangerous congestion at the turnstiles. That congestion occurred because, as both the club and the police should have realised, the turnstile area could not easily cope with the large numbers unless they arrived steadily over a lengthy period. The police had failed to draw up plans on how to control large numbers should they arrive in a short period. Unfortunately, that event, which Lord Taylor considered to be foreseeable, was what took place.

Finally, Lord Taylor found that the presence of an unruly minority, who had drunk too much, aggravated the problem, as did the club's confused and inadequate signs and ticketing. There were a number of reasons for that dreadful disaster, and no single person or organisation was held to blame, but Lord Taylor did clearly put a significant portion of the blame at the door of the police. Indeed, he was particularly critical of the attitude of South Yorkshire police to the disaster.

Lord Taylor said: It is a matter of regret that at the hearing and in their submissions the South Yorkshire Police were not prepared to concede that they were in any respect at fault in what occurred. Mr. Duckenfield, under pressure of cross-examination, apologised for blaming the Liverpool fans for causing the deaths. But that apart, the police case was to blame the fans for being late and drunk and to blame the club for failing to monitor the pens. It was argued that the fatal crush was not caused by the influx through gate C but was due to barrier 124a being defective. Such an unrealistic approach gives cause for anxiety as to whether lessons have been learnt. It would have been more seemly and encouraging for the future if responsibility had been faced. Lord Taylor also considered the reports that had been published in the press about the behaviour of Liverpool fans. Again I quote from his report: Before this Inquiry began there were stories reported in the press, and said to have emanated from police officers present at the match, of 'mass drunkenness'. It was said that drunken fans urinated on police whilst they were pulling the dead and injured out, that others had even urinated on the bodies of the dead and stolen their belongings. Not a single witness was called before the inquiry to support any of those allegations, although every opportunity was afforded for any of the represented parties to have any witness called whom they wished. As soon as the allegations I have mentioned were made in the press, Mr. Peter Wright, Chief Constable of South Yorkshire, made a dignified statement dissociating himself from such grave and emotive calumnies. Those who made them and those who disseminated them would have done better to hold their peace. That is strong criticism. I think that those quotations demonstrate that many of the points made by the programme, "Hillsborough", were considered by Lord Taylor at the time.

I should stress that, since the report, the police have accepted responsibility for the part that they played in the disaster. The present chief constable of South Yorkshire, Richard Wells, has on several occasions publicly expressed his deep sorrow at the deaths. More recently, on the "Today" programme, he said that the police saw their responsibility in three particular areas. He admitted that, once the gates were open, the police should have foreseen where the fans would go; he accepted that they might have reduced some of the pressure by changing the kick-off time; and he also accepted that officers did not recognise soon enough the distinction between disorder and distress. The South Yorkshire police have accepted that they were at fault in those respects and the South Yorkshire police authority has paid compensation to the families of those who died.

The second investigation into events was an inquest conducted by Her Majesty's coroner for the western district of South Yorkshire. That was a difficult task, partly because of the number of deaths and partly because the Taylor inquiry was still in progress. The coroner conducted an inquiry into the deaths and sat for a total of 96 days. It is important that I remind the House of the purpose of an inquest.

An inquest is a fact-finding inquiry conducted to establish reliable answers to four important but limited factual questions. They are the identity of the deceased, the place of death, the time—if known—and the date of death, and how the deceased came by his or her death. That is all an inquest can consider. Rule 36 of the coroners' rules of 1984 requires that proceedings and evidence are directed solely at finding answers to those questions and forbids any expression of opinion on other matters.

The jury examining the evidence found that the cause of death was accidental death, but the findings of an inquest do not bind any person affected by them. The inquest's conclusion, indeed, must not be framed in such a way as to determine any question of criminal responsibility on the part of any named person or any question of civil liability. A finding of accidental death does not prevent further proceedings.

The third investigation into the disaster was conducted by West Midlands police, supervised by the independent Police Complaints Authority, with a view to establishing whether the tragedy resulted from, or was made worse by, criminal activity on the part of any individual. It also considered whether any officer should be subject to disciplinary proceedings.

The investigation involved the taking of 5,341 statements, as well as scrutiny of all the material that had previously been examined. The evidence was sent to the Director of Public Prosecutions, who concluded that the result did not indicate that anyone should be made the subject of criminal proceedings. That has meant that neither Chief Superintendent Duckenfield nor Superintendent Murray, who were both criticised by the Taylor inquiry—nor for that matter any other person—has been charged with any crime. For any other person apart from a police officer, that would have been the end of the proceedings, but for a police officer there remained the question of whether they had failed in their duty.

The Police Complaints Authority decided that Chief Superintendent Duckenfield and Superintendent Murray should face disciplinary charges. Police disciplinary hearings are held in private. They are concerned only with whether an officer may have failed to conform to police discipline; they do not consider wider issues.

In the event, Mr. Duckenfield retired due to ill health in advance of a disciplinary tribunal's ruling on whether he was guilty. It is sometimes forgotten that, although a number of punishments can be imposed for bad discipline, the most serious that a disciplinary tribunal can impose is that of dismissal or of a requirement to resign. In the event, Mr. Duckenfield stopped being a police officer and the disciplinary hearing could not continue, because such hearings can be held only on police officers.

The Police Complaints Authority announced subsequently that disciplinary proceedings against Superintendent Murray would be withdrawn. When explaining its decision, the authority stated that the retirement of the chief superintendent, Mr. Duckenfield, on medical grounds, meant that what in effect was a joint allegation of neglect of duty could not be fairly heard in the absence of the more senior officer. However, some time later, Superintendent Murray decided that he did not wish to remain as a police officer either.

It is of course well known that there was dissatisfaction with the verdict of the inquest. The law provides a remedy for that by way of judicial review. The fourth examination, therefore, was the judicial review of the coroner's proceedings.

Relatives of a number of the victims applied for judicial review. In those proceedings, the conduct of the South Yorkshire coroner's inquest was subjected to a close and detailed examination. In giving the judgment of the divisional court, Lord Justice McCowan ruled very clearly that none of the points raised justified the intervention of that court. In particular, the court found that the decision of the coroner to exclude evidence of what happened after 3.15 pm on that afternoon was not an unreasonable decision. It also made no criticism of the coroner's directions to the jury.

Clearly, it is not possible for me to know the truth of what happened on that terrible Saturday. What is important is that we should be satisfied that those dreadful events seven years ago have been fully investigated and examined. The hon. Member for Walton calls for a reopening of the public inquiry. I have had a number of letters making a similar request from those who were bereaved, and I have met at least two of them.

I have said that I will consider those representations. I must emphasise the fact that I would not take a decision to reopen the inquiry lightly: I must be convinced that it would be in the public interest to do so.

The charge has been made—it is one that I will consider carefully—that there has been a cover-up, an attempt to pervert the course of justice. I shall also consider whether there is any new evidence, and if so, whether that evidence is of such significance that had it been put before Lord Taylor or before the coroner, either the outcome of the Taylor inquiry or the verdict of the jury would have been different.

As I consider those questions, I shall be searching for the truth about what happened. It has been said that there was a video camera trained on the central enclosure, and that the Taylor inquiry was told that it was not working, although that was not the case. But I have been informed by the chief constable of South Yorkshire that both the videotape and a transcript of that tape were made available to the Taylor inquiry. Clearly, that is a matter that I will need to look into.

I fully sympathise with the families who feel that in some way they have not learnt the whole truth about the deaths of their loved ones. Certainly in an appalling tragedy such as Hillsborough it is perhaps inevitable, though deeply distressing for the families, that there will be confusion about some details.

I shall reach a decision on any further action to be taken as soon as I have been able to consider all those issues. I shall certainly take into account everything that the hon. Gentleman has said tonight. Whatever my decision, I shall always be deeply moved by the memory of that awful event at Hillsborough on 15 April 1989.

Question put and agreed to.

Adjourned accordingly at twenty-seven minutes past Ten o'clock.