Determinate Sentences for Murder (Hansard, 20 June 1995)

§ Mr. Gary Waller (Keighley)

I beg to move, That leave be given to bring in a Bill to abolish the mandatory life sentence in respect of convictions for murder and to confer on courts the power to impose determinate sentences while retaining the power to impose sentences of imprisonment for life. We all like to believe that the British system of justice is the fairest in the world; that every accused person is assured of a fair trial and a fairly administered sentence. Yet I would like the House to compare that model with the following statement: The judges at present are having to pass a sentence which in many cases is patently inappropriate and does not mean what it says. That does nothing to enhance the authority of the law. Nor does it allow them to carry out their proper, albeit difficult function, namely to pass a sentence appropriate to the crime and to the criminal, whilst at the same time, as far as possible, protecting the public. That was the conclusion reached by the Committee on the Penalty for Homicide, chaired by the former Lord Chief Justice, Lord Lane, and his words have been entirely endorsed by the present Lord Chief Justice, Lord Taylor, giving evidence recently to the Select Committee on Home Affairs. They were both referring to the mandatory life sentence now condemned by nearly all the Appeal Court judges as inappropriate and unjust. Another severe critic is the former Master of the Rolls, Lord Donaldson.

My Bill seeks to abolish the mandatory life sentence, but to retain the availability of life imprisonment as a penalty, where it is necessary, especially in the interest of protecting the public or because of the seriousness of the crime. In many of those cases, life would genuinely mean life. Far from going soft on murder, my Bill would ensure that life imprisonment was taken to mark the utmost horror and gravity with which society regards some truly dreadful crimes.

The present mandatory life sentence is justified by some on the basis that it differentiates a unique crime. Homicide is a unique crime, in a sense, but there must be many cases of manslaughter that are devised essentially to avoid the mandatory life sentence that would inevitably follow a conviction for murder.

There can surely be nobody in the House who thinks that all those who are convicted of murder are equally culpable, whether they be on the one hand a moors murderer, or on the other a loving husband convicted of the mercy killing of his wife; on the one hand the bank robber who in cold blood shoots a police officer in trying to make good his escape, or on the other Private Lee Clegg. Lord Ackner has described as "rubbish" the suggestion that all murders are equally wicked, and he is right.

In requiring judges to pass a sentence of life imprisonment in all cases, we not only devalue what should be the true meaning of a life sentence, but we bring about quite perverse outcomes. Even if the convicted person is released relatively soon, as in the case of a so-called "mercy killing" and perhaps Private Lee Clegg, he will be released only on licence and must live the rest of his life knowing that he may be recalled to prison at any time at the behest of the Home Secretary.

Among those who most detest the concept of the life sentence are many of the families of victims, and some of the organisations that represent them. In the case of a determinate sentence, they would know, because the decision would be announced in open court, that the person 154 responsible for the death of their loved one had been sent to prison, perhaps for a very long time. A life sentence today, however, is a meaningless concept and leaves open the possibility, as the brother of a murder victim complained on the BBC radio programme "Face the Facts", that the killer will soon be free to walk the streets of the neighbourhood as a result of an Executive decision.

In other cases, the relatives are cheated of a murder conviction because a verdict of manslaughter is substituted, perhaps on grounds of provocation, essentially because it enables a determinate sentence to be imposed in cases where a mandatory life sentence does not seem appropriate.

Some hon. Members may recall that the previous Bill that I introduced in the House sought to reinforce the opposition of the House of Lords Select Committee on Medical Ethnics to the introduction of euthanasia in this country. The mandatory life sentence for murder is of assistance to the pro-euthanasia lobby, because the public think it manifestly unfair that a relative or friend responsible for a mercy killing—someone for whom we should all surely have the maximum sympathy—is charged with a crime that is bound to carry a penalty of life imprisonment. Yet if the judge had the power to pass a minimum sentence, to show that justice can be tempered with mercy, I think that everyone would rightly applaud. Thus it was that, among many other proposals that I support, the House of Lords Select Committee on Medical Ethics also recommended the introduction of determinate sentences for murder.

Determinate sentences would also enable the courts to deal more fairly with those who kill following a prolonged period of abuse over many years— what one might call the "Brookside" factor, which is well known to followers of the Channel 4 soap.

It used to be argued that discretion had to be left to the Home Secretary because judges sometimes passed unduly lenient sentences, but now, of course, the Attorney-General has the power to refer a case to the Court of Appeal if the sentence is considered unduly lenient. That would obviously be a vital safeguard in cases of murder, where public interest is often very great.

One of the criteria whereby I judge the existence of genuine civil liberties in a state is the separation of judicial and Executive powers. Justice should be done in open court, not by Ministers. Justice behind closed doors may or may not be justice denied; we just have no way of knowing. An example that highlights that defect is the case of Mohammed Riaz and Abdul Quayum Raja. Those men, Kashmiri separatists, were convicted of the murder of an Indian diplomat— a truly awful crime that came about as a result of a kidnapping that went wrong. The principal killers were never apprehended. Riaz was implicated as a captor of the victim, and that was sufficient for him to be charged and convicted of murder, although he was not present when the act was committed. After passing a sentence of life imprisonment, the trial judge recommended to the then Home Secretary that Riaz be released after no more than 10 years at the outside. Account should be taken of the fact that he had been brought into the conspiracy at a late stage. He was, the judge stated on the basis of the evidence, unlucky to find himself in his present position.

Although he had not seen the defendant in court, the Lord Chief Justice recommended to the Home Secretary that the tariff— the term fixed in the Home Office— 155 should be increased to 16 years. Initially, the Home Secretary did not reveal what tariff had been set, but, when required to do so as a result of a landmark court decision, he stated that he had set a tariff of 20 years—double that recommended by the trial judge.

Many people of Kashmiri origin are resident in this country. What must they think of a sentence passed in such a case, not by a court but by a politician? Might they not think, as many evidently do, that the Home Secretary's agenda incorporated a wish to satisfy the Government of India—a country with immense trade potential? No one can refute that argument, for the simple reason that the decision was made in private by the Executive power of this country.

I suspect that, if sentences in some third-world country were imposed not by judges but by Cabinet Ministers, there would be many signatures to an all-party early-day motion and many letters would be on their way from the House to the ambassador concerned. Should we not seek to put our own house in order, too?

The mandatory life sentence creates anomalies. It undervalues the seriousness with which we should consider the most dreadful murders, while subjecting those who deserve some sympathy to a perverse punishment. It leaves the country open to challenge in international courts. It undermines our argument that a free, unfettered judicial system is intrinsic to any liberal democracy.

The mandatory life sentence does the opposite of what it sets out to achieve, and it should go.

Question put and agreed to.

Bill ordered to be brought in by Mr. Gary Waller, Mr. Alex Carlile, Mr. Alan Howarth, Mr. Gerald Kaufman, Ms Liz Lynne, Mr. Max Madden and Sir Keith Speed.