HC Deb 26 April 1995 vol 258 cc939-40
Mr. Michael

I beg to move amendment No. 23, in page 10, line 34, leave out from first 'appeal' to 'against'.

Mr. Deputy Speaker

With this, it will be convenient to discuss also amendment No. 26, in page 10, line 40, leave out from 'appeal' to 'against' in line 41.

Mr. Michael

We had quite a discussion in Committee about the limitations in clause 13 on the reference of matters to the commission. The Bill as it stands does not change the present situation—that fresh evidence is needed before the Court of Appeal can consider a further appeal in a case of alleged miscarriage of justice. The clause was changed in Committee. It was amended quite considerably, in fact, but it was not amended in the way in which the Opposition recommended. Indeed, we believe that the amendments resulted in a restriction which is far too tight.

As I said, there is a case for arguing, as the Bill now provides, that evidence which has been considered by a court should not be sufficient for the reopening of a case. There is a case to be made for perhaps allowing the court a little discretion where the commission wishes to bring matters to the court, but that is not in dispute today. We seek to remove the words from clause 13 which mean that matters which have been raised on application for leave to appeal should be sufficient to rule out further consideration. Perhaps I should express that again; it is not a simple point.

The clause as redrafted in Committee is so tight that, if an issue has been raised or evidence has been brought forward during an unsuccessful application for leave to appeal, it cannot be used in arguing the case for investigation by the commission and subsequent appeal by the Court of Appeal. That seems too tight and restrictive. Therefore, it seems sensible to remove those words, which is precisely what our amendments do.

In clause 13, line 34, we would leave out the words that effectively mean that evidence has been raised

on any appeal on application for leave to appeal against, the conviction, verdict or finding. It is not a vast widening of the powers of the courts to consider fresh matters where the commission considers that they should be so considered, but it would avoid a restriction which may in the fullness of time be seen to be unnecessarily tight and to prevent reference to the Court of Appeal and consideration by the Court of Appeal of cases where there is manifestly real concern that a miscarriage of justice has occurred.

In view of the importance of restoring confidence in the court system and in the criminal justice system, we think that clause 13 constitutes one step too far, one restriction too tight, and that the Minister would be well advised to reconsider the amendments which were made in Committee and to allow the simple and modest change sought in amendments Nos. 23 and 26.

Mr. Nicholas Baker

Clause 13 provides that there should be some new element for the courts to consider before a referral of a conviction, verdict, finding or sentence may be made by the commission. The hon. Member for Cardiff, South and Penarth (Mr. Michael) said that that makes the criteria within which the commission must operate narrow and restrictive. I am afraid that I cannot accept that, and I reject it.

The criteria provided in the Bill are wide and sensible. They enable the boundaries between the commission's functions and those of the courts to be clearly defined. Indeed, we believe that the criteria as drafted are broad enough to allow the commission to refer any conviction, verdict or finding where there is new evidence or new argument in relation to any evidence which may have already been raised which is of sufficient weight, bearing in mind the context of the case as a whole, to give rise to a real possibility of the appeal being allowed.

The amendments seek to exclude, from the definition of matters already raised within the terms of clause 13, any matters raised only in an application for leave to appeal. We do not think that that would be right. If the matters raised as grounds for appeal are rejected by the single judge, the applicant can renew his application to a full court. If they are then rejected by the full court, what useful purpose would be served by the commission's referring the case to a court on those same grounds—unless there were some new evidence or argument for the court to consider?

Were some new evidence or argument to come to light, and were the commission to consider that the case met the criteria for referral, it could be referred anyway, using the criteria that we have provided. For those reasons, I cannot support the amendments.

Mr. Michael

The Minister has misunderstood the whole position, and has taken an excessively legalistic approach to a commonsense amendment. He said that there must be some new element for the court to consider. In other words, if the courts have considered something once, that is not new. But our amendments do not contradict that idea. We say that, although an element is not new if it has been considered by a court, it may be new if it has been considered only during the course of an application for leave to appeal.

The Government's approach is unduly restrictive, and the Minister's analysis of the position is wrong, as is his response to this brief debate. He should think again, because I have no doubt that the Government will be invited to think again when the clause is debated in another place. Between now and then, the Minister would be well advised to consider the points that I have made, as well as what was said by several Members in Committee in a rather wider-ranging debate on how closely it is appropriate to restrict the commission.

Amendment negatived.

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