HC Deb 04 May 1994 vol 242 cc818-24

Motion made, and Question proposed, That this House do now adjourn.[Mr. Lightbown.]

10 pm

Dr. Lynne Jones (Birmingham, Selly Oak)

Today I wish to raise the case of Bryan Ruppert. Bryan Ruppert is an American citizen. He first met his partner, David Green, in the autumn of 1989 in a translation class in Germany where they were both studying for a year as part of their degree courses. Their relationship began within a few weeks, taking them both by surprise. By the end of the year, they had already visited each other's homes, met families and friends and travelled together in Europe.

Bryan spent the last few weeks of the 1990 summer vacation with David and his family before they had to part to complete their studies. With the exception of 10 days at new year, when Bryan visited David in the United Kingdom, they were separated for 13 months. That was a most difficult time for them both as they tried to cope with the separation and their studies, as they wondered how they would be together again in the future.

David stayed at Birmingham university to do a postgraduate degree, and Bryan arranged to go to Birmingham on a British universities north America club scheme, which allowed him to work in the United Kingdom for six months. By the time they met again after the long separation, they had no idea whether the relationship would be able to last but, within a couple of weeks, everything was exactly the same as it had been in Germany. They were absolutely sure of their commitment to each other.

They decided to apply for Bryan to be allowed to stay on the basis of his relationship with David, and submitted their application in March 1992, including photographs, letters from their families and even copies of telephone bills. They were very optimistic.

The refusal came in June. They had not prepared themselves for that devastating blow. While they were trying to come to terms with it, their solicitor filed an appeal and they knew that they would have a very long wait ahead. Bryan's temporary work permit had expired at that point, and he was not able to work for 30 days, and David's studies took a turn for the worse. They had been stressed since the application was originally submitted, but this was worse still. They decided that the best way to face up to their situation was to keep busy and to gather as much support as possible for their application. They contacted me as I was their local Member of Parliament.

From the first time that I met them, I was impressed by their straightforward honesty, integrity and commitment to each other. I was not the only parliamentarian who felt that way. Bryan and David began a letter-writing campaign to peers and MPs of all political persuasions. They received many sympathetic letters of support from hon. Members and noble Lords and Ladies, and they were able to meet several of them in Westminster.

The year-long wait before their appeal was heard dragged slowly. Bryan could not leave the country even when his uncle died in January 1993. Both men were under considerable strain. It could be argued that this was a good test of the relationship, and so it was, but what a horrendous way to have to prove that a person loves someone.

The appeal was heard in September 1993. The men's submission agreed that their circumstances were not covered by the immigration rules, but pointed out that the Home Office Minister had discretion to allow leave to remain, outside the rules. The men felt confident that, if their case was examined on its merits, Bryan would surely be allowed to remain. Fortunately, the adjudicator at the appeal, Dr. Popper, agreed, and wrote a strongly worded recommendation that the Minister overrule the previous decision. The men felt that Dr. Popper argued their case so well that they simply could not see how anyone could refute it: they were overjoyed.

Clearly, Bryan and David had an established relationship that had lasted for some time, and there was no suggestion that it would not continue permanently. Their relationship is stable and loving and it was not entered into primarily to enable the appellant, Bryan Ruppert, to enter the United Kingdom. David Green owns his own house, and both men are well able to maintain themselves—there is no question of recourse to public funds.

At the appeal, reference was made to the considerable support for the application from their respective parents; it was noted by the adjudicator as genuine and warm. More support came from Bryan Ruppert's employer, from Members of all parties in both Houses of Parliament, and particularly from Lord Scarman who, in a hand-written letter, wrote: I cannot believe that this"— referring to the gay relationship— is any reason why the application should be refused. A homosexual relationship between two consenting adults is, in itself, perfectly lawful. I know of nothing scandalous, disreputable or criminal in the conduct of either Mr. Ruppert or Mr. Green. He went on:

I would think that these two young men have much to contribute to their country if this application be granted. If Bryan and David had been a heterosexual couple, they would have been able to marry. Even if they had not been, their application would have been considered outside the rules in accordance with Home Office guidelines, which state:

Although there is no provision under immigration rules for a person to be allowed to remain in the United Kingdom on the basis of a common-law relationship with a British citizen (or person settled here), it is policy to consider granting leave to remain to such persons on the same criteria as those for married cases. In general, removal will not be enforced when the relationship appears genuine and has lasted for two years or more. Bryan and David's relationship has lasted for four and a half years and survived a year's separation shortly after they first met. Clearly, the Home Secretary and his officials have power to grant leave to remain, outside the immigration rules, to those in heterosexual, common-law relationships. Cannot the Minister accept the sense of grievance and injustice that my constituents feel when the basis of rejection is that their relationship is homosexual?

Dealing with its own staff, the Home Office accepts the validity of same-sex relationships. In 1993, it issued a notice to staff regarding transfer allowances: The Department will consider paying the married staff permanent transfer allowances to single staff on the basis of an established relationship (including same-gender partnerships). The Home Office defines an established relationship as one in which the member of staff and the other person or persons have been permanent members of the same household for a period of six months". So the Home Office recognises same-gender partnerships and has a policy for dealing with common-law relationships. Surely there is no reason why it cannot apply its own policies to gay men and lesbian women who currently have to find alternative methods of remaining together.

Although the Minister has argued that English law does not accord any legal status to those in homosexual relationships, and immigration practice merely reflects the general position, the same logic is obviously not applied to those in heterosexual common-law relationships. This policy of discrimination can only further alienate the gay community and encourage deceptions—as we saw in the case of the gay immigration officer Mark Watson, who is now in gaol simply because he wanted to be with the partner he loved.

Tonight, the Minister can respond to the debate in several ways. He can simply read out a statement prepared by his officials reiterating the view that Bryan Ruppert's circumstances are not comparable with those of a heterosexual couple, or are not sufficiently compelling to warrant the exercise of discretion outside the rules. That would again mean dismissing the adjudicator's recommendation that leave to remain be granted for Mr. Ruppert in the light of the relationship which those men have and the distress which a separation would surely cause.

Bryan and David are here tonight to watch the proceedings, and I sincerely hope that the Minister will not lightly dismiss the strong arguments in support of their application. Will he not at least offer to have another look at the case?

The recent case of Javier Lizarzaburu—which I understand may be on his desk at the moment—gives grounds for a review of the whole policy, as it governs same-sex immigration cases. Mr. Lizarzburu's appeal tribunal found that the most appropriate context in which claims for a person in a same-sex relationship should be considered was through the adaptation of the married immigration rules, and not as an application for indefinite leave. His appeal was therefore allowed.

I am asking the Minister to consider Bryan Ruppert's case on its merits. Alternatively, he can agree that lesbian and gay relationships should be treated in exactly the same way as unmarried heterosexual relationships. As I have shown, the Home Office does accept homosexual relationships, and further, such relationships have been acknowledged by the Law Lords, as in the case of Barclays Bank v. O'Brian, where the court set out rules to protect people who guarantee the debts of their spouses, and expressly applied that ruling to homosexual couples as well.

Same-sex partnerships have also been recognised for immigration purposes. For example, the category of "person of independent means" used to require a close connection with the United Kingdom for an applicant to be given leave to remain. In the case of Sum Yee Thong, an immigration adjudicator determined that a gay relationship did fulfil this requirement, and the Home office did not appeal against that decision.

Providing for the immigration of same-sex partners does not require a change in the law. All that is needed is a change in the guidelines, so that stable same-sex relationships fall in the same category, and are verified in the same way, as unmarried heterosexual relationships. There is not even any argument that such a change will lead to an increase in immigration, as the numbers involved are very small.

I sincerely hope that the Minister will see the justice in Bryan Ruppert's case in his response tonight.

10.12 pm
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department (Mr. Charles Wardle)

I first congratulate the hon. Member for Birmingham, Selly Oak (Dr. Jones) on obtaining this debate to discuss the case of Mr. Bryan Ruppert, a 26–year-old American citizen who has sought to remain in the United Kingdom as the homosexual partner of a British man, David Green. I recognise that the issue raised in the case may be difficult and sensitive for some hon. Members, and I do not intend tonight to discuss the general issues arising from homosexual relationships, with which we are not concerned here.

Instead, I want to concentrate on the specific matter of the position of homosexuals in the context of immigration control. The House may find it helpful to have brief details of the case to which the hon. Lady has referred. I must commend the hon. Lady for her diligence in pursuit of this case. She wrote to me about it on several occasions last year, and I have explained to her the policy which applies in cases such as this in the letters which I have sent to her.

I have also set out for her our assessment of this particular case in the light of all known circumstances, and I do not think that she added anything to those circumstances in what she told the House this evening. Although the hon. Lady is therefore fully aware of our position, both on policy and as that policy bears in this individual case, I am happy to take this opportunity to set out the position for the House.

I am also aware that Mr. Ruppert's case has attracted the interest of the hon. Member for Nottingham, North (Mr. Allen). Furthermore, as the hon. Lady has already told the House, several noble Lords raised the case last year, and my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Rushcliffe (Mr. Clarke) explained the Government's position in his replies. As there have been further developments in this case since that time, the debate has provided me with a useful opportunity to record the current position.

The facts are clear enough, and so, I would submit, is our policy on how cases such as Mr. Ruppert's are considered. I recognise that the hon. Lady will not be able to agree with much of what I have to say, but I hope that she will be in no doubt about the policy by the time I have finished my remarks.

I shall deal first with the background. These are the facts of the case—the hon. Lady has outlined many of them already. Mr. Ruppert entered the United Kingdom on 22 November 1991 as a student, when he was granted leave to enter for six months on condition that he did not enter or change employment, paid or unpaid, without the consent of the Secretary of State for Employment, and did not engage in any business or profession without the consent of the Secretary of State for the Home Department. He was also admitted to the United Kingdom on condition that he would leave on completion of his studies. Those are, of course, normal conditions under the immigration rules for persons coming here as students.

In March 1992, Mr. Ruppert's representatives sought permission for him to remain here indefinitely on the basis of his homosexual relationship with a British man, Mr. David Green. His case was assessed carefully under the rules. The position is that the immigration rules make provision for the spouse of a person settled in the United Kingdom to be granted limited leave to remain. But Mr. Ruppert was not the spouse of anyone settled in the United Kingdom, and the relevant requirements of the rules had not been met.

Furthermore, an application had been made on Mr. Ruppert's behalf for leave to remain for employment, but that is a purpose for which entry clearance is required prior to entry to the United Kingdom. He was not admitted with such entry clearance, so the application was refused. Mr. Ruppert appealed against this decision to the independent appellate authorities established by Parliament to resolve such disputed matters. His appeal was dismissed on 20 October 1993. Mr. Ruppert's representatives confirmed at the appeal hearing that he was prepared to concede the case under the rules, but that he wished to call evidence to be heard in support of a recommendation.

In accordance with this request, the adjudicator formally recorded the appeal as dismissed but, upon hearing all the evidence, as the hon. Lady has described, made a recommendation to the Secretary of State for the case to be reconsidered, so that leave to remain outside the rules could be granted to Mr. Ruppert on the basis of his relationship with a British man settled in the United Kingdom—in other words, with Mr. Green.

It may be helpful if I comment briefly on the effect of a recommendation such as that made by the adjudicator after an appeal hearing. While a recommendation by an adjudicator is not binding on the Secretary of State, considerable weight is attached to it. The application was therefore reconsidered carefully in the light of the adjudicator's comments and recommendation.

As I said in my letter of 10 December to the hon. Lady, in reviewing the case my officials took account both of the recommendation and of the representations made by the hon. Lady. But, as I explained then, it was not felt that Mr. Ruppert's circumstances were of such an exceptional nature as to justify granting further leave to remain in this particular case. Mr. Ruppert's representatives then made an application for leave to move for judicial review, but that has also been refused, although I understand that the application is to be renewed.

The current position is that Mr. Ruppert has now been here for almost two years without authority. As is normal in such cases, deportation action has been commenced against him.

To complete the picture, the hon. Lady asked me to meet an all-party group of hon. Members to discuss the case. In my letter of 17 February, I explained my reasons for declining to do so. In short, as no new information had come to light in this case and there were no more developments which needed to be reviewed, I had to say that, with respect, I saw little purpose in a discussion of the kind envisaged. Finally, in my reply to a question from the hon. Lady on 15 March, I referred to the views that I had expressed earlier.

I now turn to questions of policy. It may be helpful if I explain the decision in the context of our immigration policy on homosexual relationships. As some hon. Members will already know, there is no provision in the immigration rules for a foreign national to remain in this country on the basis of a homosexual relationship. The hon. Member for Selly Oak has made it clear that she is aware of that. Consequently, applications fall to be considered exceptionally outside the rules.

The policy on the admission of homosexuals to join or remain with a partner settled here is kept under constant review, and each application is considered carefully on its individual merits. Discretion will not normally be exercised in an applicant's favour unless compelling compassionate circumstances are present.

As hon. Members are aware, the immigration rules provide for the admission of spouses. In such cases, the very fact of marriage and the presence of children of the marriage are factors which go to establishing the genuineness of the relationship. In cases of heterosexual common-law relationships, the presence of children of the relationship, and whether the couple intend to marry, are factors which may be taken into account in deciding whether a relationship is genuine and subsisting. Clearly, such factors are not present in homosexual relationships.

As hon. Members will know, English law does not afford any legal status to homosexual relationships. Immigration practice in relation to homosexuals reflects this general position. It would be illogical to try to construct an immigration policy which did not accorcl with the general position. It is true that some countries do, in some circumstances, recognise homosexual relationships. But most countries, including the majority of our European Union partners, afford them no legal status.

It is quite clear that the majority of member states are not prepared to contemplate the admission of homosexual partners, and any movement away from our current policy would therefore put us out of step with them and with the resolution on family reunification policies which was signed by EU Immigration Ministers in Copenhagen in June last year.

Dr. Lynne Jones

rose

Mr. Wardle

I will give way to the hon. Lady in a moment.

It may be helpful if I provide the House with brief details of that resolution, which is to be applied to the family members of non-European Community nationals who are lawfully resident within the territory of a member state on a basis which affords them an expectation of permanent or long-term residence.

Under the terms of the resolution, a member state will normally grant admission to a resident's spouse and the children, other than adopted children, of the resident and his or her spouse. Other children, including adopted children, may also be admitted. Member states have also reserved the possibility of admitting other family members for compelling reasons which justify the presence of the person concerned. It is clear from what I have said that nothing in the resolution confers the right of admission to a person in a homosexual relationship with a national of a member state.

Dr. Jones

I thank the Minister for giving way. Does he agree that currently Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Australia and New Zealand recognise same-sex partnerships for immigration purposes?

Mr. Wardle

Some countries do—the hon. Lady is certainly right about Australia, Denmark and Norway—in certain well-defined cases. I think that that is a point on which she may wish to reflect.

On previous occasions when cases have been referred to the European Court of Human Rights alleging that the United Kingdom's refusal of leave to remain in the United Kingdom on the basis of a homosexual relationship constituted an unjustified interference with private life, contrary to article 8 of the convention and discrimination, compared with heterosexual couples, contrary to article 14 of the convention, they have not been upheld by either the court or the commission.

The European Commission on Human Rights has found that the absence from the United Kingdom immigration rules of settlement rights for non-nationals in respect of stable, private relationships other than family relationships does not disclose any violation of the convention.

As I told the House in my speech on 20 July last year, the Government intend to lay reformulated immigration rules. This process has taken some time, not least because we offered an extensive period of consultation, and were naturally anxious to assess fully the views of those who responded. But the process is nearing completion, and I expect to be able to lay the new rules before the House very shortly. They will not, however, make any new provision for homosexual partners. To do so would afford them, as I have already sought to make clear to the House, a status not present elsewhere in our law.

In conclusion, Mr. Ruppert's relationship with his partner is of comparatively short duration and, so far as is known, there are no compelling compassionate circumstances present in his case which would suggest that discretion should be exercised in his favour. Furthermore, nothing that the hon. Lady has said has persuaded me to change my mind.

I am, of course, very much aware of the considerable support which Mr. Ruppert's application has attracted, and due weight has been given to all the representations which have been made on his behalf. However, his application does not meet the strict criteria applied in such cases, so it will come as no surprise to the hon. Lady that I do not consider that there is any basis on which he could be allowed to remain in the United Kingdom.

As I have said, I have heard nothing this evening to persuade me to alter my view. If the hon. Lady can offer any compelling evidence in the very near future, she should do so, but I am bound to tell her that, from what she has said and what I know of the case, no such compelling evidence would persuade me to change my mind. I can see no reason to overturn the decision that has already been reached.

Question put and agreed to.

Adjourned accordingly at twenty-four minutes past Ten o'clock.

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