GENERAL DUTY AS TO DESIGNATED AREAS

HC Deb 14 July 1994 vol 246 cc1241-4

Mr. Spearing

I beg to move amendment No. 2, in page 4, line 23, leave out subsection (4).

We cleared a great deal of ground in our debate on the first set of amendments. This amendment relates to clause 5 which I believe is perhaps the most important clause. I should perhaps read clause 5(1), which is the pith of the whole clause. It states: It shall be the duty of the Corporation, in formulating or considering any proposals relating to its functions under this Act, to have regard to the desirability of securing the use of the designated areas for a diversity of purposes which may include sporting, recreational, cultural, commercial, energy-related and navigational purposes. That clause was not in the original Bill. It was put in by the LDDC after discussion and representations. As time goes by, we realise more about the advantages of recreation in the dock areas, not only in Newham, but in Millwall—the LDDC is proud of its centre there, although it does not cater for as many people as the Vic does—and in the Greenland dock and the South dock.

However, the commercial operations there have not been quite as successful as some people hoped or assumed. There is little money in water sports and recreation. They are, above all, rather like our public parks—something which costs a bit of money to keep up, and ought to have no revenue charge, or at least only a notional charge, especially as people living nearby can get to them so easily. The docks are a wonderful water resource for sport; the surface never wears out and they are relatively cheap to maintain.

However, in connection with clause 5(4), which I am about to discuss, there is a cost in keeping up the docks. We do not know the cost; it is not mentioned in the Bill, but we must pay great attention to it. There is maintenance for water areas—the locks, the dredging, the walls, the patrolling and policing, the people who open the swing bridges, those who lay down the buoys and so on. That all represents an ongoing cost, and when the Government introduced the LDDC they did not think much about it.

Subsection (4) looks a little ominous on the face of it. It says: No legal proceedings shall be brought, with regard to any byelaw under this Act, in respect of any failure or alleged failure by the Corporation or the Secretary of State to comply with the duty imposed by subsection (2) or, as the case may be, subsection (3) above after the expiration of a period of 72 days beginning with the date upon which the byelaw is confirmed. We can probably reach an accommodation, but anybody reading that would think, "Good Lord. You mean that they can make the byelaw, and if something has gone wrong, after 72 days we cannot go to the court? Finished?" If people tried to go to court, the solicitor would say, "Sorry, mate, you can't. The Act says that's it. And you can't appeal against it."

Some people reading that would be a little suspicious, because the governing subsection (1) does not give much protection. It does not say that rowing, sailing, surfboarding, sub-aqua diving and so on are a priority in the area. I believe that they should be. The area is unique. We would not think of building on Hampstead heath, or putting an airport in the middle of Hyde park, any more than we should think of filling in the Royal docks—but that is what some people once wanted to do.

Subsection (1) gives no priority. It says simply: It shall be the duty of the Corporation…to have regard to the desirability of securing the use of the designated areas for a diversity of purposes". It does not say that one purpose will have priority over another. I argue that the docks are a unique resource for the young people of east London, the rest of London and even further afield.

A regatta was held on the Albert dock not long ago in which there may well have been more boats and more competitors than at Henley. In my view, it was more important than Henley, because there were more ordinary people and more young people rowing there on that one Sunday than there would have been at Henley. Nobody knew about it; nobody was there to photograph it, but in toto I believe that it was more important. However, that fact does not give those activities priority, much as I should like it to.

If someone decided to challenge a development in the court, after 72 days, their chance would be gone. I want to know why that restriction is there, and what sort of protection we have. In expressing what I believe the priorities under subsection (1) should be, I hope that I have advertised what I should like to happen in future. I want to know why we cannot do anything after 72 days. No doubt the hon. Member for Southwark and Bermondsey will tell us why.

8.15 pm

Mr. Simon Hughes

I can speak much more briefly on this amendment, Madam Deputy Speaker. As I have informed the hon. Member for Newham, South (Mr. Spearing), in one sense there would be no problem in accepting the amendment, but there is no need to do so. Indeed, there is merit in not doing so.

If the Bill goes through unamended, clause 5(4) will state: No legal proceedings shall be brought with regard to any byelaw made under this Act, in respect of any failure or alleged failure by the Corporation or the Secretary of State to comply with the duty imposed by subsection (2) or…subsection (3)…after…72 days beginning with the date upon which the byelaw is confirmed. In lay terms, it says that if somebody wants to challenge procedurally at law the making of the byelaws, that has to be done within 72 days. That gives some certainty for the corporation, as the promoters, and the Government, as the authority within the Act, but also for members of the public.

We could do without the provision, but if it were not there it would be possible for someone to use the normal rules of court. There would be no statute expressly governing the procedure, so the normal rules of court would be used. I know for a fact what those rules say, because we have just been involved in considering them in connection with a prospective legal challenge to the Secretary of State for Health over her announcement on 10 February about Guy's hospital. The same issue arose for the people who want to keep Bart's hospital open. Because of his experience in his previous career, the Minister, too, will know what those rules say.

The rules of the Supreme Court say that someone who wants to take out judicial review proceedings has no more than three months. But that is an outer limit. Even if people apply within the three months, the courts may still rule that they have not come as quickly as they could have done. Therefore, if someone sought to challenge after 71 days, 70 days, 69 days or even 60 days, he could be told, "Sorry, you are too late. You could have come earlier." Out of the theoretically available three months—that is about 90 days—the provision in subsection (4) gives the absolute certainty that within the 72 days one can go to court and challenge the byelaws by way of judicial review if one wants to.

The normal reason for a challenge to the byelaws is the fact that certain procedures have not been carried out. For example, perhaps there should have been consultation and there has not been. I tell the hon. Member for Newham, South that the 72-day rule is actually a better safeguard, because it is a clearer safeguard, for his constituents and mine, and for the constituents of the hon. Member for Bow and Poplar (Ms Gordon) and those of the right hon. Member for Bethnal Green and Stepney (Mr. Shore)—for everyone in the four docklands constituencies. It means that our people in the three local authority areas concerned could challenge within 72 days and know that they could get into court, and no one would say that they were too late.

I ask the hon. Member for Newham, South to accept that that is a better protection. In theory, there would be 18 more days without the provision, but in practice there could be far fewer days. As the clause is written, there will definitely be 72 days. So long as people act within that period, they will definitely get through the door of the court. That is clear on the face of the Bill. I hope that the hon. Gentleman's proper concerns have been met by my explanation, and that he will be able to withdraw his amendment.

Mr. Spearing

I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for that helpful explanation. I am grateful that it will be on the record because, as he rightly says, despite appearances, the provision is there for a purpose contrary to that which some people may assume. I shall therefore accede to his suggestion that I withdraw the amendment. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.