HC Deb 11 February 1994 vol 237 cc640-6

Motion made, and Question proposed, That this House do now adjourn.—[Mr. Conway.]

2.35 pm
Mr. Andrew Miller (Ellesmere Port and Neston)

This is a serious matter, but I am sure that I and other hon. Members who are detained this afternoon regret that we were unable to travel to Rotherham for the memorial service of the late Member for Rotherham, Mr. Jimmy Boyce.

This matter affects several hon. and right hon. Members with constituencies near mine and needs to be seriously aired. At 20.40 on Tuesday 1 February, the fire brigade received a call to attend an incident at the Associated Octel plant on Oil Sites road, Ellesmere Port. The name of that road will give the House some sign of the nature of that part of my constituency.

The first crew took six minutes to arrive. On arrival, fire crews were met by a leak of ethyl chloride. One member of Associated Octel's staff had been overcome by fumes from the substance and was promptly taken to hospital. Two crews of firefighters, dressed in chemical protection suits, attempted to isolate the leak via two valves. Although the valves were closed off successfully, a large amount of the product continued to leak. Crews withdrew and, shortly afterwards, the leaking material flashed over, causing the whole plant to catch fire.

Attempts were made to extinguish the blaze, which was burning out of control, and at about midnight the officer in charge decided to withdraw firefighters due to the risk of failure of vessels within the plant.

The main concern was over a container known as the slops tank, which contained up to 30 tonnes of ethyl chloride. Firefighters then regrouped and mounted a major foam attack, using two foam tankers and another foam tanker belonging to the Shell company. The attack was conducted in extremely hazardous conditions and firefighters' actions prevented a serious situation from escalating.

Local residents in Elton, in my constituency, and in the Helsby area, which is in the constituency of the right hon. Member for Eddisbury (Mr. Goodlad), were invited to stay indoors and to close windows. That was done by public address systems on fire appliances and by the local radio station. The Minister may ask his colleagues why no public address facilities are available to the police in such an area.

Although the fire had lessened, a serious fire was still burning, which took several hours to bring under control. A total of 225,000 litres of foam were used and the Cheshire fire brigade was supported by the Clwyd and Merseyside fire and civil defence authority. The all-clear was given to residents at 6 am, and motorway and rail links were opened shortly afterwards. Throughout the incident, constant air monitoring was undertaken.

Nearby industrial premises, including ICI Organics, Cabot Carbon, Kemira Fertiliers and the northern part of the Shell refinery were evacuated.

The process undertaken in the plant was the mixing of ethyl chloride and hydrochloric acid, which is used to make the anti-knock compound for petrol, tetra-ethyl-lead. A number of firefighters were treated as a result of exposure to the chemicals.

The details that I have just put on record were largely provided by the Cheshire fire brigade and are matters of fact. I must stress that the emergency services were absolutely magnificent and I have no doubt that, had it not been for the fire crews' skill and bravery, we would be discussing a major disaster today. My rusty chemistry tells me that one of the combustion products of ethyl chloride is phosgene, so a serious risk could have ensued.

Many lessons can be learnt from that incident. The Health and Safety Executive investigation is now under way and it would be wrong for me to speculate on the outcome of that inquiry. However, I shall make a few observations. First, should any prosecutions result from the inquiry, they would be small beer compared with the economic effect on the company, which will lose millions of pounds in income. The loss will also have a major impact on our balance of trade. Last year, the plant exported some 92,000 tonnes of tetra-ethyl and tetra-ethyl-lead worth some £240 million.

Secondly, once the cause of the accident is known, further studies will need to be made on the plant's design and location. For instance, if it is determined that the plant can be safely located at the same site, can the slops tank be relocated away from the reactor vessel? That tank had a two-hour fire retardant in the form of an intumescent coating. The fire brigade was so concerned at the height of the fire because those two hours were up. Nobody can put his hand on his heart and say that that vessel was safe. Even the volume that it contained was unknown, as the instrumentation had been destroyed at an early stage of the fire.

Thirdly, had the tank gone up, what would the resultant risk have been? The fire brigade was gearing up to evacuate its teams, but would it have been possible to evacuate residents down wind?

Fourthly, did the Cheshire fire brigade and all the emergency services have sufficient resources at their disposal to combat that second eventuality? As it was, 181 firefighters were involved in the incident. Many constituents share my view that the financial allocation for emergency services in such a high-risk area is inadequate. Was the Seveso directive implemented?

Fifthly, had a decision been taken to sound sirens in the area, would those sirens have been adequate? Why were obstacles put in the way when the fire service argued for retaining the previously Government-controlled air raid warning systems in the area, which could be used to warn the public in the event of a chemical incident?

Sixthly, what would have happened if, at the same time, another serious incident had occurred? For example. could a house fire or chemical spillage on the M6 have been adequately covered?

Many far-reaching issues arise from the fire. Questions must be asked and answers are needed, and the public should have access to that information. My purpose in bringing the matter to the attention of the House is to ensure that commitments which I, along with 135 other hon. Members who signed early-day motion 528, have made are met in full by the Government. Incidentally, I am horrified that one hon. Member—the hon. Member for City of Chester (Mr. Brandreth)—has chosen not to sign the motion to date. If he disagrees with an aspect of it, he can seek to amend it, but perhaps he has better things to do with his time.

Many of the issues to which I have referred go far beyond the remit of the HSE. They cover at least two, and possibly three, Government Departments: the Home Office, the Department of the Environment and, to an extent, the Department of Health. In no way do I criticise the work currently undertaken by the HSE. I recognise that its statutory duties preclude the Minister from responding on any aspects of its work that may have a bearing on whether there will be prosecutions.

To sum up, we are dealing with an area in which the petrochemical industry is an integral and extremely important part of the local economy. Many people from an extended travel-to-work area are engaged in the industry, which contributes massively to the national economy, but there is understandable disquiet as a result of the Octel incident. The need for a public inquiry is, in my view, irrefutable. I have made the Minister aware of the concern in and around my constituency. The decision lies firmly with him.

If the Minister ignores the reasonable demands of residents in that part of the country, which contributes so much to our export capacity, his inaction will be denounced. He must agree that the public interest is best served by a public inquiry, in a format that allows the cross-examination of witnesses, investigates what went wrong at Octel and whether such accidents can be avoided in the future and, if so, how. It must also examine whether the emergency services' resources and procedures are adequate in the event of a major incident.

Finally, in my view, the Minister has a duty to the people in my area—the residents, workers and companies who contribute so much to the export effort—to ensure that the facts are in the open in the way that I have described.

2.45 pm
The Minister of State, Department of Employment (Mr. Michael Forsyth)

I congratulate the hon. Member for Ellesmere Port and Neston (Mr. Miller) on raising this most important matter on the Adjournment and I welcome the attendance of my right hon. Friend the Member for Eddisbury (Mr. Goodlad) in the debate. I know how concerned both are about the serious incident at Associated Octel.

I very much regret that the hon. Gentleman's concern has prevented him from being able to attend the memorial service for the hon. Member for Rotherham. Jimmy Boyce was a fellow Scot, who believed passionately in his socialism and was never happier than when giving me and my Government colleagues a hard time from the Opposition Benches. It is very sad indeed that his time here should have been cut so short so soon after becoming a Member of the House, and at such a young age.

The hon. Gentleman paid tribute to all the emergency services. I join him in praise for all those involved in successfully containing this extremely serious incident. Thanks should also go to the Octel employees for their prompt action in implementing the emergency plan and summoning the emergency services, and to the works fire brigade.

I understand the hon. Gentleman's concern, which I share, to discover the cause of the accident as soon as possible and to take steps to avoid a recurrence. As he knows, the Health and Safety Executive has started its investigation. It has two main strands: first, to establish why the leak and subsequent fire occurred and gather eye-witness statements while memories are still fresh; and, secondly, to determine how the emergency was handled in relation to the emergency plans and whether the plans were sufficient.

I am sure that the hon. Gentleman appreciates that it is a complex technical investigation. It is still at an early stage. The cause of the leak and the source of the ignition have yet to be determined. The HSE investigators have the full range of its scientific and technical expertise at their disposal. The 14-strong team is led by Dr. Roger Nourish, who is head of the HSE's special hazards unit, and includes specialists in chemical, mechanical, electrical and process safety engineering, and scientists who specialise in fire, explosion and metallurgy.

Dr. Nourish has already met several representatives of local residents, including a councillor, to give them the opportunity to share their concerns at an early stage of the investigation. As is its normal practice, the HSE will make its findings public. That form of technical investigation by the HSE means that any changes needed can be identified and introduced with the minimum delay. The hon. Gentleman said that he would prefer a public inquiry. I share his and my right hon. Friend's concern for those who live and work locally. They deserve to be reassured that the highest possible standards are maintained.

However, we really must await the HSE report. That report will go to the Health and Safety Commission, which is a tripartite body and with powers under the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974 to conduct a public inquiry. Ministers can set up such an inquiry and also have powers to direct the HSC to do so. The HSC has a good reputation for ensuring the highest standards of health and safety; it will want to ensure that lessons are learnt from this incident and put into practice.

I am aware that, according to press reports, the plant was "20 minutes from disaster". That was because the intumescent coating on the vessel was designed to provide a minimum two-hour protection from a fire surrounding or engulfing it. The reports ignored the fact that the vessels were equipped with additional protective devices.

Mr. Miller

I accept that the coating was designed to provide protection for a minimum of two hours. No doubt the Minister will agree, however, that the chief fire officer was acting on the best advice available at the time. Given his understanding that the protection was designed to last for two hours, his anxiety at about midnight—and his consequent decision—were justified.

Mr. Forsyth

I am not criticising the chief fire officer's judgment in any way; on the contrary, I am trying to explain that reporting of the incident which suggested that, after a further 20 minutes, the vessel might have exploded arose from a misunderstanding of the nature of the intumescent coating.

As I was saying, the reports ignored the fact that the vessels were equipped with additional protective devices, including pressure relief valves, designed to prevent a rupture and explosion. The intumescent coating was only the first line of defence. In fact, it held up well after the two hours had elapsed; and, having been brought under control, the fire was allowed to burn itself out safely.

The HSE has advised me that "20 minutes from disaster" was a gross exaggeration; nevertheless, it is examining the vessels and samples of the intumescent coating. That investigation should provide a clearer picture of the effects of the fire on the vessels and any lessons learnt will be acted on quickly. The HSE has also told me that, even if the vessels or the reactor had exploded, the off-site effects would have been minimal. I well understand the concern of local residents and businesses, but, according to the HSE, they were never in danger and the safety provision and plans are designed to ensure that. People downwind of the site, however, were advised to stay indoors as a precaution against smoke inhalation.

The hon. Gentleman has suggested that local residents should have been evacuated. To be fair to him, he has not done so today, but I understand that he has done so previously; if he has not, others have. I apologise if I have misquoted the hon. Gentleman, who is now shaking his head vigorously.

Evacuation would not have been sensible. The correct response is for residents to stay indoors with their doors and windows closed. Leaflets giving that advice had already been given to local people as part of the information required under the Control of Industrial Major Accidents Hazards Regulations—CIMAH—which are our way of complying with the Seveso directive.

Throughout the incident, teams of Octel employees and the emergency services were touring residential areas downwind of the site, but detected no danger from hydrogen chloride fumes. I am also advised that phosgene was never released and that, even if matters had proceeded further, it is unlikely that that would have happened.

Mr. Miller

My comments about phosgene—like my comments about the safety of the slops vessel—derived from the best advice that was available to the fire brigade at the time of the incident. The brigade was working on its own; its instruction sheets show that, in certain states of combustion, phosgene can be a product of a fire of that type. It was using the best possible judgment at the time.

Mr. Forsyth

I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman. Neither of us, I suspect, is particularly expert in this area. The advice that I have given has come from the Health and Safety Executive. In so far as it will provide reassurance to his constituents, I am sure that he will welcome it.

The hon. Gentleman mentioned the design and location of the plant. The Health and Safety Executive requires plant to be built to the latest standards and will ensure that it is at Octel. That is the assurance which the hon. Gentleman sought. Moreover, the prohibition notice currently in force requires the firm to provide evidence that hazards have been properly assessed and appropriate precautions taken.

The HSE does not believe that isolation of the slops tank would be either viable or desirable. The tank is an integral part of the ethyl chloride plant, but I shall ask the HSE to consider the hon. Gentleman's concerns carefully.

On the location of the plant, the CIMAH regulations aim to minimise the rise of a major accident and to limit the effects of any accidents that occur. Clearly, even after all reasonable steps have been taken to comply with health and safety law, the risk of accident cannot be removed altogether. We must await the results of the HSE's investigation before considering what more might need to be done. I shall ensure that the hon. Gentleman's point about whether conditions could ever arise in which phosgene is generated is addressed.

Mr. Miller

The point on which my constituents would like clarification is whether the Minister has ruled out, in absolute terms, a public inquiry into the incident.

Mr. Forsyth

The Health and Safety Commission has powers to call a public inquiry and Ministers have powers to direct it to set up an inquiry. We can also, off our own bat, establish a public inquiry. I should like to read the Commission's report to see how it proposes to handle the report that it will receive from the executive before reaching any view. I am not ruling out the possibility, but it would be wrong to address that matter until we have seen the results of the executive's investigation and report and of the consideration by the commission.

The hon. Gentleman asked whether there were sufficient resources for the fire brigade and other emergency services. As he knows, the Cheshire fire brigade classified the incident as a major fire and 263 firefighters were involved. I gather that, in future, as a result of plans to withdraw two emergency rescue tenders from service, the heavy rescue equipment formerly carried on them will be carried on 16 front-line pumping applicances. A dedicated crew will be allocated to the chemical incident unit, which will move to Crewe. That is in addition to the unit based at Ellesmere Port fire station.

I understand that the chief fire officer of Cheshire fire brigade has said that the brigade's firefighting and rescue capability will be enhanced by those measures.

The hon. Member may be aware that the changes require the approval of the Home Secretary. It is my right hon. and learned Friend's practice to grant such approval only where he is satisfied that nationally recognised minimum standards of fire cover will continue to be maintained. I shall ensure that the hon. Gentleman's concerns are brought to his attention so that he can take them into account.

I should mention how the work of emergency planning units on sites covered by the CIMAH regulations is funded. The regulations allow local authorities to charge site operators for providing such services. They are not covered by the civil defence funding arrangements.

I shall now discuss the concerns about arrangements for warning the general public. The off-site warnings are provided for in the CIMAH arrangements. I understand that there are two sirens on the Octel complex; one is used to warn of fire and the other to warn of gas escapes. Those sirens can be heard up to two and a half miles away. On the night of 1 February, both sirens were sounded at 20.32. The gas warning siren remained on until 01.15 on 2 February; the fire warning siren stopped at 21.00.

In addition, a fire brigade rescue tender toured the Ellesmere Port area adjacent to the M53 to alert the public by loudhailer. Two other fire brigade vehicles were sent to Helsby and Hapsford to assess off-site effects. They reported negative effects and so local hailers were not deployed. The villagers of Ince, Elton and Helsby were warned by television and radio.

I know that there have been complaints from residents in the area who were worried that they were not warned, but I understand that they lived in areas upwind of the incident, so there was no need to warn them.

In the light of representations made by local people, I will ask the Health and Safety Executive to consider the adequacy of the off-site arrangements—indeed, I understand that it already plans to do so.

The hon. Member for Ellesmere Port and Neston mentioned worries about whether the emergency services could have coped with another incident in the same area. For large incidents, plans exist for Cheshire fire brigade to supplement its front-line fire appliances with others from neighbouring brigades. On that occasion Clwyd and Merseyside assisted. The plan required the most important fire stations in Cheshire to be manned by moving other appliances from the surrounding area to backfill behind the appliances that were called in to the Octel incident. In the event of a second incident in the Cheshire fire brigade area, those supporting appliances would have been used. Cheshire is well placed to receive substantial support, if required, from Merseyside fire brigade.

I am grateful for the positive approach that the hon. Gentleman has taken to the matter, especially in his discussions with my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State and myself. I have asked the Health and Safety Executive to keep me in touch with developments, and will keep the hon. Gentleman informed as well.

Question put and agreed to.

Adjourned accordingly at one minute past Three o'clock.