APPEALS FROM IMMIGRATION APPEAL TRIBUNAL (Hansard, 11 January 1993)

§ Mr. Charles Wardle

I am sorry for my delay, Mr. Deputy Speaker, but the hours have been dragging on and I get the strong impression from the helpful hint of the hon. Member for Nottingham, North (Mr. Allen) that I may deal with the amendments fairly swiftly.

Both amendments seek to widen the scope of clause 8. In respect of amendment No. 13, the final tier of appeal in immigration and asylum matters from the immigration appeal tribunal to the Court of Appeal is intended only for the resolution of questions of law. Questions of fact should already have been resolved by the appeal structure leading up to this tribunal. Asylum claims are initially decided on behalf of the Secretary of State by officers of the asylum division. Appeals against the initial decisions can be made on questions of either fact or law to a special adjudicator. Provision is made for appeals, with leave, from the special adjudicator's determination to the tribunal on questions of either fact or law. As a matter of general practice, the Court of Appeal does not usually interfere with a 701 tribunal's findings of fact, particularly where such findings turn on which witnesses are to be believed or the weight to be attached to particular evidence. I can see no reason to make an exception to this practice in the situation covered by clause 8.

With regard to amendment No. 14, a leave requirement is routinely provided for in the case of appeals to the Court of Appeal from courts, such as the county courts, and tribunals, such as the employment appeal tribunal. I can see no reason why a special exception should be made in the present case. In addition, the absence of a leave requirement would be likely to result in an unacceptably large number of unmeritorious appeals having to be heard by the Court of Appeal, thereby causing significant delays in those courts and consequent hardship for litigants.

For those reasons, I urge the House to reject the amendment.