HC Deb 19 April 1993 vol 223 cc155-64

Motion made, and Question proposed, That this House do now adjourn.—[Mr. MacKay.]

1.13 am
Mr. George Robertson (Hamilton)

On a point of order, Mr. Deputy Speaker. Can you help the House? I know that you have resumed the Chair and that that causes certain problems when describing what occurred when the House was sitting as a Committee of the whole House, but would it be possible for you to explain the slight confusion at the end of the Committee's proceedings? Can I take it that the moving of new clause 8 will occur at the beginning of the next sitting of the Committee and that the motion to report progress took place prior to any—

Mr. Deputy Speaker (Mr. Geoffrey Lofthouse)

Order. New clause 8 has been moved, but it can be debated at the next sitting.

1.14 am
Mr. Brian Wilson (Cunninghame, North)

This debate arises directly out of the determination by Sheriff Alexander Jessop following the fatal accident inquiry into the deaths of 11 men in the North sea, after the tragic failure of a brief flight between the Cormorant Alpha platform and the accompanying safe supporter on 14 March last year. I wish to pay tribute to Sheriff Jessop for the depth and clarity of his report. I also want to place on record the sympathy of this House to the bereaved of that accident, which reminded us again of the high cost of North sea oil and gas, in terms of human life.

I do not have time to analyse in detail Sheriff Jessop's findings, and indeed I do not want to confine this debate to the specific circumstances of Cormorant Alpha. One of Sheriff Jessop's observations was: each and every witness was anxious to ensure that as much as possible could be learned from this tragic accident to ensure that future deaths might be prevented. It is in that broader spirit that I approach tonight's debate, and raise relevant questions.

Central to what I am asking the Minister to respond to is a concern about the means which at present exist for enforcing and regulating helicopter safety in the North sea. Sheriff Jessop has asked the Civil Aviation Authority to carry out a wide-ranging review of helicopter safety. This is undoubtedly overdue. As things stand, the CAA is the appropriate body for him to call upon.

However, I am bound to express my own view, which is also the long-standing position of the Labour party, that we need an independent safety body, the sole concern of which is safety in all its forms. It should not be an agency with other governmental responsibilities. The nearest parallel which I can draw is with the National Transportation Safety Board in the United States. This is the kind of body which should now have—and, indeed, years ago should have had—overall responsibility for helicopter safety in the North sea, and much else besides.

I believe the record of the Civil Aviation Authority in these matters must be subjected to scrutiny. Sheriff Jessop commented upon their "reactive" role. Many who work in the North sea believe that even this term does not adequately reflect the CAA's reluctance to take a lead. The point was made to me that Shell had at least taken the initiative in introducing its own adverse weather regime as a form of self-regulation. It deserves credit for doing so, albeit after the Cormorant Alpha tragedy had occurred. No other oil company has yet followed suit, which is regrettable. But the even more serious point is that the Civil Aviation Authority has not obliged any oil company, including Shell, to introduce these precautions. Surely it should not be down to individual oil, or helicopter, companies to decide on such a fundamental safety issue. The regulations should come through the regulatory body, and at present that means the CAA.

Sheriff Jessop has asked the CAA itself to review the adverse weather issue, and a list of others. But the point has been made to me that this is a case of asking the poacher to investigate the poacher, because many of the worries about helicopter safety in the North sea stem directly from the perception that the CAA has been, at best, "reactive" and, at worst, inactive over a long period. Nobody questions its integrity or professional competence, but it does work under pressure as an agency of Government to take account of factors other than safety.

As for adverse weather, the contradiction is that the helicopters are designed to withstand conditions in which the safety apparatus may not function. Shell has now acknowledged that fast dinghies, which may be the only realistic means of effecting a rescue, may not be launched from safety vessels in conditions which give rise to waves of over 5.5 m. That is in line with the CAA specifications for these small craft.

However, the Super Puma helicopter, for instance, is thought to be able to float in 30-ft waves. There may be limited point in that admirable characteristic if nobody can get launched to rescue the people who are on board, because of the same fierce weather conditions.

Does it not make sense to bring these factors into line? It is not, in such circumstances, the performance of the helicopter which matters more but the performance of the means of rescue. If these means do not exist, then should the helicopter be flying?

The CAA knows that helicopters are less safe than fixed-wing aircraft. As one helicopter pilot said to me, the CAA dresses people up as if they were going to the moon to travel on board one. In spite of the recognition that there is a higher risk of men ending up in the sea, the CAA does not seek to guarantee, in so far as anything can be guaranteed, an environment in which that eventuality is survivable.

That is the key paradox. Quite simply, one should not have helicopters flying over 50-ft waves unless some realistic assurance exists that there will be means of survival if the helicopter ends up in the sea. At present, the safety regime seems to rely on the statistical probability that the helicopter will not ditch and that if it does, it will not be one of those nasty days. Sadly, reality does not always match statistical probability.

I shall touch quickly on some other points. It is clear that pilot fatigue can be a factor in helicopter accidents. The logic of that reality is surely that, in the interests of safety, we should be moving towards shorter flying hours for pilots, or at least retaining the status quo. The present flight time and duty hour limitations were introduced only in 1990, specifically in response to the concerns of aero-medical examiners serving the Aberdeen area about the high incidence of fatigue among helicopter pilots. Now it seems that the process is to be reversed.

The newly issued EC proposals for limitations, to take effect in 1995, represent a considerable liberalising of the position and are causing great concern in the industry. They were drawn up, incidentally, with the involvement of non-EC countries where existing standards may be less rigid, which seems a little odd.

Under those proposals, there are no controls to prevent duty hours from being acquired in a short period. Some activities, such as standby at the place of work, may not count as duty. There are reduced provisions for rest clays. In short, the British Air Line Pilots Association—BALPA —believes that the net effect of the current proposals could be a cumulative increase in flying hours of almost 40 per cent. over the maximum currently permitted in the United Kingdom over a three-day period. That, quite simply, is unacceptable, and must not be accepted by the Department of Transport.

I turn briefly to the carriage of safety equipment, which takes me back to the question of who should exercise a regulatory role. The question whether survival craft are best carried inside or outside the helicopter strikes me as fundamental. In all the years that helicopters have been operating in the North sea, one would have thought that an informed decision might have been made on which solution offers the better prospect of survival. One would then expect the CAA to regulate accordingly.

Not so. This, like so much else, is still a matter for the individual operator. Putting the craft outside the helicopter costs more money. Some operators, notably British International Helicopters, accept that commitment; others do not. In my view, it should be a matter not of choice but of regulation.

I shall say a word about search and rescue helicopters from mainland bases. My hon. Friend the Member for Dundee, West (Mr. Ross) wants to pursue the point with the leave of the House and with the agreement of the Minister. I asked a number of people involved in the North sea what they thought about recent cuts. In each case, they thought them regrettable and potentially dangerous. "We certainly didn't want to lose Leuchars," one pilot said to me. Frankly, if they—along with many others—did not want to lose Leuchars, they should not have lost it, and that cover should be restored.

I have one final point, which is not directly for the Minister, but which I hope he will draw to the attention of a colleague. Sheriff Jessop, having presided over this harrowing inquiry, specifically recommended that witnesses in such inquiries should have access to legal aid. I hope that his authoritative view will be accepted.

I am grateful to have had the opportunity to raise these important matters, and I am grateful to the Minister for being here at this time, and, because of the circumstances in which the debate was obtained, at slightly shorter notice than usual. As the tragedy of Cormorant Alpha demonstrated, like many tragedies before it, we are talking literally of matters of life and death. We owe the people working in the North sea a great deal. Indeed, we owe them nothing but the best, and that means nothing but the safest.

1.23 am
Mr. Ernie Ross (Dundee, West)

I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Cunninghame, North (Mr. Wilson) and the Minister for allowing me a couple of minutes to speak on this issue. It is not just the fact that many hon. Members, if they had been aware that this debate was taking place, would have wanted to say something about the withdrawal of the search and rescue facilities, especially at Leuchars, which is not in my constituency, but in the constituency of the hon. and learned Member for Fife, North-East (Mr. Campbell) who, I am sure, would have wished to have made some comment.

The matter is of concern to those of us on the east coast of Scotland, not only because of the facility that was available to those who wanted to go climbing in and around Tayside but because of the part that it played in the many incidents that unfortunately occur offshore in the various east Neuk holiday resorts and in holiday resorts off the east coast of Scotland. Had the hon. and learned Member for Fife, North-East been here, he would have been able to put the case for the retention of that search and rescue facility more strongly than I can.

I am also concerned about the movement of search and rescue helicopters down the whole of the east coast. Some of the changes that are taking place—particularly the movement of the SAR helicopters from Coltishall to Wattisham—have put some grass platforms in the southern sector at least 20 more minutes beyond the limit that is normally acceptable, and that is bound to give us cause for concern.

Let me return to the Cormorant Alpha accident. As my hon. Friend explained, the concern over safety is that there is a gap between the regulatory responsibilities of the Health and Safety Executive and the Civil Aviation Authority. Similarly, as regards the decision whether to fly, there is a gap in responsibility between the offshore installation manager, who is responsible for everything on the installation, and the pilot, who is responsible for the helicopter and the passengers.

We know from anecdotal evidence that many of the unions, including my union, MSF, have gathered a great deal of evidence to suggest that, in the North sea, pilots are under pressure to fly in conditions that are bad enough to justify a decision not to fly. An unco-operative pilot could lose his employer the next contract.

Because the CAA says that the pilot is responsible, those commercial pressures are never revealed. If the pilot admitted that he had flown when he thought that the conditions were not correct, he could end up losing his licence, and that could lead to his dismissal. If he does not respond to the pressures put on him by his employer, his employer could lose the contract.

Even if the employer supported the pilot when he said that he believed that the conditions were not right for him to fly, there is the possibility that, when the contract review came along, the employer could lose. All those areas of concern needed to be answered by the Minister—if not tonight, on a later occasion.

We have plenty of hard evidence, which will be going to tribunals in the near future, to suggest that oil companies often tell the contractor who to keep and who to make redundant: often, the oil companies themselves do not deny it. Again, the pressure is on the pilots.

As my hon. Friend said, we are also worried that, given the conditions on arrival at the scene, an arrival time of two hours for night flights is not adequate. There is no way that many of those involved in incidents can survive during the period that it takes the helicopter to reach the scene.

The Norwegians base an SAR machine offshore to provide better cover. I hope that the Minister will be able to say what steps have been taken to base search and rescue helicopters offshore to take account of that concern. We are concerned that some of the changes that the Ministry of Defence has made were on safety itself, and I hope that the Minister will be able to return to that matter at a later time.

One other element involved in the Cormorant accident was the use of cordless headsets in the helicopters. There has been some debate about whether the cordless headset is viable or makes sense. There is evidence that, unfortunately, during the Cormorant Alpha accident, someone was trapped when the cord was wrapped around his neck. There are clear signs that, in many cases, companies are resisting a move towards cordless headsets, simply because of finance. I hope that the Minister will say that the Government support the use of cordless headsets in helicopters, and that pressure will be placed on companies to introduce them as quickly as possible.

1.29 am
The Minister for Transport in London (Mr. Steve Norris)

I congratulate the hon. Member for Cunninghame, North (Mr. Wilson) on securing this Adjournment debate on an important issue that affects the safety of thousands of workers in the often hostile environment of the North sea. It is useful for the House to have this opportunity to consider the matter, and the debate is also timely, as the hon. Gentleman said, given the recent publication of the sheriff's report in Aberdeen about the accident near the Cormorant Alpha platform last March. I hope that the hon. Gentleman will allow me to join him in expressing our sympathy to those who were bereaved in the accident, and to pay tribute to the work of Sheriff Jessop, who has produced a comprehensive and useful report.

I must tell the hon. Member for Cunninghame, North and the hon. Member for Dundee, West (Mr. Ross), whose interest in the matter is consistent, that I may not be able to answer all the technical points that have been raised, but I undertake to study the record and to respond to any of the points that I cannot answer this evening.

With regard to cordless headsets, I recall the evidence given to the sheriff about the sad circumstances of one of the fatalities, which appeared to show that the person concerned was unable to extricate himself from the head cord. However, I am unsure whether that is a situation that demands a position from the Government. If it is, it is one of the matters to which I hope to return.

North sea oil and gas are of vital importance to the economy, but we must ensure that safety is always the first priority in aviation or any other activity. In the United Kingdom, the regulation of civil aviation safety is a matter for the Civil Aviation Authority. The letter from my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State to Christopher Chataway setting out the CAA's objectives makes it very clear that safety is the responsibility of the CAA, and that the Government do not intend to interfere in the discharge of those duties.

Aircraft accidents in the United Kingdom are investigated by the air accidents investigation branch of the Department of Transport. That organisation is deliberately separate from the CAA, so that the regulators are not put in the position of having to judge the effectiveness of their rules and regulations. As the hon. Member for Cunninghame, North said, that would be a bit like asking poachers to judge other poachers.

The AAIB is very widely respected in the aviation community—for instance, its painstaking reconstruction and report of the Lockerbie disaster has drawn worldwide acclaim. The branch is, of course, preparing a very detailed report on the accident at Cormorant Alpha, and this will be published at the end of May. It would not be right for me to prejudge that report.

However, I can assure the House that the CAA will study the AAIB's report very carefully when it is published, as it does in all such cases. It will be for it, using its professional expertise, to decide on action to be taken in response to the safety recommendations in the report. I understand that the CAA is also studying the report on Sheriff Jessop's fatal accident inquiry. There is already a significant programme of work aimed at improving helicopter safety and I shall return to that shortly.

The principal use of helicopters in the United Kingdom for passenger and cargo transport is in the North sea, where, as was said, the extreme environmental hazards are well known. Some eight different types of multi-engined aircraft are used, more than half being the largest types, the Super Pumas and S-61s, each carrying up to 19 passengers. In 1992, the United Kingdom offshore helicopter operations involved some 256,000 flights by 122 helicopters, carrying nearly 2 million passengers.

Even those large figures show a reduction on recent years—in 1991, 137 aircraft on 323,000 flights carried nearly 2.4 million passengers. I give the House those figures simply to put the safety record into perspective vis-a-vis the great number of uneventful helicopter operations.

In the 12 years 1981 to 1992 inclusive, there have been six fatal helicopter crashes offshore, 72 passenger fatalities and the death of 10 crew, of whom more than half were lost in the 1986 accident, when 43 passengers and a pilot died in the Boeing Chinook near Sumburgh in Shetland. That sort of helicopter is no longer used. Sadly and unusually, there were two unprecedented accidents in 1992, in each of which a deck worker was killed by a helicopter rotor.

I must stress that we are looking at the statistics of rare events—six fatal accidents in more than 3 million flights —and one accident can have a marked influence on the apparent trends. If one takes a five-year moving average, the number of fatal accidents per million hours flown declined from more than five to less than two through the 1980s. However, one accident in 1990 and the one in 1992 have pushed the average back up to 3.5. The CAA and the industry know that continued efforts are needed to maintain an improvement in that record.

Mr. Ernie Ross

The statistical evidence which the Minister is producing would not normally be challenged. However, in the North sea, we are moving to not normally manned platforms, which will mean about 20,000 to 30,000 extra flying hours per employee, and, unfortunately, such incidents are more likely to occur. Although the statistics were relevant before, they will not be relevant once we move more towards not normally manned installations.

Mr. Norris

That is a fair point to make. I do not want to overdo the point on which I have been elaborating. It is merely to set the incidence of accidents in the context of a busy theatre of activity in which literally millions of passengers are being transported. It is always a difficult thing to do, but in the short time available I am trying to place in context the sort of accident rate that we have had, wherein, for example, a single accident had a significant effect on the statistical averages because of the number of fatalities that have occurred over 12 years.

The oil industry, under the aegis of the United Kingdom Offshore Operators Association, has set up a helicopter safety steering group. The aim of that group is to co-ordinate progress towards improved helicopter safety. The CAA, the three principal helicopter operating companies—Bristow, Bond and British International Helicopters—and the British Helicopter Advisory Board, chaired by Lord Glenarthur, are represented on the group. Subjects already under study include improvements to lifejackets and the automatic inflation of emergency floats.

It is worth repeating that helicopter operations in the North sea take place in a wide range of weather conditions, but not beyond those approved by CAA in terms of the capability of aircraft and crew. Nonetheless, it is often a hostile environment. The oil companies generally have a wind-speed limit for working on helidecks, and require their employees to wear survival suits when flying. They also give their employees training in emergency procedures. The hon. Gentleman raised the question whether all companies in the North sea should operate adverse weather policies. Clearly, that is an important question.

In his report of the fatal accident inquiry into the Cormorant Alpha crash, the sheriff recommended that every operator and installation in the North sea should take into account the effect of adverse weather on the availability of rescue resources. The Health and Safety Executive is considering that matter in the context of planned new regulations on emergency response, on which it intends to issue a consultative document in the summer.

The new offshore safety case regulations, which come into force this year, require a demonstration that foreseeable risks to persons from a major accident have been fully assessed and measures in place to reduce risks to as low as is reasonably practicable. In that context, it would effectively impose what amounts to an adverse weather policy requirement on operators in the North sea under the new safety case regulations.

The hon. Member for Dundee, West referred to the adequacy of search and rescue facilities. During this debate, I do not want to go into the whole question of the deployment of individual helicopters. I hope that he will allow me to get back to him on that. Suffice it to say that we have search and rescue facilities in the United Kingdom which are the envy of most other countries.

Aeronautical search and rescue is co-ordinated by the rescue and co-ordination centres of the RAF. The centres can call on RAF, Royal Navy and coastguard helicopters as well as other ships and aircraft. In addition, Shell provides a helicopter station in the east Shetland basin which is available to assist with SAR. Helicopters are sometimes called up to operate SAR missions in sea states too hazardous for small surface vessels.

We should not overlook the fact that our neighbours in Norway and Denmark also have helicopter operations in the North sea, albeit on a smaller scale. It is heartening to observe that, in an emergency, the helicopters of each country can be used to help the others. Sadly, the hazards are common. The Norwegians suffered a fatal accident in 1991, with the loss of three lives.

On the matter of principles, it is worth noting that the rotary wing of the helicopter gives it well-known capabilities and manoeuvrability, which make it so important for oil industry support. However, the rotary wing and the machinery which drives and controls it make the helicopter a complex vehicle. That complexity and the uses to which the helicopter is put have made it difficult to achieve accident rates similar to comparable turbo-prop fixed-wing aeroplanes. However, it is the aim of the CAA to achieve comparable accident rates.

Mr. Wilson

Will the Minister give way?

Mr. Norris

I have only four minutes, but I give way to the hon. Gentleman.

Mr. Wilson

I realise that the Minister has only four minutes, but will he comment on pilots' hours? If he cannot respond in detail and give me the Government's view tonight, perhaps he will undertake to write to me.

Mr. Norris

I did not intend to elaborate on the subject of pilots' hours. However, the hon. Gentleman referred to it in his speech and I shall write to him specifically on it.

In the early 1980s, the CAA and the oil industry established the helicopter airworthiness review panel, which reported in 1984 with some 15 detailed recommendations. In response to the HARP recommendations, a comprehensive programme of research was defined. The cost was borne jointly by CAA, the Departments of Transport and Energy and the oil industry—the UK Offshore Operators Association. Some £1.6 million was spent in the period 1987 to 1990.

A follow-on programme costing £1.7 million is currently in progress, with the Health and Safety Executive now contributing to it. It is a tribute to all involved that the fruits of this work will soon come into service in the form of systems to monitor the technical condition of the helicopter and to provide pilots and engineers with timely warnings.

In addition to making technical improvements to helicopers, the programme includes such items as the development of visual approach guidance lights, improved helideck markings and friction surfaces.

The Health and Safety Executive has responsibility for all aspects of safety on offshore installations, whereas the CAA is responsible for flight safety. The HSE has contracted the CAA to assist with a major inspection programme of helidecks, concentrating initially on the more difficult cases. The work is now in its second year; some 95 decks have been inspected so far, with a further 60 in the current phase. The remaining, less restricted, decks will be considered later. In addition to this, the national air traffic services have worked closely with the industry to improve radio communications and radar cover for North sea operations.

The safety of helicopter operations in the North sea is generally good, considering the environmental conditions experienced. However, there is no room for complacency and the reports from the sheriff of Grampian, Highlands and Islands and the air accident investigation branch will be carefully considered.

There are naturally calls for a review of North sea helicopter safety. As I have told the House, much work is in hand, and I would be cautious about diverting expert staff from the established programme, or of duplicating effort. It is, however, a most important subject, and I am glad that we have had the opportunity to debate it. I reiterate that I undertake to cover in writing any items which hon. Members raised which I have not covered in my speech.

Question put and agreed to.

Adjourned accordingly at seventeen minutes to Two o'clock.