Child Support Agency

HC Deb 01 April 1993 vol 222 cc713-27 6.45 am

Mr. Harry Cohen (Leyton)

I am pleased to have secured a debate on the operational guidelines for the Child Support Agency. The agency will come into operation on 5 April and I have already heard advertisements for it on the radio which have a background of reassuring, soft-soap music that is intended to assure the public that it will be of assistance to them. The adverts hide, however, the operation of a potentially vicious piece of legislation, especially for many of the women whom it is intended to help. I think that it will help many women to obtain maintenance payments from the father of their child and it will also help some fathers. At the same time, it is potentially vicious for some women. I shall set out the reasons for that when I refer to the operational guidelines.

The Child Support Act 1991 passed through the House without the detailed scrutiny that such a measure should have received. That was probably because it passed through this place shortly before the general election. It was the strategy of the then leader of the Labour party, my right hon. Friend the Member for Islwyn (Mr. Kinnock), not to make matters such as child support issues in the election campaign. He decided to concentrate on the main areas of difference between the parties, such as unemployment and the national health service, and to avoid other arguments. In some instances it was felt that the Labour party would have problems in defending itself and in others it was considered that the issues could be distorted. We know, however, that my right hon. Friend did not concentrate entirely on unemployment and the NHS and that he introduced proportional representation at the end of the campaign, but that is history. It was the tactic not to make the Child Support Bill an issue.

The principle that a father should pay for his child is generally accepted. I do not think that there is any doubt about that. It is only unfortunate that the details behind the principle were not examined in detail. For example, the Treasury will be the main benefactor when the agency comes into operation. We know that 70 per cent. of all single mothers are on income support. Every extra penny that they obtain through the agency will go to the Treasury. The guidelines were not issued at the time that the Bill passed through the House, so the intimidation aspect was not given proper consideration. Nor were the family poverty consequences of the benefit penalties considered. If a woman is deemed not to have co-operated, she can lose £8.80 per week from her income support for six months and a further £4.40 per week for the next 12 months. That can push a woman and her family below the poverty line, so both her welfare and that of her child or children may be jeopardised. The House did not give the Bill the scrutiny that it deserved.

There is no advantage to pursuing a maintenance claim for the majority of the 70 per cent. of single mothers on income support because any maintenance would be set off against their income support. Many of those women would not receive an extra penny, yet they would confront a panoply of threats and risks. The operational guidelines will discourage genuine income claims from many women.

Intimidation by DSS or Child Support Agency officers, however well they have been trained, will inevitably occur. The woman could be "locked up" in a DSS office, perhaps with her child, until she gives the required information. Under the guidelines, she can be pursued at her home or at work until she provides that information. She may be at home and without any support while the interview is conducted. She may be asked intimate questions about her sex life that she does not want to answer. She may be told that she has no good reason for refusing to give information, even if she fears that to do so might have violent consequences for her and her children. She can also be threatened with the benefit cuts to which I referred earlier. Women in that situation must take on the new role of informers to the DSS part of the police state that is being established in that respect.

The message to women with children on benefits is that they cannot be independent—they must disclose information about themselves and about the father of their children, or they will lose a substantial proportion of their benefit.

The guidelines place a woman and her child or children at personal risk. The Child Support Agency leaves women in the lurch and accepts no responsibilty for the consequences of a woman disclosing information that the agency requires. Under the application of the "Requirement to Co-operate Policy Guidelines", which were recently published, the parent with care—PWC—must show good cause for refusing to co-operate, or she will lose benefit. Even if she fears that making such a disclosure is against her own best interests, she must do so. The guidelines give many examples of women being forced to disclose.

The beginning of the guidelines refers to a parent not having to give the information if she will suffer "harm or undue distress" as a result. That seems reasonable, but no technical definition of harm or undue distress is given: a good deal of discretion is given to the Child Support Agency and the DSS officer concerned.

The guidelines give the dictionary definition of harm— to hurt, injure or damage"— and of undue distress— excessive, unjustifiable or disproportionate strain, pressure, anguish or pain". What the guidelines do not mention is the woman's fear of those experiences. That is an unsatisfactory start: the guidelines do not provide the necessary get-out for the woman who could become a victim if she discloses information about the father of her child.

The guidelines give the DSS the opportunity to "doorstep" a woman at her home, perhaps to snoop on her—that has happened in the past—or even to knock on the door of her place of work. Paragraph 7 states: several important points … should be borne in mind"— I shall return to that phrase— the welfare of any children living with the PWC must be considered. That is not a factor that would allow a woman not to disclose if the children's welfare would be damaged; it need only be "borne in mind" by the DSS officer. In many ways it is a meaningless guideline and the DSS is likely to go ahead and cut the benefit anyway if it so chooses.

Paragraph 7 states that the PWC has a right to be believed unless what she says is inherently contradictory or implausible". Implausible to whom? To the DSS officer. If he takes a hard line, the phrase "borne in mind" will not fit the bill.

There is another interesting aspect of paragraph 7, which states: a reduced benefit direction is a strong sanction and will have an important impact on the income of a PWC". In the context of paragraph 7, that is a threat: a DSS officer can say, "I am going to impose this sanction to make you give the information."

The paragraph also states that such reductions should not feature in any benefit savings statistics. That is disingenuous: over time, pressure could still be imposed for cutting benefits. The Government have published league tables in every other area; they may do the same in this regard, thus putting pressure on DSS officers to cut benefit.

If the woman fails to complete and return the form she will be penalised. She will be deemed to have refused to co-operate. Paragraph 12 says that the Child Support Agency is supposed to help a woman who does not want to fill in the form—for reasons connected with her own safety-to obtain maintenance. That is a lie, for 70 per cent. of women will obtain no extra maintenance. That money goes to the Treasury. Women will see through that deception.

The paragraph also says that the absent parent will not be given the woman's address by the DSS officer, or even information about the town where she lives. That would be a welcome statement, if it were true. In most circumstances, however, the absent parent will know the woman's address. I have already asked why the Child Support Agency does not pick up the consequences of its actions. It does not offer any support to women who want to be rehoused if they have been forced to give this information. In the majority of cases, the absent parent is likely to know the address. The Child Support Agency does not help the woman to find safe housing when her address is known to the absent parent.

The paragraph goes on to state that the payment of maintenance does not give the absent parent the right to contact the child. What help is there with legal fees in those circumstances? The social fund does not make it a priority for the DSS to obtain an injunction against the absent parent to prevent him from gaining access, if that is what the woman wants. The Child Support Agency washes its hands, even though that is the consequence of what it forces upon women in a number of cases.

In addition, the paragraph states that the mother may want more flexibility in her life and that maintenance will help her to get it. In the majority of cases, that is a laughable statement. If a single mother is on income support, any maintenance is matched by a cut in her benefit. There is no flexibility for her. The extra money goes to the Treasury.

Paragraph 13 states that if a woman still refuses to co-operate, despite knowing of the help that she can obtain from the Child Support Agency, consideration will need to be given to whether the parent with care and/or any children living with her will be at risk of harm or undue distress. Again, that sounds all right, but it could be interpreted as the DSS saying to the woman, "You're not a proper mother. You haven't co-operated." My reading of that paragraph is that the kids could end up going into care. Co-operation with the Child Support Agency is regarded in the guidelines as more important than a woman's perception of the harm or damage that might be done to her or her children. That is not satisfactory.

According to paragraph 14 of the guidelines, there will be no definitive list of circumstances. Each case will be taken as it comes. That could lead to considerable inconsistency in deciding who must disclose and who does not have to disclose. A woman in one area may have to disclose, whereas a woman in exactly similar circumstances in another area may not.

The guidelines deal also with the question of fear of violence. In this regard, there is the matter of the victims of sexual abuse, including rape and incest, resulting in the birth of a child. Pressure is put on the woman to name the father, even in those serious and fearful circumstances. Again the Child Support Agency washes its hands of the consequences, saying that they are a matter for the police and that it will not reveal the woman's address. That might well be ludicrous, for obvious reasons. In such circumstances the Child Support Agency makes absolutely no commitment to provide safe housing—another appalling fault. Paragraph 18 says that, although cases must be handled with extreme care, the information must be obtained. It must be obtained despite the woman's fears.

Paragraph 19 provides that it is for the officer of the Child Support Agency, not for the woman, to determine whether there is a risk of harm or undue distress. What will be the level of an officer making such decisions? I expect that it is likely to be a relatively low level on the administrative scale, yet the officer will have enormous discretion in cases of considerable sensitivity.

Paragraphs 20 to 24 relate to an absent parent who may want to see his child. Paragraph 20 deals with the fear that if the absent parent is required to pay maintenance he will demand to see the child, even if that is considered to be disruptive. The woman may wish to sever all links with the absent parent. These are very good reasons for not having to provide information, but it is not recognised in the guidelines. The guidelines state that maintenance is entirely separate from access. They also state that many parents with care and absent parents are known to link the two but it is important to stress that both the parents are responsible for maintaining the child subject to their financial circumstances. In other words, it is admitted that parents link the two issues. That is right, because, in many cases, if the absent parent pays maintenance, he will demand access and thus come back into the woman's life, which could cause great problems for her. In any event, that will be her fear.

Once again, the Child Support Agency washes its hands of the matter. There is no comment on what happens if the woman's fears are realised and the father demands access. The guidelines contain no help for the woman or child whose lives might be disrupted. They take no account of the possible consequences of its demands.

Paragraph 22 states: A belief that an approach to an AP would result in demand for contact should not, on its own, normally be sufficient to enable a PWC to succeed in a claim that harm or undue distress would be caused. Again, the guidelines ride roughshod over the mother's fears. It is for the courts, or someone else, to take up the issue of access, but there is no help for the woman to get a court injunction. She will get nothing from the social fund in those circumstances. Often, it will be too late for her to go to court because the damage will have been done.

Paragraph 23 states: The PWC's wish to sever links with the AP should not normally provide grounds for her to succeed in a claim of harm or undue distress. There would normally need to be additional factors for that to be the case. The wishes of the parent with care are being overridden by the DSS, with the result that she must make a disclosure.

Paragraph 24 states that PWCs may refuse to co-operate because it could cause them or their children undue distress to re-open any degree of contact after a lengthy period. In that case, additional factors would be required for the case to be made. Paragraphs 22 to 24 reveal that the Child Support Agency could not care less about the children's best interests.

Paragraph 26 is interesting. It states: Sometimes, a PWC will wish to protect an AP … because he is living in a stable relationship with someone else', but the guidelines do not care about that. The paragraph continues: It would be unusual for this situation to justify a claim that co-operating would cause undue distress". even though it might be a genuine reason for not making a disclosure. Why should a state agency disrupt a stable relationship in another family?

The same paragraph also states: The PWC should be reminded that the CSA will act as a buffer between her and the AP and that … contact with the AP will be on a confidential basis. A lot of women will not believe that that will necessarily happen. There is no guarantee of confidentiality, and the CSA is not liable if it breaks that guideline. That is not satisfactory.

Paragraph 27 is about parents who are juveniles—that is, parents who are either under 16 or, although over 16, are still classed as children for income support purposes. They do not have to disclose who the absent parent is, but they will have to do so as soon as they put in their own claim for income support, when they become 16 or when they leave school, so they could well face threats and intimidation along the lines of, "Disclose the parent now, because you will have to tell us when you are 16 anyway." So juvenile mothers could be put under great duress.

Paragraphs 29 and 30 refer to those who may face criminal prosecution. Again, juveniles may be involved. One or other of the parents may have been under age, so there could be a prosecution. Paragraph 29 says: Other than in the most exceptional circumstances"— which it does not explain— information obtained by the Child Support Agency will not be passed to the police. Again, there is no guarantee of that. A lot of DSS information is passed to the police, via a telephone call from police officers to the DSS office, for example. Many parents will not believe that the information will not be passed on and that prosecution will not result.

Paragraph 30 says: it is unlikely that these circumstances"— that is, the fear of being prosecuted— on their own, will be sufficient to justify a refusal to co-operate. Again, people are being forced to co-operate on pain of losing their benefit.

Paragraph 31 is about artificial insemination. There has been extensive correspondence, in which the Minister has been involved, on that subject in The Guardian. I shall not go into detail about that, but perhaps the Minister will comment on it, because he remarks in his letters to the newspaper have provoked further correspondence saying that people who have had artificial insemination still have to name the father.

Paragraph 31 also says that the former husband may have to pay maintenance. That is incredible. The former husband may have opposed the artificial insemination, or it may have taken place after the relationship had broken down. Yet he will still be pursued for maintenance. That is most unsatisfactory.

Paragraph 35 is concerned with cases in which the parent with care wanted the child but the absent parent did not. The guidelines say that, regardless of those circumstances, the absent parent still has to pay. That could be unfair in many cases. For instance, there could have been deception. There is an argument that it would be unfair for the father to have to pay in such a case.

Single women, and their freedom of choice to have a child, are the real target of the guidelines.

If a single woman—perhaps a lesbian—wants to have a child, but does not want to name the father, she will be forced to go with someone anonymous so that she cannot provide a name. That is forcing that woman into something even more immoral and denying her freedom of choice. Again, that is not acceptable.

Paragraph 40 refers to voluntary arrangements under which the parent with care may not wish to co-operate because she considers that she already has a satisfactory arrangement with the absent parent and does not wish to disturb it. According to the paragraph, she should co-operate. The disturbance of a voluntary agreement would not on its own be sufficient to justify a claim of harm or undue distress. Again, the woman will be forced to go against what she considers her own best interests.

Paragraph 41 deals with a parent with care who is mentally ill or handicapped. That might prevent her from understanding what was required, so that she might seem unco-operative. Officials are advised to treat her with patience and sensitivity because she may have given as much information as she could. The clear implication is that the DSS will still force a mentally ill or handicapped parent with care to provide the name of the father. At least, the paragraph is ambiguous and could be interpreted in that way by a hardliner in the Child Support Agency.

What about the woman who has had more than one lover around the time of conception? What will the agency do in those circumstances? Will the woman be forced to name one, both or more? Will the agency pursue the alleged absent parent and inform him that the woman slept with more than one man at the time? What will be the moral code in dealing with such cases? If either side wants DNA testing to establish the father's identity, will the agency wash its hands of the test and tell the person to pay for it if he is rich enough, or will it just label him as the parent? The Minister should answer that point. That will affect the father, but again the woman will be the victim: the DSS will be judgmental because she has had more than one lover at the time of conception. She will probably be deemed not to have co-operated and will therefore lose her benefit.

My hon. Friend the Member for Newcastle-under-Lyme (Mrs. Golding) wants to know what will happen in cases where there is a variation in the maintenance which has already been agreed by the courts. According to her constituents, already the courts are telling people that they will not deal with the matter and that it is being referred to the new agency. What is happening? Is the agency usurping the role of the courts? That is a fair point.

There is the matter of a clean break. I shall read a passage from a recent issue of The Big Issue: One of the more disturbing aspects of the New Act … is its retrospective powers. Over the past 20 years the divorce courts have favoured the clean-break principle. To guarantee a roof over the child's head, and ensure the mother was entitled to state benefits, the courts encouraged and, in many cases, ordered men to agree to clean breaks. Usually this involved the man moving out of the matrimonial home and giving up his equity in it as an alternative to paying maintenance. These couples who made a clean break settlement will now have their agreements torn up by the CSA. An article in The Guardian of 19 January says that the alternative will be exacerbated tension and wrangling over access, despite the fact that the clean-break principle was agreed. It interferes with the woman's right if she wants a clean break. The court was the final adjudicator on the matter, yet it will not be: the Child Support Agency will have the role retrospectively. It is forcing the woman to have economic dependency on a partner who is perhaps long gone from the relationship.

I shall say a word about men in such circumstances. They may have acquired the responsibility of a new family which will be disregarded in many respects by the Child Support Agency. Such men may be on income support or students with a loan, small grant or low wage which will be reduced. They may find themselves below the poverty level.

I quote a case referred to in the same issue of The Big Issue: Rob, 37, lives in Sheffield. He left his wife, Lynn, three years ago. Since then he has paid no formal maintenance. As part of a clean break agreement he moved out of the house, took on the family debts and agreed to share the care of his two daughters, who now split their time between their two parents' homes. In return he was given one third of the equity of the house and awarded a nominal maintenance order … Everyone thought the matter was settled. But Lynn is now on Income Support. 'Already' Rod says, 'the DSS has intimidated her into giving them my address. My understanding is that any money taken from me will reduce Lynn's benefits. At the same time it will reduce the amount of money I have to spend on my children.' Rod is unmoved by the suggestion that the taxpayer is supporting his children. 'I'm a taxpayer myself. I'm on low income and I pay tax at the single person's rate. I also spend money on my children. The Government has a responsibility to ensure that people do not fall below a minimum standard, children included. The effect of the Act will be to make my children worse off. I'll do all I can to resist the Child Support Agency—not because I refuse to look after my children's interests, but because I want to look after them.' That situation could be repeated in a number of circumstances.

The Child Support Agency and the guidelines to which I referred extensively could have some bad consequences for a large number of men, women and children. They could even result in violence as the bitterness which has long since been buried brought back to the surface. If that happens under the guidelines, the Child Support Agency will wash its hands of the consequences. That is immoral. The Government should re-examine the legislation, which in the next century may well be regarded as Dickensian.

7.28 am

The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Social Security (Mr. Alistair Burt)

First, I apologise to the hon. Member for Leyton (Mr. Cohen) for being a moment late arriving for the debate. I congratulate him on securing the last Adjournment debate of the night, and I am pleased to have an opportunity to respond to him.

The hon. Member and I know each other extremely well. I fully appreciate the sincerity with which he put his case. I hope that he will accept that I have the same degree of sincerity. I am worried about exactly the same people about whom he is worried. But I feel that the hon. Gentleman's fears are overblown. I hope to demonstrate to him in the next half hour or so that we have considered those fears carefully, and that they are met by the workings of the agency.

I begin by setting the Child Support Agency in context. The new agency is unique among the next steps agencies which have been set up by the Government, because it builds a new service from scratch. The service will create a new system for the assessment, collection and payment of child maintenance. The service will not only be available for those who usually come to the Department of Social Security and the Benefits Agency—those who receive benefits. It will also take over the role of the courts in assessing and enforcing maintenance for all parents who wish to take advantage of the new arrangements.

The aims of the agency are to deliver on behalf of children a consistent, effective and efficient service for the assessment, collection and payment of child maintenance. In addition, the agency aims to help parents with the care of children to make informed choices about whether to take up employment.

To achieve those aims, the agency's objectives are to implement the Child Support Act 1991 under agreed plans for the phased take-on of clients and ensure that maintenance assessments are accurate and payments are regular; to provide a service to clients which is accessible, courteous, prompt, fair and efficient, and seen by them as such; to provide clear and accurate information to clients and the public about the child support system and the services and benefits available to clients who are in work; to establish and maintain an effective working relationship with the courts, advice agencies and other organisations with an interest in the agency's business; to contribute to the Department's evaluation and development of policy and ensure that the agency can respond to change; and to make the most efficient and effective use of available resources.

The hon. Member began by saying that the purpose of the Child Support Act 1991 was not necessarily to benefit children but to benefit the taxpayer. In the case of those on income support, the broad principle behind the Child Support Act is that all parents have an obligation to maintain their children. A child has the right to be maintained by each of its parents financially, if the parents can afford to do so and no matter what the relationship between the parents has become.

The interest of the taxpayers is that, although all taxpayers would like to assist children when they need help and no other help is available, most taxpayers feel that, when the parents can meet an obligation to their children, they should do so. As the hon. Gentleman said, many taxpayers are low paid. They have their own families to look after. It surely cannot be wrong, then, that, if the obligation towards a child can properly be met by the parent, it should be. If the money that is taken from the father is used to reduce the income support pound for pound, others are relieved of a burden which they should not have.

I also remind the hon. Gentleman that family credit—the "in work" benefit—has a £15 a week maintenance disregard, so there is an encouragement for a woman to go back to work. We recognise, as the hon. Gentleman will, that the majority of lone parents do not wish or intend to stay on income support for ever. Most lone parents want to get back into work. As their children become older, obviously it becomes easier for them to return to work.

Establishing maintenance in the first place is an important part of that process. Even if at first the woman receives no immediate benefit by way of an increase in the amount of money received, should she go back into work, the maintenance will provide an extra source of income. As time goes on, having that maintenance right established and being paid will add to a woman's options. The hon. Member will agree that we want women to have the maximum range of choice in circumstances such as he has described. I feel that that choice is extended by establishing maintenance at an early stage and maintaining it throughout the child's life. That is one of the purposes of the Act, so even if some women do not see an immediate benefit to themselves financially, the benefit can accrue in the medium and longer term, and can be a real and genuine benefit.

The hon. Gentleman spent some time dealing with the guidelines for the requirement to co-operate, which I fully understand. I will come to those in some detail as time goes on, but I should like to start with some general remarks about the requirement to co-operate and why it is there; and also place it in the context of some of the remarks that he made at the beginning of this debate about the way in which Opposition Front-Bench Members had dealt with the matters throughout.

It is not the first time, as the hon. Gentleman will appreciate, that the requirement to co-operate has been raised, either with me or with my right hon. and hon. Friends in the Department of Social Security. I am, however, absolutely clear that the agency has put procedures in place to ensure that the policy of the Government is delivered, and that the policy is that the requirement to co-operate which applies to certain people receiving benefits will be waived if there are reasonable grounds for believing that there will be a risk of the parent with care or any child living with her suffering harm or undue distress as a result of authorising the Secretary of State to take action.

The hon. Gentleman questioned the need for the requirement to co-operate. I do not believe that that view is sustainable under any reasonable scrutiny. We have made it plain, and the hon. Gentleman accepts, as do his Front-Bench Members, that both parents are responsible for the financial support of their children.

During the consideration in Committee of the Child Support (Miscellaneous Amendment) Regulations 1993 on 17 March, the Front-Bench spokesman, the hon. Member for Newcastle-under-Lyme (Mrs. Golding) said: the Labour Opposition support strongly the principle of the Child Support Act of forcing financial responsibility on the absent parents".—[Official Report, Third Standing Committee on Statutory Instruments, &c., 17 March 1993; c. 7.] In another place, on 25 March, Baroness Hollis, took the same line in general, recognising that both parents, have an obligation to maintain children and that when husbands walk away from wives, or when wives walk away from husbands, they do not also walk away from their children".—[Official Report, House of Lords, 25 March 1993; Vol. 544, c. 500.] I do not believe that these general statements of support for the policy would bear any examination whatsoever if there were not some requirement on a parent with care to co-operate with the agency in seeking maintenance. If that were not the case, surely the hon. Gentleman would concede that those would just be hollow words. If it were possible for either parent, solely at his or her wish, to walk away from their obligations to their children merely because of a change in relationship between them, there would be a danger that the child would miss out. There has to be some consideration of sanction in order to give those general words of support any meaning.

I suggest to the hon. Gentleman that that form of sanction was very clearly designed in the Act, but it was precisely because we sought to explain to hon. Members throughout the House the way in which we would deal with that sanction and the sort of things that we would take into account that the Act attracted such all-party understanding and support.

Much of what the hon. Gentleman said this morning questioned the basis of the way in which we intend to apply those guidelines and deal with this difficult issue of the requirement to co-operate, but in his remarks he really did seek to present a classic worst case scenario at every step. I put it to him that we have taken sufficient care and concern to ensure that that should not happen.

I believe that it was precisely because of the intentions that we explained to the House during the passage of the Bill that it received all-party support. I do not think that it is now right for hon. Gentlemen to seek to suggest that they did not raise too much of a fuss about it because they did not know how it would work. If the words about the responsibilty of parents were really meant, they were meant with an understanding that there would have to be some consideration of sanctions should there not be co-operation with the agency.

I believe that the general welcome was given because hon. Members understood how we intended to apply the legislation. I now wish to turn to that in seeking to help the hon. Gentleman this morning. He wondered whether officers would be given sufficient training to enable them to interpret the guidelines correctly. I can assure him that staff conducting interviews will have been thoroughly trained not only in the correct procedures to follow, but in how to conduct the interview.

Great care and attention has been paid to preparing the agency's staff to deal sensitively and sympathetically with the situations. All staff who meet the public will receive training in specialist interviewing skills developed and delivered with the help of Relate, which has substantial experience of interviewing people in sensitive situations.

I am quite satisfied that the way in which we have approached training has been with the understanding in mind that women in the most sensitive and difficult circumstances may be approached. That is precisely why officers have been trained extremely carefully.

The hon. Gentleman suggested that a woman might be interviewed alone, and he used the phrase "locked in a DSS office". I am sure that he will concede that that is not my intention or that of anyone involved in the agency. I can assure him, first, that any woman who so wishes can be accompanied to an interview, and need never be alone in those circumstances. Secondly, there is no question of anyone being locked in the DSS office to complete the giving of information.

The work that we have completed on the requirement to co-operate has been carried out with the assistance of the National Council for One-Parent Families and the Child Poverty Action Group. I pay tribute to Sue Slipman and Fran Bennett, who have been extremely helpful. I do not suggest in any way that either organisation has agreed with the Government on every jot or tittle of the legislation, but they have understood what we were trying to do and how we have been trying to make our procedures as fair and resonable as possible. They have helped us immeasurably in looking at the forms, the guidelines and the statement that women would receive before interview informing them of their rights. They have been reassured of our intentions at every stage, just as the House was previously reassured.

The steps we have taken demonstrate the intentions behind the legislation. The training undertaken with Relate is part of that process, designed to reassure on the way that we handle the work.

The hon. Gentleman also suggested that the reduced benefit direction may be given at the whim of an officer in the Child Support Agency. That will not be the case. It may reassure him if I detail the steps before any reduced benefit direction might be taken.

If a parent or a parent's partner claims benefit or is in receipt of benefit, a maintenance application form will be sent out by the Benefits Agency or the Child Support Agency for completion. With that initial form requiring that an application for child maintenance should proceed, the accompanying letter includes the following provision: Under child support law you are required to apply for child support maintenance and to provide information to allow us to recover child support maintenance, unless doing so would put either you or any children living with you at risk of suffering harm or undue distress. If you believe you have good reasons on these grounds not to apply for child support maintenance, please let us know. At the first step, a parent is informed that if she is in difficult circumstances we are there to assist.

The help notes that accompany that letter, under the section headed, "Absent parent's details" state clearly: You will not be required to fill in this form if there is a risk of harm or undue distress occurring to you, or any children living with you, as a result of your providing information about the other parent, or authorising the Secretary of State to seek maintenance for you. If we had not been genuine in our intentions concerning the legislation, and if it had been a large cost-saving exercise, surely the warnings would not have been published. Those warnings are included because we understand the circumstances with which we are dealing. We wish to make it clear that, if there is any problem of the manner described by the hon. Gentleman, consideration will be given to our waiving the right to co-operate and pursue maintenance.

When the maintenance application form is returned with the absent parent details uncompleted or incomplete—or if it is not returned—a parent with care will be asked to attend an interview or will be visited at home or, if necessary, at work. The hon. Gentleman suggested that that was a form of pursuance—not so. It gives the woman maximum opportunity to be seen where she wants to be seen so that the matters can be discussed.

If, at that stage, a parent with care shows good cause why she should withhold details of the absent parent—because she has satisfied an officer that there is a reasonable chance of harm or undue distress—no further action will be taken. If she fails to show good reason why she should withhold details of the absent parent or fails to attend for interview, a letter is sent on behalf of the Secretary of State to tell her that she has not shown good reason for failing to co-operate. The parent then has six weeks in which to consider her position and make further representations to us.

If, at the end of those six weeks, the parent with care has either not co-operated or failed to show good reason, the case is referred to a child support officer, who considers all the details afresh. That officer will then write again to the parent with care and give a further 14 days in which to comply with the requirement to co-operate or give good reasons for not doing so.

After that 14-day period, if, after careful consideration, a child support officer is satisfied that there is no reason to waive the requirement to co-operative, that officer may then issue a reduced benefit direction and send a copy to the parent with care. The hon. Gentleman wondered whether, at that stage, the officer would consider the welfare of the child. Regard to the welfare of the child can be considered even at that stage—even if no co-operation with the agency has been forthcoming, and the ability to issue a reduced benefit direction has come into play. The reduced benefit direction can be stopped even at that stage if an officer considers that the welfare of the child will be adversely affected. Once the reduced benefit direction has been applied, a further appeal process is still allowed.

There is a lengthy period during which a parent's case would be considered by a number of different people before any consideration were given to a reduced benefit direction. At each stage, there would be time for a parent with care to consider her position, and advice would be open to her, from her own sources and elsewhere, on whether it would be right for her to proceed in the way in which she should.

I must make it clear to the hon. Gentleman that more than adequate cover is provided in a situation in which a woman might be unclear or unsure in any way. No sudden, out-of-the-blue, reduction of benefit will be announced. Before that step is taken, a variety of opportunities offer the chance to consider what course of conduct has been followed and why co-operation with the agency is the better step.

I should like to go through the guidelines that we have issued, in the same manner as the hon. Gentleman did. He wondered why we had not spelt out even more clearly the details relating to harm or undue distress, and why we left it at the dictionary definition. We have done so precisely because we do not wish to exclude any circumstance from our consideration.

If we try to provide an exhaustive list of examples and to define too tightly the term "harm or undue distress", there is a danger that we might miss some circumstances in which harm or undue distress is caused to parents who come before us. We made the definition as wide as possible because we wanted to leave all the options open to ensure that officers would be able to consider all the cases on an individual basis.

The sequence of events that I have just set out is detailed in the guidelines, which we have published. We made them available precisely because we wanted those who advised women to know what the precise circumstances would be. We have tried to be as open as possible in dealing with the circumstances. Paragraph 5 sets out in detail the way in which an application will be treated. It shows that we want the agency to act with good intent.

Paragraph 6 clearly sets out the opportunities of appeal. A woman need be under no fear that a sudden reduced benefit direction will come upon her with no warning, leaving her with no opportunity to do anything about it. The hon. Gentleman said that several important parts of paragraph 7 should be "borne in mind". That phrase means exactly what it says—the issues are to be in officers' minds at all times as they deal with people who come before the agency. The welfare of any children must be considered. The parent with care has a right to be believed unless what she says is inherently contradictory or improbable.

A reduced benefit direction is a strong sanction and will have an important impact on the income of a parent with care. It is very much a last resort, not something that will come quickly to an officer's mind. It is there to remind him of the impact of a benefit directive. As the hon. Gentleman said, the guidelines state. a reduced benefit direction should not be counted in any benefit saving statistics. That section was designed deliberately to provide a reassurance that the benefit direction will not be included in any targets.

We are caught in a cleft stick—if we had not included such a provision in the guidelines, the hon. Gentleman would have asked, "What about the savings that will be made under the scheme? The Government will try to ensure that plenty of women are placed in that position so that savings can be made." In order to make it clear that that is not our intention, and will not be the case, we have included that passage in the guidelines. Once we have done so, the hon. Gentleman picks on it as one of the reasons for the measure, so we cannot win.

All that I can do is to ask the hon. Gentleman to accept my assurance—as I know he will—that we will not make any savings, which are not the point of the measure and will not be included in any targets. We set out the points to be borne in mind as we wanted to show what officers should consider when they are talking to parents with care who may have difficulties.

The hon. Gentleman also referred to paragraph 12, which deals with the fact that a number of matters must be made clear to the parent with care. It states that the Child Support Agency exists to help her obtain maintenance". I have dealt with the issue of income support. A parent with care who said that there was nothing in the measure for her would be told that there is. We ask her to consider not just short-term, but medium and long-term, factors. We ask her to consider what she will want to do when the children are older and at school. If she wants to return to work, maintenance will help her. Acquiring maintenance at an early stage will open up her options for the future.

The guidelines state: she need not see the absent parent", which is absolutely right. The Child Support Agency operates as a buffer if a woman does not want to have any contact with the absent parent. While I recognise that there will be a number of circumstances in which her address will be known, there will be occasions when she will have moved away and will not want any contact, but will still feel that a man has an obligation to maintain her child. We make it clear that, in those circumstances, we act for her. We can collect the maintenance from the other parent and deal with the administration; the money will be paid to us and then paid to the woman. We can reassure her that she will not have to have contact with the absent parent if she does not want to see him.

The next part of the paragraph states that the absent parent will not be given her address or even information about the town in which she lives, which is absolutely right. The system that we have devised ensures that all correspondence goes out not from individual Benefit Agency offices in towns up and down the country but only from six regional centres. That means that an absent parent who may be looking for his former partner in circumstances in which she does not wish him to find her cannot even discern from the address of the letter from the Child Support Agency where she might be. We have tried to cover that as well. Everything in paragraph 12 is designed to enable an officer to tell a woman the sort of points that we have considered on her behalf, and that is why it is there.

Then we go into the circumstances that we have detailed in paragraph 13 and beyond, setting out some examples. In it, we stress our understanding of the difficult nature of some of the interviews and some of the situations in which we find women. We say: The interview to discuss this must be handled with care and sensitivity—many PWCs will be genuinely distressed about having to discuss the circumstances surrounding a former relationship. It will, however, be necessary to obtain enough information to enable a decision to be made about the case. That is it in a nutshell. That is the point between us.

The gist of the hon. Gentleman's argument was that he feels that in some circumstances, there should be almost automatic right of non-disclosure and, providing that certain words are used by a woman, that will automatically ensure that no further steps are taken. I cannot think that that is the correct way to proceed, or that it would be a positive step. The guidelines show flexibility in implementing the policy sensitively.

It would not be useful to have a list of good grounds after which no discussion could take place. That could lead to problems by spelling out just what an absent parent might need to do, or say, or threaten to do, just to avoid maintenance. That is why we feel that it is better to leave it as we do, setting out clearly how we feel about harm and undue distress, and saying how officers will be trained. I hope that that shows the hon. Gentleman that we feel that an automatic right is not correct.

In setting out the circumstances afterwards, all that I ask the hon. Gentleman and others to do is to use their plain common sense about obvious circumstances that, when information is presented to officers, will enable them to act straightforwardly and say that there is no doubt that there is good cause why they should not pursue maintenance on the woman's behalf, and will not do so. I am clear that, in the vast majority of cases that come before officers, they will be able to make that judgment, sensitively and correctly.

In the paragraphs after that, we detail some examples. The list is not designed to be exhaustive because we do not wish to exclude anything. I ask any reasonable person reading the guidelines to draw the inference that these are circumstances in which officers will act with consideration and sensitivity and where anyone given a reasonable presentation of the facts will respond by saying, "That is enough. This need go no further. No problem. We shall not be pursuing maintenance in the circumstances that you describe." That is what we have tried to set out.

The minimum number of questions will be asked to enable officers to reach a decision that tells them that those grounds have been satisfied. There is no desire to be over-intrusive. All that officers need to do is simply to establish that the requirement behind the Act has been satisfied, and that reasonable cause has been shown. In the varying circumstances that have been brought to us, a judgment will be made in each case as to how much information is provided. It will depend entirely on the circumstances.

We deliberately try to cover many aspects in paragraph 41. The hon. Gentleman spoke of the mentally ill or handicapped. I appeal to his common sense and obvious decency. He must understand that an officer will be in a position to judge in such a case just how much information that person will be able to give and at what stage he or she will be able to say that there is no need to go any further.

We must remember that an interview is not necessary in all cases. If sufficient information is provided in the form in the first place to enable the officer to form the judgment that there will be no question of pursuing maintenance because reasonable grounds have already been established, then some interviews may not need to take place. I suggest that, when dealing with the mentally ill or the handicapped, all the officers will be able to decide at what stage any questioning should ease because there is no need to pursue it. That is not designed to imply that officers or the agency will press or harass the mentally ill or the handicapped to pursue maintenance for our purposes.

There are other circumstances that are described in the paragraphs that the hon. Gentleman went through, but the same general principles apply. As for access and contact, the position is, as the hon. Gentleman is aware—

It being Eight o'clock, the motion for the Adjournment of the House lapsed, pursuant to Order [26 March].