ANNUAL REPORT

HC Deb 15 December 1992 vol 216 cc370-84

'An annual report of the delegation of functions under this Act shall be made to Parliament by the Minister responsible for the Office of Public Service and Science.'.—[Ms. Mowlam.]

Brought up, and read the First time.

Mr. Rhodri Morgan (Cardiff, West)

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

Madam Deputy Speaker

The hon. Member's name is not on the list of those who signed the new clause, so it will need to be moved formally by an hon. Member on the list.

Motion made, and Question proposed, That the new clause be read a Second time.—[Ms. Mowlam.]

Mr. Morgan

I should explain why a member of the Labour Welsh Front Bench rather than a member of the Labour citizens charter Front Bench has opened the debate on a new clause on the need for an annual report by the Minister for the civil service, public service and science. It is fairly easy to explain the matter to anyone who has, like me, been a civil servant—and subsequently a Member for a Welsh constituency—for more years than I care to remember.

If a unit within the civil service was relatively self-contained, it means that it was relatively easy to disperse to areas such as Scotland and Wales—sometimes referred to by the Chancellor of the Exchequer as the territories. If those units were relatively easy to disperse because they were self-contained, it was relatively easy to delegate their functions. Therefore, in the eye of the storm, to a degree that might not have occurred to those Conservative Members who represent more the "have" rather than the "have not" areas—although I can see some exceptions on the Government Back Benches. [Interruption.] I was about to concede the point; I had not spotted the hon. Member for Lanbaurgh (Mr. Bates). I concede that there are areas in the north-east of England which are in the same "have not" category.

As far back as the 1960s, it was common for Governments, especially Labour Governments, to disperse the relatively self-contained, operational management aspects of the civil service to such areas. I recall the initiative taken by Lady Castle when she was the Secretary of State for Transport—if that was the title at that time —to set up, in the early days of mass computerisation when the Government tended to take those initiatives in advance of the private sector, the driver and vehicle licensing centre in Llangyfelach just outside Swansea. I was about to say that, if the Minister could pronounce Llangyfelach, I would advise the Labour party not to vote against the Third Reading of the Bill, but I know that that would be too easy a win for the Labour party.

Some of us have a particularly soft spot for Llangyfelach, partly because we have family connections in the area and partly because of the famous story told by Max Boyce about a Welsh rugby fan talking to an American fan who was standing next to him at a rugby match. The American fan asked the Welsh fan where he came from, and he said Llangyfelach. When the American turned away, the Welsh fan's friend said that he should have explained a bit more about it, because the American was probably from California. The Welsh fan then turned to the American fan and said, "I am sorry, I did not explain to you. I am from Llangyfelach, which is two miles from Morriston." For some of us, "two miles from Morriston" is all the explanation that we need.

In the 1960s and 1970s, as a result of the initiatives taken by both Labour and Conservative Governments under the Fleming plan and the Hardman initiatives, many of the easily delegated and dispersed self-contained aspects of the civil service were dispersed. In south Wales one thinks of the Business Statistics Office, the Export Credit Guarantees Department insurance services department in Newport, Group Two and Companies House in Cardiff. Those are the classic areas of the civil service that we are talking about as the most subject and prone to delegation under the powers sought in the Bill. That is why the people in the outer areas of great Britain, the territories, including the north-east of England, although the Chancellor would not call that area a territory, want additional protection built in to ensure that the Government are clear in their own minds about delegation before we can possibly concede the powers to them.

Additional protection is needed, or the jobs in the relatively self-contained operational management aspects of the civil service will be put at risk and the Government will act on ideology: "Get rid of them. Delegate them. Put them into agencies. Disperse the management functions. Take away the parliamentary accountability." Obviously, the Government have pursued the strategy of politicising the upper levels of the civil service and removing parliamentary accountability from the lower and middle levels.

8.15 pm

Those of us who represent constituents in which large numbers of people work in specific units in the civil service, in the eye of the storm in the row about what the Government have in mind in the delegation of functions, put the matter high on our agenda. That is why we have tabled new clause 3. It is a simple but important two-line clause to ensure some protection for our constituents and the customers of the service.

We are not against flexibility in the line between direct parliamentary accountability and the delegation to the lowest level possible of as much management freedom in the civil service to take initiatives that result in a better service, lower costs and a better job. We want to give civil service management the powers and incentive to do the job better. We are not happy with the Kafkaesque, hall of mirrors, fairyland world of pseudo-privatisation into which the Government want us to plunge without any of the necessary parliamentary protection, which we obviously cannot afford to see happen.

In 1988 the Government set up next steps agencies. Some of them will be turned into trading funds, as happened in 1991 with Companies House, which is next door to my constituency. The trading fund is then led to a further strategy and ownership review, which is being undertaken at present. Once again, that will destabilise Companies House, which will possibly have three changes of management structure in three years. That is why we want additional protection provided in the Bill.

We have seen the introduction of contractorisation. Naval dockyards and atomic weapons establishments—there is one next door to my constituency—have been affected by contractorisation. The training and enterprise councils carry out some of those functions. Where is the operational responsibility for the functions carried out by the TECs? Are the TECs quangos? They are not listed as quangos.

Mr. Michael Bates (Langbaurgh)

Does the hon. Gentleman accept that training and enterprise councils, especially the one in Teesside, do an excellent job in promoting business and developing opportunities for young people in some of the less prosperous areas of the country? Those training and enterprise councils are directly accountable to the Secretary of State for Employment and the Minister of State, Department of Employment.

Mr. Morgan

I thank the hon. Member for Langbaurgh for raising that matter. He has made precisely the same point as I did. I am not commenting on the merits or demerits of individual TECs or the TEC system as a whole.

I am saying that the Government have not yet defined a TEC. Is a TEC a quango? I do not know whether the hon. Member thinks that he knows the answer. Normally, the definition of a quango is whatever the Secretary of State in the Department says is a quango. The other definition is that quangos should appear in "Public Bodies". Normally, the new addition of "Public Bodies" is published about now.

I had hoped that we would have the benefit of a copy of "Public Bodies 1992" before this debate started to see whether some of the mess in the Government's mind about the form of some of the halfway houses between delegated functions in the civil service, quangos, and trading fund bodies. If "Public Bodies 1992" had come out, TECs might be in there. I can tell the Minister that, although the TECs were set up in 1990, they are not listed in "Public Bodies 1991". I shall look with great interest to see whether Companies House is in "Public Bodies 1992", because it was set up on a trading fund basis in 1991 and is audited by the Comptroller and Auditor General as if it were a quango. However, I understand that it is not defined as such.

All that produces uncertainty and instability. The Labour party is against that uncertainty and instability, but favours flexibility. Flexibility gives people high morale in the civil service and gives them an incentive to offer suggestions on how their jobs can be done better, at lower costs or by providing a wider or better service.

That is the spirit that the citizens charter is supposed to embody. However, I am afraid that the Government want to destabilise the civil service simply because anything that is given the label of private sector is seen as good straight out of "Animal Farm"—and anything that is in the public service is seen as bad: "If it moves, privatise it." If it does not move, kick it until it moves. We believe that that is unhealthy. That is why we want the additional protection built in of a requirement that there must be an annual report.

We are dealing with muddy waters. We are dealing with five or six aspects half way between privatisation and public service. We do not believe that that is fair to the hundreds of thousands of people who work in the civil service, particularly where there is high unemployment. Such people cannot walk out of jobs if their civil service job is privatised or their Department is converted into an agency or trading fund. If they lose their job, they cannot walk into another job.

The civil service is an extremely important employer in Wales. That is why we do not believe that the muddy waters created by the Government have yet been sufficiently clarified for us to say to the Government, "Fine, you know what you are doing. Go ahead. You do not need to report back to Parliament every year." It is essential that the Government should be able to demonstrate to Parliament every year that they have clarified in their own mind which bodies should be next steps agencies, which should be trading funds and why, and which should be like the TECs—delegated companies limited by guarantee but not allowed to make a profit. They should clarify which bodies should be ready for privatisation while the Government have a majority committed to that course of action, and why.

The Government must explain to Parliament every year why they have chosen a certain slot from all the hallway houses. I give an example from close to my constituency of where the Government have not clarified in their own mind just how much financial and managerial autonomy they wish to give to a body. I shall omit references to the DVLC at Swansea because I see two Swansea Members in the Chamber who might try to catch your eye later, Madam Deputy Speaker.

In 1988 Companies House became a next steps agency and in 1991 it became a trading fund. It now has a dummy board of directors, as if it were a private company, called a steering board. What is a steering board? Has the Minister for the civil service ever explained to this House or the other place what it is and what it is supposed to do? I do not believe that he has.

A steering board can bring in people from the private sector. The senior directors of Companies House can take directorships in other companies, so they can say that they are almost in the private sector. But Parliament was never told that. If there were a requirement to make an annual report, the Government would have to say what they were doing with Companies House and why.

Problems can arise. For the first time ever, the directors of public sector bodies with statutory responsibilities—which can give criminal records to directors who are late in filing their accounts—can sit on the boards of private companies. How are those private companies regulated? The directors of Companies House could give a criminal record to directors of a company when they too sit on the board of that company.

You might think that I am giving a fictitious example, Madam Deputy Speaker. Let me read out a letter from the companies registrar dated 12 June 1992 to the legal department of Bovis Homes Ltd. The letter refers to some six companies including Chiswick Green Management Ltd. and Devonhurst Management (Offices) Ltd., which are subsidiaries of Bovis Homes. Bovis Homes is a large company which is a subsidiary of P and O.

The letter says: Thank you for your letter of 10 June about the problems you are facing in filing accounts for the above companies. As the accounts for these companies are already overdue, there is no provision for an extension of time to be granted. However, if I can have your assurance that the outstanding accounts will be delivered no later than 14 August 1992, I am prepared to delay prosecution action against individual directors for this period. You should, however, be aware that each set of accounts delivered late after 1 July will be subject to a late filing penalty which is mandatory and payable on demand. That implies that a criminal record could be given to the legal directors and other directors of Bovis Homes.

The letter from David Durham, the registrar of companies, to M. J. Platt of the legal department of Bovis Homes is interesting. The number two in charge at Companies House has also been a director of Bovis Homes since last year. That is a classic conflict of interest problem which should be reported to Parliament every year. The Government should say, "These are the difficulties that we have had in attempting to make Companies House act in a more businesslike way. It sounds fine in theory, but occasionally there are problems in practice." Conflict of interest problems will arise in practice.

One might almost have expected a postscript to Mr. Durham's letter saying, "My number two will see you at the board meeting and I hope that he will not see you somewhere else as a guest of Her Majesty after that." Such problems should be reported to Parliament every year. The Minister would do so if he took his job seriously and acted not out of ideology but in an attempt to solve the practical problems of giving incentives to the civil service to make itself more efficient every year.

Instead, the Minister merely utters guttural grunts that everything that has the word "private" attached to it is good and everything that has "public" attached to it is fuddy-duddy, old-fashioned and no use to anyone. That is why we are in favour of a flexible line between public sector, normal civil service management and the new forms of management, provided that they are explained to Parliament every year and we receive a report on the practical problems that arise. On behalf of the taxpayer we could then certify that the civil service did its job properly, with all its statutory duties and powers to give people criminal records or impose fines on them. Parliament gives such bodies those powers.

It is not just about business. An annual report would preserve the morale of civil servants so that they felt part of a team and were not destabilised by the Governmenet"s ideological commitment to privatisation.

Mr. Donald Anderson (Swansea, East)

I am delighted to follow my hon. Friend the Member for Cardiff, West (Mr. Morgan). I congratulate him on his ability to catch things that fall from lorries. I thought that we were pretty good at that in Swansea, because we received the memorandum from the chief executive, but my hon. Friend scores the best total for things falling into his hands.

I take issue with my hon. Friend on only a few points. First, he said that the Driver and Vehicle Licensing Agency was in Llangyfelach. It is not. It is in Clase, within the boundaries of the city of Swansea. I think that the reason why he said that it was in Llangyfelach was that he had a good joke about it. Secondly, he had great faith that the annual report which we hope will be published will reveal all that he wants it to reveal. He did not give credit to the Government or the civil service for the possibility of obfuscation.

The civil service and the Government could well produce a report which gave bare details but not the detailed information that my hon. Friend seeks, which could open the way to genuine probing by Parliament. Having said that, I agree that the new clause is important. In the light of what the Minister said in Committee, I believe that my hon. Friend is probably pushing at an open door. The new clause strikes at the heart of the question whether the new bodies can be made accountable to Parliament and the public.

Worrying things are happening in the civil service, partly, alas, because of the one-party rule that has prevailed in the past decade or so. Civil servants realise that the pathway to promotion means dancing to the tune of a Government who have been increasingly ideological, in the Orwellian sense which my hon. Friend described. Civil servants have been increasingly politicised during that time. The more powers are delegated by the Government, the less they are within the searchlight of Parliament.

If there is a report, Parliament should be able to keep some sort of check on what is being done. No one is saying that there should not be as much efficiency as possible in the civil service or that people's comfort should be disturbed regularly by a comparison with outside sectors.

We are concerned that the Government have a hidden agenda—they think that private is good and public is bad —and they will push the civil service along that continuum.

8.30 pm

Discrete areas, such as the Driver and Vehicle Licensing Agency at Swansea, are not at the core of the Department of Transport. Therefore, the Department has no loyalty to them. We fear that, when a highly ideological Government with a politicised civil service says—perhaps in rhetoric at a party conference—that we must privatise X number of jobs in the civil service, it is obvious that jobs that do not form part of the core will be thrown overboard because senior members of the service have no loyalty to them. Such areas have already been the objects of dispersal policy.

By seeking to fatten various parts of the civil service for market as part of their privatisation policy, the Government are undermining the regional policy that various Governments have pursued with some success. We have some good examples in Swansea: hence the presence of my right hon. Friends the Members for Swansea, West (Mr. Williams) and for Llanelli (Mr. Davies). We have benefited from the positive aspects of dispersal policy.

The vehicle inspectorate in Swansea is in danger of losing jobs as a result of Government policy to go ahead with privatisation. As a result of the decision to privatise by January 1994, there is a danger that jobs will also be lost at the Driver, Vehicles and Operators Information Technology Directorate, in the constituency of my right hon. Friend the Member for Swansea, West, and it may be sold to a foreign buyer. There is certainly a danger that it will be moved from the Swansea area, which has high unemployment. The jewel in the crown is the Driver and Vehicle Licensing Agency, which is at Clase and not at Llangyfelach.

Civil servants are wary of public scrutiny, want to go ahead on their own with a complacent Government and want to present other regional Ministers with fait accompli at the end of their deliberations. I invite the Minister to read and re-read the document by the chief executive at the DVLA, which so happily fell off the back of a lorry. Had it not done so, and had it not fallen into the hands of civil servants, it would have continued on its course within the Department of Transport and would have been presented as a fait accompli to the Secretary of State for Wales in February or March.

The issue affects job prospects in an area of high unemployment. Can the Minister deny that, in the normal course of events, had the document not been made public by a civil servant, the regional Minister would have been brought in after decisions had already been taken? Happily, the Secretary of State for Wales is aware of the danger, thanks to a public-spirited civil servant. He knows how vital the DVLA is, as it underpins the economy of Swansea and the sub-region. He can make representations to the Government. Had that not been the case, there would not have been any serious discussion of the matter.

The danger is that civil servants consider such issues on tramlines. The Government ask them to find ways to economise. They know that the pathway to promotion is by feeding the Government what they want in terms of privatisation, so they consider ways to privatise and will seek to ignore public opinion.

I shall quote to the Minister the words of Mr. Curtis, the chief executive at Swansea, who said at the end of his consultation document: given the close links between unions at DVLC and local MPs, it would be likely to lead to Parliamentary Questions and requests to meet Ministers. That might disturb our quiet life or stand in the way of the juggernaut of privatisation, which would lead to the loss of jobs in Swansea and would leave a white elephant there in the form of a large building. I think that my right hon. Friend the Member for Swansea, West has costed that and perhaps he will give us the figures.

To return to the problem of narrow accountancy, civil servants consider how an issue will affect their department or a sector within it. It may make sense—

Madam Deputy Speaker

Order. Before the hon. Gentleman continues, he seems fairly wide of new clause 3. Could he focus his argument on the new clause?

Mr. Anderson

I am seeking to give a significant local example of what might be avoided if the searchlight of knowledge comes to the House as a result of the annual report. I shall continue with my example and then conclude.

I hope that the Minister will agree that essentially the Government must consider wider issues, which include job prospects. At DVLA, job prospects would have been totally ignored had the matter followed the course that the chief executive wanted. I and my right hon. Friend the Member for Swansea, West might be accused, like Cato, of travelling around the streets mentioning DVLA again and again and perhaps of sickening Ministers, but we shall continue to do so because we want them to know that the matter is vitally significant to jobs in our constituency and in the sub-region. We fear that they would have ignored that fact. We want the wider employment implications to be considered fully. We know that they would not have been considered and we appeal to the Minister to ensure that that happens.

Parliamentarians will only be able to do their job, Madam Deputy Speaker, by opening such developments to public scrutiny and by giving as much notice as possible about the nature of delegations and the conditions under which they are given in an annual report. Essentially, we are meant to represent our constituents and to give Ministers some idea of where the shoe pinches and of the local effects of decisions taken at a high level, which affect people's lives.

Mr. Alan Williams

I apologise for the length of my earlier intervention and I add only that if you thought that was a speech, Madam Deputy Speaker, you should hear me when I make a speech. However, I do not intend to prevail on your good will, because I value it too highly.

My hon. Friend the Member for Swansea, East (Mr. Anderson) raised a serious issue, which is at the heart of the relationship between the Executive, the Government, and Parliament. It is the essence of the concept of accountability. It is inevitable that the further down the line responsibility is passed—however sensible and logical that may be in administrative terms—the further the Minister, and thus the House of Commons, move from accountability.

Earlier, the Minister said that he saw the Public Accounts Committee as playing a key role in maintaining accountability. I want to try to show the clash between what the Minister claims the Bill will sustain—accountability to Parliament—and the reality of administrative devolution, which will not only take decisions away, but convolute the lines of communication.

My hon. Friend the Member for Swansea, East (Mr. Anderson) spoke of the DVLA. The Minister will know from debates in Committee that the DVLA is close to the heart of hon. Members from my district. We were alarmed at the civil service internal document that stated that the information should be kept from Ministers because they might use their rights to call on Ministers to be accountable. The civil servants say that they do not want us to be able to ask Ministers about their decisions and recommendations, as that could be inconvenient. It is difficult to reconcile that with what the Minister has been trying to tell us about sustaining accountability.

My hon. Friend the Member for Swansea, East also made a valid point about costing. However, the more one delegates and fragments, the more difficult it is to achieve direct financial accountability. If the decision to get rid of 3,000 jobs at the DVLA in Swansea is acted on, the DVLA would be able to say that its costs had been reduced by £40 million a year as it was no longer employing those people. Its representatives can pat themselves on the back and say that it was a good decision. They do not have to explain to anyone that the cost of those 3,000 people being out of work would, according to the latest Department of Employment figures, be about £27 million a year. The £27 million does not fall within their remit, and they are not accountable to their Ministers for it. The Treasury, the Department of Employment and the Department of Social Security—through lost national insurance contributions —will bear the cost.

One problem of the new clause is that it does not go wide enough. It refers to "the Minister responsible". In the case of DVLA, which Minister is accountable? Is it the one whose Department suffers the loss of national insurance income? Is it the one whose Department loses income tax? Is it the one whose Department pays unemployment benefit? The one Minister that it is not is the Minister to whom the DVLA is accountable, and who is accountable to the House. Therefore, costs are created and jobs lost, but the Minister responsible for those consequences is not accountable.

In the confidential document, the head of the DVLA said that the building would become a white elephant. The building cost more than £60 million when it was new and, according to a letter sent to me by the Minister for Public Transport, its depreciated value is now about £35 million. However, there is no accounting for white elephants. That sounds flippant, but it is true. Nobody has to account for the loss of the capital value of those premises.

Even the Minister accountable for the DVLA could come to the House and say that his Department had saved £40 million on labour costs, while ignoring the unemployment costs, for which someone else had responsibility. However, nobody has to come here to explain how £35 million worth of assets have been completely written off. Where is the accountability in that? How does the Minister explain that in terms of bringing delegated authority closer to the House? Virtually the only sector for which there would be some accountability would be the £76 million of redundancy payments that would have to be made to those declared unemployed.

8.45 pm

The process of fragmentation and delegation inevitably makes it more difficult to monitor the position. Even Ministers find it more difficult to do so. We accept that Ministers are meant to come to the House wearing the metaphorical sackcloth, and say, "The deed was done by John Evans in the sub-office in Llanelli, but I stand here at the Box and accept full responsibility for it." We know that the Minister involved does not bear full responsibility. Very often, he or she does not even recognise responsibility for it.

The Minister referred to the Public Accounts Committee. Recently, the Comptroller and Auditor-General identified errors in the accounts of the Development Board for Rural Wales, and qualified those accounts. The Minister—and certainly his permanent secretary as the accounting officer—will understand how serious it is for accounts to be qualified.

The Public Accounts Committee had an acrimonious meeting with the accounting officers for both the Welsh Office and the Development Board for Rural Wales. However, within a couple of weeks of that acrimonious exchange over the shortcomings of the chairman who was responsible for the package that led to the irregularity, the Secretary of State for Wales did the very opposite of apologising to the House. The Secretary of State should have apologised, said that the incident should never have happened and that, even though it happened to someone delegated to act in his name, he accepted responsibility.

Instead, the Secretary of State said that he did not care what the Public Accounts Committee said or whether there was a motion on the Order Paper asking for the chairman to be sacked. The Secretary of State promptly reappointed the chairman for three years. Where is the accountability there? Where is Parliament's power? It is bad enough if the organisations to which the power is delegated try to conceal information, but it is worse if they are doing so with the compliance and apparent endorsement of Ministers.

My hon. Friend the Member for Llanelli (Mr. Morgan) mentioned another example of how information is concealed from Ministers as well as Parliament. The matter was raised only yesterday in the Public Accounts Committee in relation to another organisation. The Minister for Public Transport is aware of yesterday's hearing in relation to the Welsh Development Agency. One of his colleagues, who has been on the Public Accounts Committee for many more years than me, said that the WDA report was the worst that he had come across in 20 years in the House. However, nothing will happen to the people responsible.

When the permanent secretary to the Welsh Office was asked who would discipline those people, he said that it would not be him or the Secretary of State. He was asked who would exert discipline within the WDA. Obviously, it would not be the members of the board, as they had all been in on the spoils. They had all been enjoying private mileage in cars paid for by the taxpayer. They were all in the affair together. Where is the accountability there?

Madam Deputy Speaker

Order. Where is the relationship with the new clause that we are supposed to be debating? Will the right hon. Gentleman focus his argument on it?

Mr. Williams

I thought that I was doing precisely that, but I apologise for my lack of clarity. I was criticising the new clause, which lays down that the Minister responsible should produce an annual report. My point was that in this case the Minister responsible, the Secretary of State for Wales, far from bringing the matter to the attention of the House of Commons, condoned it and kicked the House in the teeth by saying that he would reappoint for another three years the people who had committed the misdemeanour.

I do not want to try your patience too far, Madam Deputy Speaker—

Mr. Morgan

Christmas spirit.

Mr. Williams

Indeed. Many good things go with Christmas.

Yesterday we learned that officials had mounted an operation named, appropriately enough for this season, Operation Wizard. As far as we can gather, the WDA had employed consultants at huge fees which were then concealed in the accounts. The operation has never been publicly declared. Allegedly, it involved enabling the agency to develop a management buy-out of part of its operations. That is known as taking delegation to its extreme. It is not the Minister who is opening this back door; it is the people with the delegated power who are trying to open it with a jemmy and take public assets out through it.

They planned to use public funds to carry out consultancy work on the feasibility of the project and set themselves up with a nice little number to take over some of the profitable operations, to run them as a privatised concern—all things which the Minister has said could never happen. The process runs as follows: delegation, subordination to a quango, then the step out the back door into a private entity with no accountability.

I am grateful to the Minister for having listened to my remarks, as he did in Committee, and to you, Madam Deputy Speaker, for your good will.

Ms. Marjorie Mowlam (Redcar)

As my hon. Friend the Member for Swansea, East (Mr. Anderson) has said, we feel that we are pushing at an open door in this matter, because in Committee the Minister gave a commitment to make an annual report to Parliament on the delegations that had been made. We are interested not just in the list of such delegations but in the parameters and conditions attached to them. We are interested in scrutiny and in ethical values, and as my hon. Friends have repeatedly said, we are interested in accountability.

When asked these questions in Committee, the Minister said: the hon. Member is asking fair questions that I have not considered at this stage. We do hope that he has considered them by now, and that he has some answers.

The Minister also said: I see no objection to the idea that the report to Parliament should specify the person to whom delegations are made." —[Official Report, Standing Committee D, 24 November 1992; c. 56–57.] We should like these two points clarified, if possible.

As the Government move towards a greater public/private mix in the civil service—a Treasury Minister has said that that is the ultimate aim—so the distinctions between the two sectors become blurred. Although both are working to serve the consumer, the lines of accountability and the ethos of the civil service can get muddied in this process. It would be useful if the Minister could give us some information tonight about a matter affecting his Department.

It would be useful to know, for instance, whether Sir Peter Levene's appointment was a public one. I presume that he was appointed by Francis Maude, and he now works directly to the Secretary of State and is responsible for the efficiency unit and for purchasing. If his was a public appointment, what is his salary? That information should be in the public domain. Is it calculated on a pro-rata basis along the lines of the salary of a pennanent secretary? The case of Sir Peter exhibits the sort of difficulties about the culture and ethos of the civil service that concern us. He has, after all, a direct line to the Secretary of State and to the Prime Minister.

We should also like to ask some questions about Sir Peter's powers. He is chairman of the docklands light railway. One would not want to make the connection, but in his role in the civil service efficiency unit, he suggested that civil servants should move to Canary wharf. Similarly, he is a vice-chairman and managing director of a merchant bank, Wasserstein Perella, but one would not want to connect his responsibilities at the bank—for mergers, acquisitions, advisory services, restructuring, re-capitalisation, takeovers and leveraged buy-outs—with his role in the efficiency unit and in the future of the civil service. It is this sort of grey area that we find confusing.

Mr. Robert Jackson

I do not want to enter a competition to determine the location of the DVLA as between Clase and Llangefelach— [Interruption.] I have made a reasonable approximation of that pronunciation, but we shall have to listen to the tapes. The hon. Member for Cardiff, West (Mr. Morgan) seemed to be a little hazy about his geography. I noticed that he was rebuked by the hon. Member for Swansea, East (Mr. Anderson), so he had better not interrupt from a sedentary position to correct my pronunciation—he had better find out where the place is first.

We have had a rerun of the debate in Committee about the Government's commitment to dispersal policies and their compatibility with delegation. I repeat now what I said in Committee: the Government remain committed to dispersal policy. It is one of a number of general central policies of Government which will continue irrespective of delegations under the Bill.

The hon. Member for Redcar (Ms. Mowlam) asked about Sir Peter Levene. I shall have to write to her about the details, but I understand that he was appointed by the Prime Minister. There is a danger in the way that the hon. Lady and other Opposition Members speak; they give the impression that they do not believe that the experience of people from the private sector can be of use in the public sector. That is a great mistake. We in the public sector can learn a great deal from the experience of people from the private sector. Quite often, the people concerned voluntarily give of their time, sometimes at a low rate of remuneration, and there is an element of public service in that which should be acknowledged by all sides of the House.

I am a little surprised at the debate. I know that it is the custom to stray wide, but we shall have an opportunity to return to many points on Third Reading. Not one of the instances mentioned by Opposition Members related to management functions covered by the Bill. By definition, the annual report will contain nothing relevant to the points that were made.

I take this opportunity to say a few words about leaking and falling off the back of a lorry. The hon. Member for Swansea, East spoke as though it were a matter of credit for somebody to acquire property that had fallen off the back of a lorry. Governments of both parties have for many years accepted that civil servants have a duty to serve the Government of the day. If government is to be conducted properly, it is important, in the interests of everybody, that the Government can have confidence in their ability to consider proposals and to make them public only when it is appropriate.

It is not a question of undue secrecy. It is just important that all the options, including radical options, should be available to be considered. Many proposals are dropped as a result of consideration within Government. Opposition Members spoke about the effect on staff. I would simply say that a document was leaked, and that had an effect on the staff—and that is not a happy situation.

Mr. Donald Anderson

Clearly we could debate what is in the public interest. In my judgment, there is a strong argument for saying that when, in such a case, a document is produced by a civil servant that is of a highly political nature and which rules out all options save one—and that option would involve the destruction of 3,000 jobs in an area of high unemployment—there is a public interest in that issue being debated openly and fairly, rather than being presented to the regional Minister at the end of the day. The normal presumption against the leaking of such a document could be overriden when such considerations apply.

9 pm

Mr. Jackson

The hon. Gentleman is fair-minded and honourable, and I can see that he feels a bit defensive. It is right that he should feel defensive. If such a proposal were made, of course there should be an active debate. There would certainly be an active debate when right hon. and hon. Members of the calibre of those who represent the two Swansea constituencies are involved.

The fact remains that no such proposal was made. It was simply raised for discussion within Government. I do not want to trespass on your patience and tolerance, Madam Deputy Speaker, but I give way to the hon. Gentleman.

Mr. Alan Williams

I am instinctively with the Minister in his remarks, in that I do not favour the leaking of documents. Like the Minister, my colleagues and I have experience within Departments, and clearly certain rules must be observed. We do not want to disregard them.

However, sometimes a different argument can be made than that put by my hon. Friend the Member for Swansea, East (Mr. Anderson). Sometimes, a situation arises involving an individual known today as a whistleblower. We had that only yesterday. The person blowing the whistle was doing so against the individual to whom he had to report if he had a complaint. What should the individual do in that situation? It is not a question of someone wilfully wanting to leak a confidential document or anything of that nature. In the case to which I refer, the individual wanted to make a complaint against the activities of senior management—but the line of complaint was to the very senior management that was the subject of the individual's complaint. He had no other route to follow.

Mr. Jackson

The right hon. Gentleman has extensive experience of Government; leaking was a problem when he was a member of a Government, and it remains a problem today. I emphasise that it tends to prejudice the ability of Government to give reasonable consideration to all the options if leaking occurs.

The Opposition are seeking, through new clause 3, to formalise the promise of an annual report that I made on behalf of the Government in Committee. The Government's view, as I explained in Committee, is that promoting that promise to the face of the Bill is neither necessary nor desirable. I could say also that the amendment is inappropriately drafted, because it refers specifically to the Office of Public Service and Science. It would cause considerable problems if that were on the face of the Bill and at some stage in the future, peradventure, that office were, as a result of changes in Government machinery, replaced by some other body. that is a good example of the inflexibility that arises from such an attempt to dot every "i" and cross every "t".

Hon. Members are of course right to make great play of the importance of keeping the House informed of civil service management matters —although I am not sure that the House is always terribly interested. Perhaps the attendance tonight and at previous debates for which the Government have found time illustrates that. In principle, however, it is a fair point that we should keep the House informed—hence the promise that I made of a report on delegations by written answer.

In fact, that would give the House more information about the management of the civil service than it has had before. According to the scenario constructed by the right hon. Member for Swansea, West (Mr. Williams), delegation inevitably leads to the extension of the accountability chain, so that there is less and less accountability. I do not agree: I think that this occasion for delegation has led to the creation of an entirely new opportunity.

All the next steps agencies operate within written and published frameworks of objectives and performance obligations. As the right hon. Gentleman made a point about chief executives, let me add that those frameworks include a clear statement of a chief executive's accountability to the Minister concerned. All that is spelt out much more clearly than the provisions normally found in civil service business units outside the agency framework. In short, accountability to Parliament, and the provision of information about the management of the civil service, have been extended.

The hon. Member for Cardiff, West made a fair point when he identified the problem of being kept up to date with all the changes in the organisation of the civil service and public-service bodies, which are already happening and may increase in the future. I certainly undertake to examine the publication that the hon. Gentleman quoted —"Public Bodies"—and see whether it can be improved and extended to provide more information about the range of different bodies.

I recognise that, as the process of public service reform goes ahead, certain issues arise: following changes in the status of bodies, for instance, legal relationships require clarification. I shall examine that point for the hon. Gentleman, but I do not believe that the report that the Opposition demand in new clause 3 would give him what he seeks. He cited the status of training and education councils, for instance; the legal position and accountability of TECs would have to be dealt with in a different way.

The hon. Member for Redcar asked what we would put in the report. We would publish an annual list of delegations in the form of a written response to a parliamentary question. The list would specify the nature of delegations, and—the hon. Lady stressed this point particularly—the office of the recipients of delegations. It would include a summary of the main conditions where conditions were applicable.

Obviously, hon. Members would have an opportunity to pursue matters in further detail. Where appropriate, they could pursue with the original recipient of a delegation, whether he was a Minister or an official—or with the central Department, which might be the Treasury or the Office of Public Service and Science—the granting of delegations and commissions. That would considerably extend the present availability of information, and I think that it would be very helpful.

I do not think it necessary to apply such provisions to something that is on a statutory basis on the face of the Bill, referring to a specific Department whose status and name may change. After the initial rush of delegations, the torrent is likely to dry up—if there is a torrent—and many of the delegations that follow will be minor and specific.

It will always be open to hon. Members to table parliamentary questions asking for information at shorter intervals than the annual process that I have described, or, indeed, to pursue matters of detail arising from the original answers. Those interested will have access to information when it is required, and when it will be useful to them and to the House.

Ms. Mowlam

I welcome that answer. If the Government agreed to a freedom of information Bill, the problem of leaking and of where documents arrive would no longer be a problem. Let me put it on record that I wish to cause no offence to Sir Peter Levine—who, when I was on the Public Accounts Committee, was one of the most competent people who came before us in comparison to many of the other civil servants who were present. My point is very different: it relates to the mix of public, private and ethical accountability, which I think the Government are avoiding.

In view of the specific points that the Minister has listed, I do not think that we shall secure the further accountability and ethical scrutiny that we want. In view of that, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Motion and clause, by leave, withdrawn.