The Gulf

HC Deb 19 March 1991 vol 188 cc148-50

5. Mr. Cran

To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what further progress has been made in his Department's review of Britain's defence commitments; and what lessons have been learned as a result of the Gulf war.

Mr. Tom King

We believe that there is scope for changing our defence arrangements following the collapse of the Warsaw pact and the unification of Germany. Some initial decisions have already been announced, but the final size and shape of our armed forces will need to take account of our consultations with NATO and our allies, the security position in Europe and with the Soviet Union, and progress on arms control. We shall also need to take account of the lessons learnt in the Gulf.

Mr. Cran

Does my right hon. Friend agree that the most important lesson of the Gulf war is that the United Kingdom must hold unto itself the decision on when to commit its armed forces? Will he further agree that if we had been part of a common defence arrangement in Europe we would probably not have been able to make a contribution to collective security?

Mr. King

I certainly believe, as the lessons of the Gulf have shown, in the importance of having allies with whom we can work closely, and in the benefits of a coalition in such circumstances. I also strongly support the need for us to have the power to act and, first, to be able to take the decision to act. The other important aspect, which I know that my hon. Friend will support, is to have the power to act and to have forces able to act and to make such a valuable contribution.

Mr. Menzies Campbell

Does the Secretary of State agree that the commitment of the United Kingdom must depend on the nature of the threat that it may have to meet? In that regard, does he share my concern that the Soviet Union launched more submarines last year than in the previous year and there are reports that it has now placed 10,000 tanks east of the Ural mountains, apparently to frustrate the effects of the conventional arms reduction treaty? Will due account be taken of those factors in assessing the commitments of the United Kingdom?

Mr. King

The hon. and learned Gentleman will have noticed that that point is precisely one of the aspects with which I dealt in relation to the progress of arms control. One of our concerns is the number of Soviet tanks transferred from the Soviet army to the Soviet navy, putting them outside the remit of present arms control and leading to a situation in which, as is well known, the Soviet navy now has more tanks than the British Army. We have raised those issues. My right hon. Friend the Prime Minister raised them very directly on his recent visit to Moscow. That is precisely why we have not ratified the conventional forces reduction in Europe treaty.

Mr. Onslow

Will my right hon. Friend assure the House that, whatever reviews take place, his Department will not lose sight of the importance of our reserve forces and especially of the Territorial Army?

Mr. King

I very much agree with my right hon. Fnend. I refer the House to my statement last July, in which I said: The volunteer reserves continue to play a key role, and we wish to consider the appropriate numbers for the future, having regard to our needs and realistic levels of recruitment and retention."—[Official Report, 25 July 1990; Vol. 177 c. 472.] The whole House recognises the valuable role that the reserves and the volunteer reserves have played as recently as in the Gulf campaign. That underlines the importance of the role that they can play.

Mr. O'Neill

What other out-of-area threats do the Government envisage having to meet? How relevant would armoured divisions be in such circumstances? Following the destruction of the fourth largest army in the world—the Iraqi army—few countries, surely, could pose a threat equal to that posed by Iraq in the recent past.

Mr. King

It is incredible that the hon. Gentleman—the Opposition Front-Bench spokesman—should conclude that we shall not be forced to face any further armoured threat in the world. The lesson to be drawn from the Gulf and, indeed, from the very fact of the difference between that threat and the threat that we faced in the Falklands, is that we must be prepared for the unexpected and able to make our contribution, whatever shape the threat may take.