HC Deb 16 October 1990 vol 177 cc1114-25

Amendment made: No. 43, in page 24, line 39, leave out 'rules made under section 15(11)(c) or, as the case may be, regulations made under section'

and insert 'regulations made under section 15(10A) or'.—[Lord James Douglas-Hamilton.]

Lord James Douglas-Hamilton

I beg to move amendment No. 44, in page 25, line 20, at end insert—— '(ee) in a case where the practitioner has provided inadequate professional services, to direct the practitioner to pay to the client by way of compensation such sum, not exceeding £1,000, as the Board may specify;'.

Mr. Deputy Speaker

With this we may discuss Government amendments Nos. 45, 125, 79 to 81 and 126.

Lord James Douglas-Hamilton

These amendments fulfil an undertaking that I gave during the Committee's consideration of new clause 12, which was tabled by the hon. Member for Glasgow, Garscadden (Mr. Dewar). I said that I would accept the principle behind that new clause, and I have tabled the amendments to do so.

The amendments provide the Council of the Law Society, the Scottish Solicitors Discipline Tribunal and the Scottish Conveyancing and Executry Services Board with a power to order the payment of compensation by a practitioner against whom a complaint of providing inadequate professional services has been upheld. It is intended that the compensation will be for distress or inconvenience that the client has suffered, although it will be open to those disciplinary bodies to order the payment of compensation for a specific and quantifiable financial loss. Amendments along these lines have been pressed for by the Scottish Consumer Council since the introduction of the Bill in another place and I am confident that the consumer lobby will give them a warm welcome. The Law Society of Scotland has indicated that it does not dispute the principle on which the amendments are based.

The House will wish to be aware that a corresponding provision along these lines is included in the Courts and Legal Services Bill—indeed, it was specifically sought by the English Law Society. The amendments also include a further refinement, included after detailed discussions with the Law Society of Scotland, which makes it clear that any decision of the board, the tribunal or the council cannot be founded upon in any proceedings in order to show negligence on the part of the practitioner; that any award of compensation will be totally without prejudice to the client's right of redress under civil law; and that the amount of any award of compensation can be taken into account in the calculation of any award of damages by a court. Those provisos are eminently sensible and will, I hope, meet with the approval of the House.

The compensation power provides a useful additional remedy to the disciplinary sanctions already available to the board, the council and the tribunal.

Mr. Dewar

We have been moving along at fair lick and we have dealt with a great many quite important, but on the whole technical, matters.

The amendment is worth a particular welcome. It has been tabled in response to a new clause that I moved in Committee, but in a sense it is the culmination of a campaign. I join the Minister in paying tribute to the Scottish Consumer Council that lobbied for the amendment. Its chair, Barbara Kelly, was present when these matters were discussed in Committee. The amendment provides an important new power and extends the remedies available to the public in their dealings with solicitors when something has gone wrong. That is useful and important.

We are all aware that the Law Society rightly takes a stringent view of dishonesty or a failure to abide by the solicitors' account rules. However, the general public have felt for some time that there has been a lack of provisions to deal with problems of shoddy work, delay, inadequacy or incompetence. The Law Society already has the power to instruct that the work be put right either by the solicitor free of charge, or by another solicitor at the expense of the defaulting solicitor.

I am aware of the problems through my experience in my constituency and through my contacts with the public. Even those who are now somewhat distant from the everyday business of the law profession are often recipients of stories about it and tales of distress. There is no doubt that those who are faced with inadequate professional services, and the delay and the problems that flow from that, suffer inconvenience and distress. It is right that a power should be available to the Law Society, through its disciplinary machinery, to offer some form of compensation.

The wear and tear on the nerves and the general aggravation that can result from the problem of trying for many weeks, perhaps months, to get a satisfactory answer from the defaulting solicitor can be a considerable burden for those concerned. I think that £1,000 is a fair sum to have available as an upper limit—not as compensation, but as a payment to mark the inconvenience and distress that has been caused.

Sir Nicholas Fairbairn

The hon. Gentleman said that it was not compensation, but the amendment states, "by way of compensation".

Mr. Dewar

I understand that, and I know that there was some discussion about whether the word "compensation" should be included. I am interpreting the word as I believe it will be interpreted in practice. It is not compensation for a loss, but the giving of some solace for the inconvenience and distress that has been caused. Had the amendment been tabled in Committee, I would have looked for a different word—

Sir Nicholas Fairbairn

"Solatium".

Mr. Dewar

"Solatium" has been suggested by a man of law as a suitable shot at getting the right nuance.

I am making a distinction of some importance, and whatever the word in the Bill, I suspect that it will be approached more in the terms of solace or solatium by the Law Society when it operates the scheme. It is in that spirit that I welcome the amendment as an important improvement on the current position. Although a minor matter on another level, it is important to those concerned. It is right that the powers should be available, and I am glad that the Minister has given way on that.

Sir Nicholas Fairbairn

I welcome the amendment, but I want to put certain questions to my hon. Friend the Minister. I am not sure whether I misheard him, but I thought that he suggested that the fine—it is solatium for the client but a fine for the practitioner—could be subtracted from any award given in civil proceedings. That would be wrong.

I do not like absolutes such as £1,000. People may have suffered appalling experiences and immeasurable losses. There is nothing magic about £1,000, except that it operates on the decimal system. It is idiotic. We just agreed to amendment No. 33, which contains words in the law of Scotland that are new to me: shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly. Is it not the threat of eternal life to be proceeded against and punished accordingly? It does not say, "You will only be burnt for 10 minutes," or "Satan's oven will not be allowed to be turned up above 50 degrees." If we are to introduce into the law of Scotland the concept of according punishment, why not do it here?

It seems ridiculous to pluck from the air some symbolic, maniacal figure such as £1,000. If an appropriate sum would be £10,000, £50,000 or, as in a recent case in England, £3 million, why should that not be the sum awarded? I see no point to imposing a limit. Why not use instead the words "and punish accordingly"? If we are to introduce marvellous, 16th-century wording of that kind into the law of Scotland, why impose a limit of £1,000? If it is suggested that the award is made by way of compensation, will not the argument be made by the lawyer appearing for the solicitor in future civil proceedings that the complainant has already been compensated? The advocate may argue that, under the Act, the Law Society has awarded compensation of £958.

While I welcome the right of the board to punish delinquent practitioners, the choice of words is most unfortunate, because the word "compensation" can be used in two senses. In cases of reparations, one often finds that the person suffering an injury only begins to recover when he or she has won their case—even if they are awarded only one penny. I appreciate that the complainer may be compensated in the sense that he or she will be made to feel better, but there is also the punishment of the delinquent practitioner to consider. I ask my hon. Friend the Minister seriously to reconsider whether there needs to be an imaginary limit rather than revert to those wonderful and ancient words of "punish accordingly".

Lord James Douglas-Hamilton

I first make the point that such compensation cannot be founded upon in the courts if a negligence action is subsequently raised, because it relates to distress or inconvenience arising from inadequate professional services. We are talking not in terms of punishment but of assisting the individual concerned. Compensation paid to the client is not to be regarded as a fine upon the solicitor. There is a maximum of £1,000, and the Law Society can award up to that sum—but it does not set limits on what the courts can award. In any event, negligence actions are completely separate from the provision before us.

Amendment agreed to.

Amendment made: No. 45, in page 25, line 43, leave out 'or (b)' and insert ', (b) or (dd)'—[Lord James Douglas-Hamilton.]

Lord James Douglas-Hamilton

I beg to move amendment No. 46, in page 25, line 47, at end insert—

'(6A) Where a practitioner—

  1. (a) fails to comply with a notice under subsection (6) above; or
  2. (b) complies with such a notice but the Board are not satisfied as to the steps taken by the practitioner to comply with the direction to which the notice relates, the Board may apply to the Court of Session for an order requiring the practitioner to comply with the direction to which the notice relates within such time as the court may order.'
The amendment provides the board with an additional enforcement power, to enable it to ensure compliance with any disciplinary direction that it may issue under clause 18(6). It allows the board to invoke the power of the court in support of its disciplinary measures, by providing for it to seek an order from the Court of Session requiring the practitioner to comply with a disciplinary direction. A similar power is available to the council of the Law Society, to secure enforcement of its disciplinary decisions by application to the solicitors' disciplinary tribunal. The amendment provides a useful addition to the board's powers, and I commend it to the House.

Amendment agreed to.

Lord James Douglas-Hamilton

I beg to move amendment No. 47, in page 26, leave out from the beginning of line 21 to 'refrain' in line 27.

Mr. Deputy Speaker (Sir Paul Dean)

With this, it will be convenient to consider the following: Government amendments Nos. 48 to 50.

Amendment No. 139, in schedule 7, page 94, leave out lines 13 to 15 and insert:—

'In paragraph 14 for the words "may be published in such manner as the Tribunal may determine" there shall be substituted the words "shall where the solicitor complained against is found guilty of professional misconduct or of providing an inadequate professional service be published in such manner as the Tribunal may determine and in all other cases every decision may be published in such manner as the Tribunal may determine.".'. Government amendment No. 84.

7.15 pm
Lord James Douglas-Hamilton

Amendment No. 47 was the subject of considerable debate in Committee. It deals with the extent of the publicity that should be given to the decisions of the Scottish Conveyancing and Executry Services Board and of the Scottish Solicitors Discipline Tribunal. Hon. Members who were on the Committee will recall that, following lively debate, I undertook to reconsider the matter.

I have reached the view that all decisions of both the board and tribunal should be published, including the names of the practitioners against whom there has been no finding. In doing so, I have taken fully into account representations to the effect that even an acquittal could damage a practitioner's reputation, on the argument that there is no smoke without fire. However, I do not believe that that is likely to be a problem in practice—not least because there is likely to be little public interest in the names of those who have been acquitted. That has proved to be the case south of the border, where the English solicitors' disciplinary tribunal publishes its findings in full. The General Medical Council does likewise.

I do not accept that any special provisions should be made for Scottish solicitors in that respect. Both the board and the tribunal retain a discretion to refrain from publishing names or any other information that might damage the interest of persons other than the practitioner or his close associates or their families. That proviso was requested by the Lord President of the Court of Session, and is eminently sensible. The drafting amendments seek to remove the uncertainty about the effects of the provision that was expressed in Committee. I am aware that this issue divided the Committee, but I am satisfied that the amendments capture its overall mood.

Mr. Dewar

I am bound to observe that the amendments do not capture my mood. The Committee was divided—not between parties, but between those in all parts of it, which presented the Minister with a genuine difficulty in reaching his decision. It would not be sensible to pursue my objections at this stage, but I must express my personal regret at the Minister's decision, which I believe is the wrong one.

It is important that any solicitor held to be guilty of dishonesty or of bad practice, who is the subject of any finding of guilt—to use a shorthand, lay term—in respect of proper professional ethics should have his name and the finding published. However, I have grave reservations about that being done where there has been no finding of fault.

I am unimpressed by the Minister's arguments. Even in General Medical Council findings of no fault or not guilty, its hearings are held in public and it publishes its findings, but its practice should not bind us in considering the correct procedure in disciplining solicitors. Anyone who followed the recent case of the unfortunate doctor who was found not guilty of having sexual intercourse with one of his patients will know that even the colour of his underwear became the subject of prurient and astonishingly widespread public interest. That doctor would be amazed to hear the Minister say that a finding of not guilty may not necessarily damage the reputation of the individual concerned. Of course it can.

I accept that the General Medical Council is in a slightly different situation, in that its hearings are public, so that journalists can attend to report the juicy bits of evidence. That will not happen with solicitors' hearings, but even where there is no finding of fault, details of the hearings may still come to the public notice.

Perhaps I should now put on my own sackcloth and ashes and tell the Minister that such hearings are matters of not only public but professional interest. Although I read the informative articles in each issue of the Law Society of Scotland's journal when I was in private practice, I also checked the records of the disciplinary committee that appeared at the back of that publication. If I learned that one of my colleagues or someone whom I vaguely knew had been up before the committee, and even if that individual had not been found to be at fault, I could not help noting that a charge had been brought at all—and the fact that it had did not do that individual's reputation any good in my mind.

To be quite honest, his professional reputation suffered. People used to say, "Well, you know, he has been before the disciplinary committee a couple of times. All right, they didn't get anything on him, but!" Solicitors are no more objective about presumptions of innocence than any other group, and they are just as much of a gossipy village as any other vested interest or professional group. It is nonsense for the Minister to say that there will be no damage.

In amendment No. 84 we have gone to great lengths to say that there need not be publication if it would damage the interests of any person other than the solicitor, his partner or their families. Also, there ought to be some consideration for the inevitable damage that could result for someone who is also worthy of consideration: the solicitor who has been the subject of allegations which have not been proved to be justified.

Publication is bound to have a damaging effect, for the reasons that I have given. Clearly, my own preference would have been for my amendment No. 139, because it said that there should be no discretion, if there was a finding of fault, which is a big change from the present arrangements. If solicitors were found guilty of the complaint made against them, their names had to be published, subject to the necessary qualifications in amendment No. 84.

However, if the finding was not guilty, we should at least leave the element of discretion so that, if it was clear that there was no moral turpitude and the allegations made had been held not to be proved, the discretionary committee of the Law Society could decide that, even if there was an interest in ventilating the circumstances of the case because it made a point of practice about which solicitors ought to be aware, it could be done without naming the solicitor concerned. That seems to be a sensible provision, and I am sorry that it has not found favour with the Minister. He is wrong, and individuals may suffer as a result.

Sir Nicholas Fairbairn

I agree wholeheartedly with the hon. Member for Glasgow, Garscadden (Mr. Dewar) as I can imagine nothing more harmful than publication. As he generously suggested, professional people are no less scurrilous in their suspicions, although there should be a presumption of innocence, than non-professional people. If someone comes up before the disciplinary committee and gets off twice, all they will say is that he has got away with it again. Publication will be a slur on a solicitor's professional reputation and it will be impossible to remove it.

I was astonished that a Scottish Minister should pray in aid the English section of the General Medical Council as an example to show that people did not suffer. I do not suppose there is any hon. Member in the Chamber who does not remember the name of the doctor the hon. Member for Garscadden mentioned, but the women with whom he was supposed to have had intercourse were protected and known as Mrs. A and Mrs B.

The General Medical Council presumed guilt before it started, because it said that a couple of women could not be named, although their practices could not be affected as they did not have any. Their livelihoods and their families would not be affected, but the council said that the man who was wrongly accused could be named and the press were able to name him. I would not want the English section of the General Medical Council to be taken for an upholder of morals if that is the way that it behaves.

Therefore, at the very least there should be the discretion not to disclose the name of a solicitor against whom a complaint has been made. 1 could name many cases—but I shall not—in which a disappointed litigant has made allegations against a solicitor, frequently at the same time as litigation but often years later, for motives which were entirely vindictive, irrational and emotional. There is absolutely no reason why the solicitor's livelihood, or that of his family and his partners, as well as his clients' interests should be put at risk by the publication of such an accusation. People remember accusations, but they rarely remember acquittals.

Mr. Menzies Campbell

If the Minister seeks to rely on the General Medical Council, one can only assume that he was on holiday throughout the months of August and September. Anyone who had any regard to the nature and degree of publicity which attached to the proceedings referred to by the hon. Member for Garscadden could not but believe that a procedure which resulted in such publicity was thoroughly defective and damaging. The subject of such publicity has little chance of recovering.

I hope that the individual we are discussing will recover, but the nature of the coverage in the press, on television and radio was such that he will find it a substantial obstacle to overcome. These matters must be assessed against the principle of public interest. It is clearly in the public interest that they should know about solicitors who have contravened the rules and regulations and have been found guilty of so doing.

One might argue that, for the public's protection, they should know which solicitors have fallen below the prescribed standards of behaviour and conduct, so that they can exercise a choice about going to that solicitor. Also, they can be advised that discipline and behaviour are taken seriously by the Solicitors Discipline Tribunal.

Where is the public interest in publishing the names of people who have not been found to have contravened the regulations? Hon. Members on both sides of the House and in Committee have accepted that the professional and financial consequences may be substantial for the individual concerned and for his partners and associates.

The Minister has taken a broad brush, and decided to publish and be damned, but the people who will be damned are those who do not deserve to be. Even at this stage, the Minister should be able to exercise his independent judgment, and take a decision for which he would be praised by both sides of the House—a decision that would reflect an independence of mind appropriate to the office that he holds—and say that he will think the matter over again. If he withdrew the amendment and gave it further consideration, he would earn the respect of the whole House.

Mr. Harry Ewing

It is a great pity that the example of the General Medical Council has been thrust into the debate. There is no comparison between a medical practitioner who is accused of misconduct and the procedure followed when a legal practitioner is accused of malpractice.

In the case of the medical practitioner, whether a consultant or general practitioner, a whole host of procedures are followed before the case finally goes to the General Medical Council. Many cases do not even reach the council, because they are dealt with and disposed of at an intermediate stage. That is not the case with legal practitioners, because there is only one avenue for dealing with their alleged misdemeanors.

The example of the General Medical Council is a red herring, for the reasons I have already stated and also because the council is constituted differently from the tribunal which considers allegations made against legal practitioners. The General Medical Council includes members of the public. My hon. Friend the Member for Aberdeen, North (Mr. Hughes) was a lay member of the council for a number of years, and a number of lay members sit in judgment on cases. There is no comparison between what happens to a medical practitioner and what happens to a legal practitioner when they transgress.

The Minister ought to accede to the request by the hon. and learned Member for Fife, North-East (Mr. Campbell) and take this matter away. There is no doubt whatsoever that it would do almost irreparable damage to a solicitor practising in a closely knit community. Anyone who thinks that closely knit communities are to be found only in villages knows nothing of some of Scotland's larger urban areas. In my constituency, all the solicitors who practise in Falkirk, Grangemouth and Bo'ness are well known to every person who lives in those communities. If, after a disciplinary hearing, any one of those solicitors was found not to have transgressed yet had his or her name published, I can give the Minister an absolute guarantee—my hon. Friend the Member for Linlithgow (Mr. Dalyell) is here; he knows the communities that I am talking about as well as I do, and in the case of Bo'ness better than I do—that that solicitor's practice would be damaged beyond repair.

7.30 pm

It is a major error for the Minister to suggest that those who are found not to have trangressed should have their names published. I accept what the Minister said about there being no smoke without fire. A balance has to be struck. Do we publish the name of someone who is found not to have transgressed and therefore seek to clear that person's name, or do we withhold the name and hope that people accept that that person has not transgressed?

I accept that a balance has to be struck, but it is not a fine balance. The heavy balance of probability comes down in favour of not publishing that person's name. Damage will be done in any case, but the damage could be minimised by not publishing the names of those who were found not to have transgressed. The names of those who were found to have transgressed should certainly be published, but those who have not transgressed can do without the ignominy of their names being published, with the statement that they have been found not guilty. There is nothing more damning. The Minister ought therefore to withdraw the amendment.

Mr. Dalyell

When colleagues have spent many hours on a Bill, those hon. Members who did not spend those many hours upstairs ought to be reticent. Perhaps, however, I may be allowed to break silence on this issue—and briefly.

I am strongly in favour of the arguments that were first advanced by my hon. Friend the Member for Glasgow, Garscadden (Mr. Dewar). My strong, ferocious feeiing is the result of constituency experience. When my hon. Friend the Member for Falkirk, East (Mr. Ewing) referred to Bo'ness he may have been thinking of a particular case that arose some years before Bo'ness became part of his constituency, when I represented it. The case is indelibly marked on my memory. It demonstrates how vulnerable solicitors can be if someone bears a grudge against them, a grudge that is perhaps completely ill-founded. Doctors are also vulnerable, and the police are becoming more and more vulnerable.

As my hon. Friend the Member for Falkirk, East said, the trouble is that there is no smoke without fire. Mud sticks in small Scottish communities. This is not a party matter. When it becomes clear that the mood of the House of Commons is such that the Minister ought to think again—this Minister has a reputation, well deserved, in my opinion, for decency and for listening—and since he has heard colleagus on all sides ask him to think again about this matter, as a result of all our experiences, he should do so. Therefore I ask him, please, to do so.

Lord James Douglas-Hamilton

We have had very interesting debates, both tonight and in Committee. The tenor of the representations made on that occasion was rather different. Powerful speeches were made in Committee on the subject in support of the proposition that there should be no special treatment for lawyers on the question of what publicity should be given to the disciplinary decisions of the relevant regulatory authorities.

Views on the matter do not divide along party political lines. For example, on that occasion the hon. Member for Falkirk, East (Mr. Ewing) said that he saw no grounds for making a special case for lawyers in this context. On looking into the position with regard to similar professional regulatory authorities, I am of the firm view that the case for giving publicity to the decisions of the council, the tribunal and the board in all cases is conclusive.

I recognise the strongly held views both inside and outside the legal profession on this question. Nevertheless, I believe that the amendments that I have tabled reflect a sensible and moderate approach. I hope, therefore, that the hon. Member for Glasgow, Garscadden (Mr. Dewar) will not feel that he has to press amendment No. 139 to a Division. I do not see the need for any secrecy in connection with the decisions of the tribunal or the board, whatever the outcome of the case in question.

Mr. Wilson

We intend to press this matter to a vote because an important point of principle is involved. What both we and the hon. and learned Member for Perth and Kinross (Sir N. Fairbairn) have been asking is: do we believe in smearing people? To publish a verdict of innocence but still to broadcast the fact that the case occurred amounts to stigmatising a person's reputation.

Sir Nicholas Fairbairn

I advise the hon. Gentleman—I shall not charge for this opinion—that if he wants to defame someone without the risk of having to pay damages, all that he needs to say is, "My dear boy, let me be the first to deny this rumour that is going about that you are a paedophile."

Mr. Wilson

Perhaps we could have a conference to agree on which rumours about the hon. and learned Gentleman we should deny.

I am not a lawyer; I have a journalistic background. People have come to see me on many occasions because they were obsessed by what they regarded as a legal grievance. That has occurred particularly in the Highlands. Crofting throws up innumerable cases of that kind. Such people go to every lawyer in the Highlands and Islands and become absolutely convinced that each new lawyer they see is more bent and less interested in their case than the previous lawyer. People who are obsessed in that way take their case from lawyer to lawyer.

I have spent many hours trying to get to the bottom of complicated cases in order to find out whether someone has been badly treated. As soon as one realises that a person has been to 10 lawyers and that the first nine agree, one's suspicions are aroused. When a person is convinced of his rectitude but when in law he does not have a leg to stand on, the idea that the lawyers should be exposed as having failed their client, or should be suspected of having failed their client by the publication of this material, would be gratuitous, offensive and unnecessary, and would not lead to public satisfaction with the process. It would discredit people who had no cause to be discredited.

We all agree that wrongdoing and malpractice should be published, but where malpractice and wrongdoing have been found not to have been committed there should be no publication. It is a simple principle. I wish that it could be extended beyond solicitors to many others. There is nothing so damaging as the dirty little paragraph in a local newspaper telling the world that someone has been found not guilty of something. Two wrongs do not make a right. Let us not enshrine in law, by means of the amendment, the principle that solicitors should be treated in the same way.

Mr. Deputy Speaker

The Question is that the amendment be made—

Mr. Dewar

rose—

Mr. Deputy Speaker

Order. We are dealing with amendment No. 47.

Mr. Dewar

On a point of order, Mr. Deputy Speaker. It would save a lot of confusion if I say that I shall recommend to my hon. Friends that we force a Division on amendment No. 139.

Mr. Deputy Speaker

The hon. Gentleman can do that, but it appears way on in the Order Paper. We cannot take a Division on amendment No. 139 until we reach it on the Order Paper. The hon. Gentleman could certainly divide the House on that amendment, but it would not happen for some time. Perhaps he would like to reconsider his position in the light of that.

Mr. Dewar

The only way that I could achieve the effect that I wish is either to vote for amendment No. 139 or against Government amendment No. 84. That might have the effect of marking the point that I make. I do not know whether it would be easier to divide on Government amendment No. 84. Unfortunately, it is a mixed bag of amendments, but I am sure that the Chair understands my difficulty.

Mr. Deputy Speaker

If I could help the hon. Gentleman, I would, but Government amendment No. 84 appears a long way down the Order Paper. It will not be possible to vote on it until we reach it.

Mr. Dalyell

Further to that point of order, Mr. Deputy Speaker. Might not this be one of the occasions when parliamentary procedure is a bit unhappy in its effects? In the light of what has been said, some hon. Members would like to give the Minister time to consult his ministerial colleagues and advisers and reach a considered decision. I am very much against Ministers being forced, at point blank range, into a decision when, if given more time, they might reach a different decision.

Mr. Dewar

In the circumstances, I will not divide the House at this point, but I reserve the option to do so on amendment No. 139 when we reach it. That would be common sense. I am attracted to the point made by my hon. Friend the Member for Linlithgow (Mr. Dalyell). I do not know whether the Minister has any room for manoeuvre, but he will have gathered that we feel quite strongly about this point of principle and that our feelings are shared by some Conservative Members.

I hope that it is not improper to say that I have had conversations with the Law Society on the matter and that in general it supports the point that I am making. There is quite a group of interested people and of people of some expertise, and perhaps in the interval before we reach amendment No. 139, the Minister will consider his position and consult representatives of the Law Society, who are in the building.

Mr. Deputy Speaker

I understand the difficulty that the House is in, but I can give the hon. Member for Glasgow, Garscadden (Mr. Dewar) an assurance that, when we reach amendment No. 139, if he desires to divide the House, that desire will be conceded by the Chair.

Mr. Harry Ewing

Further to that point of order, Mr. Deputy Speaker. To clear the mind of hon. Members, the vote on amendment No. 139 is anything but imminent. As I read the Order Paper, it would be the last vote in our consideration. That takes the pressure off the Minister and gives him much more time to reach that sensible conclusion.

Mr. Deputy Speaker

I hope that we have reached a sensible and happy conclusion.

Amendment No. 47 agreed to.

Amendments made: No. 48, in page 26, in line 29, after 'than' insert '(i)'.

No. 49, in page 26, line 30, leave out 'and' and insert 'or (ii)'.

No. 50, in page 26, line 31, after first 'or' insert '(iii)'.

No. 51, in page 26, line 42, leave out 'inquiries under this section' and insert 'this section and section (Board's intervention powers).'

No. 125, in page 26, line 42, at end insert— '(11A) The Secretary of State, after consulting the Board, may by order made by statutory instrument subject to annulment in pursuance of a resolution of either House of Parliament, amend subsection (2)(dd) above by substituting for the sum for the time being specified in that provision such other sum as he considers appropriate. (11B) The taking of any steps under subsection (2) above shall not be founded upon in any proceedings for the purpose of showing that the practitioner in respect of whom the steps were taken was negligent. (11C) A direction under subsection (2)(dd) above to a practitioner to pay compensation to a client shall not prejudice any right of that client to take proceedings against that practitioner for damages in respect of any loss which he alleges he has suffered as a result of that practitioner's negligence, and any sum directed to be paid to that client under that provision may be taken into account in the computation of any award of damages made to him in any such proceedings.'—[Lord James Douglas-Hamilton.]

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