M V Marine

HC Deb 27 March 1990 vol 170 cc460-8

Motion made, and Question proposed, That this House do now adjourn.—[Mr. Nicholas Baker.]

8.54 am

Mr. Neville Trotter (Tynemouth)

The tale of the loss of the M V Marine is tragic and shocking. All cases in which a ship perishes with its entire crew must, of course, be tragic, but I suggest that in the case of the Marine there was also a shocking story of a ship that was taken to sea with a crew half of whom were inexperienced and quite untrained, and with only three experienced men on board.

The vessel sailed from Liverpool during the night of 9-10 December last, with a cargo of scrap iron bound for Seville. She was 15 years old and 2,800 tonnes dead weight. I shall return later to the time gap before she was reported missing and a sadly unsuccessful search for her was launched.

I draw the attention of the House particularly to the woefully inadequate crewing of the ship. I know that all hon. Members share with me the deepest sympathy with the relatives of those who perished with the vessel. We should also share a sense of outrage at the way in which those responsible for the ship sent her to sea so disgracefully and dangerously undermanned.

The vessel had been sold in October 1989 by its Swedish owners to a Panamanian company, Tropica Armadora, when the new owner transferred her to the flag of the Bahamas. Before the sale, the vessel had a crew of nine—a master, a chief officer, a second officer, three qualified and certificated able seamen, a cook, a chief engineer and a motorman. After her transfer to the Bahamas flag, the vessel sailed with a crew of only six—a master, a mate, a chief engineer and three ratings. Most importantly, those three ratings were unqualified and had been recruited from a jobcentre. They were raw young lads from Tyneside. They were promised training, but it is clear that no serious training in the art of seamanship was given to them. Indeed, in the circumstances of the vessel, it was clear that no training could be given. There were only three qualified men on the ship and the other half of the crew had no experience whatever.

Each of the three deck crew had joined exactly four weeks before the ship sailed. That was the only experience that they had had at sea. One of them, George Cramman, was a constituent of mine. He had been a bricklayer until he had sailed four weeks before on his first voyage. The three lads were completely lacking in any nautical experience or training. By any reasonable criteria, the ship put to sea with insufficient crew.

Mr. Don Dixon (Jarrow)

Three of the men who were lost at sea were my constituents. Indeed, Mark Rannigan was only 17 years old and had no experience or training when he was recruited for that ship.

Mr. Trotter

I agree absolutely. A particularly tragic aspect of the loss was the age of the three young men. One was only 16 or 17, a mere boy.

It seems that the three lads had been told that the vessel had a crew of eight or nine and that they would be trained. I would expect uncertified and inexperienced deck crew to be taken on a ship on the basis of being additional to the experienced crew responsible for the sailing of the vessel. Indeed, the United Kingdom regulations stipulate that unqualified sailors should not be counted as part of the crew for safe manning purposes. The ship must have sailed without complying with international standards for safe crewing in terms of the size, training and experience of the crew.

So the vessel set off on that December night from Liverpool to the bay of Biscay, in the middle of winter, faced with many hours of severe weather, with only three experienced sailors on board and with three young lads fresh from the jobcentre on Tyneside. Presumably the engineer worked below deck. That would leave only two competent sailors, the captain and the mate, to man the ship—to navigate and to keep watch, presumably turn and turn about. This was a ship of 2,800 tonnes, not a tiny coasting vessel. There was no back-up for anything that happened unexpectedly. Presumably there were times when one of the three young men was left on his own in control of the ship.

If the point came where lifeboats had to be launched, the crew were incapable of launching them, especially in the weather conditions into which the vessel was sailing in the bay of Biscay. The young men had no experience or proper training in lifeboat drills, an elementary part of basic sea training. I understand that the lifeboats could not be automatically lowered and had to be lowered manually. How could three untrained lads cope properly in a storm in those circumstances?

I must comment on the role of the jobcentre in South Shields in the recruitment of the three young men. Apparently, a 20-year-old girl was offered a job on the ship but, fortunately for her, she turned it down. I understand that a company called Laird Line Ltd. asked the jobcentre to help recruit trainee crew members and a ship's engineer. The vacancy that was displayed by the jobcentre, in good faith, stated that no qualifications were necessary, and that training would be provided to enable recruits to obtain deck hand and able seamen certificates, as well as engine room qualifications. The display also explained that suitable applicants would be encouraged to take up full apprenticeships in those occupations.

Given the circumstances of the ship, that was an outrageous description. Serious inquiries need to be made about how such a misleading advertisement was displayed in the jobcentre. In due course, I look forward to hearing the response from the Minister with responsibility for that subject, although today—quite properly—the reply to this debate will be given by my hon. Friend the Minister for Aviation and Shipping, rather than by one of my hon. Friends at the Department of Employment.

Other allegations have been made—with what justification I cannot say. There has been an allegation that the stability of the vessel could have been affected by the structural amendments that were made when she passed into the hands of her new owners. There is also said to have been a history of engine trouble. It has been suggested that the ship sailed with a broken radio. One must ask what surveys had been carried out. Had there been any recent inspections of the vessel? There are regulations for port state inspection. Had the vessel been inspected while she was in British ports?

I turn now to the question of ownership. The owner is officially shown as being Tropica Armadora SA, a company that is registered in Panama, but who are the real owners and who are the beneficial owners? While the company may have been registered in Panama, thousands of miles away, I suggest that there is some responsibility nearer home. There is a relationship between this vessel and the remote highland village of Aberlour in Scotland.

I said that I would return to the action that was taken ashore when the vessel went missing. She sailed on the night of 9-10 December and was never heard of again. She was due in Seville on the evening of 14 December, but the alert was not given until 17 December, a week after she had sailed. It seems that it was only when relatives of the master and the engineer tried to make contact by radio on 16 December that it was realised that something was amiss. By that time, it was nearly a week since she had sailed.

Therefore, we need to ask, why did not the owners act sooner? Who managed the ship? Who was responsible for keeping in touch with her, and who was responsible for such disgraceful manning? According to a relative of the engineer, the Falmouth coastguard told her that the ship had been reported missing by the wife of the mate. The relatives of the other crew were not informed until 21 December, when the police broke the tragic news. There even seems to have been some doubt about who was on board. The relatives of another young lad were woken to be told that their son had been lost when, thank goodness, he was fast asleep in bed upstairs.

Mrs. Cramman, the wife of poor George, eventually received a letter dated 29 December, which was headed "Tropica Armadora", with no address and with a telephone number that I checked last night. It is in the village of Aberlour in the Scottish highlands. The letter was signed by Joanna Smith on behalf of the company. It enclosed a press release telling of the searches that had been carried out and listing the crew.

The press release "offered sincere condolences", but the letter that was addressed to Mrs. Cramman contained only the following words of sympathy: I hope that these details may answer some of your questions on the matter, and I am only sorry that we have no further news of the vessel. For and on behalf of the company. I remind the House that the tragic bereavement was suffered over the Christmas holiday. A letter was sent to my constituent's widow on 5 January by solicitors acting for the company. It expressed the deepest sympathy and gave advice about how she should submit a claim to the insurance company.

The Falmouth coastguard gave an anxious relative the name and telephone number of Mrs. Smith in the highlands as being the person to contact about the missing ship. It seems that Mrs. Smith told the relative that she was a friend of the owner, Mr. Chris Douglas. I stress the word "owner" because, as I understand it, Chris Douglas happens to be the name of the vessel's mate. It seems that Mr. Douglas also came from the village of Aberlour. Was he also the owner or the part-owner?

What do we know about the captain of the ship? The engineer, poor man, had also been signed on at the jobcentre in South Shields, although he was an experienced and qualified man. Was the captain also a part-owner? There is a big question mark over who the real owners are. Who are the directors of the company? Who was responsible for sending out this ship undermanned into the bay of Biscay in the middle of winter on a voyage that led to the deaths of the whole crew? Do the people who were responsible for that action reside in this country?

According to the Department of Employment, the advertisement was placed by a company called Laird Line. What is it? What was its role in the build-up to this tragedy? I suggest that a thorough investigation is clearly necessary. What happened to the ship? I suspect that we shall never know. However, we can seek to establish responsibility for the way in which she sailed, her condition and the undermanning of the ship.

If those responsible are within United Kingdom jurisdiction, they should be brought to account. Above all, we must take steps to prevent this from happening again. When the widow and mother of poor George Cramman came to see me in my constituency, the main message that they wanted me to put to the House and to the Ministry was that we must stop this happening again.

The ship was no doubt overwhelmed in a crisis in the stormy weather. Perhaps the cargo shifted. Clearly, the crew could not cope because of its lack of experienced men. The lack of a proper crew must have been a feature in the loss of the ship. An inquiry is needed to establish how that came to pass.

The Marine was a Bahamian-registered vessel. The investigation is therefore, rightly, being conducted by the authorities in the Bahamas. However, as all six crewmen were British, our marine accident investigation branch has asked for and been promised a copy of the Bahamas Government's report. As you will appreciate, Mr. Deputy Speaker, there is a strong British connection. Indeed, there is a stronger connection with Britain than with the Bahamas. I doubt whether the ship had ever been anywhere near the Bahamas. The crew members were all United Kingdom nationals. They were recruited in this country. The ship sailed from Liverpool. It appears to be beneficially owned in this country. It seems that its management was in this country. There is a far clearer connection with us than with the Bahamas.

A further important queston must be asked. Are other ships with the same owners operating in the same way out of United Kingdom ports? That is a matter for inquiry by us rather than by the Bahamas Government. Such ships could be similarly operated by the same owners flying a different flag and would thus be of no concern whatever to the Bahamas Government. It would be interesting to know the terms of reference of the Bahamas inquiry. The British interest in the loss is much wider than that of the Bahamas Government.

I do not wish to prejudge the results of the inquiry by the Bahamas authorities, but serious questions are raised by the tragedy. They are questions of public concern in this country. I hope that the report of the Bahamas Government will be published so that we can all know what it says and can judge for ourselves whether it covers all the serious issues that have been raised. If it does not, the experienced British marine accident investigation branch should be called in to carry out its own inquiry.

9.7 am

Mr. Don Dixon (Jarrow)

First, as a Whip I apologise for breaking the convention of the House and speaking in the debate. I have sat here for most of the night and as three of the crew of the Marine were my constituents, I feel that I have an interest in the matter.

Several weeks ago I supported the hon. Member for Tynemouth (Mr. Trotter) in an inquiry into the toxic waste plant at Pelaw, which is next to my constituency. I support all that he has said on this matter and the information that he has given to the House is that which I also have. I fully support the disclosure that he made.

As the hon. Gentleman rightly said, the tragedy took place during the Christmas period. Paul Wilson's father came to see me over the Christmas period to tell me of his concern and the lack of information that the families or next of kin had received. I wrote to the Minister on 3 January—I compliment him on having replied quickly—and I had a discussion with him in the Members' Lobby not long afterwards.

The next of kin and I support the call for an inquiry. One of the current problems is that the Bahamian inquiry will be in-house and its terms of reference will be narrow. It will concern only itself with the circumstances in which the vessel was lost rather than exploring the possible crew irregularities to which the hon. Member for Tynemouth referred. It will not consider the possible effect on the stability of the vessel following pre-sail structural modifications, to which the hon. Gentleman also referred.

The three ratings referred to had few qualifications and little sea service. That is in violation of International Maritime Organisation convention No. 74 concerning the certification of able seamen. That convention lays down provisions regarding the minimum age, the minimum period of service and the testing of a candidate's knowledge of seamanship.

I thank the hon. Member for Tynemouth for taking the opportunity to raise this important issue and I hope that the questions that he posed will be answered by the Minister.

9.10 am

The Minister for Aviation and Shipping (Mr. Pa trick McLoughlin)

First, through my hon. Friend the Member for Tynemouth (Mr. Trotter) and the hon. Member for Jarrow (Mr. Dixon), I wish to express my sincere condolences and those of the House to the families who lost relatives as a result of the unfortunate accident. My hon. Friend has made a number of points relating to the Marine and I think that it would be best if I tried to answer as many of them as possible. I shall therefore not dwell on descriptions of the vessel or the accident, which my hon. Friend covered extremely well.

When the marine accident investigation branch learned that the vessel was missing, because of the United Kingdom interest, particularly the fact that all the crew were British citizens, it immediately contacted the Bahamian authorities. It was established that the Bahamas was carrying out a full investigation, and a copy of the eventual report was requested. That has been promised, and the MAIB has been advised that it can expect to receive a copy of that report in the middle of this year. It is understood that the report will be published.

My hon. Friend, from whose constituency one of those who was lost came, has asked that the MAIB should carry out an investigation into the loss of the vessel, and that my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State should consider a public formal investigation into the matter.

I accept that there is a considerable United Kingdom interest, and I do not take lightly the loss of six seamen—I am sure that no hon. Members do. The prime responsibility for investigating an accident on the high seas rests with the flag state, but I assure the House that MAIB maintains its contact with the Bahamas. With no survivors and no wreckage having been recovered, the investigation will be very difficult, however much expertise is applied to it.

From its discussions, the MAIB is satisfied that the inquiry is covering the same ground that it would have covered. I have no reason to believe that the Bahamian inquiry will be less than thorough, and it would not be right to anticipate its findings. Therefore, I consider that it would be wrong for a separate investigation to be undertaken by the MAIB or for a formal investigation to be ordered, at present. It is important to emphasise "at present".

Minimum safe manning is a difficult area to regulate because there are no international conventions on safe manning, nor are there any international agreements on minimum safe manning scales for seagoing ships. However, there are resolutions on safe manning standards agreed by the International Maritime Organisation. Those standards are applied within the European region by a memorandum of understanding on port state control.

In the absence of international requirements, the United Kingdom introduced a voluntary safe manning scheme some years ago. That scheme embodies the principles of safe manning contained in International Maritime Organisation resolution A481 and the vast majority of United Kingdom owners see benefit in having safe manning certificates. Assessing minimum safe manning means that the crew shall include sufficient officers and ratings, with the appropriate skills and experience, to ensure safe operation.

My Department has seen no evidence that the Marine had been issued with a safe manning certificate by the Bahamian marine administration. The Marine was a vessel of 1,397 gross registered tonnes operating in an area defined by United Kingdom regulations as the extended European trading area. In making an assessment of the minimum safe manning for a United Kingdom ship, my Department would require detailed information about the ship, including her equipment, the level of automation fitted and the crewing arrangements, together with a study of the ship's plans. It is possible that a visit to the ship would have been made.

My hon. Friend asked when the Marine was last inspected by the Department of Transport. The Department of Transport's marine surveyor from the London marine office inspected the Marine on 18 October 1989 under the port state regulations to which I referred. Six deficiencies were discovered, most of which were relatively minor. They did not warrant the ship's detention. I hope that that shows that the ship had been inspected.

Mr. Trotter

I take it that that was a structural survey. Presumably, there was no checking on the manning.

Mr. McLoughlin

I should like to give my hon. Friend the exact details about that. It would be better if I wrote to him because I wish to cover a number of other points and time is marching on.

The 1978 international convention on standards of training, certification and watchkeeping for seafarers—STCW—specifies the mandatory minimum requirement for officer certification and for ratings forming part of a navigational or engine room watch. The 1978 STCW convention came into force on 28 April 1984 and there are currently 77 contracting states. Both the Bahamas and the United Kingdom have signed the convention.

In terms of ratings forming part of a navigational watch on a seagoing ship of more than 200 gross registered tonnes, the convention requires approved seagoing service, including not less than six months' sea experience in navigational watchkeeping duties unless the rating has undergone special training, which would include a period of seagoing service of not less than two months. There is no evidence that any of the ratings who served on the Marine met this requirement. While the convention does not prohibit the carriage of unqualified or trainee ratings for the purpose of training, any such ratings—as my hon. Friend said—would need to be carried in addition to the minimum crew specified for safe operation.

My Department requires that any person or agency supplying seafarers to a ship in a United Kingdom port should have a licence. To supply seafarers in those circumstances without a licence is an offence, but there are the following exceptions to this rule—the owner of the vessel, the master or mate, or any person in the full-time employment of the owner may recruit without a licence. In addition, an agent may supply his own employees provided that they remain in his employment and he is responsible for paying their wages and for all other conditions of service. The agent is regarded as the owner of the vessel for this purpose and is known as a ship management company or "manning agent".

I now turn to the jobcentre involvement in the recruitment of the crew members of the Marine. On 19 September 1989 South Shields jobcentre was notified by Laird Line Ltd. of vacancies for a ship's engineer and trainee seafarers. The directors of Laird Line were the master and mate of the Marine, who were fully entitled to recruit the crew for that vessel. Sadly, both lost their lives when the vessel sank.

The jobcentre accepted the vacancy for trainee seafarers on the basis that full training, leading to formal qualifications, would be given. As their procedures require, the jobcentre staff checked that the vacancies complied with equal opportunities legislation.

On 25 September 1989, Mr. Douglas, the mate of the Marine, interviewed in South Shields jobcentre people who had expressed interest in the vacancies. Mr. Douglas told the jobcentre staff that he would be offering employment to a qualified engineer and three trainees. However, not all took up his offer, and the crew who sailed on 9-10 December were not all drawn from the original jobcentre recruitment exercise.

Although satisfied that the jobcentre acted correctly, my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Employment has been considering whether jobcentre procedures for handling merchant shipping vacancies need to be revised in the light of the Marine incident. This has been the subject of correspondence between the Department of Employment and my hon. Friend and Opposition Members. I assure my hon. Friend that he can expect a full response in the near future. I hope that he will find it helpful.

Mr. Dixon

I understand that the Minister is trying to answer as many questions as possible in the few remaining minutes of the debate, but does he accept that jobcentres are Government agencies and that any youngsters going to them to be interviewed and then to be recruited will naturally feel that everything is above board and that it will be safe for them to take the job on offer? When incidents such as the Marine tragedy occur, it would seem that youngsters have been misled.

Mr. McLoughlin

I am sure that the hon. Gentleman has made a valid point and I know that my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Employment is examining the matter. I hope that the hon. Gentleman and my hon. Friend will be satisfied with my right hon. Friend's response.

As I have said, the death of six seamen is not taken lightly by me or by my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State. When the MAIB receives the Bahamian report into the accident it will consider—

Mr. Trotter

I appreciate all that my hon. Friend has said, and his response has been helpful, but I cannot help thinking that the Bahamian inquiry will be more restricted than the inquiry that ought to be held. Will he take that on board?

Mr. McLoughlin

I am about to do so.

When the MAIB receives the Bahamian report into the accident, it will consider it very carefully, in the knowledge that the vessel was lost without trace and that there were no survivors. If the chief inspector of marine accidents is of the opinion that the inquiry was any less thorough than an investigation that his inspectors would have carried out in the same circumstances, an investigation by his branch will be given due consideration.

We shall await the report of the Bahamian inquiry and then judge what lessons can be learnt and what action can be taken to avoid such a tragedy ever happening again. It was a nasty tragedy, as is any accident which involves loss of life. Given the time of year and the circumstances, it was especially regrettable. I repeat my condolences and those, I am sure, of the whole House, to all those who lost relatives in the accident. I hope that we shall be able to learn lessons from it so that we can try to avoid any such accident happening again.

Question put and agreed to.

Adjourned accordingly at twenty-two minutes past Nine o'clock.