HC Deb 27 March 1990 vol 170 cc446-59 7.48 am
Miss Ann Widdecombe (Maidstone)

I am immensely grateful for this opportunity to raise the recent historic ruling of Mr. Justice Brooke. I understand that my hon. Friend the Under-Secretary of State for Health will be joining the debate shortly, and I should like to put on record my gratitude to him, as he has answered a number of debates on abortion, usually at unseasonal hours. He also answered an earlier debate during the night. Indeed, I am usually accompanied on these occasions by my hon. Friends the Members for Hyndburn (Mr. Hargreaves) and for Basildon (Mr. Amess). The last time that my hon. Friend the Minister answered a debate of ours, on 27 July, he asked, "When shall we three meet again?" I am afraid that on this occasion, there are only the two of us, but the others join me in the remarks that I intend to make.

The ruling by Mr. Justice Brooke was in the case of a mother who had sued a health authority because she bore a handicapped son. She had asked the health authority, or at least the doctors, to abort the son at 27½ weeks. To their credit, the doctors refused. They said that, even though handicap was present, under the Infant Life (Preservation) Act 1929, the pregnancy had advanced too far and they refused the abortion.

In ruling in favour of the doctors and the health authority and against the mother who had claimed damages, Mr. Justice Brooke took the opportunity to give a long overdue and much-needed clarification of the Infant Life (Preservation) Act, which states that it is an offence of child destruction to destroy a child capable of being born alive. It goes on to say that there is a presumption that the child will be born alive at 28 weeks, but if a child is capable of being born alive before that time, it is still protected under the Act. The Act says that, after 28 weeks, there is prima facie proof that the child could be born alive. The burden of proof would be on the doctor performing an abortion after that time to show that the child could not have been born alive. Before the 28th week, the burden of proof lies on those who would prosecute the doctor.

The words capable of being born alive have been construed in different ways. I am glad to see my hon. Friend the Minister in his place. I refer him back to the debate on the Carlisle baby on 8 June last year. I asked several questions in that debate. I asked why, when the child had been born alive as a result of an abortion which had gone wrong, and had survived gasping and with a pulse rate for three hours, resuscitation was not provided. My hon. Friend the Minister replied that the doctors had decided that this was not a viable birth. I asked why the child was not registered for birth or for death. I obtained the same answer in each case. The doctors had decided that it was not a viable birth.

Mr. Justice Brooke ruled that the meaning of the words capable of being born alive was that a child was capable of surviving independently of its mother even if only for a short time". Those are the crucial words, and that is the crucial clarification. Many of my hon. Friends and I have claimed over a long period that that was the correct interpretation of the Infant Life (Preservation) Act 1929. The Carlisle baby, who survived for three hours—a short time, but nevertheless it survived—was therefore born alive.

The medical profession and, I regret to say, the Department of Health, however, have tended to define life in terms of long-term viability. That does not stand up in logic. If I were terminally ill, I might have no long-term viability but no one would suggest that I was not alive. We do not say that our hospices are full of unviable beings. They are full of current living people. The Carlisle baby was a living child.

If Mr. Justice Brooke's interpretation of the Infant Life (Preservation) Act 1929 is true—at present, that is the ruling that we have in law and the only recent judicial clarification that I know of on the matter—it follows that all those children who are aborted in National Health Service or private clinics at an age when they are capable of surviving, if only for a short time, are protected by the Infant Life (Preservation) Act 1929 and that those who destroy them commit the offence of child destruction.

Does the Minister agree that, under the terms of Mr. Justice Brooke's ruling, at least 2,000 illegal abortions are carried out every year in National Health Service and private clinics? The medical profession says that, at 22 weeks, there is a 5 per cent. chance of long-term survival, yet 2,000 abortions are carried out after 22 weeks. How is that compatible with Mr. Justice Brooke's ruling on the Infant Life (Preservation) Act? The medical profession tells us that, after 24 weeks, there is a 15 per cent. chance of survival. We know that children of 24 weeks are regularly horn breathing and with a pulse rate. Every year, however, there are some 20 abortions after 24 weeks. How are those abortions compatible with Mr. Justice Brooke's ruling that, if a child is capable of surviving for even a short time, that child is covered and protected by the Infant Life (Preservation) Act? Does my hon. Friend the Minister agree that in all those cases the Act has been violated?

We must remember that Mr. Justice Brooke gave his ruling in the case of handicap. He did not say that there were exemptions to the Infant Life (Preservation) Act. He said in a straightforward manner that, if a child is capable of surviving, albeit for a very short time, it is protected. What is a very short time? Let us consider abortions at 20 weeks. We must remember that the Carlisle baby was 21 weeks, but it survived for three hours. Surely there must be cases of earlier survivals for shorter periods. Let us take the 20th week as the guide, which surely must be logical, given that the NHS has clear guidelines that, after the 20th week, resuscitation equipment shall be available.

Mr. Peter Thurnham (Bolton, North-East)

The hon. Lady is talking about being logical, but could she make it clear where she stands on the issue?

As I understand it, 1 million women are at risk from an unplanned pregnancy. During the course of a year, a third of them become pregnant—half of them have an unplanned child and the others have an unplanned abortion, which is much to be regretted. The hon. Lady's solution to the problem is to lock up the doctors, but does she accept that she is approaching the problem from the wrong direction? We are all sorry about any abortions, particularly late ones, but why does the hon. Lady approach the matter from the legal angle, when we should be approaching it from the opposite direction? Why does she believe that there is a hard and fast point at which the law can decide whether a child is viable? Surely those matters should be left largely to the medical profession.

I believe that the hon. Lady is wrong to think that the law can be used as some kind of a weapon in her campaign against abortion. She should consider the practice in Holland, where, the number of abortions is half that carried out here, although the laws are much more liberal.

Miss Widdecombe

The hon. Gentleman has already spoken once today. I gave way to him out of courtesy, expecting an intervention, but I got another speech. I shall not give way to the hon. Gentleman again, no matter how pressing the points that he wants to raise.

The hon. Gentleman has totally misunderstood the nature of the debate. I am willing to engage with him on the general principles of abortion at a time that will come shortly. I am not talking about what I think is the right line, what I want to do with the doctors or where I want to define women's rights, but about Mr. Justice Brooke's legal ruling. I want to know what the Department of Health is doing about complying with that legal ruling. As Mr. Justice Brooke has talked about survival which lasts for only a short, unspecified period, as the basis of the Infant Life (Preservation) Act, is the Minister satisfied that abortions which are carried out when a child can survive, albeit for a short time, are within the law?

When he replied to my debates on the Carlisle baby case and to the administration of the Abortion Act 1967, last June and July respectively, the Minister said that he accepted that his Department had to work within the confines of the Infant Life (Preservation) Act. In view of the recent judicial ruling, does he think that his Department is doing that?

Another case has recently made headlines—that of Ashley Gardiner, a child of eight months gestation, who died when an allegedly reckless and drunken driver killed his mother. In that case, the Crown prosecution service decided that it would not prosecute for death caused by dangerous driving. I appreciate that my hon. Friend the Minister cannot answer for the Attorney-General's decisions, but there is a similarity of language in the replies to those two cases.

My hon. Friend the Minister gave a thorough reply to the Carlisle baby case debate, for which we were all most grateful. He said that it was a distressing and sad case, but nothing would be done about it. The Attorney-General said exactly the same. He said that it was sad that an eight-month-old child had been killed in the womb, but he was not actually going to do anything about it.

We have had Mr. Justice Brooke's ruling, and at eight months that child was clearly capable of being born alive. Therefore, it was capable of being destroyed under the Infant Life (Preservation) Act, so it was capable of being killed. I do not understand why the man alleged to have caused the incident is not being prosecuted for causing death.

Does my hon. Friend the Minister accept that viability in the long term is not an accurate interpretation of the Infant Life (Preservation) Act? What investigations will he demand into the alleged King's college baby case, the facts of which emerged in Sunday newspapers two weeks ago after a member of staff was so distressed by what had happened that she wrote to the hon. Member for Liverpool, Mossley Hill (Mr. Alton) setting out the facts. That incident has shades of the Carlisle baby case.

The alleged facts in the King's college baby case are that a child of 27 weeks, clearly more than capable of being born alive, suffering from a relatively minor but certainly not a serious and incapacitating handicap, was killed in the womb while its healthy and fit twin was allowed to go on living. That was described as a selective reduction, in which a pair of children are growing in the womb and the doctors decide which one shall be allowed to live and which one shall die. Can the Minister honestly say that such a policy complies with the Infant Life (Preservation) Act? If it does, why is that so? If it does not, what steps does he intend to take?

I return to some of the questions that I raised in July about the administration of the 1967 Act. The Minister is familiar with the questions. Mr. Justice Brooke's ruling has changed the answers that I was given then, or certainly should do. My question was this. If a child is not capable of being born alive, what is the point of the lethal injection of urea or saline that is given in the administration of the prostaglandin method of late abortions? That method is widely used in the National Health Service, as opposed to the dismemberment method which is so grotesquely used in the private clinics and which the Minister continues to allow. The prostaglandin method involves inducing an early birth and administering a lethal injection which, in the words of the medical text books, ensures that the child is born dead.

If the child is not capable of being born alive in the first place, what is the purpose of an injection to ensure that it is born dead? If a doctor is giving an injection deliberately to kill a child which he believes to be capable of being born alive, surely he is violating the Infant Life (Preservation) Act 1929. Under Mr. Justice Brooke's ruling, which has nothing to do with long-term viability but everything to do with short-term survival and short-term independent breathing—he talked not about existence but about independent breathing—how can lethal injections be compatible with observation by the Health Service of the Infant Life (Preservation) Act? Surely that is illogical and wrong.

Does the Minister accept that there is a lack of will throughout the Health Service, and certainly within the Department, to ensure that the Abortion Act 1967 is policed in its own right? Surely the effect of Mr. Justice Brooke's ruling is that the amendments to be tabled to the Embryology Bill by the hon. Member for Liverpool, Mossley Hill (Mr. Alton), my right hon. Friend the Member for Castle Point (Sir B. Braine) and myself will be unnecessary. If the Act was properly policed and if the Infant Life (Preservation) Act was properly enforced, the abortions that we wish to outlaw would be outlawed already. Is it not the case that, under Mr. Justice Brooke's ruling, those abortions which are already outlawed are greater in number than those which we would outlaw?

We have been obliged, reluctantly but of necessity, to exempt all cases of severe handicap. Mr. Justice Brooke has not made that exemption. Indeed, his ruling was based on a case of handicap. Mr. Justice Brooke is saying that, if the law were properly administered, no changes would be necessary to the 1967 Act to bring about the limitation on late abortions that is desired by the majority of Members in this place.

Surely there is a clear responsibility on the Minister, first, to outlaw the use of lethal injections and, secondly, to outlaw all abortions for whatever reason except saving the life of the mother after the 22nd week at the latest, and probably after the 20th week if we take the judge's views as they stand. If my hon. Friend does not accept that, how does he interpret Mr. Justice Brooke's ruling? What will he do to ensure that the Health Service and private clinics observe the ruling? What has already been done to observe the ruling, which is several weeks old?

I turn to the dismemberment method. Surely there must be a clear case for saying that if a child that is capable of being born alive is protected by the Infant Life (Preservation) Act, what goes on in the private clinics—live dismemberment of babies after the 18th week of gestation without anaesthetic—is a violation of the Act and a gross atrocity under the Act. We have been claiming that for some time, and the Minister's standard response has been to say that the method of abortion chosen has to be down to clinical judgment.

I ask my hon. Friend this question. We know that the eight-month-old baby in the womb who died as a result of a road accident is claimed not to have died. If that baby had already been born and was being transported in an incubator when it met with the accident, the death of a live person would have been recorded. There is no doubt that the law would have said that that was a death. Yet because the child was in the womb he was deemed not to have died.

Does the Minister accept that we would not countenance or even dream in our worst nightmares of the live dismemberment, for whatever reason, of a child in an incubator? We would not even dream of creeping up and giving that child a lethal injection, and live dismemberment would be utterly repugnant, so why is it acceptable when practised on a child of identical age and development in the womb? Is it because we see the one and not the other? Is it the fact that we can see the pain and the reaction of the child in the incubator that makes such an act unthinkable?

It is very convenient that we do not see the pain of the child in the womb—it is hidden from us. Is that the reasoning—that we can do wrong so long as we cannot see that we are doing wrong? Is it really down to medical judgment whether a child shall be dismembered alive? Now that there is no longer a shred of doubt that such children are protected under the Infant Life (Preservation) Act, will my Friend consider outlawing that method?

Perhaps the fact that that method is permissible does not come down to whether its effects are seen or not seen. Perhaps we now define life in terms of our perception of life. If a child is wanted it is a person. If it is not wanted—even if it is an identical twin, as in the case of the King's college baby—it is not a person. That is the slippery slope. If we start to define humanity in terms of our perception of humanity we shall be doing what was done by a regime in the 1930s which defined an entire race as sub-human. That is what is done—if not in theory, in practice—by racially repressive regimes everywhere. If we start to define humanity according to our wants and perceptions rather than on objective criteria, we are heading for a very dark age indeed.

I said earlier that Mr. Justice Brooke had protected even the handicapped, and Mr. Justice Brooke is to be congratulated. During the passage of the Bill unsuccessfully introduced by the hon. Member for Mossley Hill, any handicapped person could switch on the television or radio at any hour of the day or evening and hear politicians such as myself glibly discussing whether they had the right to be born. That is not an insult that we would offer to any racial or religious group. How dare we single out the handicapped for such an insult and treat them as a race apart? Will the Minister now accept that, as a result of Mr. Justice Brooke's ruling, handicapped children capable of being born alive are as well protected under the Infant Life (Preservation) Act 1929—and under the Abortion Act 1967, which must comply with the terms of that Act—as fit and healthy children, who account for 92 per cent. of all abortions after the 18th week? If the Minister does not accept that, can he tell us how he squares Mr. Justice Brooke's ruling with that refusal?

Mr. Justice Brooke has done something that we have been requiring for a long time, but it should not have been down to Mr. Justice Brooke to make that decision. The terms of the Infant Life (Preservation) Act have always been abundantly clear. A child does not have to be born alive or to survive long term—it merely has to be capable of being born alive. What we have been given by Mr. Justice Brooke is a definition of "born alive"—breathing independently for only a short time.

Perhaps the Minister will be able to tell us what is the earliest recorded birth or abortion in which the child breathed for only a short time. With regard to the Carlisle baby case, is it not true that there were precedents, that other children had been born breathing, at earlier stages of gestation? They may not have been capable of surviving, but clearly they were capable of being born breathing. I suggest the test that I mentioned earlier. If a doctor really believes that a child is not capable of being born alive, there is no point in a lethal injection. I suspect that if a lethal injection were not given, and if the NHS guidance were that the child must be given every possible chance, there would be many fewer abortions because doctors would not be willing to take the risk.

The other point about which I am concerned is the lack of will to enforce the Acts in their own right—long before the passage of any amendment in this parliamentary Session. How many doctors have been prosecuted for aborting children who were capable of being born alive? I think that my hon. Friend the Minister will be able to tell me that over a very long period there has been only one. Yet there is clear evidence, as in the Carlisle case and in the King's College case, that this abuse is going on all the time. Any child who is aborted after a certain stage of gestation would have had a chance, however slim, of being born alive. For that reason, there should be more prosecutions. It is as simple as that.

Those of us who have worked to have the legislation amended have been channeling our energies in the right direction, but there is another way—mere enforcement of the law as it stands. As I have said, Mr. Justice Brooke has made it abundantly clear that the law is already adequate to do all the things for which the hon. Member for Mossley Hill, my right hon. Friend the Member for Castle Point and my hon. Friends the Members for Hyndburn (Mr. Hargreaves) and for Basildon (Mr. Amess) and I have been calling. The legislative changes for which we have been asking would be unnecessary if only the law were applied.

Will the Minister please look again at the guidelines on resuscitation? During the debate on the Carlisle baby case, on 8 June, he told me that resuscitation equipment had to be available from the 20th week. But "available" means simply "on the premises". The equipment does not actually have to be used; it merely has to be there. The mere presence of equipment does not mean that any effort will be made to save a live baby.

To qualify for a licence, a private clinic must have resuscitation equipment if it is to abort after the 20th week. But even if that equipment remained unused, uncleaned, unmaintained, its mere presence would enable the clinic to comply with the guidelines issued by the Minister. Should there not be a very clear requirement that if a child is born alive, resuscitation equipment must be used? If the child is not capable of long-term existence, the resuscitation equipment will ultimately be unsuccessful, but at least we should know that efforts had been made to save the child.

The Carlisle case, to which I keep referring, is the clearest demonstration largely because it was the result of a coroner's inquiry and we have sworn affidavits and do not have to rely on rumour or newspaper reports. We have a clear legal guidance as to what went on.

The Carlisle case epitomises what I suspect goes on a great deal. I doubt whether there are children gasping for three hours on kidney dishes in wards up and down the country—I do not wish to paint such a horrible picture—but in a lesser sense, I suspect that there are many Carlisle babies born alive who breathe for just a short time and who are treated as though they had never breathed at all, as though they were the foetuses which the pro-abortion lobby claims them to be.

That is the problem. It is one of misuse of language. If a baby is wanted, it is a baby. It is referred to as a baby from the moment of its conception. If it is not wanted it is a foetus, even while its identical twin, in the King's College case, is a baby. What sort of doublespeak, dual standards and misuse of language is that?

Will the Minister seriously consider investigating fully the allegations surrounding the King's College baby and give an absolute undertaking that he will consider referring that case for prosecution on the facts as they are alleged, because there almost certainly should be such a prosecution?

We are told that that case caused great distress to members of staff, but, as so often, as the Select Committee on Social Services has been hearing while it considers the conscience clause, a member of staff writes and says what happened but asks not to be identified. Is there an atmosphere of fear in the Health Service? Has the Minister considered whether that conscience clause is being adequately upheld? If, in horrifying cases such as the Carlisle case and the alleged King's Cross case, staff are afraid to speak out, how much less ready must they be to speak out over smaller, routine—if I may put it that way—violations of the Abortion Act 1967 and the Infant Life (Preservation) Act 1929?

The pressure of fear should be removed. No member of staff, either of an NHS department or of a private clinic, should ever have to write to any Member of Parliament, as they do in droves, and ask not to be named. One of the most difficult features of the investigation now going on in the Select Committee is not the lack of evidence but the utter unwillingness of people who believe that they have been discriminated against because they do not believe in assisting at abortions, to be named for fear of their careers, their future progress, and sometimes of jeopardising their jobs.

We heard, oh so eloquently, from one consultant that he was prepared to come forward and give his name because he was now a consultant, but a few weeks earlier, when he sent his initial letter to the Committee, he did not want his name made public. What sort of atmosphere are conscientious objectors working in in the Health Service—I assume that they would not be in a private clinic because they are dedicated clinics—that even in the worst hospital cases and the worst excesses of abuse they do not want their names to be given?

I sum up by putting some questions to my hon. Friend the Minister which I would be grateful if he could attempt to answer in the time left for the debate. He has always answered debates on this subject thoroughly. We are grateful for his careful explanations and for his almost invariable follow-up in writing. I know that he will answer my questions to the best of his ability.

Does my hon. Friend accept that Mr. Justice Brooke's ruling must be observed in the Health Service and in the private clinics? If he does, and if he accepts Mr. Justice Brooke's decision that they are capable of being born alive, does he also accept that, already, without any changes to the 1967 Act, thousands of illegal abortions are being carried out in this country by the NHS and by private clinics?

Does he accept that the ruling given by Mr. Justice Brooke now protects the handicapped child in exactly the same way as it protects the fit and healthy child? Does he accept that the use of lethal injections means that a doctor must believe that there is a chance that the child is capable of being born alive and, therefore, under Mr. Justice Brooke's ruling, such injections should not be given? Does he accept that long-term viability can no longer be used as a criterion for assessing whether a birth is live, because his answers in the Carlisle baby case about the birth and death registrations were not that it was not a live birth, but that it was not a viable birth? Will he accept that there is now a clear contradiction between Mr. Justice Brooke's ruling and assuming long-term viability to be the criterion?

Will the Under-Secretary consider revised guidelines specifying not only that resuscitation equipment must be available, but that it must be used if a child is born breathing? Once again, I ask the Under-Secretary to accept that there has to be a case in humanity, never mind in law, for reconsidering the social, legal and moral acceptability of live dismemberment without anaesthetic? Will he undertake to investigate thoroughly the allegations surrounding the King's College baby case? Will he state clearly that there is no case in law, as it stands, particularly under Mr. Justice Brooke's ruling, for saying that a handicapped twin can be "selectively reduced", as they delightfully described it—I would call it by a stronger term, but I will not use it because I have tried to avoid emotive terms such as murder—in the womb at 27 weeks, while its twin is allowed to live? Will he say that, if that did happen, it is illegal?

Will the Under-Secretary of State say whether he believes that there is an atmosphere of fear in the NHS among people with conscientious objections? Although I understand that he will wish to await the report of the Select Committee before responding to any courses of action that might be recommended, will he at least state his concern that those with conscientious objections should be fully protected under the Act?

Will the Under-Secretary of State say that, if the Act were properly policed and enforced, there would be no need for legislative changes and that those changes are needed because the Act is not properly policed and not properly enforced?

Will the Minister say what revised guidance he has issued in the light of Mr. Justice Brook's ruling? if he has not issued any revised guidance, why not?

In short, will my hon. Friend state what effect that historic ruling has on the conduct of late abortions in this country, and will he guarantee that if there are clear violations of either the Abortion Act 1967 or the Infant Life (Preservation) Act 1929, it is his Department's view that those violations should be referred for prosecution? In other words, will he guarantee that the Acts are vigorously enforced, rather than loosely conducted? I should be grateful if he could answer those few queries.

As I said earlier, I understand that he cannot comment on the case of the child who died in the accident, but he may perhaps like to reflect on what would have happened if it had been a child in an incubator, and whether there is need for further clarification.

Mr. Deputy Speaker (Sir Paul Dean)

With the leave of the House, I call the Under-Secretary of State.

8.28 am
The Under-Secretary of State for Health (Mr. Roger Freeman)

I was going to seek your leave, Mr. Deputy Speaker. Thank you for giving me the chance to speak twice in this debate.

I believe that both I and my hon. Friend the Member for Maidstone (Miss Ann Widdecombe) are somewhat surprised at her good fortune in being called at what is likely to be the conclusion of this debate.

I pay tribute to my hon. Friend's undoubted energies. To be as fresh and as lucid as she has been at this hour of the morning is no mean feat, but to maintain the enthusiasm and dedication to the causes which she holds so dear is a most remarkable quality. I pay tribute to her: to speak so eloquently for nearly 40 minutes without notes is an incredible achievement, and one of which the whole House should be proud.

My hon. Friend has raised a number of important issues. I think that she will understand if I am reluctant to comment either on case law or on matters that are really for my right hon. and learned Friend the Attorney-General. She will not expect a Health Minister charged with administering the present law to venture too far down the path of commenting on recent cases, but I shall do my level best.

Let me say at the outset that abortion is not a convenience but a tragedy, in each and every case. Those are my personal feelings, but I am sure that they are shared throughout the House. We sometimes fall into the trap of believing that abortion, at whatever stage of gestation, is a medical convenience rather like minor surgery, but it is always a tragedy for the mother—indeed, for both parents of the life that is involved.

The scale of abortion is significant, not only in Britain but in other western European countries. Earlier in this Consolidated Fund Bill debate we talked at some length about the pressures on the National Health Service. It should be noted that some of the demands are created by ourselves, and not by the natural misfortunes of life—the afflictions that we, as human beings, may not be capable of controlling.

There are substantial pressures on the obstetric and gynaecological departments of NHS hospitals arising from the demand for abortions. I make no moral judgment, as a Minister of the Crown, about the need for such abortions, because the law provides for such services under the 1967 Act; I merely comment that we should not dismiss the pressure for them lightly, as some minor convenience that is provided for all who seek it.

It may be helpful if I review briefly the legislative background to abortion issues. As my hon. Friend said, it is an offence under the Infant Life (Preservation) Act 1929 to destroy the life of a child that is capable of being born alive, except when that is done in good faith for the sole purpose of saving the mother's life. Although she did not refer to it specifically, I think that my hon. Friend has always accepted that that exemption clause exists, allowing abortion regardless of gestation period to save the mother's life.

The 1929 Act contains a rebuttable presumption that a foetus of 28 weeks' gestation or more is capable of being born alive. In the event of a prosecution under the Act in respect of the death of a child of 28 weeks' gestation or more, the onus would be on the defence to prove that the foetus was not capable of being born alive. In the case of the death of a child before the lapse of 28 weeks, it would be for the prosecution to prove that the child was capable of being born alive.

Let me make two observations. First, I am sure that my hon. Friend would accept that, even with the advance in medical science, it is still difficult to date precisely the gestation period involved in a particular case. We are making best estimates. Our understanding of the gestation process and of the date at which fertilisation occurred and, therefore, of the age of the foetus is improving, but it is still imperfect.

I sense, too, that that there is a growing consensus among hon. Members, based in part on medical advice, that the 28-week period could and should be reduced. I believe that that is a relatively uncontroversial statement, but this is a matter not for the Government but for the House. I merely comment that to reduce the gestation period from 28 to 24 weeks would be a move that the House might find convenient. It would reflect a consensus among the medical profession, due, I suspect, to significant advances in medical technology.

Miss Widdecombe

I believe that the Minister has just made an extremely dangerous statement. Many members of the medical profession believe that the limit should be very much lower than 24 weeks. We have also been assured throughout that there is no Government and Department position on the precise number of weeks. There is a danger that the Minister's statement, although uttered in good faith, will be taken as a pre-emptive statement. I should be grateful if he would state specifically that there are plenty of doctors, consultants, obstetricians and gynaecologists who believe that 24 weeks is too high.

Mr. Freeman

My hon. Friend is right. I was choosing my words carefully.

Miss Widdecombe

But not carefully enough.

Mr. Freeman

I am grateful for my hon. Friend's intervention. It allows me to make it plain that the Government do not have a view and that I was merely reflecting what seemed to me to be a consensus, based upon advances in medical technology. Of course she is right that the difference between 23, 24 or 25 weeks is a matter of judgment. I am merely reflecting the advice received from medical circles: that a reduction from 28 to 24 weeks might be based upon advances in medical technology. However, I fully understand my hon. Friend's position.

The main thrust of my hon. Friend's speech was directed towards the ruling of 5 February. It is a recent ruling. My hon. Friend is very quick off the mark—quicker, perhaps, than the Department of Health, in the sense that we are talking about a judgment that is only six weeks old. She would not expect me at this stage to gibe a definitive answer as to our view of Mr. Justice Brooke's ruling. That is primarily a matter for my right hon. and learned Friend the Attorney-General.

My hon. Friend's main comment was that the definition capable of being born alive as commented upon in Mr. Justice Brooke's judgment could have a different interpretation from the one that some people have put upon it. In other words, it is not just long-term viability: it is the ability to survive, if only for a few hours. I shall seek to deal with my hon Friend's comments, but may I preface my remarks by underlining once again that medical technology has advanced considerably since 1929 and that it is advancing all the time. In a clinical sense, therefore, the definition of "viability" is not immutable and fixed for all time. It is changing.

When I visited St. Helier hospital last week—a major London hospital in the constituency of my hon. Friend the Member for Carshalton and Wallington (Mr. Forman)— I saw the excellent efforts of the staff there to keep alive premature babies of very small birth weight by means of techniques that were undreamed of five or 10 years ago. Another great pressure on resources in the Health Service—I referred earlier to abortions—and one to which we are happy to respond is the pressure to provide the technology, equipment and staff to keep alive premature babies, some born after a gestation period that would not even have been contemplated a few years ago.

The case involving the judgment given by Mr. Justice Brooke has only just been fully reported and its implications will have to be carefully considered. I assure my hon. Friend that we will take great care to interpret the judgment. That is primarily a matter for the Law Officers, but I assure her—prompted by this debate, which has been helfpul—that we shall, with all speed, ensure that the implications of that judgment are properly considered.

Matters relating to the Infant Life (Preservation) Act 1929 are for the Home Secretary, as his Department is responsible for the administration of that Act. It is widely known that the consensus of the main medical and professional bodies is that, with the advances in medical and scientific development in neonatal medicine, it is now possible for some babies born after 24 weeks to survive. I accept my hon. Friend's comment that, while she does not dispute that fact, she would perhaps extend it to include infants born after a shorter gestation period. My Department took steps to draw that view, shared by the relevant royal colleges, to the attention of members of the Royal College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists.

Administratively, the 24-week limit has been imposed on those private facilities approved under the Abortion Act 1967. Under that, as my hon. Friend will know, they are authorised to carry out terminations after 20 weeks, and we have taken the step already of imposing the new lower limit administratively. There is of course the exception, to which I referred, in cases where the life of the mother is threatened.

In 1988, the latest year for which figures are available, in Great Britain there were 23 abortions after 24 weeks. I cannot give my hon. Friend the number within that 23 where it could be said that the abortion was necessary to preserve the life of the mother, but when I respond more fully to her in writing I will give her that analysis.

My hon. Friend referred to a case allegedly involving selective termination of pregnancy at King's College hospital. As she said, the hon. Member for Liverpool, Mossley Hill (Mr. Alton) has written to the Minister for Health drawing attention to that and asking a number of questions. Details of that distressing case were reported recently in the Sunday Express. My Department's regional liaison division is conducting inquiries into the circumstances of that case and will shortly be reporting, not only to Ministers at the Department of Health but to the Law Officers. I look forward to those inquiries being completed quickly.

I share my hon. Friend's view that the Ashley Gardiner case, which involved reckless driving, was unfortunate. I well understand her anxiety and distress about the outcome of the case. As she rightly said, those are matters for the Law Officers, and she will not expect me to comment further.

My hon. Friend implied that there was a loss of will by the Department of Health in monitoring the 1967 Act. I assure her that that is not the case. She argued that there were imperfections in the Act, and that she wished to see Parliament change the 1967 Act and the Infant Life (Preservation) Act. Given the law as it stands, it is emphatically not the case that there is a lack of will in the Department of Health. My Department maintains a team of investigating officers, including doctors, nurses and administrative staff, and I assure my hon. Friend that any complaints about specific cases, raised from whatever source, are properly and fully investigated and that, where necessary, appropriate action is taken.

Miss Widdecombe

Can my hon. Friend honestly say that the Carlisle baby case would have been referred to a coroner and properly investigated if, after several months during which the Department and medical services did absolutely nothing, a member of staff had not finally gone to a Catholic priest? Did that show that the Act was being monitored properly?

Mr. Freeman

I understand my hon. Friend's anxieties and strong feelings, but we must operate in the real world. My hon. Friend is right to say that we rely on the good will and co-operation of staff, whether consultants, nursing staff or midwives, for advice and information. Ministers in the Department and the Law Officers are not all-knowing and all-seeing, so to that extent my hon. Friend's remarks are accepted. Ministers in successive Governments have seen as highly important the administration of abortion legislation to ensure that no one, whether in NHS of private hospitals, is above the law. A proper implementation of observance of legislation is also important to protect the women who choose to have abortions, and we must not forget the health of the women involved. I resist my hon. Friend's implication that there is a lack of will and determination to enforce the law by the Government and the Department.

My hon. Friend referred to lethal injections. I realise that she finds these techniques repugnant. Whatever one's personal views about abortion, it is always a tragedy when an abortion occurs. The method adopted is, of course, a matter for clinical judgment. It is neither sensible nor practical to define in legislation the method used to terminate pregnancies.

My hon. Friend referred to prosecutions.

Miss Widdecombe

My hon. Friend has not missed the point, but he has not answered the point on injections. If a doctor believes that a child is incapable of being born alive, what is the point of giving it a lethal injection to ensure that it is born dead? Is there not a straight contradiction there? Is not the doctor saying, by administering a lethal injection, that the child could be born alive? If he is saying that, is that not an infringement of the Infant Life (Preservation) Act?

Mr. Freeman

There are two issues here. The first is my hon. Friend's key argument, which is the interpretation of the Infant Life (Preservation) Act-is the child capable of being born alive? I have said clearly that the recent judgment by Mr. Justice Brooke, which appears to interpret the 1929 Act in terms of the ability of the child to survive for only a few hours, is receiving careful attention. I shall not give my hon. Friend a definitive answer this morning and she would not expect me to. The judgment that has to be made by the clinician involved is separate from the techniques, however repulsive and repugnant, used by the clinician to render the medical services necessary to the woman in a particular case. I hope that my hon. Friend will agree that it is not sensible to enshrine in legislation or regulation a precise medical technique.

On the conscience clause, I am aware that officials from my Department have given evidence to the Select Committee on Social Services. We await its report with interest and I assure my hon. Friend, who serves on that Committee and through her the Chairman and members of that Committee that the recommendations and observations of the Committee will be given very careful consideration and attention. I am given to understand that that report is expected shortly, and I know that the whole House will be interested in it.

In conclusion, I repeat and sum up the answers that I have given to the nine points that my hon. Friend made at the end of her speech. I am unable to answer the questions dealing with the legalities. She would not expect me to comment on those; that is not a matter for me or for the Department. of Health. She asked whether Mr. Justice Brooke's ruling should be observed: we are carefully studying that recent judgment, which has great significance for abortion procedures. She asked whether handicapped children are covered: all children are covered. I will take further advice on that matter, but that is my initial response.

I hope that I have dealt with the issue of lethal injections. My hon. Friend referred to lives being "dismembered": the use of medical techniques is a matter for the clinicians involved. She asked whether we will issue revised guidelines on procedures: once we have considered Mr. Justice Brooke's ruling and taken further advice, if revised guidelines are needed we will certainly issue them. She asked whether the King's college baby case will be investigated: I have already given my hon. Friend some assurances on that score.

Regarding the conscience clause and the Select Committee's report, we await that with interest, and any recommendations that may be made will be followed very carefully.

My hon. Friend asked whether the law will be enforced: yes, with diligence. It is a matter for the House to make a judgment on amendment to the abortion law. Each hon. Member will have his or her vote on that most important matter when it comes before the House.

Mr. Nicholas Baker (Dorset, North)

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Motion, by leave, withdrawn.