REPRESENTATION UNDER THE LEGAL AID ACT 1988 (Hansard, 25 July 1990)

§ The Attorney-General
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

Mr. Deputy Speaker
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following: New clause 25—Representation under the Legal Aid Act 1988 in Supreme Court and in care proceedings or proceedings for contempt in any court—

§ The Attorney-General
During consideration in another place there was some worry that, in opening the way for the extension of rights of audience in the Crown court, the Bill might also have made it possible for the Government 549 to limit the right of a defendant to select his legal representatives or effectively to limit the categories of legal representatives from whom he could choose by limiting the numbers of lawyers on a case. That is, of course, no part of the Government's plan, nor is it any part of our plans to impose or require fee sharing.
A litigant's ability to choose his legal representatives—I use the plural advisedly—is an important part of the safeguards of access to justice in a general case. My noble and learned Friend the Lord Chancellor therefore accepted an amendment that was designed to make it clear that the defendant's choice was to be preserved. In doing so he also made it clear that, in defence of the legal aid fund and all those who pay for it, he must be able to secure value for money and there was a need to ensure that the amendment was drafted to allow for that.
On reflection it became clear that some reworking was necessary. The amendments that resulted in the existing clause 49 were introduced after careful consideration and extensive discussion with both branches of the legal profession. Broadly, their effect is to make it impossible for the Government to prescribe for any proceedings in the Crown court the number of representatives or their category, but to leave unchanged both the Lord Chancellor's powers to decide how much their work is separately worth to the legal aid fund, and also the court's powers to decide that the circumstances of a particular case mean that one representative will do where two would be usual.
The amendments, as far as they went, were broadly welcomed by the Standing Committee. Other amendments tabled by the right hon. and learned Member for Aberavon (Mr. Morris) would have extended the provisions to legally aided proceedings in the High Court or the Court of Appeal. In Committee, I undertook to consider whether the principle of the Government's amendments might be extended to some or all of the higher courts.
The amendments are the result of that consideration. They go further in that they extend the principles to the House of Lords as well. They are comparatively simple. The existing clause 49, which is restricted to representation in the Crown court under part V of the Legal Aid Act 1988, will be replaced by a new clause that extends to all the higher courts, including the House of Lords, and is identical in structure to the existing clause. The result is that the present rights of the legally aided client to select his representatives will be preserved in full. The present power, under the 1988 Act, to make regulations limiting the number of legal representatives to one will no longer apply to the Supreme Court and the House of Lords, but the Lord Chancellor's powers to make remuneration regulations reflecting the value to the legal aid fund of the work done will be preserved.
I believe that that will be seen as a helpful response to the representations made in Committee and elsewhere.

§ Mr. Fraser
The new clauses and amendments are helpful because, had they not been introduced, relations between the professions would have been soured with the extension of the rights of audience. The Opposition tabled new clause 25, which has been taken with this group. It enables two legal representatives to be appointed even in contempt and care proceedings. Is that new clause 550 necessary, or are its provisions similar to those of the Government new clause, in which case we need not press it any further?

§ Mr. Alex Carlile
As one of those who pressed the Attorney-General on this in Committee, I am grateful for the new clause and in particular its extension to the whole of the Supreme Court, which includes the Crown court. The whole basis of legal practices in many parts of the country—in rural areas such as my constituency as well as in many of our large cities—is that the client comes to the solicitor, although the solicitor may not necessarily have the expertise to take the case to its conclusion, even if he has the right of audience to do so. Therefore, the client is best served by a specialist preparer and a specialist advocate. The new clause will continue those arrangements.
The county court is not included in the new clause. We discussed the situation in the county court when we explored the various possibilities in Committee. The county court is, quite rightly, to have a much expanded jurisdiction, and it will deal with many of the serious civil cases, particularly those involving personal injury. It is to be hoped that the litigant in the county court will not be adversely affected by any requirements to be set by the Legal Aid Board. It is to be hoped that the civil litigant will still be able, in the wide range of cases in which he is entitled nowdays to have a specialist preparer and specialist advocate, to have those services into the future.

§ Mr. Vaz
I too welcome the new clause. I should have been one of those who would have created a row, souring relations not just between the professions, but between the two Front Benches. The Attorney-General has accepted an important principle. I only wish that a statement about it could have been made earlier, as that would have meant that people would not have had to lobby so long and hard.
The Attorney-General's acceptance of the principle was spoilt when he talked about value for money in legal aid. That goes back to a point made by the Solicitor-General in the Committee considering the Legal Aid Bill in 1988, when he said that the interest of justice had to be made cost-effective. We believe that legal aid is a right. It is the only means by which people can protect their rights in court. At a time when £1 million is being thrown away on the Authorised Conveyancing Practitioners Board and £460,000 is being given away to the Council of Licensed Conveyancers, the Attorney-General could be a little more supportive of the legal aid scheme, rather than applying the pure Thatcherite principles that I am afraid have affected this important part of policy.

§ The Attorney-General
The application of Thatcherite principles has been responsible for a vast increase in expenditure—by almost 10 times—over the past 10 years.
The Government's new clause and provision is wider in scope than new clause 25, tabled by the hon. Member for Norwood (Mr. Fraser). I hope that that deals with his anxiety.
I agree with the hon. and learned Member for Montgomery (Mr. Carlile) that substantial work will be dealt with in the county court under the provisions of part 1. The Government will take careful note, as I am sure will the Legal Aid Board, which is independent of the Government, of the points that he made. I am grateful for what has been said in this short debate.