Cambodia

HC Deb 09 July 1990 vol 176 cc150-8

Motion made, and Question proposed, That this House do now adjourn—[Mr. Lightbown.]

12.11 am

Mr. Jim Lester (Broxtowe)

This is the second time that I have raised the subject on the Adjournment and the third time that I have spoken in the House about Her Majesty's Government's policy on Cambodia. Having put that on the record, I do not intend to repeat the points that I have made previously. I am sure that all hon. Members who take an interest in Cambodia are anxious about the lack of progress towards a settlement. We recognise that, perhaps inadvertently, delay cuts right across the Government's declared policy as I understand it, one of the major elements of which is to prevent the return of the Khmer Rouge. We have stated that strongly on more than one occasion.

The present delay leaves longer for the Khmer Rouge—which we and other EC countries, as well as the Association of South-East Asian Nations, have declared unacceptable in the strongest terms, if words mean anything—to undermine the existing order in Cambodia and to maim and kill even more innocent people by indiscriminate use of mines and hit-and-run tactics, to boycott the talks in Tokyo. It was behind the fourth occasion on which Prince Sihanouk, as leader of the so-called coalition, signed an agreement with the Hun Sen regime and backed out of it.

In previous debates, I have never suggested that recognition of the Government is a good policy. It is essential to reconcile the internal and external Khmers. They need to work with each other if a democratic, neutral future is to be assured. However, as the months go by, that seems an increasingly attractive alternative.

I remain deeply worried about Her Majesty's Government's inability to make any further direct moves beyond the delegation that visited Phnom Penh in December last year and the welcome distribution of £1 million announced by my right hon. Friend the Minister for Overseas Development to United Nations and non-governmental organisation operations in Cambodia.

I recognise the diplomatic skills of senior Foreign and Commonwealth Office officials in moving the Security Council to overall agreement on 16 January. Two of the 16 points agreed were that no acceptable solution can won be by force of arms and that there is an urgent need to speed up diplomatic efforts to achieve a settlement.

On 26 May, a further agreement was made. It said : The Five reaffirmed that a comprehensive political settlement must include specific provisions, as follows:

1. (a) To ensure the verification of the withdrawal of all foreign forces and the cessation of external military assistance, …
2. (b) To establish formally a supreme national council;

To enshrine the fundamental human rights and freedoms which the Cambodian people must enjoy, together with the necessary protections and guarantees; To provide a system of guarantees for the independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and inviolability, neutrality and national unity of Cambodia. We understood that there was to be a further meeting of the Security Council tomorrow, but that has been postponed to 17 and 18 July. It is in advance of that that I want to raise these points, because it is at that meeting that we hope that some progress will be made.

Since those two rounds of meetings, we have seen the results of the recent Tokyo discussions, after considerable preparations by the Japanese Government. They tried to promote what many of us have argud for—a supreme national council based on a 50:50 split between the Hun Sen Government and the coalition. I understand from the Minister of the Cambodian Government that there was an agreement to form a supreme national council on the basis of six from the Hun Sen Government and two plus two plus two from each of the other factions. The Khmer Rouge boycotted it.

The second agreement was that, if the Khmer Rouge boycotted the discussions, the other formula could be six plus three, plus three from each of the other groups. I understand that all that work has been rejected by Prince Sihanouk as of no value.

Meantime, we have seen a rush of recent claims about what is happening inside Cambodia. Nobody knows the true security position. We have seen reports of the four-five-six stratagem cutting the main routes in the north-west to starve the people in Phnom Penh of food. We have heard further assertions by the Khmer Rouge that they want to cut the routes to the south, which would bring about the fall of the Government. We do know, however, as there is plenty of evidence, that Cambodian boat people are now in Australia, where they seem far from welcome, and in Indonesia, and that between 20,000 and 80,000 are internally displaced people. This certainly was not the case when I last visited.

I understand that there are 11 relocation sites, some of which have been visited by the Red Cross and Oxfam. That shows that people are on the move because of this continuing civil war, which is indirectly assisted by external support for the coalition. It is taking its toll of innocent civilians and making genuine settlement more difficult.

I press my hon. Friend the Minister to make more contact in Phnom Penh to get even-handed information better to form our policy. Other countries, such as Thailand, France, Japan, the Netherlands, Canada, Sweden and Australia, have closer contacts than we have. India has a diplomatic representation. France has opened an office of the Alliance Francaise, which is the equivalent of the British Council, but is staffed by a diplomat. Does my hon. Friend share the information from that office? Does the Soviet Union, which is also knowledgeable about the short-term situation in Cambodia, keep the Government informed?

I am worried that this delay means a gradual undermining of the Cambodian economy and the military situation so that only the Khmer Rouge could gain a victory. We are all set against that. If it ever happened, where would we, despite all our protestations, hide our face?

It is not seriously disputed that the Hun Sen Government have instituted a generally constructive administration under great difficulties. Certainly nobody would dispute that they stand qualitatively superior to their predecessor. I hope that my hon. Friend will at least refrain from the hostile language of previous debates when, despite condemning the Khmer Rouge, we have tried to argue that the regime in Phnom Penh is of Khmer Rouge officers imposed by Vietnamese bayonets. After 10 years and many visits from hon. Members from both sides of the House, that is no longer a legitimate argument.

If we cannot set up our own mission, at least we should back a European or United Nations' mission in Phnom Penh to show that we are even handed in our assessment of the external and internal Khmers. A great deal of work needs to be done to plan for aid projections for the future when a settlement is agreed. We should provide economic assistance to balance the withdrawal of Soviet and east European aid, a welcome sign of the change in those countries' attitudes. But in countries such as Cambodia, and certainly Vietnam, it poses short-term difficulties.

We should work enthusiastically towards a ceasefire, so that we can implement the Secretary-General's Paris recommendations. I hope that we can talk in strong terms to China, the United States and the USSR to agree to stop shipments of military arms and resources. I should like Thailand to take active steps to ensure that human rights exist in the coalition camps, and at least move those who wish to go to neutral camps under United Nations protection, so that they can avoid conscription to fight in the civil war.

I should like us to press the United States, and particularly China, to change their policy of treating the the existing regime as an extension of Vietnam, which it is not. There are many sources of information, including congressmen and senators who have been to see the position for themselves. I welcome the report in today's edition of The Independent that the United States Secretary of State, Mr. Baker, is talking about reviewing American policy on Cambodia. I do not know whether my hon. Friend the Minister has any idea what that means, but if he does we shall be pleased to hear from him.

Mr. Chris Mullin (Sunderland, South)

I pay tribute to the hon. Gentleman for his persistence on this issue. Does he agree that, whether or not the United States changes its policy on Cambodia, the British Government should get together with other EC Governments and pursue an independent foreign policy in relation to Cambodia? Time is short—the hon. Gentleman will have seen the detailed report by Mr. Raoul Jennar stating that the regime in Phnom Penh has between 12 and 18 months, after which time it will go under. Some substantial assistance, more than just a seat at the United Nations, will have to be rendered to Cambodia if it is to survive.

Mr. Lester

I wholly agree with the hon. Gentleman. One of the reasons that I asked for this debate was because I sensed that it is a critical situation. I believe that nobody genuinely knows the military state in Cambodia. The Government is in a catch-22 situation. If they say that they cannot win, they are not regarded as able to defend their territory, and so are not seen as a potential Government. If they say that they are strong and intend to fight, it gives the impression that they seek to continue to solve the problem by military means.

One of the criticisms that I heard in Washington when I was there arguing with the United States Administration was that they said that they do not support communist regimes, and they described the Hun Sen regime as communist. The question that I, and perhaps my hon. Friend the Minister, should ask is, in that case, why do they support Laos and have an embassy there? Why do they give China most favoured nation trading status? Why cannot they normalise their relations with Vietnam, which would be one of the most significant factors in bringing about peace in south-east Asia?

One of the comments made by the Cambodian Government is that their only fault is that they were liberated from Pol Pot by the Vietnamese. They say that, if they had been liberated by any other force—the Thais or anyone else—they would now be in a much happier position. They are given no credit for any of their actions.

I wish to ask a question of my hon. Friend—this time well in advance of the United Nations General Assembly. Last year, ironically, it passed a resolution that was profoundly out of date with the day-to-day position, but which there was not time to renegotiate in between the withdrawal of the Vietnamese forces and the drafting of the ASEAN countries.

My question is: what view are Her Majesty's Government going to take in the next session? I hope that they can influence the nature of the ASEAN draft in good time and accurately reflect the fact that the Vietnamese have withdrawn; that there is a civil war in Cambodia; that it is being fought against a ruthless army led by men who have been universally condemned for their past actions; and that they are now establishing, in the hiatus, a strong guerrilla base trying to win by attrition what they could not win by negotiation or the ballot box.

The second issue at the United Nations is that of who will occupy the seat increasingly being held by the dubious external Government of the coalition. I know that my hon. Friend will say that the British Government do not recognise them as the external Government but just go along with the rest of the United Nations by using the term. We have all seen that the fact that the Khmer Rouge has held the seat on behalf of the coalition has given them incredible advantage in terms of the negotiations.

On 3 July, my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister said: In future, we shall reconsider our vote as to who shall take that seat for Cambodia."—[Official Report, 3 July 1990; Vol. 175, c. 856.] Tonight I ask my hon. Friend to reconsider our overall policy and actions on Cambodia and to tailor them to meet the statement made by my hon. Friend the Foreign Minister to me on 26 March: Our abhorrence of the Khmer Rouge remains absolute, and we are doing what we can to prevent Pol Pot and his friends from returning to power."—[Official Report, 26 March 1990; Vol. 170, c. 29–30.] I am asking whether what we are doing will prevent Pol Pot and his friends from returning to power.

12.26 am

The Parliamentary Under-Secetary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (Mr. Tim Sainsbury)

I am grateful to my hon. Friend the Member for Broxtowe (Mr. Lester) for providing this further opportunity to discuss the efforts of the international community to restore peace and stability to a country and people that have known war and desperation for too many years.

We may be approaching a decisive stage for Cambodia's future. The five permanent members of the Security Council meet again on 16 and 17 July to pursue their efforts to formulate a comprehensive political settlement acceptable to all the Cambodian parties; we are waiting to see whether the agreement between Hun Sen and Prince Sihanouk in Tokyo in June will lead to an end to hostilities and the creation of a supreme national council by the end of this month. There are signs that the Hun Sen regime is faltering as economic difficulties bite and military pressure from the resistance increases; and we and others are already considering how to handle Cambodia at this year's United Nations General Assembly. This is clearly a good moment to review recent developments and to consider the prospects for the peace process.

My hon. Friend asked how we get our information to furnish the background against which to carry out this reconsideration. Although we do not have diplomatic representation in Phnom Penh, we keep ourselves well informed of events there. Our embassy in Bangkok is responsible for reporting on Cambodia and draws on a wide variety of sources for its information. We exchange information with our friends and partners, including the French, other members of the 12, our partners in the permanent five and, of course, the Australians. We take every opportunity to meet people who are living and working in Phnom Penh. There is, however, no question of our having Government-to-Government relations with the state of Cambodia without a comprehensive political settlement.

We continue to play an active part in the search for peace, based on a conviction that a comprehensive political settlement is the only effective way of safeguarding Cambodia's future and preventing a return to the atrocities of the Pol Pot regime. When the House last debated Cambodia, in November 1989, hon. Members may recall that my right hon. Friend the Minister of State referred to new diplomatic ideas coming forward, in particular an interim United Nations authority, as suggested by Congressman Solarz". He added: A return to the negotiating table is becoming increasingly urgent".—[Official Report, 13 November 1989; Vol. 160, c. 51.] His remarks were clearly in tune with the thinking of our friends and partners. In late November, the Australian Foreign Minister, Senator Evans, proposed a settlement based on an enhanced United Nations role in Cambodia, including an interim United Nations administration. Meanwhile, the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council have also been considering their role, given that they are uniquely well placed to influence the development of a settlement in Indochina.

Mr. George Foulkes (Carrick, Cumnock and Doon Valley)

The Opposition substantially share the view advanced by the hon. Member for Broxtowe (Mr. Lester). The Minister says that the permanent five are especially well placed to put forward a solution. Britain, which is one of the permanent five, is even better placed, because it is not seen to have any axe to grind. So far, the Minister has spoken as an observer. It would help the House if he could tell us what positive proposals or suggestions the Government will put forward at that meeting to try to help solve the difficulties.

Mr. Sainsbury

I am coming to that. The hon. Gentleman should recognise that the permanent five must work together on the problem if there is to be an effective solution and real progress.

The five were encouraged by the international response to Senator Evans's initiative, and in particular by the fact that none of the Cambodian parties dismissed it. They concluded that they could usefully develop Australian ideas with the eventual aim of putting definite proposals to the Cambodians themselves. We regard this as a helpful and important step towards reviving the negotiating process.

Against this background, the Asia directors of the permanent five have made encouraging progress in their four meetings so far. At the first, in Paris, they agreed 16 principles to guide them and others in working for a peaceful settlement. These confirm the objectives that Britain has consistently pursued in the search for peace: that no acceptable solution can be achieved by force of arms; that a comprehensive political settlement is the only way of ensuring a durable peace; and that free and fair elections must be held. Those principles have since been widely accepted, most notably by the three members of the resistance coalition National Government of Cambodia, as the best foundation for a settlement.

At their second and third meetings, the five had more detailed discussions on specific aspects of a possible settlement. These included the modalities of peacekeeping—including military aspects—the administrative structure in Cambodia in the period before elections; the organisation of elections; and a supreme national council as the repository of Cambodian sovereignty.

The most recent meeting of the permanent five, in New York, took place in rather different circumstances. There were indications of a rapprochement between China and Vietnam, and Prince Sihanouk and Hun Sen were about to meet in Tokyo. The five, therefore, while indicating that they could be flexible over the scale and scope of a United Nations role in Cambodia, also stressed that there must be certain indispensable conditions for a comprehensive settlement in Cambodia if the United Nations was to play an effective part without quite unacceptable risks to its personnel and if the settlement was to be durable. They spelled these out, and I think that they are important enough to repeat in full.

Such a settlement must ensure the verification of the withdrawal of all foreign forces and the cessation of external military assistance; a durable ceasefire; the re-grouping of the armed forces of the factions into designated cantonment areas—all under the control of an effective United Nations peacekeeping operation. It must formally establish a supreme national council and ensure free and fair elections for a constituent assembly under United Nations auspices. It must enshrine the fundamental human rights and freedoms which the Cambodian people must enjoy, together with the necessary protections and guarantees. It must provide a system of guarantees for the independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and inviolability, neutrality and national unity of Cambodia.

These conditions reflect our hopes for Cambodia's future, and are the minimum guarantees that the Cambodians will eventually be able to live in peace and stability, free from the fear of civil war and the return of Pol Pot's Khmer Rouge.

We hope that the Cambodian parties can agree a settlement on that basis. The structure and powers of the SNC are really for it to decide and we would not wish to insist on any specific formula for the inclusion or otherwise of all the Cambodian parties. But it is an open question whether the Cambodians will be able to agree without strong outside help. Their record is not good. Earlier this year, the Australians pursued a useful but inconclusive series of contacts with the Cambodian parties in an attempt to establish what common ground existed between them. In February, the Indonesians hosted a meeting of regional countries, including the four Cambodian parties, but the participants failed to agree on a final document, mainly because Vietnam and the Khmer Rouge did not seem ready to settle.

However, in Tokyo, Hun Sen and Prince Sihanouk signed a document committing themselves to the creation of a supreme national council and a voluntary end to hostilities by the end of July. That could be a step in the right direction, but it also illustrates the difficulty of trying to achieve a partial settlement which is not organically linked to all the other elements in a comprehensive and internationally acceptable settlement.

Mr. Lester

The point that I wanted to make—as I said in my speech—is that I understand that Prince Sihanouk has now withdrawn from that agreement. This is the fourth time that he has reached an agreement with the Hun Sen Government, and the fourth time that he has withdrawn.

Mr. Sainsbury

I think that that reinforces what I have just said about the difficulties of reaching agreement with all the Cambodian parties. The Khmer Rouge disassociated itself from the document because it claimed that it was not treated as an equal partner. Without the agreement of all parties, there must be serious doubts about the effectiveness of any ceasefire, and without the other minimum indispensable elements that the five agreed in May, the United Nations is unlikely to become involved in such a settlement.

Where, then, does the way forward lie? We are approaching a turning point. By the end of this month, with or without the Khmer Rouge, a supreme national council may exist, opening the way to a new alignment of the Cambodian parties. Hun Sen embraced the idea with great enthusiasm—as well he might, for his own position is looking increasingly uncertain. As the countries of eastern and central Europe look to their own economic development, money is being progressively cut off. The same is happening to Hun Sen's foreign mainstay, Vietnam: not only the rug but the floor and foundations are being pulled out from beneath both regimes.

The Government in Phnom Penh are becoming demoralised, at the same time as military pressures from the resistance increase. Hun Sen should therefore have every incentive to reach a settlement as soon as possible. The resistance coalition should also be ready to negotiate. The Khmer Rouge must know that the international community would never accept its return to power alone in Cambodia by military force, and that under it Cambodia would be condemned to isolation, continuing misery and probably civil war. We call on all the Cambodian parties to compose their differences and begin the essential process of national reconciliation.

Our conclusion, therefore, is that there is greater urgency than ever to achieve an internationally acceptable comprehensive political settlement. The permanent five had intended to meet representatives of all four Cambodian parties at their next meeting in Paris. Failure of the Tokyo meeting to demonstrate unanimity among the Cambodian parties has caused the five to think again.

We agreed that, before meeting the Cambodians direct, the five must agree what they intend to say to them. The aim of the five's Paris meeting will therefore be to complete a detailed examination of a series of working papers to form the basis of a comprehensive political settlement. These would then serve as a mandate for a meeting with the Cambodian parties as soon as possible thereafter. If the Cambodians themselves are prepared to work within the five's framework, it may be possible to consider a date for reconvening the Paris international conference on Cambodia. I do not wish to raise hopes that this will happen in the near future, but we should like it to: it is our aim.

As my hon. Friend has already made clear, if no settlement is reached, another concern is the question of Cambodia's representation at the United Nations, and this year's debate on Cambodia at the General Assembly. As I stated in my answer to the hon. Member for Sunderland, South (Mr. Mullin) on 13 June—in column 283 of Hansard—we are reviewing our policy on this matter with our EC partners. My right hon. Friend the Prime Minister repeated that in answer to questions on 3 July—in column 856.

Our friends and partners are all well aware of our reservations about allowing the status quo at the United Nations to continue, given the changes in the situation since last year's General Assembly. With this in mind, over the summer we shall be looking at the possibilities for change, taking into account the efforts of a range of countries—including those of the permanent five—to achieve a comprehensive political settlement.

The question of Cambodia's United Nations representation will first come up in the credentials committee in about mid-October. Much could happen before then. In the event of a comprehensive political settlement, the issue would resolve itself: in the period before free elections, the supreme national council would occupy the seat in place of the National Government of Cambodia. It would be defeatist to assume now that a challenge to the credentials of the national government of Cambodia—in the credentials committee or on the floor of the General Assembly—will be necessary by October. As for the General Assembly debate on the situation in Cambodia, we have yet to see a resolution, and would not expect to do so until the autumn. When we do, we shall take a view on how to respond.

Meanwhile, as my hon. Friend has pointed out, the humanitarian needs of the Cambodian people are as great as ever. Since my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary announced our intention of building up our humanitarian aid programme for the benefit of all Cambodians, we have made good progress, especially inside Cambodia. To date, we have already contributed £224,000 to British non-governmental organisations for projects inside Cambodia and have committed a further £230,000. A number of other proposals with a total value in excess of £500,000 are also under consideration.

My hon. Friend referred to the pledge of £1 million we made at the beginning of this year for the work of multilateral agencies inside Cambodia. As my right hon. Friend the Minister for Overseas Development announced in her written statement on 5 July, we shall be donating £500,000 to UNICEF, £300,000 to the world food programme, and £200,000 to the World Health Organisation. Each pledge is for a specific purpose to alleviate suffering and raise the standard of people's lives inside Cambodia. We also remain committed to providing humanitarian assistance for the civilian population of camps for displaced persons along the Thai-Cambodia border, administered by the non-communist resistance factions.

Mr. D. N. Campbell-Savours (Workington)

Will the hon. Gentleman give way?

Mr. Sainsbury

No, I am afraid that there is not enough time.

No-one, however, could deny that the best way of bringing relief to all Cambodians is a return to peace and stability, with the opportunity to choose whom they wish to govern them. We are committed to working for this and will do our utmost with our friends and partners to achieve it. Unless the Cambodians themselves want peace, however, and are prepared to work constructively and co-operatively towards it, no settlement will be successful. We would urge all the Cambodian factions to take full advantage of the opportunities that the international community is making for them to reach a comprehensive political settlement. If they do, they can be sure of Britian's help and support in Cambodia's reconstruction and development.

The motion having being made after Ten o'clock and the debate having continued for half an hour, MR. DEPUTY SPEAKER adjourned the House without Question put, pursuant to the Standing Order.

Adjourned at nineteen minutes to One o'clock.