Trident

HC Deb 06 February 1990 vol 166 cc753-4

12. ;Mr. Andrew F. Bennett

To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what discussions he has had with the United States Defence Secretary on future progress on the Trident programme.

Mr. Tom King

That was one of the matters that I discussed with Mr. Dick Cheney during my visit to Washington last week, when he confirmed to me that the Trident D5 system is expected to enter service with the United States navy at the end of next month.

Mr. Bennett

Does the Secretary of State agree that many defence analysts in the United States think that there is at least a 50 per cent. chance that the Americans will cancel the D5 programme, that there is grave concern about its technical problems, that there is great pressure in Congress for financial savings and that there is also a possibility that the United States will negotiate it away? Does not that leave the British Government with a major strategy problem and is not that the explanation for the talks with the French to try to develop a new nuclear weapon?

Mr. King

The answer to the latter part of the question is no. That is an entirely different sort of weapon. The hon. Gentleman cannot have listened to my answer. He says that he thinks the Americans might be about to cancel the Trident D5 system, but did he not hear me say that it is coming into service at the end of next month? He may also have noticed the proposal that the United States Administration put to Congress last week requesting funds for the 18th Trident submarine and 52 Trident 2 missiles.

Dr. Hampson

Does my right hon. Friend agree that, given the potential instability in central and eastern Europe, and who knows what might be the longer-term commitment of the United States to Europe, it becomes even more crucial that we retain a credible independent nuclear deterrent so that potential territorial ethnic disputes in central Europe are not dragged into a wider context of the major powers?

Mr. King

My hon. Friend is aware that even if the Start negotiations are completed successfully, the Soviet Union will still be left with a substantial and modernised strategic capability. Contrary to what the hon. Member for Denton and Reddish (Mr. Bennett) implied about the attitude of Congress, I found that, not only in the Administration but among the responsible leaders in Congress, whatever other changes might be envisaged, the importance of preserving a strategic nuclear deterrent was clearly recognised throughout Congress.