§ Mr. Tam Dalyell (Linlithgow)I have the impression that, so horrendous is the prospect of a protracted or, indeed, any war in the Gulf, the House of Commons has anaesthetised its collective mind about it.
I am one of a dwindling number of hon. Members who have been here since the time of Harold Macmillan, but I have never been more uptight about any issue than I am about a Gulf war—in particular, the ecological consequences of the military option, which are the subject of this debate.
I am plain frightened for my country and for millions in the Arab world and the so-called third world.
I am more concerned about this matter than I have been about anything in my life. The issue could be the survival of humanity. I am not given to flights of fancy or to exaggeration. As the Minister answering the previous debate said, for 24 years, I have been a weekly columnist for New Scientist.
I think that we are in danger, to use the title of John Tusa's programme, of sleepwalking to war. Some extremely alert and effective Members of this House seem to be under the impression that what would happen would be a glorified pub brawl. I fear that the reality would be very different; it could be Passchendaele in the sands.
For 21 months, I wore the emblem of the Desert Rats. I was tank crew. My heart goes out to those who, 40 years later, are tank crew in what used to be the Scots Greys now—the Scots Dragoon Guards—and the other armoured regiments, who are having to deal not only with the sand but with the dust of the desert and what that can do to the instrumentation of tanks.
A number of hon. Members have talked about "liberating Kuwait". I am not sure that it would not be more accurate to say that the option is not liberating Kuwait but "obliterating Kuwait." Any land military attempt to "free" Kuwait could result in the kind of fighting that was experienced at Guadalcanal and the Solomon Islands or at Iwo Jima. Iraq's would be a battle-hardened army. The present crisis is totally different from the Falklands and the Argentine conscripts. We are talking about people who have been through a decade of extremely tough war.
I shall be personal for a moment in a way that I am not normally personal, least of all about myself. I was brought up as young child by a grandmother who was broken, and broken-hearted, because my grandfather was one of those lucky enough to come back from Gallipoli, but was never the same again. My grandmother and grandfather made Edward Grey, Asquith's Foreign Secretary, my mother's godfather, so I have been interested in his books. We could be lurching into another war such as the first world war, and I have been re-reading the diaries of Grey who, reflecting on the first world war, said:
Let us examine the first of our considerations as dominant in my mind in the last week of July 1914. This was that a great European war would be a catastrophe on an unprecedented scale, and that this would be so obvious to all the Great Powers that when on an edge of the abyss they would call a halt and recoil from it.He continued:The first half of this impression unfortunately admits of no qualification now. We know the full tale of the loss of life, 400 of the maiming and wounding, but the amount of grief and suffering caused by it is more than human thought or sympathy can measure.I hope that I may be forgiven for saying that both my mother and my father were Arabic speakers and I was brought up to respect the Semite people, Arab and Jew. I have the feeling that threats and refusing to talk simply will not work with those people. I am distressed at what I can only refer to as a certain kind of Anglo-Saxon self-righteousness.When I was a young Member of Parliament in January 1964, my wife and I were in Cairo. On our last night there, at his request, I received a message to go and see President Nasser in his private house on the outskirts of Cairo. The hour and a half that he gave me made a lifelong indelible impression on me about the aspirations of the Arab peoples.
I draw from such an experience the view that, if we try to humiliate the Iraqis, whatever we may think, there will simply be a bitter war. I think that the troops on the ground understand that, and I should like to pay tribute to Brigadier Patrick Cordingley. It must have taken courage, and I thought that he was quite ritght, to speak out as he did about possible losses. Some people may think that a field commander should not do that, but in these circumstances he was justified in bringing the possible casualties to the attention of people here.
If my hon. Friend—hon. Friend in more senses than one—the Member for Swansea, East (Mr. Anderson) thinks that I am a bit way out, I call in aid Sir Brian Urquhart of the United Nations, in particular his Montagu Burton lecture to the university of Edinburgh. He said:
The idea of Saddam Hussein as the righteous champion of the underprivileged of the world …ularly hard to take, but it is a distinct possibility. One must understand the extreme frustration and hopelessness of some parts of the world … which could be channelled easily by someone clever. This is Saddam's Robin Hood act, but it is getting quite a lot of takers in the Middle East.Sir Brian should be listened to.Having worked itself up to an impressive pitch of martial readiness in the Gulf, the United States may think it needs to achieve every one of its stated aims in full, or be regarded as having failed. Some Americans think that the United States remains a great power only if it deals once and for all with Saddam Hussein. That is a dangerous attitude. Perhaps as politicians we must understand the possible difficulties of loss of face by the President of the United States, but I beg Ministers and some of my colleagues to realise that loss of face is as nothing compared with the alternative of war. That is why I have concentrated on the ecological aspects, although the Minister may not think them important.
Saddam Hussein has the ace of trumps and a good deal more. The right hon. Member for Old Bexley and Sidcup (Mr. Heath) and others have told us—it is almost certainly established fact—that Hussein has deep-mined at least 300 of the Kuwaiti oil wells. Even if only 30 were ignited, accepted safety standards would go for the proverbial burton. The effects would linger in the atmosphere. I told the Foreign Office—no doubt it suspected that I would do this—that I intended to quote yet again what the King of Jordan said in his speech on global warming:
The preliminary calculations of our scientists indicate that if half Kuwait's oil reserves (or about 50 billion barrels) were to go up in flames during a war, the environmental impact would be swift, severe and devastating. Emissions of carbon 401 monoxide, carbon dioxide and sulphur dioxide would surpass internationally accepted safety standards by factors of hundreds, and, without factoring in wind effects, would blacken the skies over a radius of at least 750 km from Kuwait —that is, all of Kuwait, Iraq, Bahrain, Qatar, the Emirates and the waters of the Gulf, and most of Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Syria and Iran. Other than poisonous emissions of carbon monoxide and sulphur dioxide the emission of carbon dioxide will increase by at least a factor of 100 over the current total global emission of 5.5 billion tonnes per year. Lingering in the atmosphere for around a hundred years, this massive carbon dioxide emission would promote the green house effect and contribute to global warming, climatic changes, lower global food production and human and animal health deterioration. The environmental and human toll of such a scenario would be beyond our wildest fears. If oil production facilities suffered long-term damage, which is likely in the event of war, the catastrophe, we warn warn of, would be compounded by the devastating impact of the loss of oil imports for economies and peoples around the world.The House will have to bear with me while I go over the subsequent parliamentary exchanges. In arguing such a case, I must be extremely careful about ministerial answers and I do not want to truncate them because if I did so I would be accused of distortion. It is certainly no part of my case to distort what Ministers have said. On 13 November, I tabled Question 2 to the Prime Minister. It reads:
§ "Mr. DalyellTo ask the Prime Minister if she will make a statement on the discussions in Geneva with King Hussein of Jordan in relation to the ecological consequences of war in the middle east."
The Prime Minister at that time, the right hon. Member for Finchley (Mrs. Thatcher), replied:
My bilateral discussions with King Hussein did not cover this subject, as I made clear to the hon. Gentleman on 7 November. However, if a tyrant is never to be fought in order that freedomn and justice may be restored, tyranny will triumph with all its brutality and the environment of human rights, which we seek to extend, will have received a fatal blow.I then asked a supplementary question and said:If King Hussein is right and 50,000 million barrels of oil equivalent go up in flames, what will be the result in terms of carbon monoxide, carbon dioxide and sulphur dioxide, and what would that do to people and the planet?The then Prime Minister replied:If the hon. Gentleman wishes to avert such a tragedy, there is one method which would do it easily—that is for Saddam Hussein to withdraw totally from Kuwait and for a legitimate Government to be restored. I do not necessarily accept King Hussein's figures—mine are a little different—but that is not the main point. Saddam Hussein's withdrawal would not put right a wrong because of the brutality that has been perpetrated in his name, but that is the answer to the hon. Gentleman's question."—[Official Report, 13 November 1990; Vol. 180, c. 446.]I fear that that is not the answer to my question, because it does not deal with the king's statement, awkward and unpleasant though that statement may be. I happen to know that that statement was carefully put forward by the king's not inconsiderable science institute in Amman, which received a good deal of technical help from elsewhere.On 11 December I was lucky enough to have Question 1 to the new Prime Minister. It reads:
§ "Mr. DalyellTo ask the Prime Minister, pursuant to the answer of the right hon. Member for Finchley (Mrs. Thatcher) of 13 November, Official Report, column 446, if he will specify those figures which he possesses relating to oil stocks, carbon monoxide, carbon dioxide and sulphur dioxide which differ from those given by King Hussein, showing in each case the comparable figures and the source for those which he uses."
402 The Prime Minister replied:
No, Sir. The calculations rest on assumptions about the consequences of a conflict in the Gulf which, by their nature, are not quantifiable. The best way to avoid any adverse consequences is for Saddam Hussein to comply with the United Nations resolutions in full.The assertions may not be exactly quantifiable, but simply to say that they are not quantifiable will not do.I asked the following supplementary:
Is not the spine-chilling truth that no mining engineer, no scientist and no politician knows for certain what will occur if 300 deep-mined oil wells are detonated? In those circumstances, might not the fires rage for months, if not years, in a fashion quite outside human experience? In view of that, should not the damage to the planet, let alone the human slaughter and the Arab ecological disaster, rule out any talk of a military option?The Prime Minister replied:As the hon. Gentleman says, no one can be absolutely and precisely certain about the outcome. Insofar as it is possible to make an assessment, we see no reason to agree with any of the views put forward thus far as to what the outcome might be.This is not adequate, because in my original question I had asked about the figuresrelating to oil stocks, carbon monoxide, carbon dioxide and sulphur dioxide which differ from those given by King Hussein, showing in each case the comparable figures and the source for those which he uses.The Prime Minister might have been a bit more forthcoming about his sources.After my question, the hon. Member for Rochford (Dr. Clark), a parliamentary colleague whom I respect greatly, also asked a question:
Is my right hon. Friend aware that last week I visited the Council for Higher Education in Amman, where the calculations were carried out for King Hussein? Does my right hon. Friend agree that the horrors of war, whether human or environmental, should be made abundantly plain to Saddam Hussein in particular?The Prime Minister replied:I entirely agree with my hon. Friend about that, but on the assumptions that King Hussein used, we believe that some of the difficulties to which he referred would not be precisely as described." —[Official Report, 11 December 1990; Vol. 182, c. 814.]The Government must be far more forthcoming. I can understand the Prime Minister not going further, given the nature of Prime Minister's Question Time, and his crisp answering, but tonight the Minister has an opportunity to tell us a bit about the sources, and why he does not accept the King of Jordan's figures.My sources tell a different story. For example, there is Dave Matthews, who is a full-time officer of the Fire Brigades Union. When I made inquiries of him, he asked me whether I remembered the fire at Thorne colliery, in Yorkshire. As you come from near Doncaster, Mr. Deputy Speaker, you may know a good deal about this. It may be within your recollection that the British fire brigade, probably the most efficient in Europe, had to call in the Red Adair team to do something about that fire. As my friends in the Fire Brigades Union said, if they had to do that for what was a comparatively minor fire, who will put out a massive conflagration in Kuwait? That is a good question.
I then went, naturally, to BP, which has known me for a quarter of a century as I represent many of those who work at Grangemouth. I have had excellent relations with the company and it did me the courtesy of sending me a representative at the most senior level. He is a managing director who had been general manager in Kuwait, and was in charge, as an engineer, of the most awkward fire in 403 the middle east in the 1970s. He told me that the Red Adair team was not the only one of its type and that there were various ways of extinguishing fires, including the blowing-up method. He said, "Yes, we could cope; but with how many fires would we have to cope at the same time?" I am open to contradiction, but has there been a time when there have been more than two major oil fires raging at the same time? It is extremely difficult to dampen down and extinguish such fires. It would be even more difficult if, dare I say it, a military conflict were taking place on top of an oilfield.
Shell went to great trouble. It consulted the expertise that was available to it, both in this country and in the Netherlands, and said that the general view was, "We simply do not know." No one in the world before has ever detonated oil wells on purpose.
Furthermore, there is the problem of fire fighting in the waters of the Gulf. Much of the previous debate was about the Piper Alpha disaster. What would happen in the shallow waters of the Gulf, where fire is more uncontrollable than in the North sea, if there were to be a major Iraqi effort to set the Gulf ablaze? I am told that that would be only too likely to happen. Some of us remember the Torrey Canyon and all the difficulties that ensued as a result of that episode. The scale of that disaster might be multiplied.
Do not let us imagine that Saddam Hussain would not do it. He has shown before that he is capable of bringing the temple down with him. That may not be the basis of what we call western rationality, but on that basis we might not be having this debate nor facing the circumstances that have led to its taking place. I quote Al-Jumhouriya of 8 November. It stated that Iraq threatened to turn the Arabian peninsula into ashes and the Saudi oilfields into a sea of fire if it was attacked. It said:
The mother of all battles is nearer today.It commented that only Medina and Mecca would be spared and added:If the fire of aggression is unleashed against Iraq, flames will burn in every direction.Apparently the Iraqis have sets of sealed orders in case of war.I do not think that there is much doubt that the Iraqis could do it and would do it. Their history shows that they have not made claims of that sort that they could not put into effect. What are the Government doing to find out?
On 29 November, I asked the Prime Minister
if he will discuss the ecological consequences of a military option in the Gulf with President Bush.The Prime Minister replied:I have no plans to do so."—[Official Report, 29 November 1990; Vol. 181, c. 466.]After August, September, October and November, surely the Government should have made some effort to establish a rather more detailed view of the scenario that I and others—others with real expert qualifications--have been painting.On 16 November, I asked the Foreign Secretary whether
the United Nations has any plans to assess the safety and security implications for the oilfields in the Gulf area of possible conflagration.The Under-Secretary, the hon. Member for Morecambe and Lunesdale (Mr. Lennox-Boyd), replied:We are not aware of any United Nations plans to carry out such an assessment. For our part, we are fully aware that hostilities in the Gulf would have serious consequences of 404 many kinds. Hence our determination to bring maximum pressure to bear on Saddam Hussein to comply with the Security Council resolutions in order to resolve the crisis." —[Official Report, 16 November 1990; Vol. 180, c. 261.]I think that the Government might show a little more curiosity. Even if 30 of the 300 oil wells in Kuwait deep mined by Iraq were ignited after detonation, the emissions of carbon monoxide, carbon dioxide and sulphur dioxide would pass internationally accepted safety standards by a factor of hundreds. The skies would be blackened all over Kuwait, Iraq, Bahrain, Qatar, the Emirates, the waters of the Gulf, and over most of Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Syria and Iran.For the past 24 years, I have been a weekly columnist for the New Scientist. Successive editors of that journal would not have countenanced me if I had been given to making fanciful judgments. The truth is that no scientist from a British university, no mining engineer from an oil company, no expert in any professional capacity from the Fire Brigades Union or any of the firms that are involved in fire fighting—Red Adair would not comment to the Library of the House of Commons when he was asked —let alone any politician, could tell what would happen if 300 oil wells were detonated. As has been pointed out, at the very least it would mean that oil would be $120 a barrel in Rotterdam.
War is a disproportionate response to the original outrage of invading Kuwait. We must consider the economic consequences. On 10 December, I asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer
what assessment he has made of the economic consequences of a military option in the Gulf.The Chief Secretary replied:The Government's firm objective is to resolve the Gulf crisis by peaceful means on the basis of full implementation of the resolutions adopted by the United Nations Security Council. To achieve this, it is essential to establish a credible military option, so that Saddam Hussein is left in no doubt that he is facing a military force which could compel him to leave Kuwait. My right hon. Friend the Member for Huntingdon (Mr. Major) drew attention in his autumn statement to uncertainties in the economic outlook generated by the Gulf crisis."—[Official Report, 10 December 1990; Vol. 182, c. 258.]It may be that the Government cannot answer the question; the fact is that they have not.When we talk about the effect on Saudi Arabia, we must comment that military experts do not know how Scud missiles targeted on Saudi targets would be deflected. I am not surprised that tonight we heard that General Calvin Waller, the United States commander, said that he was not ready. The truth is that they are finding it more and more difficult. We delude ourselves if we imagine that we can predict that such wars will be brief, limited to surgical attacks, with relatively light casualties and with predictable consequences for the politics and economies of the countries involved.
The difficulty is something else. If there is not a relatively quick victory, we have to turn to the question that I put to General Colin Powell when he came a fortnight ago to Committee Room 14. It will be within the recollection of some 70 of my colleagues there, mostly Conservative Members, that I asked two questions. The second was whether General Powell contemplated the use of nuclear weapons. I prefaced that by saying that I was one of the minority of Members of Parliament who thought that there was no successful military solution to be had, but that I respected General Powell's sincerity about preferring the peace option to war.
405 Within the hearing of many of my colleagues, General Powell said that he did not contemplate the use of nuclear weapons, but he added that he could not rule out any advice that he might give in certain circumstances to the President of the United States. I believe that everybody in that room realised that in certain tragic circumstances the nuclear option was a possibility. The mind boggles at not only, for heaven's sake, the ecological effect, but the human effect and the effect on relations with the Arab world for decades, and possibly longer, to come.
§ Mr. Dave Nellist (Coventry, South-East)I do not want to distract my hon. Friend from his line of thought, but would it not be appropriate at this point to remember that only a few short years ago the partial explosion of one nuclear power station at Chernobyl had serious long-term consequences in Wales and in Scotland and that one accident in Bhopal had long-term consequences for the lives and livelihoods of thousands of people in India? If the effect of the destruction of a number of oil wells was added to the effects of biological, chemical and nuclear warfare, the region that would be affected would be massive and the number affected would run into millions.
§ Mr. DalyellI am genuinely grateful to my hon. Friend. That is an important part of the argument. It is a serious point, succinctly and well put, and I would like to add it to the argument.
Admiral William Crowe, the former chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, expressed the following view:
If deposing Saddam Hussein would sort out the Middle East and permit the US to turn its attention elsewhere and to concentrate on our very pressing domestic problems, the case for initiating offensive action immediately would be considerably strengthened. But the Middle East is not that simple. I witnessed it at first hand; I lived in the Middle East for a year.I would submit that posturing ourselves to promote stability for the long-term is our primary national interest in the Middle East. It is not obvious to me that we are currently looking at the crisis in this light. Our dislike for Saddam seems to have crowded out many other considerations. In working through the problems myself, I am persuaded that the US initiating hostilities could well exacerbate many of the tensions I have cited, and perhaps further polarise the Arab world. Certainly, many Arabs would deeply resent a campaign which would necessarily kill large numbers of their Muslim brothers and force them to choose sides between Arab nations and the west …We may be, in a certain sense, on the horns of a no-win dilemma. Even if we win, we lose ground in the Arab world and generally injure our ability to deal in the future with the labyrinth of the Middle East.I firmly believe that Saddam must be pushed out of Kuwait; he must leave Kuwait. At the same time, given the larger context, I judge it highly desirable to achieve this goal in a peaceful fashion, if that is possible. In other words, I would argue that we should give sanctions a fair chance before we discard them.Some of my hon. Friends might ask, "What about the United Nations?" I was fortunate enough to be chosen by Mr. Speaker to lead the Inter-Parliamentary Union delegation to Zaire. It was a truncated visit because we were recalled for the vote of confidence debate. However, we saw the country's Foreign Minister, who had just held a long meeting with James Baker. We naturally asked him about it.I do not think that I am distorting matters in any way when I say that it was clear that Zaire lined up with the Americans not because of a judgment on the middle east, 406 but because it wanted the lifting of the ban on American aid to Zaire that had been imposed because of that country's human rights violations—an issue totally separate from the merits or demerits of going along with the American position in relation to the United Nations.
Some of us fear that, if there is a conflict, it will be goodbye to King Hussein and the Hashemites, and that it may well be farewell to President Mubarak. Heaven knows what would be the reaction in Tunisia and Algeria. There is considerable hearsay that the Tunisians are providing credits to the Iraqis so that they can circumvent the embargo. I ask for that strong rumour to be investigated. I cannot claim it as fact, but perhaps someone could comment at a convenient point on whether there is any evidence of that happening.
I might be asked what I think the Labour party should do. I am very influenced by my most senior parliamentary colleagues. One was a beachmaster at Anzio, and another is a former Prime Minister with a distinguished war record; and my right hon. Friend the Member for Chesterfield (Mr. Benn) served bravely in the RAF during the second world war. They have all taken a rather distinctive line. I would like my party to follow the idea of my hon. Friend the Member for Falkirk, East (Mr. Ewing), and ask my right hon. Friend the Member for Leeds, East (Mr. Healey) to pay an official visit to Baghdad on behalf of my party.
The alternatives are horrific. I did national service at a time when many of my contemporaries at Catterick went with the 8th Hussars and other units to Korea. A lot of them were shot up. The tanks did not work properly, and the soldiers who had to get out of their tanks to do something about equipment that had gone wrong became the proverbial sitting ducks.
I draw attention also to the hospital aspect, in the event that the worst happens. This afternoon, I asked the Secretary of State for Scotland if he would make a statement on the provision made in Scottish hospitals for the reception of service casualties in the event of the use of the military option in the Gulf. The Under-Secretary replied:
Plans which provide for the treatment of military casualties in Scottish hospitals in the event of war have been reviewed. If required, beds would be made available in NHS hospitals in Scotland to treat service casualties arising from possible hostilities in the Gulf.It so happens that there used to be a distinguished burns unit at Bangour hospital, in my constituency. The shortages of skills to cope with burns and similar injuries are a national problem—I will not say a national "crisis". I am not casting blame, but saying that there is a real problem, which is encapsulated by an article in The Universe, the Catholic newspaper, of 16 December 1990 entitled "Wife's horror at Gulf graves plan".It says:
A plot of land has already been allocated to bury victims of the Gulf war by the War Graves Commission, claims the wife of an Army officer serving in Saudi Arabia.The Catholic woman, who didn't wish to be named, is based in Germany and keeps in touch with her husband by mail and forces' radio and television.She said: 'The most sickening thing my husband told me was that men from the War Graves Commission have been out to Saudi Arabia. They have already measured and acquired a plot of land in preparation for any war dead.Last week saw the first suicide in the Gulf. A medic shot himself on hearing that his wife had left him.'407She said Army officials had warned wives not to believe all they heard or saw on television, radio or in the newspapers and that they would be kept reliably informed through military sources.The woman, mother of two young children, said that according to British Forces Broadcasting Service (BFBS), the soldiers are not allowed even to mention the word 'Christmas' in Saudi Arabia.That appeared in print. I do not know whether it is true. However, I gave the Foreign Office notice that I should like it to comment on whether the War Graves Commission has been out there or not.It is not only a question of British service men. We ought to remember that many Iraqi women and children would certainly be killed in any action. Some people say that they believe that they would be dying for a heroic cause, and refer to Iraqi mothers who believe that their sons will be next to Allah, which is the reward for martyrdom.
When the Iraqi people are attacked, they will react as the citizens of London did in 1940, or like the citizens of Hamburg in 1943. Production in German cities increased after bombing because that is the effect that bomb attacks have on populations.
I believe that we should let sanctions run for a long time. A powerful television programme, produced by George Carey, called the "Case for Peace", showed convincingly that if sanctions ran for at least another year the Iraqi forces would be at least 30 per cent. less effective.
Also, we ought to have an explanation as to why the British—apparently—led the pack of EEC Ministers against the wishes of the Germans and the Italians by cancelling the meeting that was to have taken place with Tariq Aziz in Rome. Unless we talk we shall get nowhere, and we deserve an explanation why we took the initiative against the wishes of two of our major European partners.
§ Mr. Julian Brazier (Canterbury)I have listened with interest to the case that the hon. Gentleman is making. Indeed, I have a particular interest, as both my father and my grandfather—coincidentally—were wounded fighting in the middle east, my grandfather severely so in Mesopotamia.
The hon. Gentleman has made his point clearly and with great integrity. May I remind him, however, that just over half a century ago these Benches were full of people who had fought in the first world war, and who took the view that the diplomatic solutions that he is talking about now must be tried and pursued at all costs rather than another war taking place? It was because we went on and on—through the abandoning of Czechoslovakia, the Munich crisis and so forth—failing to grasp the nettle that we finally allowed Hitler to become so strong that we very nearly lost the war.
In a year or two, Saddam Hussein may have the very nuclear weapons that the hon. Gentleman so dreads. Surely the worst option of all would be to back away and allow diplomatic talks to go on and on, allowing Saddam Hussein to become more powerful, and to delay action until he has the next move.
§ Mr. DalyellThat is certainly a respectable point of view. I can only say, in shorthand—because I am trying the patience of the House with my long speech—that I do not accept the 1939 analogy, and I certainly do not accept any comparison with, for instance, the heroic work of the 408 8th Army against Rommel. The weapons available now —leaving aside nuclear weapons—are such that the consequences would be entirely different.
Let me put another argument to the hon. Member for Canterbury (Mr. Brazier). Let us suppose that there was a military victory. What then? We are faced, are we not, with a sullen, resentful and vengeful Arab population, and it would be an Anglo-American army that would be holding them down. It is highly significant that 10 of our partners have not sent any troops to the middle east. Like it or not, this is seen to be becoming more and more an Anglo-American situation.
Let us suppose that blood was spilt. Would King Hussein remain in Jordan? Would President Mubarak retain power in Egypt? What would happen in Syria is anyone's guess.
§ Mr. BrazierAs the hon. Gentleman knows, I have a particular interest in that part of the world; indeed, I was in the Lebanon in February. The truth is that the boot is on the other foot. If we back away from this, the star of Saddam Hussein will rise still further, and the positions of the very gentlemen whom he has mentioned—certainly that of President Mubarak; I am not especially concerned about President Assad—will be strongly threatened. Mubarak will be seen to have backed the losing side, and his position will be extremely weak.
§ Mr. DalyellWhat I might describe as a martyred Saddam Hussein would also create problems for the youngest among us. Once blood had been spilt, the circumstances would be horrific. That is why I say to Ministers—to the Prime Minister really, I suppose—that we ought to swallow our pride and talk to the Iraqis. When the Prime Minister—rightly—visits troops, he should also go to Jordan to hear what the Jordanians say. Yemen was the one United Nations country, apart from Cuba, to vote against the consensus in the Security Council; it is also the country nearest to Iraq, with the most to lose. He should go there.
I believe that the heavyweight European leaders—particularly Felipe Gonzalez, and perhaps Chancellor Kohl, although I should like to see our Prime Minister among them—should go to Baghdad themselves, to talk and talk. That is not appeasement. There is great confusion between dialogue and appeasement. The results of failing to have a dialogue would, I believe, be as horrific as I have tried to outline.
§ Mr. Donald Anderson (Swansea, East)I congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Linlithgow (Mr. Dalyell) on his persistence and determination in putting very grave issues before the House. Implicit in his speech was his belief that in no circumstances, even if sanctions were to be imposed for a year and found to be wanting, would the use of force be justified on account of the resulting ecological and financial consequences.
That is not the Labour party's view, and it is certainly not the view taken by the United Nations in a series of resolutions passed by the Security Council. I heard what my hon. Friend said about Zaire, but if one analysed the motives of Security Council members in that way one could rule out almost any United Nations move. The credibility of the United Nations is at stake. If the UN does not emerge from this crisis with an enhanced 409 reputation, the prospects for a new world order, envisaged by the founding fathers of the United Nations in 1945, will be strangled at birth.
The new ecological dimension was given great publicity by King Hussein in mid-November and it added to the anxieties of those who were wholly against the use of force in any circumstances. The consequences of an ecological disaster are of great concern. They were set out in detail in The Guardian on 16 November. That newspaper rendered a signal public service by quoting at length King Hussein's speech to the world climate conference in Geneva. One has to treat with respect what King Hussein said, but it is significant that he was not unaware that the message he was broadcasting lent additional weight to a threat which had been made by Iraq. His speech must therefore be considered in that context.
My hon. Friend the Member for Linlithgow has considerable scientific knowledge and has many contacts in the world of science, on which he has drawn so well. He will therefore be the first to admit that there are many scientific uncertainties. He seeks scientific precision from the Government, and he seeks precision about the financial and other effects on the third world, but by their very nature the variations are so great that it would be impossible to respond with precision.
All one can say is that, in the worst scenario, the effects would be substantial indeed. For example, will the wells ignite? What will be the prevailing winds at the relevant time? One need only consider Carl Sagan's article in Foreign Affairs, "Nuclear Winter: Climatic Catastrophe", in the winter of 1983–84 and the United States Administration's eventual response in 1988, to see the differences on a matter of this nature within the scientific community. Indeed, some of the effects may work in opposite directions. Although the emissions of carbon dioxide, sulphur dioxide and carbon monoxide may lead to global warming, by contrast, with the effect of rising dust, the rays of the sun could be reflected back and there could be a cooling effect, as happened with the eruption at Krakatoa at the end of the last century.
So much in the calculations of the greenhouse effect is unpredictable because it depends on the complicated pathways of the relevant gases. Should we take the most extreme or the most realistic scenarios, and with what effect? What would be the possibility and effect of ignition? What do we know of the effect of the bombing of the Abadan refinery during the Iran-Iraq conflict, and of the fact that that refinery it is now back as it was before?
In the speech that my hon. Friend quoted, King Hussein spoke of the preliminary calculations of our scientists and of the effects being felt within a radius of at least 750 km from Kuwait. The effect being spread about 750 km around Kuwait means that Iraq is very much within the care radius of the effect. What do we make of that? Before coming to the debate, I re-read Milton's "Samson Agonistes", who pulled down the same destruction upon himself. Is Saddam Hussein prepared to act like Samson? It is clear that he has been acting against his own interest. Even if Saddam Hussein were to lay Kuwait to waste by fire, the cloud effect could be as devastating in Iraq as in Kuwait.
We must be aware of the worst scenario adumbrated by my hon. Friend, and of the unpredictability, the 410 differential effects and the motive of the messenger. The key point is surely the extent to which such considerations should affect our policy in the Gulf. My hon. Friend concluded that, in the worst scenario, the effect could be so devastating that, in effect, war could in no circumstances be contemplated. That, however, could be an equally dangerous conclusion.
One clear effect of allowing ourselves to be blackmailed by the direct or indirect threats of Saddam Hussein would be an effective paralysis of policy, not only in this crisis but in relation to any other aggressor with the capacity to create ecological devastation, through threats to the oil fields and wells of the kind that Saddam Hussein is making, or the capacity of a nuclear reactor, for example. If, as a result of threats and blackmail, Saddam Hussein succeeds in producing a paralysis in policy, what is to stop him using those same threats to advance one step further into Saudi Arabia or one of the Gulf sheikhdoms? That would render the United Nations impotent in the face of aggression and strangle at birth the potential enhanced role for that world organisation.
King Hussein has broadcast one of Saddam Hussein's threats, but in the course of the conflict Saddam has made a multiplicity of threats and he can continue to do so. At the start of the crisis on 2 August, he dispatched what he called volunteers into Kuwait, but nothing further has been heard about them. Could not similar "volunteers" be sent into Jordan in the knowledge that that would trigger an immediate response from Israel? Some of the ballistic missiles available in Saddam Hussein's armoury could be fired at Israel, which would trigger a great conflagration in which Iraq, being at the centre of it, would be the first country to be devastated. Such issues should be considered when seeking to evaluate the threat made by Saddam Hussein and set out by King Hussein in his November speech when he called on the expertise of some of his scientists.
We must take the issues raised in the debate seriously. My hon. Friend the Member for Linlithgow may consider himself, alas, to be the Cassandra of the conflict. Certainly, we must be aware of the worst scenario and its potential consequences. The military option has been underscored by Security Council resolution 678. On 11 December my right hon. Friend the Member for Manchester, Gorton (Mr. Kaufman) stressed in the House that although we seek, above all, a peaceful solution, if in the end the only way to oust Saddam Hussein from Kuwait is by force, then force will have to be used.
My hon. Friend the Member for Linlithgow was right to remind us of the possible and awful consequences of war. Above all, we must be firmly behind the United Nations. We must also be aware that if the crisis proceeds further, the responsibility for that will lie squarely at the door of Saddam Hussein as a result of his initial aggression on 2 August.
§ The Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office (Mr. Douglas Hogg)Before dealing with the speech of the hon. Member for Linlithgow (Mr. Dalyell), I should say that I am in total agreement with what has just been said from the Opposition Front Bench by the hon. Member for Swansea, East (Mr. Anderson). I agreed with him about the ecological consequences and the uncertainties that must surround any assessment of them, 411 and particularly about the need to support Security Council resolution 678 and all those which proceeded it. On this matter, the Opposition and Government Front Benches are as one.
The purpose of the speech of the hon. Member for Linlithgow was to make the essential point that war is a beastly, bloody and unpredictable business. He went on to say that the damage to life and property would be great. His contention was that in such circumstances the military option should not be pursued. Within that general argument, he made a specific argument—that war in the middle east in the present circumstances gives rise to such a risk of ecological disaster that in no circumstances should the use of force be contemplated.
In response to the hon. Gentleman's argument on the ecological consequences of war, I hope that he will forgive me if I make this observation. If I wished to advance an argument of principle against the use of force, I would choose to rely primarily on the certainty of death and injury to those involved in the conflict rather on the uncertainties which underpin the hon. Gentleman's argument and which, in any event, seem to be of a different and lesser order of magnitude when contrasted with the loss of life and the physical injury that may be the outcome of a war in the Gulf.
§ Mr. DalyellThere may be a great chasm between us. The Minister's speaks, no doubt sincerely, with the experience of 20 years as a lawyer. I speak with 20 or more years' experience of spending a great deal of my time working on scientific subjects and producing a column for the New Scientist, with all that that entails. We may have different ways of looking at the world.
§ Mr. HoggI hope not. I am saying that what is of critical importance in a matter such as this is the prospect of death and injury. To my way of thinking, it is odd to argue a case against war in terms of oil spillage, carbon dioxide emissions and global warming. That is not an obvious way to conduct an argument. The argument should focus on such critical issues as human life, the right to freedom, the need to resist armed aggression, and the maintenance of the authority of the United Nations.
Before I go further into detail, I inform the hon. Member for Linlithgow that not only, for the reasons that I mentioned, do I find that he conducts his argument at an inappropriate level but I believe that he is making himself an instrument of Saddam Hussein's policy. The hon. Gentleman concludes from Saddam Hussein's threat to detonate a series of oil wells that there is no practical action that we can take to reverse the act of blackmail and agression that has taken place. To express such a view encourages Saddam Hussein in his truculence and intransigence and thereby diminishes the prospect of peace.
I do not for one moment suggest that that is the intended consequence of the hon. Gentleman's remarks, but I believe that it is the inevitable consequence. At no stage during the hon. Gentleman's extended speech—I make no criticism of the fact that it was long—and at no stage during his speech in our recent debate on the Gulf, which I have read carefully, did he suggest any clear way of ensuring the reversal of the act of aggression. The hon. Gentleman suggested that his right hon. Friend for Leeds, East (Mr. Healey) should go to Baghdad, but that is 412 unlikely to achieve the objective that both the Opposition Front Bench and the Government Front Bench agree is our primary objective.
I will comment upon the ecological arguments advanced by the hon. Gentleman, but first I wish to put them into what seems to me to be the proper perspective so that we can judge the weight that we wish to attach to the hon. Gentleman's objections and to the political facts.
We need to be clear about the nature of Saddam Hussein's conduct. Saddam Hussein's conduct is aggression of the most obvious and brutal kind. He invaded Kuwait—his neighbour and a sovereign state with which he had been in negotiations and in respect of which he had given assurances of non-aggression. In the process of that invasion, he killed a large number of people. Once the invasion was complete, he embarked on a systematic policy of murder, pillage and, it now seems, torture. He also seized and held many thousands of non-combatant western hostages. With the release of those hostages, he has complied only with the first of three conditions imposed on him by the Security Council.
We must focus on compliance with the other two conditions—complete and unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait by 15 January and the restoration of that country's lawful Government. Resolution 678 empowers the international community, of which we are part, to use all necessary means to secure compliance with the previous resolutions and, most particularly, to ensure that Iraq leaves Kuwait unconditionally and completely by 15 January. The phrase "all necessary means" obviously embraces the use of force, but the resolution is not itself a call to arms or a timetable for military action. It provides an opportunity for Saddam Hussein to go—and go peacefully—and that he must do, for our sakes and his.
Everyone in the House agrees that because war is such a bloody and beastly business, and because its consequences are so unpredictable, we must do all that in conscience we can do to avert a war. Therefore, as people have said elsewhere, it is right to go that extra mile to achieve peace. We are strongly behind the suggestion made by President Bush that he should have the opportunity—himself and through emmissaries—to put the facts clearly to Saddam Hussein and his Foreign Minister. It is absolutely essential that the Iraqi president should know exactly where he stands. There can and will be no concession on the requirements of the Security Council. No partial solution is possible. There is no linkage with other issues. That is the view of the Security Council, of the United States, of the United Kingdom, of the Arab states which have mobilised their forces in the middle east, and of the European Community.
How are we seeking to achieve that political objective? We are doing so by sanctions, and by the deployment of forces—so far, entirely peacefully. The only person who has used force is Saddam Hussein. The only people who have died have been killed by Saddam Hussein. That is the plain fact that the House must recognise. We must ask ourselves, in conscience, whether sanctions are likely to succeed. That they are causing hardship in Iraq is certain, but is it a level of hardship such as to bring about a reversal of policy or, differently put, to cause the destabilisation of Saddam Hussein's regime? My own belief is that it is not. We cannot forget that the people of Iraq suffered eight years of pointless and brutal war, again promoted by Saddam Hussein, yet did not throw that man out 413 Therefore, my judgment is that sanctions alone will not bring about a complete and unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait.
§ Mr. DalyellIf that was the whole story, how comes it that, with the knowledge of Her Majesty's Government, we exported the most formidable arms consignment to Saddam Hussein? If we thought during all those years that he was so terrible, what on earth were we doing exporting arms to him? The answer is clear. Many people did not want Saddam Hussein to be beaten by the mullahs and ayatollahs. Furthermore, if what the Minister said is all self-evident truth, why are the British Government, with their European partners in Rome, so reluctant to see Tariq Aziz?
§ Mr. HoggThe hon. Gentleman is doing less credit than he should to his argument. There has been a long-standing prohibition on arms sales to Iraq.
As for the hon. Gentleman's second question as to why we and other countries in the Community have not sent emissaries to Baghdad, it seems right that there should be a single, clear voice expressing the significance of resolution 678 and the previous resolutions, and it seems right that the country which is to shoulder the greatest part of the military burden should provide that voice.
§ Mr. NellistIs my hon. Friend the Member for Linlithgow (Mr. Dalyell) not absolutely right in that, in the 1980s, Iraq was the middle eastern country favoured by the western nations? During the Iran-Iraq war, America provided $2£5 billion of food aid and $5 billion of trade credit. In October 1989, one of the Minister's colleagues —now the Secretary of State for Health—told the House that the Government recognised that Iraq had bombed and killed thousands of Kurdish people. Ten days later, however, the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry increased British trade credits to Iraq by £400 million. Finally, during the 1970s and 1980s, France sold $25 billion worth of arms to Iraq.
§ Mr. HoggTo what is the hon. Gentleman directing his remarks? The facts speak for themselves. Twice in a decade Iraq has launched a brutal and unprovoked attack on its neighbour. First, it attacked Iran and there was a bloody eight-year war, in which more than a million people died. Secondly, on 2 August, it launched an unprovoked attack on a small country, occupied it and murdered its citizens. Those are the facts with which we have to deal. Exploring history 20 years back does not touch on that issue.
§ Mr. NellistWhat about two years ago?
§ Mr. NellistI refer to the statement made by the right hon. Member for Bristol, West (Mr. Waldegrave) when he was a Foreign Office Minister. He said two years ago that the Government officially condemned the Iraqi bombing of the Kurds, when 10,000 people died in Halabja. Ten days later, the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry rewarded the same Saddam Hussein, who we are now told is such a bad bloke, by extending to him £400 million worth of trade credits. My hon. Friend the Member for Linlithgow and I are merely showing that two years ago this man was a friend of the Government.
§ Mr. HoggThe hon. Gentleman makes my point for me. Saddam Hussein is a brutal man. By reminding the House of his attack, using gas, on his own people in Kurdistan, the hon. Gentleman makes that point crystal clear. It can be seen again in Hussein's conduct in Kuwait. Many hon. Members will have read the Amnesty report; all hon. Members will have read the summary of it. We must face the fact that the people of Kuwait are being subjected to a systematic campaign of murder and pillage. Iraq is in the process of eradicating Kuwait as a state, of brutalising its people and of incorporating that country into its own. That is a sin against international order and morality. We cannot stand back idly and say that there is nothing that we can do because of the ecological consequences.
The debate has been long and I must bring it to a close. There is no doubt that war is unpredictable or that grave damage will be caused. Some of that damage will be to property, perhaps to the oil fields. There may be emissions, dark clouds and other horrors of that sort. We do not know their extent because the assumptions are unknowable and the consequences unverifiable. The imponderables are too great. Which way will the wind blow? We do not know.
All we can say is that war is beastly, and that beastliness must be judged against the political requirements of resisting aggression and supporting the collective authority of the United Nations. On this point, I entirely agree with the hon. Member for Swansea, East. We cannot stand back and declare that these things are too beastly, horrible and difficult and so we shall do nothing. If that were our policy we should certainly revert to a form of international anarchy.
§ Mr. DalyellI do not want to be committed to a policy when we do not know where it leads—
§ Mr. Deputy Speaker (Mr. Harold Walker)Order. Mr. Brazier.