HC Deb 05 April 1990 vol 170 cc1329-38 10.14 am
Mr. Ian Gow (Eastbourne)

Apart from the Republic of Argentina, which lays claim to part of Her Majesty's dominions—what it describes as the Malvinas—the only other country which lays claim to any part of Her Majesty's dominions is the Republic of Ireland. That was highlighted in the debate to which he have just listened.

I want to remind the House of the terms of articles 2 and 3 of the Republic's constitution. Article 2 says: The national territory consists of the whole island of Ireland, its islands and the territorial seas.

Article 3 says: Pending the re-integration of the national territory, and without prejudice to the right of the Parliament and Government established by this Constitution … the laws enacted by that Parliament shall have the like area and extent of application".

In the McGimpsey judgment, given in the Irish Supreme Court last month, these words appeared: The reintegration of the national territory is a constitutional imperative. The recent decision of the Supreme Court in Dublin to refuse the request for extradition followed after the judgment in the McGimpsey case. Many who are expert in the law of the Republic of Ireland believe that the decision to refuse to grant extradition—not in the case of two suspected terrorists but in the case of two convicted terrorists—depended to a substantial degree on the earlier judgment in the McGimpsey case.

It was possible because my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister had in mind the profoundly objectionable terms of articles 2 and 3 of the Irish constitution that she said in this place: no commitment exists for Her Majesty's Government to consult the Irish Government on matters affecting Northern Ireland. That has always been our position. We reiterate and emphasise it, so that everyone is clear about it."—[Official Report, 29 July 1982; Vol. 28, c. 1226.]

On 17 May 1984, again speaking in this place, my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister said: The constitutional future of Northern Ireland is a matter for Northern Ireland and this Parliament, and for no one else."—[Official Report, 17 May 1984; Vol. 60, c. 503.]

However, the year after that last quotation appeared in the Official Report on 17 May 1984, the Anglo-Irish Agreement was signed. That agreement gave to the Government of the Irish Republic—to the Government of the only country whose constitution laid claim to Northern Ireland—the right to put forward views and proposals about how Northern Ireland was to be governed and laid upon Her Majesty's Government an obligation, if they disagreed with those views and proposals, to make determined efforts to resolve differences.

The Anglo-Irish Agreement specifically said that the Government of the Irish Republic were there to represent nationalists. You know, Madam Deputy Speaker, that four nationalists have been elected to this Parliament. Three of them have taken their seats. The proper people to represent nationalists in dealings with Her Majesty's Ministers are those who have been elected to this place, and not the Government of a foreign power. To confer upon the Irish Republic responsibility for the representation of some of Her Majesty's subjects when those subjects have at least in this respect an equal right with all other of Her Majesty's subjects to elect their own representatives, was intensely divisive.

If right hon. and hon. Members think that I am going too far when I say that Her Majesty's Government accepted that the Government of the Irish Republic were to represent nationalists, article 4 of the agreement, states: The Conference shall be a framework within which the Irish Government may put forward views and proposals on the modalities of bringing about devolution in Northern Ireland in so far as they relate to the interests of the minority community. I shall return to article 4 later in my speech.

Mr. William Ross (Londonderry, East)

Surely what the hon. Gentleman said about the Irish Government representing only nationalists is the only position that that Government could take, as their Supreme Court has clarified the matter. We can all see the reasoning behind it, which was that they have a legal claim to Northern Ireland and a constitutional imperative to pursue the objective of a united Ireland. As Unionists object to that, there is no way in which the Irish Government could legally, within their own constitution, represent a Unionist viewpoint.

Mr. Gow

I agree entirely.

There are some Members of Parliament, among whom I am not to be included, who believe that Her Majesty's Government entered into the Anglo-Irish Agreement in something other than good faith. I have never doubted the good faith of Her Majesty's Government or of the Government of the Irish Republic in entering into the Anglo-Irish Agreement. Despite the words of my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister which I read to the House, I believe that she, above all people, was appalled, as we all were, by the continuing violence in Northern Ireland and that she, above all, was mindful of the misery caused to wives who were turned into widows and children who were turned into orphans. She was as appalled as any Member of Parliament by the misery caused by the terror, by the continuing division between the communities in the Province, and by the fact that at that time unemployment in Northern Ireland was worse than in any other part of the United Kingdom. She and Her Majesty's Ministers wished genuinely, sincerely and honourably to redress those evils in Northern Ireland. They really believed that the agreement would bring the Province peace, stability and reconciliation. To my deep regret, I was not able to share that belief, but of course the Government believed that the Anglo-Irish Agreement would be acceptable to nationalists.

The Foreign Office, which was the principal Department involved in the protracted negotiations, advised the Government that the agreement would be welcomed in Dublin, in the Vatican, in Roman Catholic Europe, and, above all, in Washington, where it was believed that the signing of the agreement would lead to a diminution of financial and material support for terrorist organisations in the Province. Of course, when they heard that that agreement, if signed along the lines of the final draft, would be widely welcomed and would restore the confidence of the nationalists, Her Majesty's Ministers asked one other question. They said, "You have told us how pleased all these other people will be and how the capitals of Europe and even the most important capital of all, Washington, would be pleased, but what will be the reaction of Unionists?"

That is where the Government were so badly advised. They were given the answer, "Paisley will huff and puff, but on the whole Unionists will be well satisfied with the agreement." The argument ran that the Unionists would be well satisfied because, it was claimed, quite wrongly, that the Irish Government had acknowledged for the first time in article 1 of the agreement that there could be a change in the status of Northern Ireland only if a majority of the people of Northern Ireland wanted it.

However, my right hon. Friend the Minister of State will recall the opening words of the Sunningdale communiqué in 1974. For the sake of accuracy, I have a copy of the text of the declaration made at Sunningdale in 1974, 11 years before the Anglo-Irish Agreement was signed. It stated: The Irish Government fully accepted and solemnly declared that there could be no change in the status of Northern Ireland until a majority of the people of Northern Ireland desired a change in that status. The British Cabinet genuinely believed when it sanctioned the signing of the Anglo-Irish Agreement that the Republic had taken a great new step forward in acknowledging that for the first time. But it was not so.

The second reason why it was claimed that the Unionists ought to be well satisfied with the agreement was that it would lead to a new era of co-operation in the defeat of terrorism between the Government of the Irish Republic and Her Majesty's Government and between the Garda and the Royal Ulster Constabulary. But the Anglo-Irish Agreement was not necessary to secure co-operation in the defeat of terrorism.

There is no such agreement between France and Spain whereby France is allowed to put forward views and proposals on how the Basque country should be governed. That is not necessary to secure co-operation between Spain and France in the defeat of terrorism. Relations between France and the United Kingdom, in regard to anti-terrorist measures, could not possibly be better, happier, or more effective, and we are able to achieve that without giving France the right to propose how Alderney, Sark or Jersey should be governed.

It is a myth to say that a precondition of co-operation was the signing of the Anglo-Irish Agreement. If that were the reality, and if the Republic had told Her Majesty's Government that they would co-operate only if they were given the right to put forward views and proposals about how part of the United Kingdom should be governed, that would be the most massive indictment of the honour, integrity and commitment of the Government of the Irish Republic to ending violence.

My right hon. Friend the Minister of State looks puzzled at my assertion that that was the advice given to the Cabinet. He has no need to take my word for it. My right hon. Friend the Prime Minister gave an interview to the Belfast Telegraph just five weeks after the agreement was signed. For the sake of accuracy, I have a copy of the interview which she gave to Mr. Desmond McCartan. She was asked about the reaction of the Unionists to the agreement, and she replied: the reaction has been much worse than I expected. One is trying to find out why. She did not say that the reaction has been "worse than I expected", but "much worse".

The Prime Minister said that she was trying to find out why. What does that mean? It means that the Prime Minister was told that the reaction of Unionists would be one of support, whereas it turned out to be one of hostility. The Prime Minister and the Cabinet had been misled and had not been properly advised. We can readily understand why that was. The Government of the Irish Republic had taken the SDLP into their confidence, but Her Majesty's Government had had no discussions with Unionists beforehand, although anyone with the slightest knowledge of Northern Ireland would not have had to have discussions with Unionist Members to know the views of the people of Northern Ireland.

The way in which the Anglo-Irish Agreement is viewed by the overwhelming majority of people in Northern Ireland in April 1990 is no more favourable than it was on 15 November 1985. There is a sense of disbelief that we could confer that place of special privilege on the Government of the Irish Republic, whose constitution still lays claim to Northern Ireland; a sense of disbelief that we should ask another Government to represent some of Her Majesty's subjects when those subjects have the right to elect their own Members.

Sir Michael McNair-Wilson (Newbury)

Does my hon. Friend agree that the fact that the Irish Government are enabled to represent the nationalist community in the north implies that Her Majesty's Government do not seem to feel able sufficiently to represent the interests of those citizens of the United Kingdom in a way that is fair and even-handed in relation to other United Kingdom citizens?

Mr. Gow

When dealing with any of the four countries that make up the United Kingdom, Her Majesty's Government have a duty to take account of the interests of all of the people in each of those four countries. For example, the Secretary of State for Scotland must ensure that, in the administration of Scotland, nationalists, socialists, liberals and those who, like myself, believe in the Union are all governed under a fair and just law. He must ensure that each citizen, whatever his or her political or religious beliefs, shall be treated in the same way under a just law.

It is the duty of Her Majesty's Ministers to safeguard and protect nationalists—and republicans—in Northern Ireland. I am wholly opposed at all times, and in all circumstances, to any discrimination in Northern Ireland on the ground that a citizen is a Roman Catholic, a nationalist or a republican. I shall make only one caveat: that nationalists in Northern Ireland, whom I acknowledge, honour and respect, must accept their responsibility to behave as responsible citizens, obeying the law at all times. That means doing their utmost to defeat terrorism. I agree with my hon. Friend the Member for Newbury (Sir M. McNair-Wilson) that the Government in every part of the kingdom must protect all their citizens, whatever their views, under a just law.

The Anglo-Irish Agreement did not get off to a happy start, because it was in two versions—the Irish text and the United Kingdom text. The Irish text did not refer to the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. That is not very surprising, in view of recent judgments from the Supreme Court, and in view of articles 2 and 3. It was not a happy start to a solemn treaty and agreement when the texts did not coincide.

I congratulate my hon. Friend the Under-Secretary on the robust reply that he gave to the previous debate initiated by my hon. Friend the Member for Londonderry, East (Mr. Ross). The words that fell from his lips were carefully fashioned—and were approved by my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State. His description of the judgments of the Supreme Court was "baffling and deplorable", and I agree entirely with that choice of words. However, my hon. Friend's efforts, and those of the Government, to secure much better—indeed, proper—extradition arrangements will be wished godspeed by every hon. Member. It is a terrible commentary on the evils of terrorism that on a supposedly friendly country, with whose Government we have entered into a treaty, should be conferred a special provision which means that that country above all others—a country that has suffered from terrorism—is now perceived, with justification, to be a safe haven for terrorists.

In the cases of Finucane and Clarke, we are referring not to suspected terrorists but to people who were convicted of grave terrorist crimes. During their escape from the Maze prison, further grave crimes were committed. My hon. Friend the Under-Secretary will accept that it is not impossible that those two, whose extradition was refused, will now engage in further terrorist activity, and that is greatly to be deplored.

No one who believes that the signing of the Anglo-Irish Agreement will fail to bring to the Province that peace, stability and reconciliation that we all want to see, and no one who is critical of the agreement, should criticise it without offering an alternative. Clearly the agreement can be changed or amended at any time with the consent of both parties. If my right hon. Friend the Minister of State makes an agreement with my hon. Friend the Member for Newbury, however solemn its terms—whether it is registered with the Comptroller of the Household, the United Nations, Mr. Delors or anyone who is now in fashion—it can be altered at the request of the two parties who made it.

I have submitted to my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister and to the then Foreign Secretary—now Lord President of the Council—the text of a revised Anglo-Irish Agreement. When my right hon. Friend the present Secretary of State for Northern Ireland arrived at Stormont or Hillsborough, he also was a beneficiary—I am not sure whether he regarded it in those terms—as I sent him the text of my alternative to the Anglo-Irish Agreement. That alternative could have been fashioned with the consent of the two contracting Governments. The revised agreement did not give the Republic the right to advance views and proposals about how one part of the kingdom was governed—or, as article 4 says, the right to put forward proposals on behalf of nationalists as to what form of devolution there should be. It envisaged something that had been fashioned earlier by the Conservative and Unionist party.

Shortly after my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister was elected leader of the Conservative party on 11 February 1975, she appointed as shadow Secretary of State her friend and mine Airey Neave, who held the post from February 1975 until he was assassinated in the precincts of this House on 30 March 1979. Just before he was assassinated, the shadow Cabinet had agreed—you, Madam Deputy Speaker, will not be surprised to learn that it had done so without much discussion—the Conservative party's policies for Northern Ireland. The manifesto stated: In the absence of devolved Government, we shall seek to set up a regional council or councils with widely devolved powers over local matters. I am still waiting for Ministers to implement the policy that had been fashioned by Airey Neave with the consent and concurrence of the leader of the Ulster Unionist party and, if I am allowed to say this without any presumption, with the concurrence of the hon. Member for Eastbourne.

We are still awaiting the implementation of that policy. The conclusion that Airey Neave had reached in his four years of stewardship as shadow Secretary of State was that the least dangerous and most hopeful way forward was to treat Northern Ireland as closely as possible to the way that we treat the rest of the United Kingdom. That did not mean identical treatment, because England, Wales and Scotland are governed differently, but it recognised the most important truth that the House can learn—that the most important factor in prolonging terrorism in Northern Ireland is uncertainty about the constitutional future of the Province. Ministers have not yet understood that truth.

The uncertainty about Ulster's constitutional future was not diminished but increased by the signing of the Anglo-Irish Agreement. The certainty about Ulster's constitutional future has not been increased by the two judgments in the Supreme Court in Dublin last month; it is the uncertainty that has been increased by those judgments.

It is perfectly possible, despite the commitment in article 4, for Ministers to confer modest additional powers on the 26 district councils in Northern Ireland. Dublin would not like us doing so, but we do not need its consent. Nothing prevents my right hon. Friend the Minister of State from trying to set up a regional council in Northern Ireland with some of the powers enjoyed by regional councils in Scotland and county councils in England and Wales. Nothing stops him bringing to an end the absurdity that we legislate for 1.5 million of the Queen's subjects in Northern Ireland by unamendable Order in Council, which we would not accept for our constituents.

Sometimes, the policy that I am advocating is described as integration. It could perfectly properly be described as administrative devolution. The time will come when Ministers realise that the surest protection for the minority and the greatest guarantee of stability in Northern Ireland is to adopt that policy, of which the late Airey Neave was the principal architect. The sooner we do so, the greater will be the prospect of peace, stability and reconciliation which all decent men want to see.

10.43 am
The Minister of State, Northern Ireland Office (Mr. John Cope)

I congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Eastbourne (Mr. Gow) on securing this debate and on the manner in which he has pursued and promoted his views on the subject since his resignation, which I much respected, from the Government. In diverging from my hon. Friend, as I will, he knows that I have every respect for his parliamentary and political manners. Once again, he clearly set out his views. I observed that he dwelt a little more on the past of the agreement. The debate was advertised as being about the future of the agreement, but I read from one to the other.

Mr. William Ross

Has it a future?

Mr. Cope

Perhaps that was the point that my hon. Friend was making.

It is my task to make it clear that the Government remain committed to the Anglo-Irish Agreement and to the principles that underline it and are embodied in it. The agreement was intended to address how the legitimate interests of the Irish Government in matters within Northern Ireland, particularly regarding the minority community, could be acknowledged without diluting United Kingdom sovereignty or the status of Northern Ireland as part of the United Kingdom. In his closing remarks, my hon. Friend the Member for Eastbourne demonstrated the sovereignty of Parliament and the Government's advice to it on various matters.

More important, article 1 of the agreement provides a formal acknowledgement by both Governments of the factual status of Northern Ireland as part of the United Kingdom; that that status would be changed only if and when a majority of the people of Northern Ireland wished it; and that if that should occur, both Governments would facilitate it. As my hon. Friend the Member for Peterborough (Dr. Mawhinney) said in the House on 14 March in replying to an Adjournment debate, that firm bedrock has not been shaken by the McGimpsey judgment.

The agreement provides a structure in which views and proposals can be put forward by the Irish Government, in particular in the absence of a devolved Government, and a framework in which the differences that inevitably arise between us from time to time can be resolved in a constructive and co-operative fashion, with the minimum, although not always with the absence, of acrimony. Such differences are inevitable and it is better to try to resolve them through such a framework.

I hope that all hon. Members will agree that a close relationship with the Irish Republic, as provided by the agreement, is an essential component of our efforts to ensure that terrorism does not succeed in Northern Ireland. This morning's earlier discussion on extradition emphasised that point.

The conference, supported by the secretariat, has provided the forum in which Ministers and senior officials on both sides can maintain close and frequent contact. That has inevitably given each side a greater awareness of the political and other realities against which the other side has to operate and has helped to reduce the risk of misunderstandings arising over particular incidents and has increased the possibility that problems will be resolved in a constructive and co-operative spirit. It has enabled each side to take decisions within its jurisdiction with greater knowledge and awareness of the likely impact on and reactions of the other side. That does not mean that we do not disagree with out Irish colleagues on some issues, but it does mean that we have a way of trying to resolve them.

The agreement has been, and continues to be, widely welcomed internationally, where it has been recognised as making a very positive contribution to addressing the fundamental problems of Northern Ireland.

My hon. Friend has criticised the agreement again today, because it treats Northern Ireland differently from the rest of the United Kingdom. However, we must recognise that, in Northern Ireland there are two distinct communities and that in that sense, it is not like any other part of the United Kingdom. The two communities have different aspirations, traditions and allegiances. There is, regrettably, as the House knows all too well, a history of animosity and conflict between them. The agreement provides a means of giving recognition to the identities of the two communities in a framework that ensures that the wishes of a majority shall prevail. Their wishes are, of course, that Northern Ireland should remain part of the United Kingdom.

Mr. William Ross

The Minister is now talking about the interests of the majority. Does he remember that, a moment ago, he was talking about the input of the Government of the Irish Republic? Will he, on behalf of the Government, now give the House an assurance that, on all future occasions when Ministers happen to be speaking to the Government of the Irish Republic, they will keep firmly in the forefront of their mind the fact that the Government of the Irish Republic have been instructed by their own Supreme Court that at every opportunity they must pursue the objective of a united Ireland and use whatever constitutional or other means are available at the time?

Mr. Cope

In seeking to balance the interests of the majority and those of the minority on different occasions, which it is our responsibility to do, we try to keep in mind all relevant considerations, including the views of the Irish Government and the factors that may have led them to present those views to us.

For the avoidance of doubt, I should just add that it is my wish also that Northern Ireland should remain a part of the United Kingdom. I hope that it does, but it is the wish of a majority of the people of Northern Ireland rather than my own wish which matters and should be paramount, as the agreement recognises.

In addition to enshrining the principle of consent as the basis for determining the future of Northern Ireland, the agreement has provided a valuable forum in which cross-border co-operation in security and other matters can be pursued. There is absolutely no doubt that close co-operation in security is essential to our efforts to defeat terrorism. Nor is there any doubt that there have been improvements since the signing of the agreement, and there is now a much more effective level of co-operation between the two police forces. However, there is no room for complacency and I do not say that all is perfect. There remains much work to be done at the political level to ensure that security co-operation is as effective as it can be. The advantage of the agreement is that it provides us with the mechanism through which the two Governments' shared interest in bringing terrorism to an end can be advanced.

The British Government have always made it clear, of course, that they do not regard the agreement as a panacea which provides the solution to all Northern Ireland's problems. Although, as I have said, it provides a valuable framework in which relations between the two Governments on Northern Ireland matters can be conducted, we do not regard it as immutable or as incapable of improvement.

Mr. David Winnick (Walsall, North)

Does the Minister agree that, apart from the co-operation between Ministers in the Irish Republic and in the United Kingdom, which I fully endorse, there is a strong case for continuing co-operation, now that it has started, between Members of Paliament in the Republic and those in this country? Like the hon. Member for Wirral, South (Mr. Porter), I participated in the first session of the new British parliamentary body. I look on that as a welcome initiative. Does the Minister agree?

Mr. Cope

It is a helpful development. A review of the working of the Anglo-Irish Conference—

Mr. James Kilfedder (North Down)

I appreciate that the Minister has a full speech there in justification of the Anglo-Irish Agreement. He has stated that the agreement has provided great benefits to the people of the United Kingdom—forgetting the Irish Republic at present. We had good relations with Dublin over security and there was a degree of co-operation. If anything, it has worsened since the signing of the agreement. Will the Minister now list the benefits that have accrued to the United Kingdom as a result of signing the agreement?

Mr. Cope

I have already given my opinion, which is that benefits have accrued in security co-operation, and I shall talk about some of the other ways in which I believe benefits have accrued and in which co-operation has improved.

A review of the working of the intergovernmental conference, as prescribed under article 11 of the agreement, was completed in May last year. The communiqué recording the outcome of that review and a document setting out developments that have taken place since the signing of the agreement are available in the Library of the House. The two Governments reaffirmed, in paragraph 27 of the review communiqué, the fundamental objectives of the agreement in promoting peace and stability in Northern Ireland, diminishing the divisions between the two traditions, creating a new climate of friendship and co-operation between them and improving co-operation in combating terrorism.

Mr. Barry Porter (Wirral, South)

Will my right hon. Friend give way?

Mr. Cope

No, as I have given way several times.

The two Governments concluded at that stage that the conference had proved its value and that no fundamental change was necessary in its role. They also agreed that if in future it were to appear that the objectives of the agreement could be more effectively served by changes in the scope and nature of the working of the conference, they would be ready in principle to consider such changes. That is relevant to one of the fundamental provisions of the agreement, article 4, to which hon. Members have already referred, which refers to the British Government's policy—which has the support of the Irish Government, too—that responsibility in respect of certain matters within the powers of the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland should be devolved within Northern Ireland on a basis that would secure widespread acceptance throughout the community.

It remains the Government's view that it is desirable for locally elected representatives in Northern Ireland to have a greater say in the decisions that affect the lives of the people of Northern Ireland.

Mr. Barry Porter

Will my right hon. Friend give way?

Mr. Cope

No, as I have given way several times.

In order for this to happen, it is essential for dialogue to take place between the Northern Ireland political parties and with the British Government. My right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland has, as the House knows, been having a series of meetings with Northern Ireland political leaders to explore what scope there is for making progress.

The judgment of the Irish Supreme Court in the McGimpsey case should not be allowed to block the path to political progress in Northern Ireland. We are offering talks on political progress without preconditions. Unionists may, therefore, legitimately seek change in articles 2 and 3 of the Irish constitution as part of their list of objectives to be achieved from any talks. I draw their attention to a speech made by an Irish Minister in the debate in the Irish Senate on the McGimpsey judgment, in which he did not say that the Irish would never change their constitution, but said that they did not want to change it in a vacuum and that they would be prepared to examine and review the articles in the context of new political arrangements that might emerge in these islands. Few would doubt that the amendment of articles 2 and 3 of that constitution would have a most important and positive effect on the atmosphere within Northern Ireland and on relations between the Republic and the United Kingdom.

There can be differing views about the form and extent of any devolution of powers, but there appears to be common recognition that devolution is the basis on which widespread acceptance is most likely to be achieved and that both sides of the community must play a proper role in any future institutions of government in Northern Ireland. The achievement of devolution on a basis that will secure widespread acceptance is a central part of the agenda set by the agreement. That does not mean devolution within the agreement, but it does mean that we look to the Irish Government to support our efforts to facilitate the process. As any political progress within Northern Ireland will have implications for relations with the Republic of Ireland, we have kept in close touch with the Irish Government about ways in which progress might be achieved. My right hon. Friend the Secretary of State expects to meet his Irish co-chairman of the conference again in the near future to continue that discussion.

The British Government hold fast to the view that a close and co-operative relationship with the Republic of Ireland is essential. For our part, we shall seek to sustain and develop the relationship. Equally, we shall seek to heal any damage to the relationship caused by external factors and to resolve disagreements between the two Governments in an amicable, if sometimes forthright, manner.

It being Eleven o'clock MR. SPEAKER interrupted the proceedings, pursuant to Resolution [16 March].