THE SECURITY SERVICE COMMISSIONER (Hansard, 17 January 1989)

HC Deb 17 January 1989 vol 145 cc281-92 281

§ Mr. Allason
I beg to move amendment No. 1, in page 3, line 5, leave out from 'appoint' to end of line 7 and insert 'two Commissioners for the purpose of this Act.'

The Second Deputy Chairman
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following amendments:
No. 60, in page 3, line 5, leave out 'a Commissioner' and insert 'an Inspector General'.
No. 2, in page 3, line 8, leave out 'Commissioner' and insert 'Commissioners'.
No. 68, in page 3, line 8, leave out 'Commissioner' and insert 'Inspector General'.
No. 3, in page 3, line 9, leave out 'his appointment and there shall be paid to him' and insert 'their appointment and there shall be paid to them'. Clause 4, page 3, line 11, leave out subsection (3) and insert— '(3) In addition to his functions under the subsequent provisions of this Act, the Inspector General shall be under a duty—
(a) to monitor the compliance by the Service with its operational policies;

(b) to review the operational activities of the Service; and

(c) to submit certificates pursuant to subsection (4A) below; and

(d) to keep under review applications made and warrants issued under section 3 and, in particular, the execution of such warrants'.
No. 4, page 3, line 11, leave out 'his' and insert 'their'.
No. 5, in page 3, line 12, leave out 'Commissioner' and insert 'Commissioners'.
No. 6, in page 3, line 13, leave out 'his' and insert 'their'.
No. 79, in page 3, line 13, leave out 'section 3 above' and insert 'this Act'.
No. 7, in page 3, line 16, leave out 'Commissioner' and insert 'Commissioners'.
No. 8, in page 3, line 16, leave out from 'as' to end of line 17 and insert 'they may require for the purpose of enabling them to discharge their functions'. No. 9, in page 3, line 18, leave out 'Commissioner' and insert 'Commissioners'.
No. 64, in page 3, line 18, leave out 'Commissioner' and insert 'Inspector General'.
No. 10, in page 3, line 19, leave out 'his' and insert 'their'.
No. 11, in page 3, line 19, leave out 'him on any matter relating to his' and insert 'them on any matter relating to their'. No. 13, in page 3, line 22, leave out 'Commissioner' and insert 'Commissioners'.
No. 65, in page 3, line 22, leave out 'Commissioner' and insert 'Inspector General'.
No. 14, in page 3, line 26, leave out 'Commissioner' and insert 'Commissioners'.
No. 70, in page 3, line 26, leave out 'Commissioner' and insert 'Inspector General'.
No. 15, in page 3, line 31, leave out 'Commissioner' and insert 'Commissioners'.
No. 71, in page 3, line 31, leave out 'Commissioner' and insert 'Inspector General'.
282 No. 16, in page 3, line 32, leave out 'Commissioner' and insert 'Commissioners'.
No. 72, in page 3, line 32, leave out 'Commissioner' and insert 'Inspector General'.
No. 17, in page 3, line 33, leave out 'his' and insert 'their'.
No. 18, in clause 5, page 3, line 39, leave out 'Commissioner shall have the functions conferred on him' and insert 'Commissioners shall have the functions conferred on them'. No. 19, in page 3, line 42, leave out 'Commissioner' and insert 'Commissioners'.
New Clause 1—Duty of Commissioners to attend meetings of Security Service Directorate— 'It shall be the duty of the Commissioners appointed under this Act to attend all meetings of the Security Service Directorate unless the Commissioners decide that the discharge of their functions does not require such attendance.'. New Clause 8—The Security Service Commission—

'(1) The Prime Minister shall appoint a Commission consisting of not more than three persons for the purpose of scrutinising the efficiency and effectiveness of the Security Service.

(2) Members of the Commission shall hold office in accordance with the terms of their appointment and there shall be paid to them by the Secretary of State such allowances as the Treasury may determine.

(3) It shall be the duty of every member of the Service to disclose or give to the Commission such documents or information as they may require for the purpose of enabling them to discharge their functions.

(4) The Commission shall make an annual report on the discharge of their functions to the Secretary of State and may at any time report to him on the discharge of their functions.

(5) The Secretary of State shall lay before each House of Parliament a copy of each annual report made by the Commissions under subsection (4) above together with a statement as to whether any matter has been excluded from that copy in pursuance of subsection (6) below.

(6) If it appears to the Secretary of State, after consultation with the Commission, that publication of any matter in a report would be prejudicial to the continued discharge of the functions of the Service the Secretary of State may exclude that matter for the copy of the report as laid before each House of Parliament.

(7) The Secretary of State may, after consultation with the Commission and with the approval of the Treasury as to numbers, provide the Commission with such staff as the Secretary of State thinks necessary for the discharge of its functions.
No. 20, in schedule 1, page 5, line 36, leave out 'Commissioner' and insert 'Commissioners'.
No. 21, in page 5, line 37, leave out 'he finds' and insert 'they find'.
No. 22, in page 5, line 38, leave out 'he' and insert 'they'.
No. 23, in page 5, line 41, leave out 'Commissioner' and insert 'Commissioners'.
No. 24, in page 5, line 41, leave out 'his conclusion on any complaint so far as referred to him' and insert 'their conclusion on any complaint so far as referred to them'. No. 25, in page 5, line 50, leave out 'Commissioner' and insert 'Commissioners'.
No. 26, in page 6, line 2, leave out 'Commissioner' and insert 'Commissioners'.
No. 27, in page 6, line 4, leave out 'Commissioner' and insert 'Commissioners'.
No. 28, in page 6, line 19, leave out 'Commissioner' has and insert 'Commissioners' have.
No. 29, in page 6, line 20, leave out 'he considers' and insert' they consider'.
283 No. 30, in page 6, line 21, leave out 'Commissioner considers' and insert Commissioners consider'.
No. 31, in page 6, line 23, leave out 'Commissioner' and insert 'Commissioners'.
No. 32, in page 6, line 28, leave out 'Commissioner' and insert 'Commissioners'.
No. 33, in page 6, line 37, leave out 'Commissioner' and insert 'Commissioners'.
No. 34, in page 6, line 38, leave out 'Commissioner may report any matter referred to him' and insert 'Commissioners may report any matter referred to them'. No. 35, in schedule 2, page 7, line 40, leave out 'Commissioner' and insert 'Commissioners'.
No. 36, in title, line 4, leave out 'a Commissioner' and insert 'Commissioners'.
No. 37, in title, line 6, leave out 'Commissioner' and insert 'Commissioners'.

§ Mr. Allason
I shall not detain the Committee long. I fear that the late hour has in considerable part been caused by the Minister's performance. I take no pleasure in saying that. The Bill and the amendments are about checks and balances. My hon. Friend has consistently pushed aside the initiatives that have been taken. He has pushed aside the Canadian precedent by talking about the so-called British experience. He was blithely dismissive of a series of constructive proposals and he has rubbished useful initiatives.
That is odd, bearing in mind that earlier my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State took a much more positive line and was helpful. Indeed, he conceded that there have been problems in the past with supervision and control of the Security Service which it would be incorrect to ignore.
Is there any matter of greater importance than the security of the nation? The amendments seek once again, probably in vain, to impose checks and balances. They seek to double the number of commissioners. Canada has no fewer than five members of the security and intelligence review committee. I am not going that far, but I urge the Government to consider two commissioners.
The Minister has persuaded Government Members this evening—I am as guilty as everybody else—to go through the Lobbies and authorise my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Environment and the Secretary of State for Energy to issue warrants to burgle homes. That is utterly bizarre. At the same time, he tells us that everything is safe in the hands of the Home Secretary.
Let me give a couple of examples of where the Minister's confidence appears to have gone a little adrift. He rubbished the suggestion made by my hon. Friend the Member for Aldridge-Brownhills (Mr. Shepherd) that there be a limit on the service of a director-general of 10 years. He said that it was unlikely to be longer than that. He clearly was not aware that the first director-general of the Security Service remained in that post for no fewer than 31 years.
There was an attempt last night to impose some kind of parliamentary oversight. That was rejected. So too was the proposal to have some kind of arrangement with Privy Councillors. Again, that was a reasonable attempt to share the burdens of the Secretary of State. That too was cast aside. We have now had a ridiculous performance over judicial warrants. The last Division took place because the 284 Minister, for reasons that are still not clear to me, seemed determined to give authority for burglary and telephone intercept warrants to Secretaries of State who have nothing to do with those responsibilities. Indeed, that was in clear contravention of the Interception of Communications Act 1985.
The amendments do not cast doubt on the commissioner's role. I seek to have two commissioners because experience tells us—I do not share my hon. Friend's confidence on the history of the Security Service—that when a single individual has overseen the role of the Security Service things have gone wrong. The examples are legion. I shall mention just three. There was the chairman of the Security Commission who was clearly misled over the Bettaney case; the chairman of the Vassall committee, going back years ago, and the evidence supplied by the Security Service; and the more notorious case of Lord Denning.
I promised to be brief, so I shall merely urge the Committee to consider doubling the number of commissioners to two to avoid the danger of a single individual being nobbled. Anybody with a knowledge of what has happened in the past will concede that that is a real danger.

12.15 am

§ Mr. Maclennan
This large group of amendments may be characterised as seeming to provide for the oversight of the security services in various aspects by means more secure than those set out in clause 4. I shall confine my remarks to two of the amendments, although I support strongly several others, especially new clause 8 and amendments Nos. 60, 68, 62, 7, 64, 65, 70, 71 and 72, which the hon. Member for Aldridge-Brownhills (Mr. Shepherd) may wish to address. I want to deal with amendments Nos. 62 and 79.
Amendment No. 62, again, is based on the Canadian experience. It proposes that the inspector general—the officer whose functions are, essentially, those of the commissioner as proposed in clause 4—will have a more wide-ranging duty of scrutiny and supervision than under clause 4. It is appropriate for a service costing about £100 million per annum that there should be such oversight of the service beyond consideration by the Secretary of State of warrant practices, which we have been considering in relation to clause 3. It is right to ensure by establishing such an officer—the Government contemplate that he should be of the highest judicial standing—that not only how the Secretary of State has discharged his duties under clause 3, but whether the service is conducting itself appropriately in accordance with the Bill is scrutinised. It is important for that officer to stand apart, to some extent, from the direction of the service, which will be the responsibility of the director-general at the apex of the service. It is clear that a Minister cannot effectively do the job. That case has been partially conceded by the Home Secretary in seeking to appoint a commissioner. Amendment No. 79 seeks to ensure that the inspector general shall keep under review the exercise by the Secretary of State of his powers not only under clause 3 but generally.
I accept that the provisions for warrants may constitute the single most important aspect of the functions of the Secretary of State under the Bill, but there are several other important functions of the Secretary of State which should 285 be subject to review. I draw attention to one provision in particular. Under the Bill it is open to the Secretary of State to specify the circumstances in which information held by the Security Service may or may not be released for consideration in determining whether a person should be employed. That very considerable power is exercised not under clause 3 but under clause 2. It seems to me that the power to intervene to affect employment opportunities—not only in respect of individuals, who would be entitled to make a complaint under the procedure set out in schedule 1, but in respect of the guidelines under which such information may be released—should be supervised by a commissioner as it has to be done in accordance with the provisions made by the Secretary of State.
The proposal represents a modest extension of the commissioner's powers. I can see no argument of principle or of practice against it. I hope that the Minister will therefore respond positively.

§ Mr. Aitken
In common with many of the amendments, new clause 8 returns to the question of oversight. Yesterday we had a long discussion about parliamentary oversight, which the Home Secretary rejected on the somewhat curious ground that Parliament could not be trusted. We also examined at some length the notion of a non-parliamentary, Canadian-type oversight, which the Home Secretary rejected on the somewhat curious ground that, although it worked well in Canada, it could not possibly work well in this country.
New clause 8 is a probing proposal, whose purpose is to find out whether any form of oversight would be acceptable to the Home Secretary—in particular a form of oversight that fulfils the three important criteria that he spelt out in the days when he was by no means hostile to the idea of oversight. On 3 December 1986, in response to a motion tabled by the right hon. Member for Plymouth, Devonport (Dr. Owen), the Home Secretary suggested that an oversight system might be acceptable if three tests were passed—the tests of preserving secrecy, of increased public confidence in the House, and of the need to avoid blunting and diminishing the clear responsibilities of the Prime Minister and the Home Secretary in monitoring the security services.
New clause 8 falls firmly within those parameters and meets all those criteria. It involves what might be called "professional oversight"—a group of genuine professionals who would have nothing to do with Parliament, politics or Privy Councillors and who could go behind the barrier of secrecy to give a vital dimension of continuity. Such continuity is most important in the light of the revelation by the right hon. Member for Morley and Leeds, South (Mr. Rees) that to his knowledge no incoming Government are allowed to examine the previous Government's monitoring of the security services. Such a group could monitor, above all, the effectiveness and efficiency of the Security Service. I cannot imagine a softer touch being applied to any organisation in terms of performance review and the monitoring of professional efficiency than is applied to the Security Service, which is simply monitored by the Home Secretary of the day who is arguably the busiest Minister in the Government.
The case for monitoring the efficiency and effectiveness of the Security Service stems from the famous case of Michael John Bettaney. That gentleman lives on in the folklore of the security services. Although he now languishes in Coldingley prison for his treachery, he will 286 surely one day have his statue in the hall of history and fame of world security services because he caused extraordinary changes in our own Security Service, without which the grave defects of the past would still undoubtedly be with us.
No novelist could have invented Michael John Bettaney and if any novelist had invented him, that novelist could not have written a plot in which Michael John Bettaney rose steadily to higher and higher posts of importance within our Security Service. He was an alcoholic, a misfit, a fantasist, a curious wild and way-out character, whose fatal weakness was alcohol in a big way. He used to be so drunk among his Security Service colleagues that he could not stand up. On one occasion, he even set fire to himself. He had two convictions for criminal dishonesty. At social occasions in the MI5 mess he used to say things such as, "Come and see me in my dacha when I retire". "I am sure the East Germans would look after me better." "I am working for the wrong side." Incidentally, those quotations were taken from the Security Commission's own report on the Bettaney case.
However, despite all those clues that something might be slightly wrong with Mr. Bettaney, he was steadily promoted, even though officials had gone to their superiors to mention such incidents. After that epic saga, Bettaney sent notes to the Soviet embassy, revealing the order of battle and all kinds of secrets. He took all sorts of documents home but the Soviet embassy could not believe that such a figure existed and completely ignored him, so no great damage was done by Mr. Bettaney.
Mr. Bettaney's story was finally told in the 1985 report of the Security Commission. From the Bettaney story it became perfectly obvious that the Security Service was in dramatic need of wholesale managerial reform. It must be stressed that none of this would have come to light had not the story that I have told come to a denouement with Mr. Bettaney sending letters to the Soviet embassy and, disappointed that there was no reply, finally knocking on the door of the Soviet embassy, thus getting caught.

§ Mr. Winnick
Is it not possible that MI5 was so busy at the time that it is understandable that that lapse took place? If MI5 was spending all its time—as the hon. Member for Torbay (Mr. Allason) told us earlier—trying to discover whether Lord Wilson was a Soviet agent, surely so many resources had to go into that that MI5 could not worry about other matters.

§ Mr. Aitken
The hon. Gentleman has a point below his humour because the same mentality and managerial efficiency that went into investigating the fantasies about Lord Wilson was the same kind of business efficiency that could not spot Michael Bettaney. There was a deep flaw in the whole of the Security Service. It is as well that the Committee recognises that successive Home Secretaries in charge of the monitoring of the efficiency of the Security Service had failed to notice that there was anything wrong, despite repeated assurances to the House from Home Office Ministers that they were monitoring the Security Service well.
The case that I am deploying has nothing to do with politics or Parliament. I am saying that there is a case for an ongoing business or managerial oversight of the security services by professionals within the barrier. On one occasion only the Security Commission was able to do that.
287 In my new clause I recommend that there should be three commissioners and that they should be, for example, a former senior officer in the armed services, an academic who has specialised in the study of Communism or terrorism, a trade union official, a senior civil servant or a diplomat. They should certainly not be former members of the intelligence community, but quite separate and independent from its history. It should be a genuine independent oversight body with a small staff working on a continuous but part-time basis.
The entire purpose of this is to ask such questions as arose out of the Bettaney case. For example, is the Security Service satisfied with the level of training and education? We know that Security Service officers are given training in what might be called trade craft and mechanics. On the Irish terrorism desk, however, there is some indication that there is little education in the true history and the politics of Ireland which would give the Security Service official the breadth of knowledge needed to grasp the dimensions of the problem.
Someone should look at the extraordinary turnover of directors-general of the Security Service—five in the past 10 years. There have been about four directors of the counter-espionage branch in the past 10 years. Someone should look closely, above all, at the management of personnel and resources. Those are the sort of performance review duties which need to be carried out on a permanent basis. I submit that the Home Secretary has not the time, the thoroughness or the continuity of approach to tackle those matters in the depth required.
I cannot understand why this country carries on being the only democracy in the English-speaking world which has no form of independent oversight, but simply says that we can trust one man—the Home Secretary of the day. He is assisted, no doubt, from time to time by the Prime Minister, but basically there is one Minister to do the job which the Security Commission did on one occasion in such a devastating way, but that was just a one-off ad hoc committee and we want something continuous.

§ Mr. Allason
My hon. Friend is right about the point that he made about the Bettaney Security Commission report, but it is worth reminding the House that the parts that have been quoted were the publicly available sections of the report, and that the Security Commission reported at that time that there was an equally large and more damning annex to that report that was never published.

§ Mr. Aitken
I am always getting nuggets of inside information from my hon. Friend which strenghthen my argument, and I am grateful to him.
A permanent monitoring body of the kind I am suggesting could have the advantage of being able to be permanently behind the secrecy barrier and, therefore, completely fall within the basic criteria set by the Home Secretary.
It has not been emphasised enough that in this strange world of the Security Service one of its most important roles is that of long haul counter-espionage. One must watch for years in this world and the monitoring in that area needs to be long on continuity and carried out on a long-term basis.
My hon. Friend the Member for Windsor and Maidenhead (Dr. Glyn) made a valuable intervention in 288 this debate. He reminded us that the world of intelligence was a jigsaw, which is a good word for it. Such a jigsaw can only be put together and watched by those whose lifespan of monitoring is far longer than that of a politician or Home Secretary, which is why some form of permanent oversight body, on a purely professional managerial level, is highly desirable.
I commend this proposition to the House in the great hope that the Minister will recognise that new clause 8 falls firmly into the category of acceptable oversight as outlined by his right hon. Friend the Home Secretary, and, if there were any justice in this world regarding amendments, it should be entirely acceptable.

§ Mr. Richard Shepherd
I want to support amendments Nos. 62, 64, 65 and consequential amendments Nos. 60, 68 and so on. The consequential amendments indicate the change from the term commissioner to inspector general. Essentially it is a cosmetic change, but it keeps the thread of continuity with the Canadian model.
The purpose of amendments Nos. 62, 64 and 65, which should have been debated with amendment No. 63 in the first group of amendments yesterday, is to provide the opportunity for reinforcing ministerial responsibility and therefore accountability. The inspector general's job is to act internally to monitor the issuance of warrants, and compliance with those warrants, to determine that the service has acted ethically, appropriately and in accordance with the law, and to report back to the responsible Minister. That mechanism in law ensures that there is one limb of oversight, primarily on behalf of Ministers, which makes a report. This is set out clearly in amendments, but to get a more coherent picture my hon. Friend should read the amendments in conjunction with amendment No. 63. The amendments deal with the internal means of monitoring.
The overall structure that we are seeking is ministerial responsibility to Parliament. Ministers will have an internal inspector general who monitors the issue of warrants and who reports on the conduct of the service and the pursuit of its objectives. That would ensure that the service conforms with the law, with propriety and with the instructions and directions from the political element of the management of the security service.
That is the basis of our actions. If the Government accepted those processes, they would be reinforced by an external oversight procedure, which would give the public confidence that it was not just an internal matter.

§ Mr. John Patten
The suggestions put forward in this interesting group of amendments fall into three categories. First, there is the idea of an inspector general, proposed by my hon. Friends the Members for Aldridge-Brownhills (Mr. Shepherd) and for Thanet, South (Mr. Aitken). Secondly, there is the idea of non-executive directors or commissioners proposed by my hon. Friend the Member for Torbay (Mr. Allason). I listened carefully to what my hon. Friend said at the beginning of his speech. When he reads the record of the debate in Hansard he will see that everyone's questions have been answered by Ministers. He may wish to reassess his remarks in the light of that. The third suggestion was the full scheme outlined in new clause 8 for up to three commissioners, proposed by my hon. Friend the Member for Thanet, South. All the amendments and new clauses illustrate the muddle and confusion that could arise when there are attempts to 289 distort and change the clear statutory nature and function of the Security Service commissioner proposed in the Bill into a mutant new person with a new set of powers or into a group of people with de facto unlimited and unclear powers.
Let us consider the widening of the oversight powers. Whether one is talking about an inspector general or two or three commissioners, my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary and I believe that the same impossible situation arises. In effect, the proposals give power without responsibility. That may not be the intention of those who have drawn up the amendments and new clauses, but they provide a recipe for intervention and muddle which could, on occasions, be dangerous and does nothing for those who want the director-general of the service and the Minister under whose authority he works to be accountable to Parliament. That accountability is already achieved by the clear structure set out in the Bill.
Wider functions of review and scrutiny can only usurp the responsibilities of Ministers and of the director-general. It is that belief which separates my right hon. Friend and myself from people like my hon. Friend the Member for Aldridge-Brownhills, who looks as though he is hovering to intervene and to whom I had better give way.

§ Mr. Richard Shepherd
The whole purpose of the amendments is to support the Minister. How can the Minister assure himself that the political objectives of the system are carried out in the way he wants by the service? If things are concealed from the responsible Minister, that is a matter of concern for the Minister and for the House. Things have been so concealed in the past. To assist Ministers in their responsibilities, we tried to construct a clear mandate for an official with the power to overlook the activities of the service. That was intended to support the Minister, not to muddy the waters. Our aim was to enable the Minister to assure the House that he was informed, that he understood what was happening in the service and that it was done in accordance with his requirements.

§ Mr. Patten
I appreciate the constructive way in which my hon. Friends put forward the amendment, but in a previous Adjournment debate I described the clear line of relations from the service to the director-general, from him to my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary, and in certain circumstances from the Home Secretary to the Prime Minister. Those relations are based on clear lines of responsibility and accountability, the commissioner always being at my right hon. Friend's elbow or looking over his shoulder. In practice, these matters cannot be reviewed effectively by someone who does not also carry the responsibility for what he reviews.

§ Mr. Shepherd
Before I came to the House I was a business man. I employed an accountant, who was responsible to me. He handled money and affairs close to the success, or otherwise, of the business. Fortunately, the law also requires that independent auditors come in to do the same accounting. That was helpful to me, as my knowledge of book-keeping might have been limited. The practice of everyday life is not inappropriate for the security services. The Government are in extraordinary awe of their security services. Such mystification should not exist. It is in all our interests that the security services 290 be made accountable, but Ministers are acting in a subservient way and claiming that everything is perfect as it is.
I have eschewed listing historical cases of the problems that have occurred, but we must remember experience elsewhere. Reform has been predicated on massive scandals in almost every civilised western democracy in which the security services have got out of control or not been kept on a leash. We want to avoid that happening here. The Government's deference is as much as to say that they cannot discuss these issues with the House—or introduce the rule of law—or, indeed, do anything at all because it would not be appropriate. Every time a route out is offered to Ministers—the Bettaney case has been mentioned, and there were many others before it—Ministers say that it is impossible.
Is the Minister in such awe of, or so subordinate to, the security services that he cannot weigh up the rule of law, common decency and appropriate action for the courts? Liberty and freedom must be balanced in any decision on how to control and review the service.

§ Mr. Patten
That was a long intervention, but I will do my best to reply to it.
I accept that my hon. Friend needed an accountancy service from outside for his business. He had his auditors. In the same way, my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary closely audits what goes on in the Security Service. He is responsible not for a successful business, such as that which my hon. Friend ran, but for a non-commercial organisation which deals with the security of the state. That is the difference which separates my hon. Friend the Member for Thanet, South (Mr. Aitken) and others from the Home Secretary and me. It is the divide that was between us in the earlier part of the debate when we discussed judicial intervention in the warrant-making process.
My hon. Friend the Member for Aldridge-Brownhills would like to see some functions reviewed in different ways by outsiders, and to that end he has put forward helpful amendments. In practice, these matters cannot be effectively reviewed by people who do not also carry the responsibilities for the matters that they would review. That is the issue of judgment that separates my hon. Friend the Member for Aldridge-Brownhills and me.
12.45 am
I can illustrate that by saying that the degree to which the amendments would require the overseer—if I may use that shorthand term—to become involved in the detailed operations and policy of the Security Service is startling. That would be an inevitable and unavoidable consequence of giving people free range over the activities of the whole service. The same argument applies when we look in detail at the role of the inspector general. I am now moving from ' the general to the three specific cases that have been put forward. Not much would be achieved by way of public assurance because the inspector general in his other guises would be responsible to Ministers for their work.
It seems impossible for annual reports to be published without dangerously breaching the security within which the service must operate. Each of the proposals suggests that that should happen. Such reports could not go into many, if any, of the wider review findings. The director-general would not be much helped in the discharge of his responsibilities by the appointment of an 291 inspector general. I know that my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for the Home Department would not be helped in the discharge of his responsibilities by such an appointment.
The idea of two non-executive directors or commissioners was put forward by my hon. Friend the Member for Torbay (Mr. Allason). He seems to think that two heads would be better than one and does not seem to think there is any special advantage in appointing senior judges to these positions. We do not think that this job would be best carried out by a two-man crew or perhaps even the three-man crew suggested by my hon. Friend the Member for Thanet, South. From the amendment drafted, I presume, by my hon. Friend the Member for Torbay, it is not clear whether the commissioners would jointly review every warrant decision by the Secretary of State and come to a collective view. If they disagreed, who would arbitrate and decide what was to happen?
We attach considerable importance to the need for the commissioner to have senior judicial experience for carrying out his adjudicating functions and grave responsibilities. New clause 8 certainly does not disbar the idea of senior judicial figures being appointed as commissioners. However, the sort of work that the Bill identifies for the commissioner should not be carried out by a wider commission. I and my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary think that these are matters for an independently minded judge of standing and authority drawn from the senior judicial bench and not matters for a committee.
The work of a commission of up to three people would be much wider than the work provided for in the Bill and would be a substantial change to the way in which the Bill is cast. For the reasons that I have given, the Government are clear that such a wider role is not necessary. My hon. Friend the Member for Thanet, South asked whether my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary would regard his scheme as providing acceptable oversight. It is clear from what my right hon. Friend said yesterday and earlier today that such a scheme does not fall into the category of acceptable oversight. Clearly, a substantial difference in principle and view divides my hon. Friends and me. I regret that, and I hope that they will not press their amendments.

§ Ms. Abbott
The Minister having rejected any form of parliamentary oversight, clause 4 offers a chance of securing administrative oversight. The idea of parliamentary scrutiny was not acceptable to the Minister because, he said, he could not trust Members. His argument against administrative scrutiny rests on the claim that all would be muddle and confusion.
I do not follow the Minister's logic. I see no difference between having a panel of commissioners under this legislation and the existing prisons inspectorate, which has oversight but which does not have political responsibility. Either the Minister has not read his brief properly or he is not acquainted with the structure of his Department.
I say that because there are many examples in the Home Office of groups of administrators exercising oversight without carrying responsibility of the type that we are discussing. That is no coincidence because of all the great offices of state, the case load, complexity and accident-proneness of the Home Office is the greatest.
292 It cannot sensibly be argued that the Home Secretary is in a position to exercise oversight without the assistance of some of the structures to which hon. Members have referred. We regret the Minister's failure seriously to address our arguments on administrative oversight. Instead, he has thrown up a smokescreen of bogus considerations. There is no reason why the structure that we propose should not work in practice. Will the hon. Gentleman at least explain why this structure would not work in principle?

§ Mr. Maclennan
The Minister rejected the various forms of oversight proposed in this long series of amendments by saying that they all provided for power without responsibility, and he thus swept them aside. But the commissioner whom he envisages establishing to conduct part of the job of oversight will, by the hon. Gentleman's definition, enjoy power without responsibility. Why does he seek to confine this oversight simply to his role in the issuing of warrants and the investigation of complaints?
Will the Minister now reply to my amendment No. 79, which would at least give the commissioner responsibility, not for supervising the entire Security Service, but for supervising the Minister's role under the measure? I drew attention to the Minister's powers to deprive people of employment on the ground that they had in some way been found unacceptable to the Security Service. Although the hour is late, we are dealing with matters of great importance. After all, we are having a very short debate on truncating the civil liberties of the people by a measure which empowers the Security Service to do what without the Bill would be illegal.
The Minister's attempts to answer the case put by his hon. Friends were perfunctory, but at least he tried to answer it. My amendment would enlarge in a modest way, without infringing any principle or practical consideration, the role of the high judicial officer, whom he and his right hon. Friend think it appropriate to supervise the issue of warrants. Why could not that officer supervise the conduct of the duties of the Secretary of State in respect of the provisions of the Bill generally?

§ Amendment negatived.

§ Clause 4 ordered to stand part of the Bill.