§ Mr. Malcolm BruceI beg to move amendment No. 173, in page 60, line 39, at end insert—
'((2)) (1) The Secretary of State shall lay before each House of Parliament additional directions for the purpose of—The amendment specifically relates to the issues of security and safety at nuclear installations following privatisation. That has been referred to in previous debates and is an important issue. The amendment addresses several specific points.
- (a) preserving the security of building or installations used for, or for purposes connected with, or arising from the generating of nuclear power;
- (b) mitigating the effects of any civil emergency that may occur as a result of the generation of nuclear power or any matters connected with or arising from the generation of nuclear power.
- (2) in setting the directions under ((2)) (1) above the Secretary of State shall consult with the relevant local
657 authority; with the corresponding health authority or board and with representatives of police, fire and ambulance services. - (3) "relevant local authority" in ((2)) (2) above means the local authority in whose area the building or installation is situated; the local authority through whose area radioactive material may be transported and the local authorities whose area is within 25 miles of the building or installation.
- (4) personnel provided for the security of a building or installation under this subsection to prevent terrorist or other attack shall be the responsibility of the the Secretary of State and shall not be provided by firms providing private security services whether employed by the licence holder or any other body or person.'.
The first part of the amendment is concerned with the security of buildings and installations associated with the generation of nuclear power. It then deals with mitigating the effects of an emergency. It provides for the co-ordination of an emergency plan with the relevant local emergency services and the notification of local authorities within a 25-mile radius of the building or installation. The final part deals with the security services associated with protecting nuclear installations against terrorist attack and requires that the provision of such security shall be the responsibility of the Secretary of State and shall not be sub-contracted to private security firms.
United Kingdom provision for the security of installations and for nuclear emergencies is not nationally co-ordinated or agreed, or well publicised. Nor does it compare favourably with nuclear installations in other countries. The requirement on nuclear power station operators is concerned only with on-site security and an evacuation planning distance of 3.5 km. Clearly, that does not take account of the possible implications of a significant fall-out of radioactivity. I have been advised that the evacuation distance is 16 km in the United States, 20 km in Finland, 10 km in Germany and between 12 and 15 km in Sweden. Only Mexico operates a smaller radius than we do, at 3 km, and the British Government should not be particularly proud of being marginally better than Mexico.
The main problem is caused by the lack of overall guidelines. It is left to each individual installation. There is no general understanding among the emergency or neighbouring authorities of exactly what is required. I am advised that Somerset county council has taken steps to ensure that there is a well-publicised plan for emergency evacuation of its nuclear installations and that it is available to the public. That is a desirable example which could usefully become the basis for the norm. It has happened only because the county council has initiated such a proposal and because it has managed to secure the voluntary co-operation of the authorities at Hinkley Point. To be fair, they get a good deal of criticism. The fact that they have co-operated is welcome.
The amendment seeks to make it a statutory requirement for this type of plan to be in operation in every circumstance and to make specific proposals for the involvement of the relevant authorities.
It should go without saying not only that there should be a plan, but the emergency services, which are likely to 658 be most immediately affected in the neighbourhood, should be consulted in the formulation of the plan and fully informed about what the plan is. The fact that that is not the case is a matter for considerable alarm and shows unjustified complacency. No matter how good we may feel the safety and performance record of British installations is, we cannot rule out human error and the fact that there could be an accident. Indeed, there have been sufficient minor incidents—fortunately, in most cases, minor—to make it clear that we must have much better provisions and contingency arrangements for preparing for the possibility of a major disaster.
I do not wish to detain the House longer than is necessary, because some of the arguments have been covered when discussing previous amendments. I believe, however, that the amendment is more specific than the previous ones and shows how we should deal with the problem.
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I make no secret of the fact that one reason why I have been a persistent and long-term critic of the nuclear power industry has been that, from the days of the previous Labour Government, it has been a requirement to provide armed police to guard nuclear power installations. That begins to bring into question civil liberties. Of course, I accept that those installations are targets for terrorism and need to be protected, but I believe that the House should consider how that protection will continue when the nuclear installations have been transferred to the private sector. That is not just idle speculation. A number of private security agencies are involved in the surveillance of people connected with or critical of the nuclear industry. It is a specific concern of mine that such a body as Zeus Security Consultants, now known as Securipol, could possibly be charged with actually carrying out the protection of those installations. If that were the case, it would effectively mean privatising not just a significant and important policing operation, but an armed policing operation. [Interruption.] The Government may want to privatise the police. However, I believe that we are in dangerous waters if we are suggesting that private nuclear power station operators should be free to contract with private security services to protect those installations. We could be faced with the possibility of a private company providing armed police and using security and surveillance methods that are more associated with counter-espionage than with normal policing operations.
It is no secret that this issue has been raised previously, but I do not apologise for mentioning it again. A couple of months ago my right hon. Friend the Member for Yeovil (Mr. Ashdown) and others tabled an early-day motion drawing attention to the involvement of Lord Chalfont in just one of those agencies. It remains the view of my right hon. Friend and my colleagues that being chairman of the Independent Broadcasting Authority is incompatible with being an active director of a company that carries out what I believe are rather unsavoury security and surveillance operations. Evidence—as recently as last week on Channel 4—has shown that the methods of operation of such companies are extremely dubious.
There have been a number of revelations in the House about our state security services and their failings, but the idea that we should be licensing and, indeed, providing a market for private organisations of this character to be able to develop and expand is unacceptable.
659 I hope that the Minister can assure us that the security of nuclear installations in the private sector will remain the responsibility of the Secretary of State. If any armed personnel are involved in the protection of those installations—which presumably will continue to be necessary, as that has been the case for at least the past 15 years—they should be employees of the state and not of any private organisation.
The amendment covers a number of different, although relevant and related matters. Do the Government propose to bring forward co-ordinated strategic plans for dealing with any emergency at a nuclear installation, dealing with appropriate evacuation procedures and informing the public and the relevant authorities, especially the emergency services and the local authorities?
If the Minister does not agree to the notification of a 25-mile radius, will he say what kind of evacuation radius the Government think appropriate and how far around it the relevant emergency services and authorities should be involved?
I am prepared to accept that the amendment is open to interpretation, but we need to know more than we have been able to discover so far from the Minister. We cannot simply allow the public to accept assurances from the industry—they will not accept them in any case—that we are much safer and better at operating nuclear power stations than are any of our competitors in any other countries and that we do not require further safety procedures. That is the current state of affairs.
Before the installations are transferred into the private sector we need a clearer statement on what the Government propose to do about emergency and evacuation procedures involving the relevant authorities. I hope the Minister can also give me an assurance that any armed security personnel involved at any nuclear installation will be directly accountable to the Secretary of State and through him to this House.
§ Mr. HardyMany of the security firms pay very poor wages and I am not suggesting that Lord Chalfont is subject to such wages. I have heard of people on £1.50 an hour—that is reason enough to suggest that Lord Chalfont is not included in that particular group. However, there are social dangers in giving people so little money. I am worried if such firms recruit people on a part-time, casual basis. It might be profitable for employers to leave us in a state of dependency on that sort of casual labour, but that is almost as questionable as some areas of the black economy that are causing concern. The Minister needs to give the House some assurances about that.
I know it is fashionable to talk about the modern bugging to which the hon. Member for Gordon (Mr. Bruce) referred a moment ago. Such bugging may provide massive profits for technologically advanced security firms. I am chiefly concerned about the people who will run the security of privatised nuclear power stations, perhaps for many years to come. For us to be dependent on such outfits gives us cause for concern and may well create a nasty taste in the mouth.
§ Mr. Michael SpicerThe nuclear installations inspectorate, through its licensing powers under the Nuclear Installations (Amendment) Act 1965, already requires that nuclear generators draw up emergency plans to deal with any nuclear accidents in full consultation with the relevant local authorities and emergency services.
660 The lack of formal responsibility on local authorities to produce emergency plans for nuclear installations of the kind that exist under the Control of Industrial Major Accidents Hazards Regulations for hazardous chemical sites has been noted by my Department. It has been decided to deal with this by making use of powers available to the Health and Safety Commission and by placing a legal requirement on local authorities to prepare the kind of integrated off-site plans for licensed nuclear sites for which the hon. Gentleman has properly called.
The House may like to note that the intention is to go beyond the normal requirements for reference accidents. which is the basis for the existing CIMAH regulations. In the case of nuclear sites, the off-site plans will be required to address the availability of contingency plans to provide for a capability to deal with nuclear accidents which have more widespread effects than the detailed site and off-site plans are designed to cater for. I hope that the hon. Gentleman will be reassured on that point, to which his amendment is appropriately addressed. Legislative help is on the way regarding the integration of plans.
The power proposed in paragraph (IA) of the amendment is already covered by clause 89(1)(a) which enables the Secretary of State to give directions about the security of nuclear power stations. That is a recurring theme of my response to the hon. Member for Gordon (Mr. Bruce). However, it would be quite inappropriate for the Secretary of State to undertake wide consultations on matters involving counter-terrorist measures because it would be impossible to preserve the confidentiality of the proposed measures. For that reason, the Secretary of State will have the discretion not to lay directions before Parliament if that would be against the interests of national security. The hon. Member for Gordon conceded the vital importance of preserving power stations from any potential attack by terrorists.
I shall turn to the point made by the hon. Member for Gordon—addressed by the hon. Member for Wentworth (Mr. Hardy)—that in his view, and this was mentioned in the amendment, there should be no role for private security companies. We cannot accept that. Security matters are the responsibility of those running the power stations, with the proviso that the Secretary of State has the capability to make directions. That fall-back exists throughout the clause; in fact the purpose of the clause is to give him ultimate responsibility to make directions. We do not see why it should not be possible for those with responsibility for security of power stations to use private security contractors should they wish to do so.
The hon. Member for Wentworth mentioned low wages. The headquarters of one of the largest security companies in the country—Group 4 Total Security—is in my constituency. Therefore, I am aware of the industry's structure, benefits and problems. However, I cannot give the assurances about low levels within the industry which he seemed to seek. Those are a matter for negotiation between the companies and their employees. However, I agree that it is extremely important to maintain the highest standards within those companies, particularly when vetting personnel.
§ Mr. HardyDoes not the Minister recognise that if a security company seeks to behave responsibly, pay reasonable wages, vet and insure its employees properly and do all that a model employer should, it is likely to be outbid by a firm that sticks up notices—of the sort that I 661 have seen in jobcentres—offering part-time employment for wretchedly low wages, has no capacity for the proper supervision of its workers, and does nothing more than bank its own large profits?
§ Mr. SpicerIf that is the case, such companies would be extremely short sighted, because they will put the security of their businesses at risk by employing cowboy operators of the kind suggested by the hon. Member for Wentworth (Mr. Hardy). Therefore, it is sensible for anyone employing contractors for security to ensure they employ those of the highest quality. No doubt, as a result, they will pay them properly for their services.
I concede the point made by the hon. Member for Wentworth that it is extremely important that companies should operate properly. However, we do not want to pass legislation to prevent nuclear power operators from using private contractors should they wish to do so. However, I stress the proviso that the Secretary of State retains—through the operations of the clause—powers of direction and therefore of ultimate responsibility for security.
On the basis of that explanation, I hope that the hon. Member for Gordon will withdraw the amendment.
§ Mr. Malcolm BruceI am still worried about the Minister's failure to reply to one or two points. Those who are involved with or concerned about the safety of nuclear installations—local authorities, for example—are less than happy about the lack of a clear agreed national guideline, and they are still pressing the Department for one. I can genuinely understand—although I do not share this view —that the Government may believe that negotiating with the local authorities and emergency services and notifying the public who live near nuclear installations about evacuation and emergency procedures might create alarm. Against that, however, too many people who live near the installations have no idea of what they are supposed to do in an emergency and no chance of finding out if there is one. Given that a major disaster occurred a few years ago —admittedly, and for this we are grateful, not in this country—I believe that the public would prefer the Government to be more honest and to encourage more discussion of this matter. They would regard it as a greater reassurance——
§ Mr. Michael SpicerThe hon. Gentleman is right to pull me up for not answering the point about the 3 km evacuation areas. That distance is not a hard and fast standard. The authorities frequently engage in much wider areas for evacuation exercises. I have taken part in an exercise that covered a much wider area. I can offer the hon. Gentleman that assurance.
§ Mr. BruceI am grateful for that assurance. Although I specifically referred to the involvement of local services in an area up to 25 miles away, that is not the point at issue. I accept that there may be reasons for variations in all sorts of circumstances. The lack of a national agreed scheme, however, gives rise to concern. Each installation must make its own plans; those plans are variable, and I am less and less convinced from the evidence made available to me that they are all good and that local authorities and the people living in these areas are adequately informed and involved in the planning process.
662 I do not want to tempt providence, but if there were a serious accident in a British nuclear installation, the Government would be found wanting for not having ensured that enough information was given to the public who live in these areas.
The final point to which the Minister did not respond was my request for an assurance that any armed surveillance that might be required in these installations would be carried out by personnel who were accountable to the Secretary of State. Personal preferences apart, I can accept a legitimate role for private security companies in the security of nuclear installations, but I cannot readily accept the deployment of armed personnel who work in the private sector. It is most unfortunate that the Minister could not give me the assurance that I sought.
I cannot claim to be particularly happy with the Minister's response. If he cannot give me any firmer assurances, I shall withdraw the amendment, but only on the understanding that the issue will be raised again in another place——
§ Mr. Michael SpicerI understand—if I am wrong, I shall publicly correct myself—that at present only the Atomic Energy Authority police in nuclear installations have the right to carry arms. That right was given them by legislation and will not apply to private companies.
§ Mr. BruceThat was a helpful intervention and I shall not pursue the point further. I have made my point forcefully and clearly. I still believe that the Government should do more, and this matter will come up again in another place. In the meantime, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
§ Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.